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INTRODUCTION

If we are successful in changing the economic attitude of the population b y psychological
means, then these psychological changes will themselves become an economic reality, and
so serve the same purposes as other measures of economic policy taken so far.
Ludwig Erhard, 19 October 19551
Die Geschichte der Bundesrepublik ist vor allem ihre Wirtschaftsgeschichte. (The history of the
Federal Republic is above all its economic history.) 
Werner Abelshauser2
In the aftermath of the Second World War, Germany appeared destined to be a
pauper among European nations. Its cities, factories, and transpor tation system
had suffered massive damage during the war. It had lost its so vereignty and was
subject to the r ule of the four occupying po wers of the U nited States, Great
Britain, France, and the Soviet Union who were not keen on r ebuilding the in-
dustrial might of a defeated Germany. During the immediate postwar years many
Germans scraped to get by, enduring dreadful housing and relying on the black
market to supplement the sustenance provided by their ration cards. But begin-
ning with the 20 June 1948 currency reform, in which the new Deutsche Mark
(DM) replaced the worthless Reichsmark (RM) in the three western zones of oc-
cupation, consumer goods seemed to appear magically fr om nowhere in shop
windows. Subsequently, West Germany experienced fantastic economic gr owth
through the 1960s in what has been called the Wirtschaftswunder (economic mir-
acle). With rising demand for goods spurr ed on by the Korean War, West Ger-
many saw its GNP increase by 67 percent in real terms between 1948 and 1952.
From 1952 to 1958 the West German GNP continued to expand at a yearly rate
of 7.6 percent in real terms and at a still r obust rate of about 5 per cent into the
1960s, a figure in line with the average growth of other European nations.3 Work-
ers’ wages increased by 79 percent in real terms between 1949 and 1959. 4 West
Notes for this section begin on page 21.
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Germany literally rose from the ashes as its cities and factories w ere rebuilt, ex-
ports soared, and the West Germans’ standard of living improved. 
Politicians, economists, and historians have inextricably linked the story of West
Germany’s economic reconstruction to the nation’s economic system, the Soziale
Marktwirtschaft (social market economy). Emerging out of the ideas of neoliberal
economists from the first half of the tw entieth century, the social mar ket econ-
omy forged a “middle way” between pure laissez-faire capitalism and the collec-
tivist planned economy. The system sought to free up economic controls, such as
price or wage controls, and allow the individual pursuit of self-inter est and self-
determination within the competition of the fr ee market. At the same time, the
government would regulate the market by establishing the “rules of the game” in
order to curb monopolies and car tels and av oid the concentration of ex cessive
economic power in the hands of a fe w. By containing the power of large capital
to set prices unfairly , the system incr eased the po wer of individual consumers
within the economy. But this economic theory had to be implemented within the
harsh realities of the political world. It had to be transformed into an effective po-
litical tool. Leaders of the conser vative Christian D emocratic Union/Christian
Social Union (CDU/CSU), most notably Konrad Adenauer, recognized the po-
litical usefulness of such a pr ogram and in the late 1940s pushed their par ty to
adopt the social market economy as the basis of the party’s economic platform. In
addition, the supporters of the social market economy from a more academic and
commercial background, such as Ludwig Erhard, the Federal Republic’s economics
minister in the 1950s, attributed West Germany’s economic resurgence, charac-
terized by the rise in productivity, exports, wages, and living standards, to the intro-
duction of the economic system they espoused.5 The social market economy was
transformed from an economic theory, or even abstract economic policy, into the
basis of a political party’s propaganda and public image—and, in part because of
the CDU/CSU’s efforts, into an important element in the West German identity. 
Erhard, Adenauer, and the CDU/CSU identified the start of the social market
economy with the June 1948 introduction of the Deutsche Mark throughout the
three western zones of Germany and West Berlin and the simultaneous lifting of
economic controls in the so-called B izone of the American and B ritish zones of
occupation. Almost immediately after its implementation, the curr ency reform
achieved mythical status among West Germans, who tell stories of food and goods
appearing almost magically within shop windows as the new hard currency ended
hoarding and the black market ceased to be the center of daily commerce for West
Germans. Many obser vers have likened West Germany’s reconstruction in the
1950s to a “phoenix rising out of the ashes” after its nearly total destruction. Some
elevate the Federal Republic’s economic miracle to legendary status; their hero is
Ludwig Erhard.6 Revered as the father of the economic miracle, E rhard boldly
predicted in the darkest hours of West Germany’s economic despair that the na-
tion would recover. Always pictured in newspapers and magazines with his self-
assured smile and a cigar in his mouth, E rhard became a hugely popular icon
within West Germany. He would often proclaim that West Germany’s economic
2 |   Selling the Economic Miracle
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success was, in fact, no miracle, but the pr oduct of sound policies and the West
German hard work and spirit. Even today, more than fifty years later, politicians
from all parties have invoked Erhard’s legacy as the panacea for the challenges the
Federal Republic faces in integrating the former East G ermany into the western
economy.7
Some historians and social scientists have argued that economic reconstruction
and the ensuing gr owth of consumerism offer ed West Germans citizens during
the 1950s and 1960s an escape fr om their N azi past. The challenge of dealing
with the moral burden of Germany’s past faded from people’s minds as they set-
tled into the material comfor t of the F ederal Republic.8 Economics, to a large 
extent, became the basis for a new West German identity. No wonder that in a na-
tion forged in part out of the economic necessity to rebuild the western zones of
occupation, its citizens identified with the economic benefits of the F ederal Re-
public of Germany rather than with any political institutions or traditions. Reveal-
ingly, West Germany’s constitution, the Grundgesetz (Basic Law), was completely
unknown to 51 percent of respondents of a 1956 public opinion survey.9 During
the 1950s more West Germans took greater pride in their nation’s economic ac-
complishments than its government or political institutions. According to a sur-
vey from the late 1950s, 33 percent of West Germans touted economic success as
a source of pride for their nation, while only 7 percent cited their government or
political institutions.10 For many West Germans the June 1948 currency reform
had a much greater impact on their lives than the establishment of the Basic Law
in May 1949.11
Looking back at the economic miracle years many fail to recognize that the ac-
ceptance and full introduction of the social market economy was by no means en-
sured. The Social Democratic Party (SPD) continually attacked E rhard and the
CDU/CSU on grounds that their economic policy did not adequately take social
concerns into account and allowed the old powers of monopolistic capitalism to
reestablish their positions of power. In addition, the strain of an unfavorable bal-
ance of payments for West Germany during the K orean War led to what some
economic historians have characterized as the reintroduction of a corporatist eco-
nomic system that fatally undermined a competitive market in West Germany.12
Meanwhile, throughout the 1950s E rhard engaged in an ongoing battle with
heavy industry regarding the introduction of legislation limiting monopolies and
cartels, which culminated in a relatively watered-down piece of anticartel legisla-
tion in 1957. Also in early 1957 the intr oduction of a “dynamic” pension signi-
fied the start of what could be seen as the West German welfare state—a concept
abhorred by Erhard.13 Furthermore, and most germane to this study, many West
Germans were reticent during the 1950s to accept the fr ee market and the ideas
of the social market economy, particularly with the economic strain caused by the
Korean Crisis.14 Many parts of West German society, especially among the work-
ing class, regarded the reality of the economic miracle as not corresponding to its
image. Consumption did not reach the heights that later public perception imag-
ined. Goods such as the r efrigerator that have come to symboliz e a subsequent
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perception of the economic miracle were during the first half of the 1950s avail-
able only to a limited number of people. For much of the immediate postwar pe-
riod, West Germans struggled to meet basic needs; then, when r econstruction
commenced by 1948/49, they continued to hav e a difficult time making ends
meet in face of rising prices and the need to replace shelter and durable goods lost
in the war. Not until the second half of the 1950s can one perceive a fully emer-
gent consumer society in West Germany. Even then, many pensioners and single
women “standing alone” were yet to experience the impact of West Germany’s
economic resurgence.15
Visions of the 1950s and its economic miracle hav e maintained a po werful
grip on the West Germans’ and later Germans’ sense of themselves and their na-
tion. Subsequent views of the period hav e ranged fr om those of 1960s student
protesters attacking what they saw as the restoration of old political and economic
elites ensconced within the material self-satisfaction of the masses to the emer-
gence in the 1970s of nostalgia for a period associated with a flood of consumer
goods such as washing machines, the Volkswagen Beetle, blue jeans, and E lvis
records.16 If the popular media and museums are any indication, this view of the
1950s continues to predominate today.17 However, even during the 1950s them-
selves, the meaning of economic r econstruction and the social mar ket economy
was heavily contested within the political realm. The image of West Germany as
the “Wirtschaftswunderland” did not emerge naturally fr om the public ’s senti-
ment, but instead had to be constructed and disseminated. The mass media, ad-
vertisers, and ev en government-supported trade fairs helped cr eate the public
perception of the economic miracle.18
Political parties also took an active role in shaping West Germans’ views of eco-
nomic developments. Through an examination of election campaign propaganda
and various public relations campaigns, this work explores how the CDU/CSU
and conservative economic gr oups successfully constr ucted and sold a political
meaning of the social market economy and the economic miracle. This creation
of a political meaning and significance of economics contributed to conservative
electoral success, constructed a new faith in market economics and what might be
called economic citiz enship by West Germans, and provided legitimacy for the
new Federal Republic Germany itself. Clearly, the CDU/CSU and business or-
ganizations understood that har d, empirical economic statistics alone w ere not
enough to move the citizenry, but that these economic realties must be attached
to deeper political and cultural meanings—a lesson the riv al SPD did not fully
fathom. Overall, the task of selling the economic miracle was an impor tant ele-
ment in the establishment of the Federal Republic’s stable democracy during the
1950s. Indeed, the transformation of West Germany’s economy was paralleled by
the emergence of a ne w political culture out of the r ubble of the Nazi past and 
Allied occupation. This study seeks to illuminate the dev elopment of new elec-
toral practices, centered on “selling” the economic miracle, that contributed to a
strong par ty system r esistant to the fracturing and w eakness that doomed the
Weimar Republic. 
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Although West Germany’s economic resurgence since the Second World War
has been a fundamental theme of its history, until relatively recently investigation
of the social and cultural implications of economic reconstruction was curiously
absent. Through the 1980s, much of the historiography of West Germany was
dominated by political and diplomatic history that traced the creation of the Fed-
eral Republic’s political institutions and its geopolitical position within the Cold
War.19 In conjunction with a mor e traditional political appr oach to the Federal
Republic’s history, historians, economists, and political scientists hav e fully ex-
plored the course of West Germany’s rapid economic r econstruction.20 These
works have focused on such issues as the dev elopment of E rhard’s economic
ideas,21 the implementation of the social market economy in the political arena,22
and the postwar transformation of the West German political economy.23 Eco-
nomic historians particularly pursued the question of whether the social mar ket
economy truly reshaped prewar economic and social str uctures or merely repre-
sented the r estoration of older capitalist practices. 24 In the 1970s and 1980s
Werner Abelshauser built on the r estoration paradigm by denying that the eco-
nomic miracle of the 1950s was initiated by Erhard and the social market econ-
omy, or even by the influx of Marshall Plan money. Rather, he argued, after West
Germany experienced a vigorous reconstruction period in the immediate postwar
years, the nation fell into longer-term patterns of economic development dating
from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.25 Others have pointed to
the importance of the international trading system, cr eated in large par t by the
United States, as an essential component in West Germany’s economic r esur-
gence.26 Most recently, more balanced accounts by historians such as A.J. Nicholls
and James Van Hook have weighed the relative impact of domestic policies sup-
ported by Erhard and encapsulated in the concept of the social market economy
versus the impor tance of historical and international economic patterns deter-
mining West Germany’s economic gr owth. This approach is, undoubtedly, the
most judicious approach to complex, interconnected issues. These recent works
strongly counter the r estoration paradigm by portraying Erhard in a mostly fa-
vorable light and contending that E rhard and his ideas represented a new strain
in German economic thought. More importantly in these works, they underscore
the relatively wide political space that West Germans possessed by 1948 in order
to develop economic policy, albeit within an international context.27
To be sure, West Germany’s economic history has been deeply researched, in
terms of both tracing the countr y’s economic growth and exploring its political
economy. But academic discussions of economic systems and their impact reflect
only one aspect of the significance of West Germany’s economic reconstruction.
Relatively untouched is a full exploration of the domestic political implication of
its economic resurgence. Justifiably, almost all historians attribute a large portion
of the CDU/CSU’s electoral success in the 1950s to West Germany’s economic
success. But almost none of them inv estigate systematically and in depth ho w
contemporary economic and political groups capitalized on West Germany’s eco-
nomic resurgence in elections. I n other words, what meaning did political and
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economic entities, including political par ties, business associations, and official
governmental organizations, attribute to the social mar ket economy and the so-
called economic miracle? 
Recent scholarship has shed light on the cultural and social dimensions of pol-
itics in the era of the economic miracle. Much of this work seeks to transform and
expand the concept of political cultur e by shifting focus fr om the mechanics of
institutional political life to ways the creation of new political identities and con-
sciousness shaped national politics. I t was most dir ectly through elections that
these nascent identities influenced politics at the national lev el. In other words,
these recent works highlight the interaction between the “politics of daily life” and
formal, parliamentary politics—thereby demonstrating the interconnections be-
tween political, economic, social, and cultural history.28 My work builds and ex-
pands upon such a fruitful reconceptualization of political culture. But instead of
exclusively examining those cultural contexts outside of formal politics, it explores
how political and national identities w ere molded and manipulated b y the very
political associations seeking to benefit from these newly formed identities. More
specifically, during the 1950s, West German political and national identities were
deliberately formed and shaped by the West German political leaders themselves.
This was particularly salient for the CDU/CSU since as a new party, albeit one with
roots in the Weimar-era Catholic Center Party, it had to create new constituen-
cies and new political practices in the F ederal Republic. In contrast, as a pr evi-
ously established party, the SPD looked to old approaches and leadership harking
back to pre–Third Reich days. 
Led by Konrad Adenauer, a former mayor of Cologne, a founder of the CDU
in the B ritish zone of occupation, and the futur e first chancellor of West Ger-
many, the CDU/CSU expanded its shar e of the v ote in each of the successiv e
Bundestag (parliamentary) elections in 1949, 1953, and 1957. Economic recon-
struction and economic policy embodied b y Erhard along with the persona of
Adenauer as a str ong, steady leader w ere cr ucial elements in cr eating the
CDU/CSU’s image over the course of the 1950s. Before the first Bundestag elec-
tion in 1949, the CDU/CSU adopted the social market economy as its economic
program and primary focus of its electoral campaigning. In large part, Adenauer
supported the policy so that the CDU/CSU would not only integrate disparate
elements within the par ty organization, but also win wider appeal at the ballot
box, thereby branching out fr om its cor e following of Catholics whose lo yalty
stemmed from the Weimar traditions of the Catholic Center P arty. The par ty
could now appeal to other sociological gr oups, including some P rotestants and
pro–free market interests that might otherwise be attracted to a liberal or nation-
alist party. In addition, the adoption of such a policy would hinder a coalition 
between the CDU/CSU and the SPD, on both the federal and state levels, since
the SPD was still calling for socializ ed planning of the economy in 1948/49. As
the 1950s progressed and the West German economy expanded, the CDU/CSU
learned how to sell Erhard and the party as bearers of the economic miracle. Eco-
nomics became central to the CDU/CSU’s image as the party, and its economics
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minister, Ludwig Erhard, came to personify the social mar ket economy and the
economic miracle. In part because of the CDU/CSU’s electoral success, the SPD
was pushed along its path of abandoning its Marxist doctrine in the Bad Godes-
berg Program of 1959. 
Bourgeois parties other than the CDU/CSU proved unable to capitalize upon
the economic miracle in elections and garner br oad support. They thereby de-
clined in importance relative to the CDU/CSU. I n contrast to the CDU/CSU,
the smaller splinter parties tended to be one-issue or r egional parties. For exam-
ple, the conser vative Deutsche Partei (German Party, DP) was based pr edomi-
nately in Lower Saxony and became associated with middle-class conser vatism.
Outside of Lower Saxony and limited areas of northern Hesse, the party possessed
little national appeal. The bourgeois Gesamtdeutscher Block/Bund der Heimat-
vertriebenen und E ntrechteten (All-German B lock/League of E xpellees and
Those Deprived of Their Rights, GB/BHE) was limited to the single issue of 
defending the rights of the expellees fr om Germany’s lost lands to the east. The
liberal Free Democratic Party (FDP) was splintered into various factions, mostly
between democratic and national liberals, which kept it fr om developing an ef-
fective national identity in the 1950s. Ov erall, the CDU/CSU was perhaps the
only bourgeois par ty capable of crafting a self image that held br oad appeal. In
large part, the CDU/CSU’s economic propaganda played a crucial part in attract-
ing the party’s broad-based support because the issue could be placed in myriad
contexts—thereby generating a variety of political meanings.29
The word “propaganda” is often used synonymously with “lies,” “deceit,” and
“distortion” (or at least as the antithesis of the “ truth”) generated by one side on
an issue. Yet propaganda is also a communicative process. According to one good
working definition, “Propaganda is the deliberate and systematic attempt to shape
perceptions, manipulate cognition, and direct behavior to achieve a response that
furthers the desired intent of the pr opagandist.”30 It functions as a form of per-
suasion. But propaganda not only seeks to mold opinions; it also reflects the ex-
pectations, assumptions, desir es, and fears of not only those who constr uct the
propaganda but also society as a whole. The symbols and messages transmitted in
propaganda serve as landmarks reflecting shifts in public perception of the world.
Those cr eating effectiv e propaganda attempt to shape messages that r esonate
within the public imagination. In this manner, propaganda both forms a society’s
views and is a product of that society’s norms and expectations. An examination
of the economic pr opaganda of the 1950s r eveals the changing parameters of
what was possible within political discourse regarding not just economics in par-
ticular, but also cultural politics in general. Propaganda on economics illustrates
the developing political consciousness of West Germans and their thoughts r e-
garding the new democracy, the more open, less class-based society, and the in-
creasingly consumerist cultur e cr eated after the Third Reich. This political
campaign material functions particularly well as a mirror of developing West Ger-
man perceptions of the Nazi past, the ever present communist alternative of East
Germany, and the growing influence of America and mass culture.31
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As Heidrun Abromeit demonstrated over thirty years ago in Das Politische in
der Werbung: Wahlwerbung und Wirtschaftswerbung in der Bundesrepublik, West
German election campaigns were not based upon programs and policy statements
but revolved around the sale of political slogans and images as though they were
goods. Over the course of the 1960s, so Abromeit argued, the Federal Republic’s
election campaigns became ever more geared toward projecting a party image, as
opposed to making any factual appeal to the electorate.32 In fact, Abromeit iden-
tified a dynamic that had alr eady emerged in the early y ears of the F ederal Re-
public, if not during the occupation period. The CDU/CSU outclassed it rivals
in conceptualizing a par ty image for itself ev en before the first B undestag elec-
tions. With the reemergence of a democratic political life after the defeat of the
Third Reich, Adenauer quickly realized that his party had to accept a free market
economic system in order to differentiate itself from the Social Democrats and to
attract voters beyond the CDU/CSU’ s traditional Catholic base. The CDU/
CSU’s electoral successes relied in part on the party’s skill in shaping a coher ent
vision of economic r econstruction and West German identity. Throughout his
tenure as chancellor, Adenauer excelled in managing public per ception and his
party’s image, a fundamental component of modern party politics. 
As the 1950s pr ogressed, the CDU/CSU pr oved particularly adept at incor-
porating new campaigning techniques into its electoral repertoire in order to sell
itself as the party of the economic miracle. The CDU/CSU’s approach to electoral
politics represented the creation of a more “Americanized” political culture in the
sense that campaigns became less overtly ideological and increasingly based on a
party’s image or par ticular issues, and also because the CDU/CSU borr owed
many electioneering techniques from the United States. Especially important was
the use of public opinion polling to take the pulse of the nation, as well as to help
devise political campaigns so that public opinion could be best exploited. In ad-
dition, by the 1957 election, the CDU/CSU was beginning to emplo y profes-
sional advertising agents to shape political campaigns and cr eate a par ty image
and identity that resonated within West German society. This change in the West
German political culture entailed what could be called the “consumerization” of
politics in the sense that CDU/CSU leaders and their advisers incr easingly con-
ceived of politics as the selling of a brand-name good imprinted with the identity
of the producer, above any pretense of convincing the electorate of the merits of
a rigid ideological program. Campaign advertisements were tested and modified
to make sure that they appealed to the v oters’ tastes and predilections. The goal
was to capture the widest market possible by securing the support of the par ty’s
core following while reaching out to v arious social classes and r eligious groups. 
In a sense, campaigns were more consumer/voter oriented at the expense of the
producer/party focus on ideology that had characterized past elections, especially
in the Weimar Republic. 
To be sure, the influence of adv ertising on campaigning had pr ecedents in
German history. In its rise to power in the late 1920s and 1930s and especially in
the creation of the “Führerkult” surrounding Adolf Hitler, the N azi Party con-
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ceived political propaganda as a form of commer cial advertising. The party un-
mistakably represented its identity with the symbol of the swastika, relentlessly re-
peated slogans, and its main brand name, H itler, to r each the br oadest
audiences.33 But the Nazis lacked the means, or indeed, the desir e, to know ex-
actly the views of the voters. They still retained a party ideology meant to move
the amorphous and undiffer entiated masses without the exact tracking of the
views of different social classes. In any case, with anything associated with Nazism
being discr edited, or at least consider ed taboo, during the postwar y ears, the
CDU/CSU looked to the American model. 
While one would not expect a conservative party led by a man in his seventies
to embrace these communicative tools readily, the CDU/CSU and Adenauer led
the way among West German parties in adopting ne w polling and adv ertising
techniques. New methods in public opinion polling and political adv ertising
equipped the CDU/CSU with the tools to translate its conceptions of the econ-
omy into electoral success. With these advantages, the party was much more ef-
fective than the SPD in its ability to identify key sociological gr oups of swing
voters, to determine their collectiv e political views, and to garner their v otes by
tailoring specific electoral appeals to them. B y adopting this appr oach to cam-
paigning, the party secured support from relatively diverse elements of the elec-
torate that other wise might hav e been missed and fur thermore gobbled up the
votes that w ere shed fr om the declining splinter par ties. As a r esult, the
CDU/CSU became a prototype of the “Volkspartei” (catch-all party) that would
dominate West German politics in the futur e.34 Faced with the success of the
CDU/CSU, the SPD had no choice by the late 1950s but to take up both polling
and modern political adv ertising as par t of its transformation into a catch-all
party. With both direct and indirect American influence, CDU/CSU and A de-
nauer were conceptualizing politics and elections in a manner different from both
the Weimar past and their main competitor, the SPD. Throughout the 1950s, the
SPD str uggled to adjust to the ne w political terrain being shaped b y the
CDU/CSU. While the CDU/CSU captured a mass market of the electorate, the
SPD continued to thrive only in their niche market of the working class. 
The social market economy and the economic miracle pr oved to be effective
political “products” because they were seen as going beyond politics by a nation
that was exhausted from political ideology. In their classic study of comparativ e
political cultures from the early 1960s, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba offered
insights into that phenomenon. Many West Germans, they noted, were relatively
well informed and participated in the political process—witness for example that
78.5 percent of the electorate voted in 1949 and 87.8 percent in 1957. However,
the authors observed that contemporary West Germans held a detached and al-
most practical attitude to ward politics. P olitical discussions b y West Germans
tended to be v ery limited. 35 As the philosopher and critical theorist Theodor
Adorno commented in 1959, the West German democracy appear ed healthy,
“[b]ut democracy has not domesticated itself to the point that people really expe-
rience it as their cause, and so consider themselves agents [Subjecte] of the politi-
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cal process.”36 Public opinion polling from the period tended to bear these views
out. A June 1952 survey from the Institut für Demoskopie indicated that only 27
percent of respondents were interested in politics, while 41 percent reported being
not particularly interested and 32 percent not at all. Generally in the 1950s only
about 17 percent of those asked said that they sometimes discussed politics.37
This reluctance to engage politically is no surprise, considering Germany’s re-
cent history of the collapse of democracy with the Weimar Republic, the rise of
Nazism, and life under a dictatorship. But this perspective also sheds light on the
project of selling the economic miracle. The meanings of economic r econstruc-
tion were easily constructed within a number of different political contexts, such
as West Germany’s anticommunist stance, the cr eation of a new Christian West
Germany following the N azi past, and the incorporation of consumerism into
West German society. With a multiplicity of political meanings associated with
economics, the issue ther eby reached the maximum number of potential “ con-
sumers.” Economic r econstruction and the rise of consumerism w ere per fect 
political products because they were issues that did not challenge the political ret-
icence expressed by most West Germans. They appeared on the sur face to tran-
scend self-interested party politics and instead got to the hear t of what it meant
to be West German. In the end, Adenauer and the CDU/CSU’s political message
merely encouraged the citiz ens’ passive acquiescence in the constr uction of the
new Federal Republic. 
The creation of a new West German political culture that borrowed campaign-
ing methods from the United States contributed to the stability of the West Ger-
man democracy and its political party system. In his 1956 analysis of the relative
strength of ne wly founded F ederal Republic of G ermany, the S wiss journalist
Fritz René Allemann proclaimed “Bonn ist nicht Weimar” (Bonn is not Weimar).
The question of why the F ederal Republic’s democracy has pr oved successful,
whereas Germany’s first attempt with democracy was not, has been an important
topic for political scientists and historians ev er since. In 1965 Ralf D ahrendorf 
argued in Society and Democracy in Germany that Nazism and Germany’s defeat
in World War II produced a “social revolution” that cleared the way for a modern
society unencumbered by traditional values and loyalties—a process particularly
hastened by the mass relocation across Germany of millions of refugees and those
bombed out their dw ellings.38 Undoubtedly the legacy of the Third Reich was
crucial in the dev elopment of West Germany’s democracy. However, domestic
changes during the early years of the Federal Republic—such as the transforma-
tion of the West German social structure accompanying a higher standard of liv-
ing and greater economic and social mobility, the development of vibrant political
parties, and the impact of the Basic Law—have all been crucial factors contribut-
ing to the consolidation of the West German party system and the stabilization of
the Federal Republic’s democratic government.39 Others have stressed the impor-
tance of international dev elopments, such as the pr eference given by the thr ee
Western powers to moderate par ties, especially b y the licensing of the CDU/
CSU, SPD, and FDP during the 1945–1949 occupation period, as a step that 
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afforded these parties a decisive advantage in the early elections of the Federal Re-
public.40 Clearly structural changes in Germany’s legal and political system have
also contributed significantly to the strength of the Federal Republic’s party sys-
tem. Perhaps most impor tantly, the condition that a par ty must garner at least 
5 percent of the vote to enter the Bundestag has hindered the splintering of the
party system that afflicted the Weimar Republic. Also, the Basic Law recognizes
the importance of political par ties. Article 21 of the document underscor es the
importance of parties in forming and expressing the political will of the people.
As a result, West Germany’s political system has been described as a “party state”
in which the parties direct and make the important political decisions.41
A crucial factor in the stabilization of the West German party system was the
emergence of broad-based, moderate par ties—which in some measur e reflected
the influence of American polling and adv ertising techniques. The creation of
such a party system has been linked to the breakdown of specific sociological sub-
cultures supporting particular political parties, a crucial change from the Weimar
Republic. This weakening of voting subcultures allowed the creation of “catch-
all” parties that collected votes from varied sociological subcultures. In contrast,
political parties during the Weimar Republic tended to be based upon narrow seg-
ments of society with r elatively parochial interests, thus making the cr eation of
broadly based parties difficult, and often times, the building of a coalition all but
impossible. For many parties election campaigns were centered on getting out the
vote from their base as opposed to attracting new voters. The Nazi Party was the
first German political party to attract voters from all social classes and inter ests,
enabling it to achieve enough electoral success to seize power.42 Although its ori-
gins lay in the Catholic Center P arty of the Weimar Republic, the CDU/CSU
was conceiv ed as an inter confessional par ty that sought to bridge the divide 
between Catholics and Protestants. Believing that such a par ty was essential for
creating a stable party system and a strong bourgeois bloc against the Social Dem-
ocrats, Adenauer quickly understood the usefulness of the social market economy
and the economic miracle for integrating divergent social, religious, and economic
groups into one bourgeois par ty. Perhaps this is most clearly sho wn by the reli-
gious affiliation of CDU/CSU v oters: a bit mor e than 35 per cent of the par ty’s
votes in the 1950s came from Protestants, whereas the Catholic Center Party dur-
ing the Weimar Republic relied almost exclusively on Catholic voters.43
Yet, the Federal Republic retained many continuities from the Weimar period,
especially the persistence of certain social subcultures determining voting behav-
ior. This is especially apparent in the case of Catholics transferring their loyalties
from the Center P arty to the CDU/CSU. I n the 1953 B undestag election, the
CDU/CSU was able to attract 52.3 per cent of the Catholic v ote, a figure com-
parable to the 55.3 percent that the Center Party garnered in the 1924 Reichstag
election. In addition, support for the CDU/CSU in terms of religious affiliation
has remained constant from 1949 to the pr esent, with around 65 percent of its
votes coming from Catholics and about 35 percent from Protestants. Today, how-
ever, only one thir d of CDU/CSU v otes come fr om practicing Catholics and
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Protestants, reflecting the larger trends of secularization in the Federal Republic
as whole. This constitutes a major change for the CDU/CSU, since chur ch at-
tendance was the strongest indicating factor in voting behavior, especially for the
CDU/CSU. In the 1953 election, for example, o ver 58 per cent of CDU/CSU
voters attended chur ch r egularly—a measure of r eligiosity. A t this time the
CDU/CSU could legitimately claim to be the “Christian party” in the West Ger-
man political system.44
Undoubtedly, religious factors were extremely important in determining vot-
ing patterns, but they do not tell the full story of how the CDU/CSU was able to
obtain its share of the votes. Despite the importance of religion to its core con-
stituency, after the 1949 B undestag election, the CDU/CSU did not str ess the
party’s Christian roots in its national-level campaigning. By the mid to late 1950s
the CDU/CSU sensed the declining impor tance of religiosity in shaping voting
behavior. In fact, the CDU/CSU’s party leadership consciously shied away from
a strategy of self-identifying solely as the “Christian par ty” for fear of scaring off
nonreligious voters. Instead, the concepts of the social market economy and the
economic miracle w ere consistent components in the par ty’s electoral pr opa-
ganda. This was not a haphazard strategy on the part of the CDU/CSU. Indeed,
the CDU/CSU leaders, especially A denauer, r ealized that r eligious West Ger-
mans were a core segment of its constituency that was unlikely to leave the Chris-
tian Democratic camp. The key to electoral success was to attract v oters who 
did not solidly support the CDU/CSU. On the basis of polling data, the CDU/
CSU knew by 1953, and surely by 1957, that a large per centage of its vote was
assured by the religiosity of its constituencies—both Catholics and P rotestants.
But 42 per cent of CDU/CSU v oters attended chur ch irr egularly, seldom, or
never. It does not appear that such v oters would necessarily be attracted to the
CDU/CSU because of its status as the “Christian par ty.” Watching his par ty’s
popularity in the polls swing in tandem with the public’s confidence in the econ-
omy, Konrad Adenauer was keenly aware of the economy’s impact on West Ger-
mans’ perceptions of politics and political par ties.45 With the CDU/CSU’s base
of religious West Germans remaining solid, the party used Adenauer’s leadership
and economic success in the 1957 B undestag election to gain a majority of 
50.2 percent of the second ballots (votes for political parties rather than individ-
ual candidates), up from 31 percent in 1949.46 From this perspective, a relatively
small minority of the voters wielded disproportionate power in the voting booth
by boosting the CDU/CSU from its previous plurality to a majority of the seats
in the Bundestag. 
The party’s seemingly incompatible r eligious and secular suppor t raises the
question of how the CDU/CSU managed to hold on to its religious roots and be-
lief in the establishment of a connected, organic West German community, while
adapting to new realities of consumerism, materialism, and mass cultur e. Party
propaganda demonstrates that the meaning of the social market economy and the
economic miracle created by the CDU/CSU was by no means unchanging dur-
ing the 1950s. In fact, the process of selling the economic miracle highlighted the
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shifting relationships within the CDU/CSU between adherents of antimaterial-
ist and materialist views of the economy. Maria Mitchell has argued that follow-
ing the conclusion of the war, Catholics in the CDU/CSU, often associated with
the prewar Catholic Sozialpolitik (social policy), railed against liberalism, unfet-
tered capitalism, secularism, nationalism, and consumerism as having pr epared
the ground for the gr owth of N azism. By the late 1940s, this antimaterialist
stance was joined with anti-M arxist sentiment to form the basis of the CDU/
CSU’s interconfessional alliance between Catholics and Protestants. This position
rejected the materialism of socialism and the unfetter ed state power of Marxist
regimes in Eastern E urope, and envisioned a ne w, Christian Germany as a bul-
wark against these threats. The acceptance of the social market economy by way
of the Düsseldor f Principles in July 1949, Mitchell has argued, r epresented the
culmination of a Christian, antimaterialist view of the economy that preserved in-
dividual freedom from state coercion, but also avoided the excesses of nineteenth-
century liberalism. 47 Undoubtedly, the combination of antimaterialism and
anti-Marxism formed a crucial element in the CDU/CSU’s identity throughout
the 1950s and worked as a powerful integrative force within the party. 
This volume argues that propaganda from the first federal election in 1949 and
the early 1950s reflected an antimaterialist conception of the economy as the CDU/
CSU and conser vative business inter ests stressed economic r econstruction as a
precondition for the primary goal of reestablishing an organic, Christian society.
They strongly differentiated such a society from the godless East German regime.
By the end of the 1950s, however, the CDU/CSU image-makers had refashioned
the predominately antimaterialist definition of the social market economy in the
face of the realities of the burgeoning, consumerist economic miracle. Although
the anti-Marxist stance continued to play an important role in the CDU/CSU vi-
sion of economic reconstruction, election campaign propaganda couched the so-
cial mar ket economy in mor e materialist terms. I ndividualistic desir es for
production and consumption, campaigning materials reveal, were to be fulfilled
through the par ty’s economic policies. By the time of the 1953 and 1957 B un-
destag campaigns, the CDU/CSU, through its use of Economics Minister Erhard,
was clearly do wnplaying any Christian, antimaterialist concerns in its appeals 
to the electorate. Instead the party offered the voters opportunities for individu-
alistic consumerism—albeit while associating this consumerism with the estab-
lishment of the West German nation itself. Together these propaganda strategies
suggest that the meaning of a Christian Democratic economy for public consump-
tion was indeed not static, but rather went through a period of constant redefin-
ition and negotiation as the F ederal Republic’s social and economic conditions
evolved in the late 1940s and early 1950s. 
This process could be described as a gradual transition fr om the ideological,
Christian antimaterialism of the early CDU/CSU to a more pragmatic material-
ism based on the social market economy and the economic miracle that could ap-
peal to a broad, multi-class audience. All the while, however, the CDU/CSU and
business public relations campaigns transformed and directed the conception of
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consumerism from something that was identified as American, alien, and threat-
ening to G erman culture, to something that was fundamentally West German
and provided a sense of security. As Uta Poiger and Maria Höhn have shown in
their respective studies of rock and roll in the two Germanies and the American
military presence in Rhineland-Palatinate, social conservatives, often members or
associates of the CDU/CSU, r eacted sharply against consumerism and the per-
ceived accompanying decline of morals during the 1950s. However, the efforts of
these political leaders, who saw themselves as defenders of a vision of a Christian
Abendland (Occident), were increasingly muted by Cold War liberals who argued
that Western consumerism was an essential par t of creating a vibrant and stable
West Germany as a bulwark against the Soviet Union.48 This work shows that a
similar process of taming and co-opting consumerism was at wor k in a dir ectly
political realm, ironically by the very party that at its founding had sought to es-
tablish an antimaterialist, organic West Germany. 
From such a perspective, this project contributes to the growing literature on
the impact and interpretation of American culture in West Germany. As Poiger
has pointed out, much of the early literatur e dealing with Americanization fell
under two paradigms: “modernization” and “cultural imperialism.” The modern-
ization approach saw a triumphant United States transforming West Germany’s
political, economic, social, and cultural practices into a system that rejected a to-
talitarian past and was modeled on a democratic, market-driven United States. In
contrast, the cultural imperialism approach viewed American culture as penetrat-
ing and manipulating West German traditions for the colonizers’ own gain. Poiger
and more recent literature have pointed out a shortcoming of both paradigms in
that they assumed West Germany was a passive, blank slate without considering
the nation’s particular conditions and the agency of the West Germans themselves
in rebuilding their society.49 No doubt, American political techniques represented
an approach that was new in West Germany, but it functioned within the partic-
ular West German context of past political practices, visions held by political lead-
ers of a new democracy emerging out of the legacy of the Nazi past, and a rapidly
changing West German society. West German political leadership r efashioned
and interpreted new political techniques within the r ealities of the F ederal Re-
public. Unexpectedly, the right interpreted and adapted new political techniques
more effectively than the left. As D iethelm Prowe has r ecently argued, Ameri-
canization presented conservatives with the political space to effectiv ely reinte-
grate themselves into West German society and political life, but at the same time
it helped democratize West Germany by promoting political stability and curtail-
ing older authoritarian, conservative traditions.50 To be sure, during the 1950s the
West German democracy was characterized by a conservative, hierarchical vision
of Adenauer and the CDU/CSU, but the cr ucial democratic political structures
were established upon which the more active civic participation of the 1960s was
based. 
In many respects, the issues of Americanization, changing political and social
practices, and gender intersected in the selling of the economic miracle. With the
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disruption of gender roles and demographic imbalances caused by defeat, a gen-
dered analysis of economic propaganda sheds light on the challenges of cr eating
political identities in postwar Germany. The female experience, especially that of
the Trümmerfrauen (rubble women) who cleared the destroyed German cities, be-
came symbolic of the experiences of G ermans as a whole during these “ crisis
years” and acted as a redemptive influence in the creation of a new West German
national identity. The image of the r ubble women helped r epress the painful
memories of the rape by mostly Soviet soldiers of hundreds of thousands, if not
millions of German women at the end of the war. In addition, the concept of the
rubble women also helped contain what many saw as the moral degeneracy of
German society centered on women’s prostitution and fraternization with Allied
soldiers after the war—often acts stemming from the need to acquire the basic el-
ements of survival for a woman’s whole family.51 The rubble women came to sym-
bolize hard work, economic r econstruction, and a literal clearing away of the
visible remnants of the recent past. They captured the nation’s imagination, in part
because contemporary accounts depicted them as selflessly performing tasks out-
side women’s usual duties. But the experience of West Germans was fundamen-
tally transformed during the 1950s by the burgeoning economic miracle. During
this period, new gender roles for women based upon consumption superseded those
of the postwar years and became important elements in a uniquely West German
national identity. Through their roles as consumers within the free market system,
women participated in what was defined as a most fundamental aspect of West
German citizenship and helped establish the Federal Republic as a nation.52
Both popular consensus and political-economic discourse in West Germany
during the economic miracle years redefined women as images of Trümmerfrauen
were replaced by those of consumers, homemakers, and mothers. However, it was
not just women’s roles that were being transformed. The construction of a female
“consumer citizen” would have proven impossible without the creation of the equal
counterpart of the male “producer citizen”—contributing, as some historians have
recently suggested, to a “remasculinization” of West Germany as men’s roles changed
from POWs and soldiers to pr oducers, providers, and fathers. 53 This gendered
understanding of West Germany’s economic resurgence during the 1950s inter-
sected, in fact, with the West Germans’ sense of themselves and their nation as a
whole. The creation of ideal economic roles of female consumers and male pr o-
ducers laid the foundation for a ne w, gendered West German national identity
that offered an escape from the recent past through economic reconstruction. 
However, this gendered discourse on economics was not only central to the de-
velopment of the public image of ideal gender r oles and national identity in the
new West German society; it also had dir ect political implications as well, espe-
cially in the r ealm of the political mobilization of the electorate. D uring the
1950s the CDU/CSU and business public relations organizations shaped and ma-
nipulated the meaning of economic r econstruction as a gender ed experience in
order to create new political identities that contributed to their own power. Their
propaganda in the Federal Republic’s early Bundestag campaigns helped create a
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lasting political meaning of West Germany’s economic rebirth that constituted a
key factor in the CDU/CSU’s electoral success. In addition, these propaganda cam-
paigns reaffirmed, following the upheaval of war and collapse, what the CDU/
CSU portrayed as stable, traditional gender roles and situated the “natural” roles
of female consumers and male producers within a larger political discourse on the
nature and development of West Germany’s economy and society.54
As a result of the loss of men in the First and Second World Wars, West Ger-
many experienced what was called a Frauenüberschuss (surplus of women). O ne
survey from October 1946 r eported that for ev ery 100 males, ther e were 126 
females. Since several million prisoners of war had not yet returned to Germany,
this imbalance was ev en greater among West Germans of marriageable age. A
1946 census estimated that for every 1,000 marriageable males, there were 2,242
potential mates. Even in the mid 1950s, the imbalance between male and female
remained; in 1955 women still made up o ver 53 per cent of the population in
West Germany and West Berlin and outnumbered men by over 3 million.55 This
demographic imbalance in West Germany had a crucial impact upon elections in
the newly-formed Federal Republic. Most dramatically, in the 1957 B undestag
election there were about 2.4 million more female than male voters out of the 31
million ballots cast in all, meaning that women accounted for almost 54 percent
of all valid ballots. In this election, just under 54 percent of women voted for the
CDU/CSU, in contrast to about 45 per cent of all men, ther eby providing the
party with 50.2 percent of the vote. Clearly, women were the crucial factor in giv-
ing the CDU/CSU the only absolute majority ev er achieved in the Federal Re-
public of Germany.56
In a 1956 analysis of the role of women in politics, Gabrielle Bremme argued
that women’s religious background determined their voting patterns. Prior to the
Second World War, Germany was 62.7 percent Protestant, 32.4 percent Catholic,
less than 1 per cent Jewish, and about 4 per cent other.57 Because many of G er-
many’s predominantly Protestant regions now lay in East G ermany, the Federal
Republic in 1950 was a little less than 46 per cent Catholic.58 Given the signifi-
cant influence Catholicism had within its cultural milieu, Bremme contended that
women voted predominantly for the conservative CDU/CSU because the par ty
had its roots in the Weimar Republic as the Catholic Center Party.59 Although it
defies precise quantification, the impact of Catholicism on women ’s voting be-
havior was undoubtedly significant. But the CDU/CSU also secured crucial sup-
port from Protestant female voters.60 Moreover, in the second half of the 1950s
the CDU/CSU str essed West Germany’s rising economic for tunes and the ac-
companying growth in consumption as a means of garnering the female v ote—
especially from women who w ere not r eligious—while appeals on Christian or
cultural grounds became increasingly muted. 
Overall, the CDU/CSU’ s appeals ev olved from speaking to the Christian
woman to targeting the consuming woman. First, in the 1949 campaign, the CDU/
CSU utilized what it pr esented as natural economic gender r oles as a political
metaphor for the nation ’s revival and r egeneration. The party represented West
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Germans’ supposed return to the roles of female housewife and male breadwin-
ner as a signal that the nation’s emergence out of complete social and moral chaos
and distress was a consequence of its policies. Second, after the economic shocks
of the Korean War, the accompanying rise in prices of consumer goods, and r e-
doubled demands for socialization b y the S ocial Democrats, propaganda cam-
paigns led by West German industry situated men and women as students of the
free market. The campaigns instr ucted West Germans on their pr oper roles
within the free market in precisely gendered terms as consumers and producers—
but not for the ultimate goal of satisfying individual wants. I nstead, the propa-
ganda depicted these roles as being essential for the creation of a balanced, organic
society that spread the benefits of the social market economy to all. Third, by the
middle of the 1950s, the CDU/CSU pr opaganda not only underscor ed more
prominently the economic upswing and the rising consumerism enjo yed by in-
dividual West Germans, but also used economic success as a means of defining
the “true” Germany, the F ederal Republic of G ermany. Production and con-
sumerism were portrayed not only as goals for their own sake, but also as civic du-
ties that defined and strengthened the newly formed West German nation. In all,
the CDU/CSU pr oved itself adept at cr eating gendered electoral appeals that
consistently depicted the female consumer and male producer, while at the same
time changing the basis of these appeals from an antimaterialist, ideological foun-
dation to a materialist position that embraced the consumerism of the economic
miracle. This was no haphazard strategy on the part of the CDU/CSU, but rather
a conscious effort to appeal to segments of the electorate that could be swayed to
support the party. This conceptual shift proved particularly significant when com-
bined with ne w campaigning techniques that allo wed the CDU/CSU pr opa-
ganda to target and more effectively reach an intended audience—especially the
crucial female swing voters. 
Propaganda on economics not only reflected conservative conceptions of gen-
der roles, but also underscored the vision of a mor e homogeneous, middle-class
society, what the prominent 1950s sociologist Helmut Schelsky termed the “niv-
ellierte Mittelstandsgesellschaft” (leveled middle-class society). Class conflict, he 
argued, seemed to be less sharp than during the inter war period as members of
the proletariat moved into the middle class in step with rising wages, expanding
pensions, and growing consumerism.61 Schelsky probably overstated his view of
West German society, for historians such as Ax el Schildt and Arnold S ywottek
have shown that this “deproletarianization” did not fully develop as class identi-
ties and status continued to r emain strong during the Federal Republic’s forma-
tive years. They point out that educational oppor tunities still depended upon
social status and affluence. In addition, they find that income and consumption
did not reach high levels until the late 1950s.62 Volker Berghahn has identified a
similar reconstitution of the bourgeoisie during the postwar era.63 To be sure, class
identities did not melt away as some contemporar y observers posited. However,
as Schildt and S ywottek noted, West German society was slo wly transforming
during the period into a “modern” society characterized by the rise of a consumer
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culture, increased leisure time, the intr oduction of new household technologies
affecting day-to-day life, and eventually an openness to such changes in West Ger-
man values. Clearly, West German society went through a period of “moderniza-
tion,” particularly during the late 1950s and early 1960s.64
In its propaganda on economics, the CDU/CSU sold a vision of the “lev eled
middle-class society,” or as Schildt and Sywottek described it, a “modern society,”
in which all members of society benefited from the social market economy. As a
party trying to establish broad-based support, the CDU/CSU also sought to un-
dermine old, proletarian identities that benefited the Social Democrats. The fact
that the CDU/CSU defined the 1948 currency reform, which supposedly put all
West Germans on equal financial footing, as the birth of West Germany itself un-
derscores the importance of the social market economy and the economic miracle
in creating the “imagined community” of the Federal Republic. These economic
developments ran parallel to, and were mutually supportive of the contributions
of Cold War tensions in creating a sense of West Germanness. As mentioned ear-
lier, within this context consumerism was not projected as something threatening,
degenerate, or self-indulgent but rather became integrated into the very narrative
of the development of the Federal Republic. It was a par t of the vision of West
Germany that the CDU/CSU was creating: Western, free, open, more equal, and
to some extent liberal. However, at the same time this West German society also
was to be an organic community, avoiding both the atomization of society in the
United States and the godless communist alternative to the East. Economic suc-
cess in West Germany was not a goal for mere certain individuals, but supposedly
advanced the aim “Prosperity for All.”
Despite the fact that many West Germans did not necessarily participate in the
fruits of the economic miracle, especially during the early 1950s, the CDU/CSU
and conservative business associations succeeded at sensing and managing expec-
tations of rising consumerism and exploiting the per ception that the West Ger-
man society was being transformed. In fact, much of the public opinion polling
upon which Schildt and Sywottek based a large part of their work were the same
data that contemporar y conservative political and business leaders used in for-
mulating their propaganda campaigns. In a broader sense, the adoption of Amer-
ican political advertising and public opinion polling could be described as part of
the very process of modernization that Schildt and Sywottek observe. In contrast,
the SPD was not as successful in adapting to the per ceived economic, sociologi-
cal, and cultural transformation underway during the 1950s. The party continued
to generate pr opaganda that spoke for the most par t almost ex clusively to its
working-class constituents and lacked a broad-based appeal. Until the SPD aban-
doned its Marxist doctrine with the 1959 Bad Godesberg Program, the SPD was
unable to become the Volkspartei that the CDU/CSU had become under A de-
nauer. Clearly, the heightened importance of consumerism within West German
society and culture was crucial in the creation of the CDU/CSU’s political image
and the evolution of political discourse on economics. However, without the ris-
ing living standards enjoyed by many West Germans, the CDU/CSU’s efforts to
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capitalize upon the expanding economy would all hav e been for naught. I n its
own way, the CDU/CSU projected a definition of consumerism that was tied not
merely to satisfying individual desires, but also to the very core concept of what
it meant to be West German—thereby creating a common bond among the citi-
zens of the young Federal Republic that helped avoid the social tensions that had
torn the Weimar Republic asunder and engendering a lev el of civic passivity
among the citizenship. 
In many ways, this volume speaks to a broad range of scholars, including those
engaged with the history of politics and the history of society and culture in the
Federal Republic. Politics of the ev eryday and formal politics do hav e a nexus:
these two worlds meet when political parties attempt to appeal to the electorate.
This is the r ealm that I explor e in this wor k. Chapter 1 discusses the economic
thought behind the social mar ket economy and examines some of the main
thinkers who contributed to the development of the intellectual basis of this eco-
nomic policy. In addition, the chapter investigates how the ideas of the social mar-
ket economy were transferred into political practice during the immediate postwar
years. Particularly important are the curr ency reform and economic r eforms of
June 1948, after which the economy in the western zones of occupation began to
operate increasingly on a free market basis. Chapter 2 explores party politics and
the CDU/CSU’s adoption of the social mar ket economy. The 1949 Bundestag
election revolved around the question of “Markt oder Plan” (Market or Plan) which
the CDU/CSU fully exploited to its adv antage. It portrayed itself as capable of
leading responsible government, as evidenced by the end of West Germany’s des-
perate conditions after the currency reform. Meanwhile, it associated the rival SPD
with life before the currency reform: scarcity, ration cards, and domination by a
burdensome Allied bureaucracy. 
Chapter 3 discusses the impact of the K orean crisis upon the West German
economy. It focuses upon the r eorientation of public opinion to ward the fr ee
market and the social market economy as a consequence of price increases caused
by the Korean boom. During this time public opinion polling revealed a drop in
public support for the free market and West Germans’ growing fear of their eco-
nomic future. Of particular importance was West German political and economic
leaders’ reading of the results of these surveys: they also began questioning the po-
litical feasibility of retaining the social market economy. Chapter 4 examines one
of the first responses to the souring of public opinion toward the Adenauer gov-
ernment’s economic policy . After the K orean crisis, the G emeinschaft zur
Förderung des S ozialen Ausgleichs (Society for the P romotion of S ocial Com-
promise), also known as Die Waage (The Weigh Scales), an organization funded
by West German industry, instituted what has been labeled the Federal Republic’s
first modern public relations campaign. Its purpose was to promote Erhard’s so-
cial market economy through a series of ambitious advertising campaigns. With
campaigns costing tens of millions of Deutsche Marks, Die Waage was one of the
first organizations in West Germany to apply public opinion polling and Ameri-
can advertising techniques toward a political goal. Die Waage not only helped cre-
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ate an understanding of the social market economy that linked economic freedom
to political freedom; its advertisements also served as political propaganda for Er-
hard and somewhat more indirectly, the CDU/CSU. 
Chapter 5 examines the 1953 Bundestag election campaign. This chapter dis-
cusses how the economic miracle was molded for use in a number of different po-
litical contexts. As pr ospects of G erman unification diminished and the S oviet
Union suppressed the 17 J une 1953 uprising in East B erlin, geopolitical issues
and the threat of communism came to the fore in this election. Within this con-
text, the CDU/CSU utilized both West Germany’s economic reconstruction and
the social market economy as symbols of West Germany’s ability to defend itself
against the thr eat from the East. I n conjunction with this position, the CDU/
CSU red painted the SPD as politically unr eliable because of its suppor t of the
planned economy. In addition, before the 1953 election the CDU/CSU-led gov-
ernment developed a wide net of institutions influencing public opinion, centered
around the Federal Press and Information Agency. The result was that, together
with the Federal Press Agency and Die Waage, the CDU/CSU employed a bar-
rage of propaganda campaigns outside of its direct efforts that battered the SPD
throughout the election season. It was during this election that more American-
style campaigning techniques were first implemented in West Germany. 
Chapter 6 discusses the CDU/CSU’ s gr eatest electoral triumph, the 1957
Bundestag election. This was the peak of the CDU/CSU’s electoral success, when
it became the first and only par ty ever to achieve a majority of the federal v ote
(50.2 percent). It was at this point that the dev elopment of CDU/CSU’s cam-
paigning techniques came to full fruition. Demographic surveys, public opinion
polling, and adv ertising agents w ere fully utiliz ed in or der to constr uct a par ty
image for the consumption of the West German electorate. Erhard and the eco-
nomic miracle proved to be easily molded into the main themes of the campaign:
stability and prosperity, concepts summed up by one of the campaign’s main slo-
gans: “Wohlstand für Alle” (Prosperity for All). In addition, in the 1957 election
campaign the CDU/CSU began connecting its economic policies to the con-
sumer goods that were now becoming available to West Germans, such as fash-
ionable clothing and electrical appliances. As this chapter demonstrates, the
SPD’s crushing defeat in this election spurred it not only to reform its platform,
but also to revamp its propaganda techniques to be more like those of the CDU/
CSU. 
The 1957 election campaign marked the highpoint of Adenauer’s government.
The stunning CDU/CSU victory ensured the retention of the social market econ-
omy. The terms of debate had shifted so decidedly that ther e was no going back
to the suppor t of a planned socialist economy . But more importantly perhaps,
West Germany had established a stable political party system. The splinter parties
were quickly fading fr om the political scene as they collectiv ely garnered only
slightly over 10 percent of all votes cast in the election. The West Germans emerged
from the 1950s as just that: West Germans. By this point reunification was not a
plausible option in the short run. A new, West German identity had been forged.
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It was an identity based in large measure upon economic success, consumerism,
and the Deutsche Mark. Ultimately these enduring symbols, not the Grundgesetz
or a stable democracy, were what lured East Germans into West Berlin when the
Wall came down on the fateful night of 9 November 1989. 
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Chapter 1
ORIGINS OF THE SOCIAL MARKET ECONOMY
AND THE CURRENCY REFORM OF 1948 

The prevailing narrativ e of West Germany’s economic r esurgence during the
1950s has proven to be an enduring and central aspect of the G ermans’ sense of
themselves. At the conclusion of the Second World War, it seemed that Germany
was finished. When Allied armies defeated the Nazi regime in the spring of 1945,
the once po werful German economy had almost completely collapsed. Allied
bombs had smashed much of G ermany’s industrial base. Transportation within
Germany had gr ound to a sputtering halt due to the systematic destr uction of
railroads and bridges by Allied bombers from September 1944 onward. By May
1945 all the permanent bridges acr oss the Rhine had been destr oyed except for
one at Remagen. Only 1,000 km of the 13,000 km of railroad track in the British
zone of occupation were still in working order.1 In the summer of 1945, indus-
trial production in the American and British zones of occupation stood at 12 and
15 percent of 1936 levels respectively.2 Such destruction was not limited to Ger-
man industr y and the transpor tation system; Allied bombs had also destr oyed
large sections of Germany’s cities. Estimations at the end of the war figured that
about 18 percent of the apartments and houses in the later British-American Bi-
zone were destroyed, while another 29 per cent suffered some lev el of damage. 3
Large cities such as H amburg saw o ver 50 per cent of their housing stock de-
stroyed through Allied bombing.4 The quantity of rubble to be cleared from Ger-
man cities almost surpassed imagination. German federal officials have estimated
that the city of Cologne, which endured a series of 500 bomber raids during the
war, had 31.2 cubic meters of r ubble per inhabitant. I f rubble were piled in an
area of 100 yards by 40 yards, the heap would have towered 4.48 miles into the
Notes for this section begin on page 45.
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sky.5 Unquestionably, the destr uction of housing stock, transpor tation systems,
and industrial plants that G ermany endured as a consequence of the S econd
World War was extensive and catastrophic.6
Most Germans experienced severe personal and economic hardship following
the war. After the collapse of the Third Reich, the West German economy suffered
a paralysis in which pr oduction of both raw materials and finished goods was
down, few goods were transported or sold, and people resorted to barter and hoard-
ing, lacking confidence in the currency. With the destruction caused by bombing
raids and the influx of some 10 million refugees and expellees from German lands
to the East betw een 1945 and 1949, housing was extr emely scarce—resulting
often times in 5 or 6 people living in a single room. Within this massive disloca-
tion and chaos, millions of Germans, including some 10 million German POWs
who r eturned home betw een 1945 and 1947, desperately sought their family
members. Hunger was rampant: official ration levels hovered around 1200–1500
calories per day between 1945 and 1947, and the food actually being distributed
provided as little as 1000 calories a day. To supplement inadequate rations, food
was acquired from company canteens, private gardens, and packages from abroad.
In addition, many Germans were forced to resort to illegal means to obtain the
calories necessary for survival. The black market boomed during this time with
cigarettes becoming an ersatz curr ency. Workers would often leav e work in the
cities to go forage out in the countr yside, thereby contributing to the lo w pro-
ductivity in the factories.7 Germans directed their growing resentment toward the
Allied authorities, seeing them as impeding r econstruction by dismantling in-
dustrial plants and r equiring reparations of needed raw materials as par t of the
Potsdam agreements. The Trümmerfrauen (rubble women) who cleared the debris
blocking the str eets of the destr oyed West German cities became a deeply in-
grained and lasting image for those who lived through the period—replacing the
image of the morally compromised German woman who fraternized with the Al-
lied soldiers for pleasure and to make ends meet.8 These were hard times for the
West Germans, critical days in shaping the meaning they later attributed to the
immediate postwar period and the ensuing economic boom. 
The year 1948 came to be remembered by the public and politicians alike as a
crucial year for the resurgence of the German economy due to political-economic
measures such as the reform of the German currency and the implementation of
the Marshall Plan. On 20 June 1948 the United States, Great Britain, and France
stabilized the German financial situation in their occupation zones by introduc-
ing the new Deutsche Mark. Overnight, shopkeepers ceased hoarding and goods
appeared in their windows as people experienced a renewed faith in the currency.
From the perspectiv e of many economists the curr ency reform and the accom-
panying liberalization of certain markets and materials were some of the key cat-
alysts for the gr owth of the West German economy.9 Now that goods w ere
available, the G ermans had an incentiv e to wor k for r eal wages and no longer
needed to venture into the countryside to forage for food; consequently, produc-
tivity rose significantly. The influx of M arshall Plan funds intensified the ne w
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faith in the D eutsche Mark and hastened the r econstruction of West German
capital and fixed assets. Although the economy was still subject to various Allied
controls and rationing, the West German people now possessed sufficient confi-
dence in the economy to conduct normal business and participate in the free cir-
culation of goods and money that is so critical to a healthy economy. 
Led by Ludwig Erhard, the chief economic administrator of the B ritish-
American Bizone, West Germany’s economic thinkers introduced the economic
system of the social market economy in 1948. This socially conscious free market
has remained the dominant economic policy in West Germany ever since. Al-
though now identified with the welfare state, its proponents saw it at the time as
a system supporting the free market in direct opposition to planning and control
of the economy, except in cases when governmental intervention was needed to
ensure competition. The social market economy was instituted with the purpose
of avoiding the overconcentration of economic power in the hands of cartels and
the state that had been so pr evalent during the Weimar Republic and Third
Reich.10 The combination of the currency reform, Marshall Plan funds, and the
social market economy has been described as the foundation on which the 
expansion of the economic miracle was based. 11 With the industrial boom
prompted by the Korean War, the West German GNP gained 67 percent in real
terms and industrial output rose by 110 percent between 1948 and 1952. From
1952 to 1958 the West German GNP continued to increase at a lowered, but still
very strong, annual rate of 7.6 per cent in real terms, and at a healthy 5 per cent
yearly GNP growth through the mid 1960s. After the momentous year of 1948,
West Germany transformed itself seemingly overnight from an economic cripple
into a giant and enjoyed prodigious levels of growth through the 1950s and into
the early 1960s.12
Although many historians have challenged the veracity of aspects of this out-
line of West Germany’s economic history during the postwar y ears, it has taken
hold in the West German national consciousness. Indeed, this narrative was par-
tially created by Erhard himself during the 1950s, especially in his 1957 book
Wohlstand für Alle (Prosperity for All, translated into English as Prosperity through
Competition). Even today the legend of E rhard and the economic miracle ar e
evoked in discussions on the economic r econstruction of the former East G er-
many and the challenges that a united G ermany faces in a global economy. Un-
doubtedly, this narrative of destruction and reconstruction exerted an important
influence upon the development of West German politics, especially during the
1950s. In many respects, this economic resurgence offered a sense of national re-
demption for Germans and became a source of legitimization for West Germany
and conservative political interests. But before these themes are explored, it is nec-
essary to briefly examine the r oots and the development of the ideas underlying
the social mar ket economy and the ev olution of economic policy in occupied
Germany between 1945 and 1948. After the policy of autar ky died with the
Third Reich, economic thought w ent through its own reconstruction. It is im-
portant to get an overview of the ideas behind the social market economy in order
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to understand how this program was picked up and molded b y politicians as a
means of overcoming some of the political challenges that faced the newly formed
Federal Republic. Although the theorists of the social mar ket economy grasped
the political dimensions of their ideas, they could not hav e foreseen the manner
in which their economic concepts would be transformed for public consumption.
In any case, their ideas pr oved to be impor tant ammunition in the battles that
would rage within the West German political arena.
The social market economy had its r oots in the “neoliberal” or “ordoliberal”
economic thought of the interwar period. Having undergone a wartime economy,
a revolution, and a transition to a democratic system, Germany experienced a vi-
brant debate on economics and social life after the end of the First World War—
mostly from a statist, corporatist perspective. During the difficult Weimar period,
when economic and political strife tore the nation apart—particularly during the
period of rampant inflation between 1918 and 1923 and the Great Depression—
solutions to the o verwhelming economic pr oblems of the day tended to entail
heightened governmental involvement in the economy. Yet there were a number
of economists who endorsed a mor e market-oriented approach—most notably
Alfred Müller-Armack, Walter Eucken, Franz Böhm, Wilhelm Röpke, and
Alexander Rüstow. Although differing in many r espects, they all sought to r ec-
oncile nineteenth-century liberalism with the demands of the twentieth-century
economy and politics, aiming especially to ward off the contemporary threats of
fascism and communism. These thinkers believed in the retention of the free mar-
ket system with a guarantee of at least a minimum social suppor t for all in soci-
ety. This defense of the fr ee market demanded some form of go vernmental
intervention in the economy in or der to reduce the concentration of economic
power in a few hands and to ensure freedom of the individual.13
The inter est in the “ social” question within economics and society had its
roots in the 1872 founding of the Verein für Sozialpolitik (Association for Social
Policy), a gr oup of economists inter ested in social r eform. According to these
economists, the laissez-faire system of economic organization had not sufficiently
alleviated the dreadful conditions of the working class. For this reason, the econ-
omists of the Verein turned away fr om pure liberalism to demand a “ purposive
state policy designed to r egulate economic life.” An impor tant component of
their view was the endorsement of large-scale governmental measures designed to
provide some measure of social security for the wor king class. By no means had
the association completely forsaken laissez-faire economics; rather it advocated for
the modern state taking on some r esponsibilities and functions within the fr ee
market. Although the Verein’s discussions on politics and the economy had lim-
ited short-term consequences, its influence on the debates regarding the role and
function of the modern state was significant, particularly in the interwar years.14
Young economists during the 1920s, such as Walter Eucken, a pr ofessor at the
University of F reiburg, developed the “F reiburg School” of economic thought,
which formed a nucleus of economic theorists who further elaborated the concepts
of neoliberalism. Although during the 1920s Eucken supported a purely laissez-
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faire approach, with the economic crisis of 1929 he came to reject this view as in-
adequate and envisioned a more active role for the state in the economy, a view
echoed by fellow economist Alexander Rüstow. 
In a September 1932 speech to the Verein für S ozialpolitik, Rüstow argued
that a strong state influence on the economy did not contradict liberalism. Instead,
the state should intervene in the economy in order to ensure full competition and
allow market forces to work. In this way, Rüstow suggested some form of a “third
way” between capitalism and collectivism. 15 Together, Eucken and Rüsto w in-
volved themselves in the D eutscher Bund für fr eie Wirtschaftspolitik (German
League for the Free Market), a group of businessmen and economists supporting
the free market system, in many ways going against the tide of interventionism of
the early 1930s. Yet with the mounting deflation of 1931, both Eucken and Rüstow
supported some form of temporary governmental expenditures to spur growth.16
Once the N azis came to po wer, Eucken was r elatively successful in cr eating
some distance between his “Freiburg School” and the Nazi regime, despite the ef-
forts of the university rector, Martin Heidegger, to “Nazify” the institution. Eu-
cken sought to rehabilitate classical economics in the face of the autarkic economy
Hitler was building in the Third Reich. He attacked many of his fellow German
economists who w ere r elativizing what he r egarded as transcendent economic
truths. From Eucken’s perspective, the truths of Adam Smith applied in the Eu-
rope of the mid twentieth century as well as in eighteenth-century Great Britain.
In addition, he called for economists to become more involved in practical affairs
and argued that economic issues had to be understood within a specific political
context.17 It was during this time that he crafted his masterpiece, Die Grundlagen
der Nationalökonomie (The Foundations of E conomics). In this wor k, Eucken
sought to understand the workings of economic systems, from any historical pe-
riod, in their totality. In other words, he was interested in analyzing the economic,
legal, social, and ethical underpinnings inherent in any economic system. In gen-
eral, Eucken supported an economic system that was market driven, with the gov-
ernment laying down and enforcing the basic ground rules of the economy, yet
not interfering with its running.18
In contrast to other neoliberal economists, Wilhelm Röpke expounded upon
the social aspects of economic organization. When the Nazis came to power, Röpke
emigrated first to Turkey and then to G eneva, Switzerland. In the face of the
Nazis’ plans for an autarkic economic system, liberal economic ideas were clearly
on the defensive. In his works over the course of the 1930s, Röpke defended the
free market against onslaughts from the both the left and the right. The free mar-
ket, he realized, was not perfect and must be protected by government interven-
tion against monopoly or other antimar ket for ces. He was also awar e of the
problems that the pr oletariat pr esented for society: if their situation was not 
improved, they were destined to turn to communism. Reacting to this problem,
Röpke advocated a go vernmental policy encouraging small- and medium-siz ed
property owners, assisting independent farmers, and fighting against the sense of
rootlessness so widespread in modern society.19
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Röpke further developed his ideas in his two books written during the Second
World War: Gesellschaftskrisis der Gegenwart (Contemporary Crisis of S ociety,
1942) and Civitas Humana (1944). In Civitas Humana, Röpke divided the eco-
nomic systems since the eighteenth century into two categories: collective or cap-
italist. He accepted neither of these systems. Collectivism led to economic
despotism, centralization, depersonalization, and eventually totalitarianism. Cap-
italism, as it was practiced, led to monopoly . Röpke called for a thir d way that
could be described as “ economic humanism.” H e favored the dismantling of
modern mass society, a deproletariatization of society, and the creation of a new
market economy in which fr ee competition was guaranteed. 20 Röpke was espe-
cially interested in what he called the anthr opo-sociological aspects of the econ-
omy. He saw the free market as resting upon a sound society. As he commented
in Civitas Humana, a purely liberal point of view was problematic: 
It [liberal capitalistic thought] overlooked that the Market represents but one narrow sphere
of social life, a sphere which is surrounded and kept going by a more comprehensive one; a
wider field in which mankind ar e not mer ely competitors, pr oducers, men of business,
members of unions, shareholders, saver and investors, but are simply human beings who do
not live on bread alone, men as members of their family, as neighbors, as members of their
churches, as colleagues, as citiz ens of the community , men as cr eatures of life and blood
with their sentiments, passions, and ideals.
A healthy society and the fr ee market must coexist together in or der to av oid 
society becoming “ engulfed by mass civilization, collectiviz ed, proletarianized,
uprooted, fundamentally dissatisfied and unstable.” 21 Röpke interested himself 
in the role of economics in relation to all other social, political, and cultural en-
deavors of human society. From this perspective, he saw the free market as being
intertwined and functioning in concert with an organic community.
Overall, the neoliberal thinkers w ere keenly inter ested in the r elationship of
the market to society a whole and thought of economic policy as being dir ectly
related to political systems that emerged in a society . A functioning market and
price system must be the basis of each action within the political economy . In
order to assure competition, currency stability and convertibility must be main-
tained. This would encourage the full interaction of the factors of production and
greater efficiency within the economy. In addition, such full competition required
open markets, preserved by the government through a liberal trade policy . Also
crucial was car eful government inter vention to guar d against monopolies and 
ensure competition. Perhaps most importantly, these neoliberal economists em-
braced a decidedly broad view of economics and were concerned about the con-
nection between economics and the cr eation of a just, open, and liberal society .
The social dimension of a liberal economic system rested upon the idea that the
free market contains within itself certain social and political advantages over cen-
trally administered economic systems. A market system in which competition was
preserved ensured the maximum expansion of the economy, whose surplus could
be redistributed more equally throughout society. Moreover, from the neoliberal
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perspective an economic system based upon competition required the maximum
freedom for the members of society, in direct contrast to collective economic sys-
tems that inevitably led to tyranny and contr ol. A liberal economic system was
not only based upon the fr eedom of individuals, but was also an essential com-
ponent in the establishment of that freedom.22
From this perspective the neoliberals echoed some of the vie ws advanced by
the Austrian-born economist Friedrich August von Hayek, whose thought cen-
tered around the freedom of the individual in society . In von Hayek’s view, one
of the greatest threats to the freedom of the individual was socialism. He believed
that there was no way that a planned economy could meet the needs of individ-
uals within society. A planned economy could only be implemented by force, and
the lives of individuals would be excessively controlled and regulated. As he com-
mented in his 1944 Road to Serfdom, “planning leads to dictatorship because dic-
tatorship is the most effectiv e instrument of coer cion and the enfor cement of
ideals and, as such, essential if central planning on a large scale is possible.”23 The
expression of a free society in the economic realm is competition. Competition,
von Hayek argued, allowed individuals to make free decisions outside of coercive
control.24 Despite their many agreements about the importance of competition in
helping maintain a free society, von Hayek and the neoliberals differ ed strongly
in that von Hayek rejected any government intervention or regulation to main-
tain markets or some form of social justice. 
Although the ideas of the social market economy had a long history, two fig-
ures, Alfred Müller-Armack and Ludwig Erhard, were essential in transferring its
abstract, theoretical ideas into the political r ealm. Erhard was born on 4 F ebru-
ary 1897, in the nor thern Bavarian town of Für th to middle-class, shopkeeper
parents. He attended a vocational secondary school where he was a very ordinary
student. During the F irst World War he ser ved in an ar tillery battalion, was 
severely wounded on the western front in September 1918, and convalesced in a
hospital until June 1919. After his r ecovery, he enr olled at a Handelshochschule
(business school) in Nuremberg in the autumn of 1919 and received his diploma
in the spring of 1922. H e then went to Frankfurt to earn his doctorate in eco-
nomics in December 1925 under the direction of Franz Oppenheimer, a profes-
sor of sociology and theoretical economics. Oppenheimer developed theories on
what he called “liberal socialism ” that r ejected both laissez-fair e capitalism and
Marxism. Oppenheimer thought that social justice had to be retained within an
economy of free competition protected by the state. He also believed that a way
of ensuring genuine free competition was to r edistribute land more equally and
thereby ensure the freedom of individuals. Erhard never accepted all of Oppen-
heimer’s ideas, especially in regard to land redistribution, and reversed the adjec-
tive by suppor ting a “ social liberalism.” N evertheless he adv anced some of
Oppenheimer’s core ideas, especially his belief in free competition as the source of
efficiency within the economy and his vie w that monopoly grav ely threatened
such competition. I n addition, E rhard took his mentor ’s view that the go vern-
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ment should sometimes inter vene in the economy in or der to stimulate con-
sumer demand and discourage the overconcentration of capital.25
After working for a time in his father ’s clothing business, E rhard moved in
1928 to an institute involved in market research at the Nuremberg Commercial
College under Wilhelm Vershofen, remaining there until 1942. During his time
in Nuremberg, Erhard conducted market research on consumer goods—a newly
emerging field. In 1935 his director, Vershofen, founded the Berlin-based Gesell-
schaft für Konsumforschung (Society for Consumer R esearch), which gather ed
economists, industrialist representatives from firms such as I.G. Farben, and rep-
resentatives of economic associations to inv estigate the r elationship of the con-
sumer to producers and the motives behind consumers’ buying. Over the course
of the 1930s the modest institute expanded quickly thr ough contracts from the
federations of the finished and consumer goods industries to inv estigate their
costs and earning conditions. I nfluenced by Vershofen’s emphasis on consumer
research, Erhard learned to respect the wishes and importance of the consumer in
driving economic dev elopment. According to Vershofen, economists and busi-
nessmen alike must take into account ethical and psychological aspects of human
behavior in their scientific inquiries in economics—an orientation to ward the
consumer that proved enduring and politically valuable for Erhard in his years as
economics minister. As he later stated in that capacity, “Our economy serves the
consumer, he alone is the standard and judge of economic activity.”26 In addition,
the contacts he made during this time with industrialists fr om I.G. Farben and
businessmen from the consumer goods industry, such as Philipp Reemtsma, head
of a large tobacco firm, proved crucial in his efforts during the 1950s to “sell” the
ideas of the social market economy.27 Meanwhile, in January 1933 Hitler and the
Nazis seized power in Germany. The Nazi regime quickly transformed Germany’s
economy into one that mix ed capitalist, planned, and autar kic elements. S ince 
Erhard was highly critical of the nationalist economic policies of Hjalmar Schacht,
Hitler’s economics minister and pr esident of the R eichsbank through 1937, he
could not hope for promotion to a university chair. 
In 1942 Erhard left Vershofen’s institute. It is unclear whether Erhard’s depar-
ture resulted from his personal conflicts with Vershofen, or whether it was because
he refused to join the Nazi Labor Front. In any case Erhard, an ardent supporter
of the free market, disagreed sharply with Vershofen’s support of cartels to order
the economy. During the late 1930s and early 1940s, Erhard had become famil-
iar with the leading economists of the neoliberal school, including Eucken, Rüs-
tow, and Röpke.28 Having parted with Vershofen, Erhard founded the Institut für
Industrieforschung (Institute for Industrial Research) with funding from several
major industrial firms. During 1942/43 Erhard concentrated upon studying Ger-
many’s transition to a peacetime economy after the war . The circulation of his
268-page memorandum Kriegsfinanzierung und Schuldenkonsolidierung (War Fi-
nance and D ebt Consolidation) was a potentially danger ous move on E rhard’s
part for J osef Goebbels’ declaration of “ total war” in J anuary 1942, talk of the
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peace after the war ’s conclusion was unacceptable to the N azi regime.29 In this
document distributed to such firms as I.G. F arben, F lick, S iemens, Dresdner
Bank, and Deutsche Bank in the summer of 1944, E rhard’s ideas regarding the
postwar-era economy began to take shape. He proposed scaling down government
control of the economy, beginning with the demobilization of labor and restruc-
turing of the economy to ward peacetime production. After a transition period,
market forces must be allowed to direct the economy. Most importantly, the ex-
pansion of the money supply cr eated by the war had to be scaled back. This in-
flation, argued Erhard, had been masked by the price controls that were currently
in place. F ollowing a transition period during which the economy was to be
structured for peacetime activity, at a decisive juncture the money supply must be
reduced and the purchasing power of money decreased. In essence, Erhard treated
Germany as though it were a bankrupt concern and what was needed to correct
the situation was a sound monetar y policy. In addition, he str essed the impor-
tance of a healthy, growing peacetime economy of consumer goods pr oduction
within the context of the fr ee market over capital goods expansion dir ected by
heavy industry.30
Erhard met Müller-Armack during the war. Although Müller-Armack was not
part of the Freiburg School, Erhard was strongly impressed by him and his writing,
“most of all not as a theorist, but instead as one who wanted to transfer theor y
into practice.”31 A Nazi Party member, Müller-Armack occupied a chair in eco-
nomics during the war at the U niversity of Münster in Westphalia.32 He also
worked within a research institute conducting market research for the textile in-
dustry. After the war was concluded, Müller-Armack began to write and speak
about the necessity of r eintroducing market forces into the G erman economy.
One of his most influential works was the Wirtschaftslenkung und Marktwirtschaft
(Economic Control and the Free Market), published in 1946, of which one sec-
tion was entitled “Soziale Marktwirtschaft,” giving birth to the term “social mar-
ket economy.”33 In this work, he argued that the economic “ rules of the game,”
or what has been called Wirtschaftsordnung, must be reestablished in the wake of
the war’s disruptions, the most important “rule” being the reintroduction of mar-
ket forces in the economy that would ensure the efficient allocation of resources
and increased productivity.34
But a key question was how Müller-Armack could possibly influence political
leaders capable of implementing the ideas of the social market economy at a time,
at least until 1947/48, when market economics were highly unpopular in the con-
text of a ruined Germany and the belief that big business had been in league with
the Nazis. Marxists from the left and Christian politicians from the right saw the
age of fr ee market capitalism passing, and some form of public o wnership and
economic planning emerging in its stead. Müller-Armack’s contact with industry,
stemming from his work with the textile market research institute, proved to be
a crucial factor in creating a political audience for the social market economy. In
June 1947 Müller-Armack established contact with an organization of Hamburg
businessmen called Volkswirtschaftliche Gesellschaft (Society of Political Econ-
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omy). This organization helped publish some of Müller-Armack’s pamphlets on
the social market economy. More importantly, these businessmen brought Müller-
Armack into contact with the budding liberal F ree Democratic Party (FDP).
Through the summer of 1947, the FDP supported economic programs based upon
some form of economic planning. After the establishment of the Bizone in early
1947, the FDP began moving toward a more liberal economic program, culmi-
nating in January 1948 with the Wageroog Program. This statement, promulgated
by the British Zone FDP, laid down free market principles as essential for the de-
velopment of German freedom. In many respects, the writings of Müller-Armack
and Röpke provided a theoretical base for the development of the FDP’s program.35
Meanwhile, when the war ended, the American occupation for ces appointed
Erhard as economic administrator for the area of northern Bavaria. Due to both
his antisocialist position and his r elatively clean past during the Third Reich, in
September 1945 the Americans r ecommended him to the S ocial Democratic
(SPD) minister president of Bavaria as economics minister for the state of Bavaria,
a post that he filled until January 1947. In December 1946 the SPD government
in Bavaria was replaced by the conservative Christian Social Union (CSU). Fol-
lowing the change in government, some members of the CSU and the SPD ac-
cused Erhard of administrative incompetence and he subsequently resigned from
his position. In November 1947 Erhard secured a position at the U niversity of
Munich through his contacts with the liberal economist Adolf Weber, and began
promoting free market principles by publishing articles in newspapers such as Die
Neue Zeitung. In these ar ticles Erhard echoed the ideas of the neoliberals. H e
stressed the idea that the government was responsible for stepping into the econ-
omy in order to preserve free competition. In addition, he argued that the fr ee
market that enjoyed true free competition was a form of the economy that was so-
cial because it benefited all consumers—that is, everyone within society.36
In the summer and fall of 1946 the British and Americans had begun planning
the fusion of their occupation z ones into one economic unit—a most daunting
job indeed, giv en the differ ent political organizations of the individual z ones.
While the American Z one was organiz ed into the v arious Länder (states), the
British Zone was directed by central zonal organizations, especially in economics.
Meanwhile, the French and the Soviets refused to participate in coordinating the
zonal administrations. In August 1946, the American military governor, General
Lucius Clay, announced plans to create the so-called Bizone, which would main-
tain fiv e central offices, staffed b y German civil ser vants, to administer the
economies, transpor tation, finances, post, and food supply of the two z ones. 
Although the Bizone was officially implemented on 1 January 1947, it had been
operational since September 1946.37
Prior to joining the American and B ritish zones’ economies together, as early
as December 1945 the occupation go vernments in the American, B ritish, and
French zones of occupation had allo wed the establishment of G erman political
parties. Retaining control of par ty licensing, the occupying po wers gave special
preference to the development of moderate parties such as the CDU/CSU, SPD,
Origins of the Social Market Economy and the Currency Reform of 1948   |   35
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
and FDP.38 The creation of the Bizone marked the start of disputes between the
CDU and the SPD on economic issues. A t the conclusion of the war , the SPD
foresaw the cr eation of an “ economic democracy” (Wirtschaftsdemokratie) that
entailed the social and economic transformation of G erman society, including
some form of a socialist planned economy—par ticularly in r egard to heavy in-
dustry—and worker r epresentation within companies ’ boards. Meanwhile, by
1946 elements of the CDU were drifting toward support of the free market, while
many of the par ty’s mainstr eam leaders suppor ted “Christian S ocialism.” The
control of the new bureaucracies within the Bizone would become a central point
of contention between the two parties.
The Economics Administration, the most important of the five Bizone offices,
drew its staffers mostly from the Zentralamt für Wirtschaft (Central Economics
Office, Z AW) in M inden in the B ritish Zone. With the suppor t of B ritain’s
Labour government, this group had been working toward the creation of a cen-
trally planned economy in the B ritish Zone. Yet in S eptember 1946 the com-
mand of the ne w Economics Administration was giv en not to Viktor Agar tz
(SPD), who had run the ZAW in Minden, but instead, following tough negotia-
tions between economics ministers from the British and American zones, to the
Hessian economics minister Rudolf Mueller, who had clear free market proclivi-
ties. But in face of pressure from the head of the SPD, Kurt Schumacher, Mueller
was replaced in January 1947 by Agartz, who sought to redouble SPD efforts for
socialization and a planned economy. In addition, the SPD had occupied all of
the economics minister positions in the Länder (states) by this point.39 As a con-
sequence, the CDU/CSU was ex cluded from decision making on economics
throughout the Bizone. This setback galvanized cooperation among the bourgeois
opposition against the SPD and sharpened the political and economic conflict be-
tween the SPD and the CDU/CSU. F aced with this political competition fr om
the SPD, the CDU/CSU, especially the organization in the American Z one,
began moving toward a liberal-conservative position that supported the free mar-
ket.40 Lacking national-level political bodies, political par ties struggled against
one other within the administrative offices of the developing Bizone. It was in this
context that the positions and identity of the West German par ties began to
emerge. 
In May 1947 the military governors of the two occupation zones announced
the reorganization of the Bizone agencies by creating a number of new organiza-
tions centered in Frankfurt to streamline administration. To oversee the economic
reconstruction of the combined zones, an overarching economic administration,
the Wirtschaftsrat (Economics Council), functioned as a quasi-parliamentary con-
trol organ. Under the direction of the Bipartite Control Group of the two occu-
pying powers, the Wirtschaftsrat could issue laws dealing with a number of areas
crucial to the B izone’s economic r econstruction, including transpor tation, pro-
duction and distribution of goods, raw materials, foreign and domestic trade, and
price formation and controls. The Exekutivrat (Executive Council), comprised of
representatives from the eight Länder (states) of the British and American zones,
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was to o versee the inter ests of the Länder and coordinate the activities of the 
directors of the five Verwaltungen (administrations offices) of economics, trans-
portation, finance, post, and food. B ecause the CDU/CSU’s delegation to the
Economic Council was larger than the SPD’ s, it was able to r elegate the Social
Democrats to the opposition and dir ect the activities of the B izone. Johannes
Semler, a Bavarian leader of the CSU who supported the free market, was tapped
as the new director of the Economics Administration on 23 July 1947 after Vic-
tor Agartz resigned due to illness.41 Over the course of 1947, CDU/CSU repre-
sentatives began working closely with other “bourgeois” parties in the Economics
Council, especially the liberal FDP, in order to form a bloc against the SPD. I n
many respects, the parties in the Bizone were already working in the same fash-
ion as the coalition that would be formed in September 1949 following the first
parliamentary elections.
The new head of the Economics Administration, facing the extreme shortage
of raw materials, food, and consumer goods, continued to follow a policy of price
controls and rationing within the B izone. As Agartz had before, Semler worked
for the revival of heavy industry within the Ruhr as an essential element in the Bi-
zone’s overall economic recovery and sought to eliminate key bottlenecks in the
economy, including problems in transportation, coal production, and electricity
supply.42 However, in early January 1948 Semler had gotten himself into trouble
with the American occupiers. In a meeting with CSU leaders, Semler was critical
of the food supplied by the occupiers, labeling the grain fodder aid from the US
as “chicken feed,” a comment picked up b y the American press. This prompted
accusations that Semler was “sabotaging the cooperation of German offices with
the Allied authorities.” On 26 January 1948 he was dismissed by the Allied mil-
itary governors, creating animosity on the part of the CDU/CSU members of the
Economics Council. With Semler’s ouster the threat grew that the Germans sit-
ting on the v arious boards and committees of the E conomics Administration
would be less willing to cooperate with the occupying for ces, thereby hindering
reconstruction. After a cooling period, ho wever, the tensions r elaxed.43 In any
case, Erhard, the former economics minister of B avaria, was named his perma-
nent successor.
Before this turn of events, in the autumn of 1947, Erhard had been appointed
to the Sonderstelle für Geld und Kredit (Special Bureau for Monetary and Cur-
rency Matters) of the E conomics Council. From this position, and in consulta-
tion with the neoliberal economist Walter Eucken, Erhard quickly adv anced a
policy of sound money and price deregulation within the newly formed Bizone.
With the money supply reduced, producers would have more incentive to gener-
ate consumer goods. Even after Erhard had left the Special Bureau, the organiza-
tion continued to work for the introduction of new currency in the Bizone.44 On
2 April 1948, Erhard officially took up the position of director of the Economics
Administration of the Bizone. The FDP’s acceptance of market principles proved
to be cr ucial at this junctur e. The Economics Council was divided, with for ty-
four CDU/CSU representatives versus forty-six Social Democrats and Commu-
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nists, but the CDU/CSU leader , Konrad Adenauer, wanted at all costs to av oid
forming a coalition with the SPD. The CDU/CSU could not agree on whom to
name to the position of economics dir ector, especially with the str ong trade
unionist wing of the CDU/CSU suppor ting more economic contr ols and em-
phasis upon heavy industry. The FDP, on the other hand, was promoting Erhard
as director of the Economics Administration and its support was crucial in creat-
ing an antisocialist bloc. As a r esult, in heated discussions in early M arch 1948,
the CDU/CSU and FDP compr omised by nominating the Christian S ocialist
Herman Pünder from Cologne to head the whole Bizone, while Erhard was nom-
inated as the director of the Economics Administration—a position to which he
was elected on 2 March 1948.45 As some historians have suggested, Erhard’s quick
rise from obscure industrial researcher to head of the economy in the Bizone was
due more to political wheeling and dealing than the CDU/CSU’s commitment to
his economic ideas.46
As director of the Economics Administration, Erhard was in a position to pro-
mote some of his basic economic principles—especially his firm belief in the
competitive free market as the most efficient method of distributing resources and
effectively uniting producer and consumer. Along with the imminent currency re-
form being pushed by the Americans, Erhard was proposing radical liberalization
of controls over the B izone economy. In addition, he thought G erman trade
should be freed from restrictions and called for ending of some of the rationing—
in other words, the introduction of the free market. Erhard also called for increas-
ing production of consumer goods. In the months prior to the currency reform,
Erhard pushed through the Law Governing the Guiding Principals for Controls
and Pricing Policy after the Currency Reform, which allotted the director of the
Economics Administration greater powers in resource allocation and pricing. This
Guiding Principles Law, approved by the Economics Council on 18 June 1948,
meant, in practice, that Erhard had a much freer hand in the liberalization of the
West German economy. Although the law still had to be passed by the Länderrat
and the Allied powers, Erhard announced immediately following the 20 June cur-
rency reform that price controls on a range of mostly consumer goods would be
relaxed. In all about 400 items were no longer under price controls. 
The occupying authorities feared that the removal of rationing and price con-
trols and ceilings would weaken the currency through inflation. Erhard, however,
was convinced that market forces, much better than bureaucratic controls, would
unleash the potential of the economy thr ough the rational decision making of
both producers and consumers. When the militar y governor of the B izone de-
manded that Erhard explain his actions, considering him to have no right to alter
price controls, Erhard is reported to have replied, “I have not altered them. I have
abolished them.” This process of price liberalization continued, and by July 1948,
90 percent of price controls had been eliminated. This applied for mostly manu-
factured and consumer goods, as a number of controls on items such as rents, util-
ities, transport fares, industrial raw materials, international transactions, and the
capital market all remained in place.47
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In spite of what could be called Erhard’s theatrics, the United States proved to
be the decisive force in the creation of West Germany’s new currency. When the
American army occupied Germany in 1945, there was no clear plan in terms of
monetary policy. But with the Reichsmark (RM) being practically worthless and
the majority of the G erman population sur viving through barter and the black
market, it was clear that G ermany’s monetary situation had to be stabiliz ed. A
group of economic exper ts, led by Gerhard Colm and Ray G oldsmith, was dis-
patched to Germany by the American go vernment to work out the details of a
plan. There they worked with General Clay’s financial advisor, Joseph Dodge, to
produce the Colm-Dodge-Goldsmith Plan, which called for a currency reform in
all four occupation zones. All through 1946 the four powers discussed plans for
such a reform, but disagreements over who would print the new currency led to
the breaking off of negotiations. B y 25 S eptember 1947, the decision had been
made to intr oduce a ne w currency in the Western zones. From February until
April 1948 the ne w Deutsche Mark notes arriv ed in B remenhaven from the
United States. So as to appear politically neutral, the notes featured neither an is-
suing authority nor a place of issue or signatur e. On 20 J une 1948, the ne w
Deutsche Mark was introduced in the American, British, and French occupation
zones. Not until four days later , after a curr ency reform was announced for the
Soviet Zone, including East B erlin, was the w estern currency introduced into
West Berlin.48
With the currency reform, the old worthless Reichsmark was to be exchanged
for the new Deutsche Mark (DM) on a one-to-one basis. But one could only ex-
change up to 40 old R eichsmarks into the new currency. Two months later one
could exchange another 20 Reichsmarks. In addition, each employer was able to
exchange RM 60 for each emplo yee in or der to meet payr olls. Wages, salaries,
rents, and pensions continued at their old rates. I n contrast, liquid assets, bank
deposits, and liabilities were converted at the rate of RM 10 to DM 1. In effect,
the currency reform drew about 93.5 percent of all currency out of circulation.49
The aforementioned relaxation of price controls of many consumer goods was in-
stituted in conjunction with the currency reform. Erhard had his press secretary
announce on the radio this reduction of price controls on the day of the currency
reform, although articles such as essential foodstuffs, coal and iron, and clothing
remained under controls.50
The public sensed that the currency reform had a positive effect on the econ-
omy. Official statistics indicated that industrial production rose 30 percent from
the second to third quarter of 1948, although it is not entirely clear whether this
reflected real production gains or that firms were more willing to report their ac-
tual production after the currency reform.51 For months retailers had been hoard-
ing goods because they did not want to accumulate the practically wor thless
Reichsmarks. Yet in the days before the currency reform, consumers were buying
up absurd quantities of anything shopkeepers would sell. It was common to hear
stories of people buying bulk supplies of Dr. Oetkers’ glaze for cakes—enough for
2,800—or hundreds of Reichmarks’ worth of aspirin, bathing salts, or rat poison.
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The currency reform destroyed the black market, which had been a source of ne-
cessities for many West Germans. Overnight all kinds of goods appeared in store-
keepers’ windows. Newspapers reported an unbelievable availability of goods. 52
Instead of a scar city of goods being chased b y abundant but wor thless money,
now there were available goods but money was scarce. People were given the in-
centive to work for wages instead of r esorting to the black mar ket and barter—
thereby setting the economy on mor e stable footing. A ccording to the popular
news magazine Der Spiegel, black market prices had fallen dramatically after the
currency reform, and sellers were having a hard time moving their goods. The ar-
ticle noted that with the fall of the black mar ket value of American cigar ettes,
which thereby lowered the income derived from American GIs, German prosti-
tutes in Frankfurt “for the first time in the history of the occupation, gave inter-
ested looks to Germans passing by with their valuable Deutsche Marks.”53
Despite the new availability of consumer goods, clear drawbacks accompanied
the currency reform. With one fell swoop—and, considering the hyperinflation
of 1923, for the second time in twenty-five years—the small saver saw his savings
wiped out. Within this context an important part of the currency reform mythol-
ogy emerged that the r eform was a “ great leveler” in society because ev eryone
started off with DM 40. But one must also consider that the owners of physical
assets or means of industrial or agricultural pr oduction had 90 per cent of their
debt wiped out. These were the same people who were in good position to enjoy
the boom that emerged in the 1950s. Meanwhile, workers, pensioners, and small
savers lost practically all their liquid assets. Even the 1952 passage of the so-called
Lastenausgleich (equalization of burdens), which transferred wealth to those who
had suffered material damage during the war, did not seriously alter the unequal
distribution of wealth within West German society.54
People were generally supportive of the curr ency reform soon after its enact-
ment. In a sur vey conducted b y the I nstitut für D emoskopie following the r e-
form, 71 percent of those polled expressed satisfaction that the curr ency reform
had occurred. This number had climbed to 74 per cent by July 1948. As of O c-
tober 1948, 43 percent of respondents believed that their lives had become easier
since the currency reform, while 37 percent considered life to be more difficult.55
In addition, an OMGUS (Office of Military Government, United States) survey
reported a remarkable shift in people ’s concerns following the currency reform.
Fifty-eight percent of respondents in July 1948 anticipated improvement in their
living conditions in the coming year, and belief that the black market was a seri-
ous problem tumbled fr om 48 per cent in J une to 16 per cent the follo wing
month. The surveys reflected that West Germans were less anxious about obtain-
ing necessary foodstuffs. Prior to the currency reform, 54 percent of Germans in
the American Zone named food procurement as their main concern. This figure
had dropped to 19 percent by July 1948, and by 1949 it was down to 10 percent.56
To a certain extent, the surveys reflect sentiments found by later social historians
who have argued that researchers should approach the period between the defeat
at the Battle of Stalingrad in 1943 and the 1948 currency reform as a whole, given
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the common experience of bomb attacks, destr uction, extr eme shor tages, and
starvation. For many West Germans, it was not the ending of military hostilities
in May 1945 but the currency reform that represented a dramatic change in their
social conditions and an impr ovement in their ability to meet the most basic
needs for existence.57
Yet, the optimism following the currency reform was surely measured. About
a quarter of all West Germans thought that Germany would never recover eco-
nomically. In addition, in July 1948 a full 42 percent regarded their lives as more
difficult since the curr ency reform. Other worries center ed around the rise in
prices. In the months after the curr ency reform, financial pr oblems superseded
food as the chief concern for G ermans (60 percent). Following the currency re-
form, 43 percent of respondents anticipated that prices would rise in the next few
weeks, while only 25 percent thought prices would fall. This concern continued
through December 1948, when 36 per cent believed prices would rise but de-
creased dramatically by March 1949, when only 7 percent thought prices would
rise while 64 percent anticipated they would fall.58 One survey conducted in the
American Zone r eported that huge majorities of r espondents (no exact figur e
given) believed that the currency reform would increase the unemployment rate.
In addition, though a large majority was willing to wor k more in order to earn
more, many believed that they would not hav e the opportunity to do so .59 Un-
employment climbed from 442,000 in June 1948 to 937,000 in J anuary 1949,
since a number of firms had to let workers go when they could not afford to pay
them in the more valuable Deutsche Mark after the currency reform. Wages were
frozen until the beginning of N ovember 1948 at lev els established during the
Third Reich. Workers’ concerns about work, prices, and wages were expressed in
a very tangible way when the trade union council of the Bizone called a 24-hour
strike, held on 12 November 1948, to demand higher wages.60
In addition, many West Germans were concerned about how the currency re-
form was implemented. O ne frequent complaint, as r eported in an I nstitut für
Demoskopie survey from June 1948, was that “ social factors should been taken
into consideration” when formulating the curr ency reform.61 In July 1948, 79
percent of West Germans believed that cer tain levels of society had dispr opor-
tionately benefited from the currency reform. These advantaged groups included
businessmen (named by 62 percent of respondents), manufacturers (38 percent),
and capitalists (20 percent).62
Despite the o verall positive view many West Germans held of the curr ency 
reform, its impact on the West German economy has come under scrutiny. Some
historians since the 1970s hav e questioned the v alidity of the idea “Wirtschafts-
wunder” in general and the overall effects of the currency reform on the develop-
ment of the West German economy in particular. Foremost among these historians
is Werner Abelshauser, who has argued that West Germany’s economic gr owth
from the late 1940s through the 1950s represented a period of catching up after
the destructive impact of the war , and that ev entually West Germany fell into
longer-term trends of tw entieth-century economic gr owth.63 Abelshauser chal-
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lenged the often accepted roots of the economic miracle by attacking the follow-
ing postulates: that the West German recovery began with the currency reform of
20 June 1948; that this recovery was based upon foreign aid, especially the Mar-
shall Plan; and that the changes in the political economy associated with the so-
cial market economy triggered the eventual West German economic recovery.64
Abelshauser argued that between 1945 and 1948 the West German economy
was plagued not so much by the destruction of the war, but instead by bottlenecks
in the economy, especially coal shortages and the inadequate transportation sys-
tem. Economic indicators showed that the West German economy was alr eady
improving by the time of the curr ency r eform in 1948. I n fact, A belshauser
pointed out, the total amount of fixed industrial assets was actually about 20 per-
cent higher in 1945 than in 1936 because of the heavy war time investment in
German industry. Even in 1948, after the impact of depreciation, reparations, and
dismantling had been felt, fix ed industrial assets w ere about 11 per cent higher
than in 1936.65 Under the direction of economic planning the bottlenecks hin-
dering the West German economy’s potential growth had been overcome by late
1947, and real reconstruction had begun. Because of this achievement, produc-
tion was already increasing by the time the currency reform was instituted in June
1948. The perception that the curr ency reform spurred the pr oduction of ne w
goods was a function of the release of hoarded goods that had been building for
more than a year beforehand. Therefore, the currency reform did not induce a rise
in production.66 More recently, scholars have challenged Abelshauser’s view of the
currency reform. They have particularly attacked what they call an overassessment
of West German industrial production prior to the currency reform—thereby di-
minishing the size of the post-r eform increase in industrial pr oduction.67 To b e
sure, in laying claim to West Germany’s economic r esurgence during the late
1940s and 1950s, Erhard and the neoliberals focused too narrowly upon the cur-
rency reform and market liberalization as the keys to West Germany’s and their
own success. In contrast, newer works have not taken their accounts at face value
and have wisely tried to place E rhard within the larger context of both internal
and external forces driving West Germany’s economic growth.68
Apart from discussions on West Germany’s political economy and more pertinent
for this study, however, is Abelshauser’s critique of the mythologies and legends
that arose around the currency reform and proved critical for the development of
politics in the Federal Republic. Abelshauser examined some of the legends that
have subsequently emerged—such as the belief that the currency reform was the
product of Germans or Ludwig Erhard in particular, that it represented an equal
start economically for all West German citizens, and that it singlehandedly trig-
gered West Germany’s subsequent economic gr owth.69 These views of the J une
1948 curr ency r eform and the social mar ket economy pr ovided conser vatives
with important political prestige—prestige that was apparent in West Germany’s
first federal elections in 1949. Throughout the 1950s the meaning of the economic
miracle and the social market economy was to be constructed and reconstructed—
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especially by those who stood to gain politically from public perceptions of these
developments. Although studies of the political economy by economic historians
can track the growth of the economy, they do not necessarily trace the perception
of economic realities held by people at the time. These perceptions, perhaps more
than any statistical analysis of the economy, had a critical impact upon develop-
ments underway in West Germany’s political culture. 
One must remember that on 20 June 1948, the currency reform was viewed
by all in West Germany not as a German measure, or one led by Ludwig Erhard,
but instead as one of the American occupier ’s policies. But even by the summer
of 1948 the mythology surr ounding the curr ency reform and bir th of the eco-
nomic miracle had begun to form. Some of the key aspects of this mythology in-
cluded the view that German economic life was overwhelmingly handicapped by
Allied military controls, an absence of a stable currency, the black market, and the
Allied dismantling of the G erman industrial capital, as opposed to attributing
economic problems to larger internal structural and international economic con-
ditions. Immediately following the currency reform, the American-British news-
reel Welt im Film (The World in Film) portrayed the reform to the population of
the three Western zones of occupation. I n an analysis of these films, M artin
Loiperdinger concluded that their reportage of the currency reform included many
of the “facts,” especially in terms of problems accompanying the currency reform,
such as social tensions and rising prices. At the same time, however, the films lent
themselves to the creation of myths and legends surrounding the currency reform.
They conveyed in an optimistic tone that the reform had ushered in a new era for
German economic recovery. When they did admit that prices had risen, the films
tried to persuade viewers that they could change prices by not frittering away their
money and by rationally participating in the mechanism of supply and demand.
When the 12 November 1948 workers’ strike and ongoing rallies against price in-
creases were portrayed, the films emphasized that this was not the pr oper way a
democracy worked. Explaining that while it was legitimate that the workers were
on strike, the single strike cost the Bizone DM 200 million in production while
Marshall Plan funds were flowing into Germany. The film editing made the Ger-
man workers appear selfish at a time when other nations were lending Germany
a helping hand. All the while, Loiperdinger concluded, the films pointed to Lud-
wig Erhard as the person to solve West Germany’s economic problems.70
In fact, Erhard himself was responsible for the creation of the mythology and
legend surrounding the currency reform. Since his days at the S ociety for Con-
sumer Research in Nuremberg, Erhard had realized the importance of the “psy-
chological” forces behind economics. H e would later addr ess this subject in his
1957 work, Wohlstand für Alle. Erhard argued that “psychology” was an instr u-
ment equal in v alue to traditional economic policies. P eople’s actions and atti-
tudes regarding economics had to be changed in order to bring them in line with
general economic aims. Erhard concluded, “Above all, the people must be made
to understand that to follo w the voice of good common sense and of economic
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reason will, in the long run, result in their benefit.”71 Erhard was clearly aware of
the importance of public opinion regarding the economy. In fact, as head of the
Economics Administration, E rhard had commissioned the abo ve-mentioned
public opinion surveys from the Institut für Demoskopie in order to keep track
of the swings of public opinion following the currency reform.72
On 21 June 1948, the day after the curr ency reform, Erhard went to the air-
waves to promote faith in the new currency and to explain the necessity of the re-
form. E rhard opened his speech b y proclaiming that “[a]fter sev eral days of
mental and spiritual anxiety , we have r elapsed into the r outine of daily life.”
Wishing to be viewed only as an “expert” who harbored no political ambition, Er-
hard explained that the German people could have confidence in what he called “our
new currency” and in the decision to abandon the principle of a state-controlled
economy. He was not, he argued, “appealing to some vague, obscure faith, not to
an irrational belief in a miracle, when I tr y to strengthen the confidence of our
people in our new currency.” In addition, he tried to convince the German peo-
ple that prices would come down as the economy righted itself under the for ces
of the market. Erhard then went on to addr ess the technical aspects of the cur-
rency reform and what it would mean for the development of the West German
economy, a message that probably went over most listeners’ heads.73 In terms of
actually convincing the public, the effectiv eness of E rhard’s public addr ess was
perhaps questionable, for at this point he was relatively unknown to the German
public. Nevertheless, his speech was one of the opening salvos in what would prove
to be a barrage of public relations efforts that Erhard would either coordinate or
endorse over the course of the 1950s. I n addition, it was a G erman voice that
came onto the airwaves to reassure the public, not that of an American occupier—
thereby helping Germans associate Erhard with what was seen as part of the lib-
eration, both economically and politically, of Germans from Allied authorities. 
In many respects, the currency reform intensified tensions between the three
Western powers and the S oviet Union and acted as a po werful impetus in the 
establishment of the new Federal Republic of Germany. The Soviet Union coun-
tered with the introduction of its own currency in the Eastern Zone on 23 June
1948 and blockaded entry into West Berlin the following day. The Western allies
responded with the Berlin Airlift, flying all food, fuel, and supplies into the be-
sieged city until the Soviets lifted the blockade on 12 May 1949. Meanwhile, in
February 1948 the three Western occupying powers along with the Benelux coun-
tries had recommended the creation of a West German government, followed by
the proposal in July 1948 by the three Western military governors to the minis-
ter presidents of the Länder (states) in the Western Zones that they form a Parlia-
mentary Council to draw up the constitution for the new West German state. The
subsequent Parliamentary Council met in Bonn fr om September 1948 through
May 1949 writing the draft for the West German constitution, the Grundgesetz
(Basic Law). The Basic Law was passed by the Parliamentary Council on 8 May
1949, approved by the Western powers on 12 M ay, and ratified b y the parlia-
ments of the West German states on 23 May with elections scheduled for August.
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In large part because of economic imperativ es, particularly the need for a stable
currency as aid began streaming into the Western zones, Germany was divided.
As subsequent chapters of this work will show, business and political interests
constructed a meaning of the currency reform and the ensuing economic miracle
that lent suppor t to both the fr ee market and the conser vative CDU/CSU.
Werner Abelshauser has identified perhaps the most important legacy of the cur-
rency reform in regard to the development of West German politics: the reform
helped set up a dichotomy betw een the Marktwirtschaft (market economy) and
Planwirtschaft (planned economy) that allowed no reconciliation, manifesting it-
self particularly in the 1949 election campaign. Abelshauser has suggested that the
position betw een the CDU/CSU’ s “ directed fr ee mar ket” (gelenkte Mark-
twirtschaft) of the social market economy and the SPD’s “free directed economy”
(marktwirtschaftliche Lenkungswirtschaft) were, in fact, not far apar t from each
other. Yet, the policy of “planning” came to be remembered by most Germans as
“primarily the planning out of the Stone Age of the economy as practiced in the
Third Reich, as w ell as in the S oviet occupation Z one.”74 Although the SPD
never supported such an economic system, the par ty during the 1950s did not
manage to disassociate itself from it. Abelshauser may be correct in his assessment
that the economic gurus of the SPD and the CDU/CSU might not have been far
apart in terms of their policies. The fact remains, however, that Adenauer and the
CDU/CSU found a way to ensur e that economics did become a divisiv e or
“wedge” issue cr eating a sharp distinction betw een the par ties. This distinction
was to be further developed and exploited by the CDU/CSU in the Federal Re-
public’s first elections.
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Chapter 2
MARKET OR PLANNED?
THE 1949 BUNDESTAG ELECTION

In the 14 August 1949 Bundestagwahl (federal parliamentary elections), the con-
servative Christian Democratic Party and its sister party in Bavaria, the Christian
Social Union (CDU/CSU) collected 31 percent of the vote, the largest percent-
age of all parties. It was enough to beat narrowly their main rival, the Social De-
mocratic Party (SPD), which garner ed 29.2 per cent. Together with the liberal
Free Democratic Party (FDP, 11.9 percent) and the conser vative German Party
(DP, 4 percent), the CDU/CSU was able to form a government in the first Bun-
destag of the F ederal Republic of Germany. In his Regierungserklärung (govern-
ment statement) on 20 September, Chancellor Konrad Adenauer commented:
The question of planned economy or social mar ket economy played a decisive role in the
election. The German people have spoken with a great majority against the planned economy.
A [grand] coalition between the parties that oppose the planned economy and those that
support the planned economy has been rejected by the will of the majority of the voters.1
Historians examining the 1949 election campaign have concurred with Adenauer
that the issue of economic policy proved decisive in the election. Moreover, dur-
ing the campaign the social market economy and the CDU/CSU became united
in public perception.2 But the question r emains: In what way did the choice of
“Market or P lanned” manage to play a cr ucial role in the federal elections of
1949? How did the CDU/CSU represent and use the social market economy as
a political platform? And, perhaps more importantly, how did the 1949 election
campaign prepare the way for subsequent use of the social market economy and
the emerging concept of the economic miracle as political tools?
Notes for this section begin on page 88.
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Jürgen Falter, a prominent scholar of German politics, has described the 1949
federal election campaign as not marking the beginning of the Federal Republic
party system, especially in terms of the sociological characteristics of the par ties.
Instead, he argues that the 1949 election was the last of the type of elections in
the pattern of the Reichstag elections of the Weimar Republic.3 This assessment
is accurate, considering that there were many parties that successfully collected at
least 5 percent of the vote in the individual Länder (states), the minimum to gain
a seat in the Bundestag. This was much like the case of the splintered political sys-
tem that plagued the Weimar Republic.4 All told, eleven different parties moved
into the first Bundestag. On the other hand, in the 1949 election the pillars of the
Federal Republic party system were already taking shape. The three parties that
would form the stable party system through the 1980s, the CDU/CSU, the SPD,
and the FDP, had already gathered 72.1 percent of the vote in the 1949 election.
These parties embodied the three main strains of German political thought: par-
ties of conservative, socialist, and liberal tendencies.5 In addition, the sociological
subcultures that characteriz ed Weimar political behavior had begun to disinte-
grate by the 1949 election. Most significant in regard to voting behavior was the
breakdown of religious subcultures. Undoubtedly, the CDU/CSU, as successor to
the prewar Catholic Center Party, garnered much of its support from Catholics—
about two thirds of its voters. Overall, the CDU/CSU in the Federal Republic as
the Center P arty in the G erman R eich attracted a similar pr oportion of
Catholics—about 55 percent. At the same time, the CDU/CSU was able to reach
out to Protestant votes that were critical to its electoral success, a pattern that was
absent in the Weimar Republic. For example, 1924 R eichstag election r esults
show that nearly 100 percent of the Center Party’s votes came from Catholics. In
the 1950s the CDU/CSU gained a bit over 35 percent of its vote from Protestants.6
Along with its staunch anticommunist stance, the social market economy can be
interpreted as a crucial political issue used by the CDU/CSU to break out of the
Catholic ghetto to which its Center Party forerunner was consigned. Already by
the 1949 election, the CDU/CSU was beginning to direct its propaganda regard-
ing the social market economy toward groups that would make it a broad-based
party, although its methods could be best described as unsophisticated. 
I would also argue that although the 1949 Bundestag election represented con-
tinuities from Weimar, or perhaps the beginning of a transitional period, in regard
to the sociological base of the parties, it also was very similar to Weimar elections
in terms of the methods utilized in campaigning. The message of the CDU/CSU
was transmitted to the public through traditional means: the leaflet, the political
poster, and speeches.7 For the first Bundestag campaign, the CDU/CSU did not
yet have at its disposal the wide batter y of parallel pr opaganda instruments it
would possess in the late 1950s, but instead was limited mainly to the propaganda
generated by the party itself. There was no real use of either modern advertising
techniques or public opinion polls, r esources that would be fully utiliz ed in the
future B undestag elections. The pr opaganda methods pr omulgated b y the
CDU/CSU were crude and direct, reminiscent of the techniques utilized during
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the Weimar era. Although cer tain party personalities who adv anced the CDU/
CSU program rose to the forefront of the campaign, especially Konrad Adenauer
and Ludwig Erhard, the campaign was not centered upon the party leaders to the
extent of elections to come. In these subsequent campaigns, the CDU/CSU be-
came highly successful at creating campaigns focused on leaders personifying cer-
tain images and positions of the par ty. In 1949, however, CDU/CSU programs
or accomplishments took precedence over any one person. P ropaganda was still
based on a par ty’s ideological position, in this case fav oring the social mar ket
economy, and was directed primarily toward energizing the party faithful, which
was characteristic of Weimar elections. I n many r espects, the “image ” of the
CDU/CSU as the par ty of the economic miracle had not fully emerged as it
would in the late 1950s. In particular, the social market economy was defined not
as the w ellspring but the antithesis of self-indulgent consumerism, unfetter ed
capitalism, and excessive individualism—qualities that the Christian element of
the CDU/CSU saw as contributing to the rise of Nazism. The social market econ-
omy was portrayed as fundamental to what has been called an antimaterialist po-
sition toward the economy , in which the economic system would allo w an
organic, secure German community to reconstruct itself in contrast to the N azi
past, the social and moral turmoil of the immediate postwar y ears, and the per-
ceived Marxist threat to the East. 8 This approach is not surprising since most
West Germans in 1949 were pursuing not luxury or consumerist goods, but rather
basic necessities such as adequate food, shelter , and clothing. With its approach
in the 1949 campaign, the CDU/CSU shaped the public consumption of the 
social market economy primarily as a position that could be seen by its base sup-
porters as a holdover from some of the party’s Catholic Center Party roots in the
Weimar Republic. However, Adenauer was clearly interested in also using the pro-
gram to reach out to new groups of voters.
At its founding in the individual zones of occupation the CDU/CSU had not
supported a free market economy. In this respect, the CDU/CSU was similar to
almost all of the emerging parties in Germany that sought more collectivist solu-
tions to what seemed like unmasterable economic challenges born of G ermany’s
vast destruction. In fact, Germany had a long tradition of state involvement in the
economy, and public opinion in the immediate postwar years seemed to support
such an approach. In the years following the war, the CDU was a patchwor k of
both differing ideologies and local political organizations—many times compet-
ing against each other for leadership at the national level. During the summer of
1945 Christian Democratic parties began to emerge across Germany with three
main centers: the Rhineland (par ticularly Cologne), F rankfurt am M ain, and
Berlin. Overall, an avowed goal of the early CDU, whose actual name emerged
from leaders in B erlin, was to cr eate an inter confessional par ty that combined
Catholics and Protestants pursuing Christian policies in the political, economic,
and moral reconstruction of Germany.
Until 1950 there was no real centralized party machine running the CDU, so
local organizations directed much of the par ty’s decision making. The Christian
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party in Bavaria, the CSU, remained completely separate from the CDU in its or-
ganization, although it campaigned with the CDU and sat in a combined fraktion
(parliamentary faction) in the Bundestag. However, since many of the early CDU
organizers were former Center Party and Christian trade union members, the three
pillar organizations of the CDU, especially the CDU in the Rhineland that was
situated within the British Zone of occupation, supported an economic program
that could be best described as “Christian Socialist.” In June 1945 the Rhineland
CDU leaders issued the Kölner Leitsätze (Cologne Principles), which advocated an
egalitarian wage policy and a redistribution of industrial resources. Other regional
CDU organizations took similar positions over the course of the summer of 1945.
In its founding in June 1945, the B erlin CDU called for the nationalization of
raw materials and key industries. Jakob Kaiser, a Nazi opponent and head of the
Eastern Zone and the Berlin branch of the CDU starting in December 1945, had
a background in Christian trade unions from before the Nazi seizure of power. He
championed a form of socialism based upon “Christian r esponsibility” and pro-
claimed in 1945 that with the defeat of N azism, a new socialist era was at hand
in postwar Germany and that a capitalist, bourgeois age had come to an end—a
sentiment echoed also by Konrad Adenauer in the British Zone.9
Christian Socialism entailed the sear ch for a middle way betw een capitalism
and the planned economy of pure Marxism. The large firms, or at least basic in-
dustries, large banks, and insurance firms should be passed o ver to community
control. But Christian Socialism opposed simple nationalization. I nstead, it en-
visioned a decentralization of economic po wer into the hands of emplo yers,
unions, consumers, and community interests in an attempt to balance the inter-
ests of capital and labor. Not only the class interests of Marxism, but also the hy-
perindividualism of fr ee-market liberalism was to be forsaken in fav or of the
creation of a balanced, classless, Christian community that pr otected individual
dignity and freedom from excessive statism. To many of the early CDU leaders,
the materialism and secularism of the capitalist economy , combined with the
Prussian traditions of statism, were what had caused Germany to fall prey to the
Nazis. Christian S ocialists believed Germany’s idealized Gemeinschaft (commu-
nity) had been shattered in the nineteenth century by industrial capitalism’s focus
on individual material acquisition within a mass, urban society. The Nazis’ hedo-
nistic and pagan promises of a racial paradise on earth had merely exploited these
trends already in place. The Communists to the East were the latest manifestation
of these dangerous aspects of modern life: materialism, secularism, and state con-
trol of the individual. Christian Socialism seemed like a natural political position
for the developing CDU in a devastated Germany and found fertile ground in the
British Zone of occupation. With the Labour Party in power in Great Britain, the
British occupiers announced plans in O ctober 1946 to socializ e the industrial
heart of Germany, the Ruhr Valley. Christian Socialist and anticapitalist sentiments
intensified with the “hunger winter ” of 1946/47, during which most G ermans’
living conditions dramatically worsened. The ideas of Christian S ocialism were
clearly expressed by the CDU in the B ritish Zone’s Ahlen Program of February
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1947, a program viewed by many historians as a middle station in the progression
of the CDU’s economic policy fr om Christian Socialism and the social mar ket
economy.10
The Ahlen Program espoused some of the Christian Socialist ideals, but fell far
short in terms of laying out actual policies. It stated that “[t]he capitalist economic
system has become unjust for the state and social interests of the German people.”
The program went on to proclaim that “the content and goals of the social and
economic new order cannot be for capitalist profit and the striving for power, in-
stead it can only be for the w elfare of our nation [Volkes]. The German people
should maintain an economic and social system [Wirtschafts- und Sozialverfas-
sung] through common economic organization [gemeinwirtschaftliche Ordnung].”
Overall, the document was a mix of earlier radical ideas and vague demands.11 It
was radical in the sense of wanting to reduce industrial concerns to their smallest
profitable size and calling for a form of codetermination (Mitbestimmung) for
workers in economic and social decision making, but it also constituted a barrier
against communal ownership of the means of production.
The Ahlen Program represented a pragmatic tactical move on the part of Ade-
nauer and the CDU’s bourgeois-liberal elements. With his elections as chairper-
son of the CDU of the Rhineland regional organization in January 1946 and the
British Zonal organization in March 1946, Konrad Adenauer had emerged as the
CDU’s leading figure in the West. Ultimately, Adenauer feared that Christian So-
cialism would limit the CDU’s appeal and open the door to a possible coalition
with the SPD—something that Adenauer saw as a disastrous development in the
process of creating a party system dominated by non-Marxist parties. In order to
ensure his position as chairperson of the CDU in the B ritish Zone and to inter-
cept the swing of public sentiment toward Christian Socialism in the vote for the
North Rhine–Westphalia Landtag (state legislatur e) in A pril 1947, A denauer
pushed for the formation of a new economic program for the CDU in the British
Zone.12 Clearly the program was somewhat of a concession to the CDU’s Chris-
tian Socialist wing, especially to Jacob Kaiser and the CDU in Berlin, a move that
was essential because of the economic and social conditions of the winter of
1946/47. In fact, Adenauer was the driving force behind the Ahlen Program’s cre-
ation. Its espousal of the “principle of the distribution of power” in the economy
did much to undermine the nationalization plans held by Karl Arnold, a Weimar-
era trade unionist and CDU minister president of North Rhine–Westphalia from
1947 to 1957. Adenauer and Arnold had been in conflict over the CDU’s direc-
tion since late 1945. Through this measure, Adenauer and the liberal wing of the
party were able to integrate the CDU’s left wing firmly and at the same time head
off a further drifting of the party to the left. Adenauer continually used the Ahlen
Program and his control of the CDU in the British Zone to thwart Arnold’s na-
tionalization efforts in late 1947. 13 In addition, the Ahlen Program contributed
to Adenauer’s leadership of the CDU on a national level, at the expense of Kaiser’s
leadership from Berlin, as it helped open the r oad to the eventual acceptance of
Erhard’s social market economy under Adenauer’s sponsorship.
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The Ahlen P rogram reflected the ongoing dev elopment of A denauer’s eco-
nomic and political thought. Early on in the CDU’s formation, but especially as
head of the CDU in the British Zone, Konrad Adenauer realized the danger that
a policy of Christian Socialism presented in the political arena, especially on the
national level. He saw the need for the party to distinguish itself from the Social
Democrats and link itself to the center-right of the German political spectrum in
order to draw more than just the Catholic vote. He feared that a party based solely
upon Catholics, as had been the case for the Center Party during the Weimar Re-
public, and supporting Christian Socialism as part of its platform would revive di-
visions among the bourgeoisie that had weakened the Weimar system. Adenauer
realized that to be successful, the CDU must be able to branch out and integrate
support from Protestants and the conservative bourgeoisie within a nondenomi-
national Christian Party. In a meeting of the British Zone CDU held in late June
1946, Adenauer commented that “[w]ith the wor d ‘socialism’ we will win o ver
five people and tw enty people will be driv en away.”14 As a result much of A de-
nauer’s effort during 1946–1949 was centered upon developing a party program
for the CDU that would allow a broad political constellation of constituents once
the Federal Republic was formed. A denauer later commented in his memoirs
that a r esurgence in G erman political life r equired a par ty that attracted both
Catholics and Protestants. He elaborated further: “Only a very great party that in-
cluded all strata of society could rebuild a prostrate, broken Germany. It must be
a party which could appeal to employers and employed, the middle classes, farm-
ers, civil servants, intellectuals, people from the North and the South, those dri-
ven from their homes and those who had simply fled.” Consequently, as leader of
the CDU Adenauer worked hard to create bridges with Protestant political lead-
ers in North Rhine–Westphalia and across western portions of Germany. Partic-
ularly impor tant was his gr owing r elationship with R obert Pferdemenges, a
prominent Protestant banker from Cologne who played a key behind-the-scenes
role in hammering out deals with the CDU’s left wing and encouraged it to aban-
don Christian Socialism.15
The main thr eat to G ermany, from Adenauer’s perspective, no longer came
from the right, as had been the case during the late Weimar Republic, but rather
now from the left and the Social Democrats. If the CDU adopted a form of so-
cialism as part of its program, the state governments would be able to enter into
coalitions with the SPD, a dev elopment that A denauer wanted to av oid at all
costs. After the A pril 1947 Landtag elections in N orth Rhine–Westphalia, Karl
Arnold retained a number of SPD members within the administration, most no-
tably Ernst Nölting as economics minister. As minister president, Arnold contin-
ued pressing for the nationalization of industry within North Rhine–Westphalia,
although his efforts were thwarted by the Americans, who were unwilling to allow
such a policy to pr oceed as long as they w ere occupiers. The cooperation of the
CDU with the SPD in North Rhine–Westphalia was unacceptable to Adenauer.
Even worse still would be the creation of a grand coalition of the SPD and CDU
at the national level. Support of the neoliberal ideas of the social market economy
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held great appeal to Adenauer, since Erhard’s free market system would rule out
compromise between the CDU and the SPD.16 To Adenauer, the SPD represented
a mortal threat to the reconstruction of a new Germany. As plans were hashed out
for the first B undestag election in early 1949, A denauer argued that the CDU
must be successful, for otherwise the SPD would build a coalition with the Com-
munists in the first go vernment—resulting in the enslav ement of the G erman
people by way of a socialist economic policy.17 He later commented that a social-
ist Germany would disturb him less with the socialization of heavy industry, than
with the fact that the SPD had dev eloped into an “anti-Christian party” (chris-
tentumsfeindlich Partei) since 1945.18
The CDU’s inner-party developments played themselves out within the con-
text of an ever evolving national political situation. As pr eviously discussed, the
Bizone Economics Administration was fully established b y the middle of 1947
with the full integration of the American and British Zones. With a stronger or-
ganization, the Bizone created a number of ne w political structures centered in
Frankfurt to o versee the economic r econstruction of the combined B ritish and
American Zones more effectively. By this time many in the B ritish Zone CDU,
especially the members of the par ty’s Wirtschaftspolitsche Ausschuß (economics
committee), were ready to abandon the Ahlen Program in favor of a more market-
oriented economic program. In July 1947, the liberal corporate lawyer Franz Etzel
was named chairperson of the economics committee of the CDU in the B ritish
Zone. On the national lev el of the CDU, the influence of Christian S ocialists
such as Kaiser from Berlin was clearly waning. In October 1948 Adenauer created
a supra-zonal economics committee with Etzel as chairperson. The body included
CSU representatives and was to work closely with the CDU/CSU representatives
on the Economics Council (Wirtschaftsrat), a quasi-parliamentary body of the Bi-
zone in Frankfurt, in developing party economic policy. Meanwhile, by late 1946
and early 1947 the Americans had made it clear that they would not tolerate plans
for socialization and would veto proposals from any state legislature that went for-
ward with such a policy—ther eby contributing to fur ther weakening of the
party’s left wing. Over the course of 1947, CDU/CSU representatives within the
Economics Council began to support the free market more actively and worked
with the smaller bourgeois par ties to hammer the SPD for espousing a fr uitless
economic system from a bygone era.19 By March 1948 Ludwig Erhard had taken
up the position of dir ector of the E conomics Administration of the B izone. In
June 1948 the currency reform was carried out in the Bizone and a series of market
reforms were instituted—creating the new availability of goods for West Germans. 
The economic upswing that followed the currency reform signaled unmistak-
ably to Adenauer that the social market economy possessed political currency and
presented him with the perfect opportunity to push the CDU toward accepting
it as a key part of the party’s platform. As part of this effort, Adenauer invited Er-
hard to address the British Zone’s CDU par ty conference in Recklinghausen at
the end of August 1948. In this speech, entitled “Marktwirtschaft moderner Prä-
gung” (Market Economy of a Modern Character), Erhard placed the West Ger-
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man economy’s conversion from the Zwangswirtschaft (controlled economy) to a
Marktwirtschaft (market economy) in a broad context by connecting the economic
transformation to fundamental social change that freed the new nation from the
legacies of the Nazi and occupation past. He opened the speech with these words:
With the political-economic change to the market economy, we have done more than just
initiate narrow economic measures; we have put our socio-economic life upon a new foun-
dation and before a new beginning.20
This change in the economic order meant not the introduction of “plundering”
or “irresponsibility,” but rather the “ committed sacrifice to the whole. N ot the
senseless and soulless state of dr ones [seelenlose Termitenstaat] with its deperson-
alization of humanity [Menschen], but instead the organic state, based upon the
freedom of the individual, striving together for an elevated whole. That is the in-
tellectual basis upon which w e want to build a ne w economy and a ne w social
order.”21 In this way Erhard was placing the social mar ket economy within the
context of a fundamental r estructuring of society and the pr eservation of indi-
vidual freedom—echoing sentiments common among early leaders of the CDU.
Undoubtedly, Erhard had to couch his economic plans in a manner that defended
personal freedom but at the same time consider ed the interests of the whole. A
full defense of the unfettered free market and egotistic individualism surely would
have elicited a strong negative response from some members of Erhard’s audience
who still held pro-Christian Socialist sentiments. 
Implicitly, Erhard was setting up an “ either/or” choice for West Germany in
terms of what the economic system meant for the individual. With the planned
economy, the individual is for ced “under the whip of a soulless bur eaucracy.”
Throughout his speech Erhard repeatedly referred to the “soulless collectivism” or
“soulless colony of drones” as a central aspect of the planned economy . In addi-
tion, Erhard stressed that the planned economy was a middle station that inevi-
tably led to a controlled economy (Zwangswirtschaft), an economic system whose
characteristics West Germans could easily understand b y thinking back to the
Nazi years and the early occupation period or ev en by looking eastwar d to the
Stalinist Soviet Union. The controlled economy of the postwar years had created
“societal chaos,” while the new currency had allowed the average German to con-
sume more in the four w eeks since its intr oduction than during the thr ee years
since the end of the war.22
As an alternative to this system that inevitably led to tyranny , Erhard offered
the social market economy. Germany, he argued, must establish an economic sys-
tem “which through voluntary organization [Einordnung], through a conscious
responsibility, struggles for the whole in a sensible, organic way.”23 By expressing
this concern for the whole of society, Erhard highlighted the social element of the
free market—echoing the neoliberal economist Wilhelm Röpke’s belief that the
economy should be somewhat regulated to benefit all in society, over purely ego-
tistic laissez-faire capitalism. But also central to Erhard’s view was that the notion
of economic freedom was essential for the cr eation of a fr ee society. In this way
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Erhard defined the fundamentals of a free society, where “in my eyes the most im-
portant of all democratic fr eedoms is the free selection of goods, along with the
free selection of professions.”24 Building on some of the ideas of Röpke, Eucken,
and other neoliberals, Erhard elucidated a view that would be repeated in politi-
cal propaganda throughout the 1950s: political freedom and freedom to consume
were inextricably intertwined; one could not be established without the other. 
By October 1948, Adenauer was pushing for the creation of an economic pro-
gram for the CDU of all three Western occupation zones.25 On 25 February 1949
Erhard traveled to Königswinter to addr ess the CDU’s zonal committee in the
British Zone. Erhard argued to the gr oup that the upcoming federal elections
hinged upon economic policy and the social conditions of the G erman people.
He implored the CDU politicians to accept the social mar ket economy as the
party’s electoral platform. As in earlier speeches to the CDU, he was sure to stress
the social aspects of the free market, in order not to alienate the CDU politicians
holding onto Christian Socialism.26 Erhard’s speech supposedly resonated a great
deal among those pr esent.27 This response reaffirmed Adenauer’s belief that the
CDU should build its economic policies upon Erhard’s principles. After his pre-
sentation, Adenauer thanked E rhard for adv ancing these “ fundamental truths”
that developments since the currency reform had proven to be “really good prin-
ciples.” The key task was to articulate these principles in “simple and clear terms”
in the upcoming election campaign.28
Others at the Königswinter meeting, including a trade unionist from Cologne,
Johannes Albers, agreed that the upcoming election campaign would r est upon
the success of the Frankfurt economic policy, so called because the Bizone’s Eco-
nomics Council and Economics Administration were headquartered in Frankfurt.
But he also maintained that social policy would play a crucial role in the election.
From Albers’s perspective, Erhard was too much of a free market liberal. The trade
unionist was leer y of the acceptance of E rhard’s policy, suspecting this would
mean the abandonment of the Ahlen Program. As a pragmatic politician, Adenauer
affirmed that the par ty could not get caught up in rigid par ty program. “I have
just said,” he r etorted to Albers, “ that all of these pr ograms and program state-
ments have no eternal value, but are concerned with matters that are vital now.”
Adenauer then introduced what would be the central question of the upcoming
election: “I would suggest, first of all, that this theme is summed up a bit in the
question: planned economy or market economy [shout from Albers: “social!”] or
do we say: bureaucratic planned economy or social market economy [laughter]. . .
Along with that, we have the Ahlen Program and the social program.”29 Again, an
Adenauer-led CDU was attempting to reconcile the free market with some of the
“social” roots of the Weimar Catholic Center Party. Prompted by the success of
Erhard’s speech and the timid response from the left wing of the party, the CDU
in the British Zone—and with that the whole CDU/CSU in the Western Zones—
adopted the social market economy as a central part of its platform for the upcom-
ing election and Adenauer permanently reined in the CDU’s Christian Socialist
element. Clearly, Adenauer understood the importance of the social market econ-
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omy not only as a club to wield against the S ocial Democrats in the Bundestag
election, but also as a means to r eel in the left wing of the CDU and pr event it
from alienating more centrist voters. 
The CDU’s immediate task was to transform the ideas of the social mar ket
economy into an effective political campaign. One clear obstacle to this task was
that in 1949 CDU had no o verarching structure. Within the B ritish Zone the
party was organized at the zonal level, while in the American and French zones it
was organized at the regional level (Landesverbände). In some parts of West Ger-
many, the regional organizations’ territory did not correspond to the administra-
tive areas of the Federal States (Länder). For example, North Rhine–Westphalia
had two regional organizations of the Rhineland and Westphalia-Lippe. In Lower
Saxony ther e were three, with H anover, Brunswick, and O ldenburg, and in
Baden Württemberg four, in North Baden, South Baden, North Württemberg,
and Württemberg-Hohenzollern.30 At the beginning of 1947 the Arbeitsgemein-
schaft der CDU/CSU (Working Group of the CDU/CSU) was formed in Frank-
furt under the dir ectorship of B runo Dörpinghaus, a founder of the CDU in
Hesse. This body acted as a “steering committee” but in fact possessed no formal
power to determine policy for the party’s regional branches. The Arbeitsgemein-
schaft der CDU/CSU and its subor dinate committees pr ovided the Landesver-
bände (regional organizations) and Kreisverbände (district organizations) of the
party with the main campaign themes and pr opaganda material for the election
campaign. 
In early January 1949 Dörpinghaus began constructing a central election com-
mittee under the working group charged with the responsibility of coordinating
campaign propaganda throughout West Germany. This election campaign com-
mittee consisted of r epresentatives from the v arious regional organizations, the
British Zonenverband (zonal organization) of the CDU/CSU, the Frankfurt Eco-
nomics Council, and the Parliamentary Council, which was drawing up the new
West German constitution. The election committee’s main task was to “initiate
the required measures which prove necessary in light of the election for the co-
ordination of the par ty inter ests, including the inter-connected organization, 
propaganda, and press duties.”31 A number of other subcommittees w ere subse-
quently created for the campaign, such as the electoral law committee ( Wahl-
rechtsausschuß) and the so-called Arithmetic Committee (Arithmetiker-Ausschuß),
entrusted with pr oviding demographic statistics on the F ederal Republic and
compiling data on previous state and local elections.32
Despite the decentralized nature of the CDU/CSU, the par ty’s image during
the campaign was molded at the national level, and in particular by Adenauer’s in-
fluence. The election committee planned the schedule of the nationwide speakers
and the party’s overall campaign strategy for the election campaign. In addition,
on 5 March 1949, a press and propaganda committee was created to develop pro-
paganda for the campaign. The committee supplied posters, leaflets, election
brochures, and other campaign necessities to r egional and district par ty organi-
zations, including the CDU’s sister organization in Bavaria, the CSU, for which
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it replaced “CDU” with “CSU” on the materials. 33 On 19 March the press and
propaganda committee convened its first meeting, with Dörpinghaus proposing
a working staff be formed to take care of the technical planning and proofing of
the campaign propaganda. Perhaps the most important information provided by
the central party leadership was the Union im Wahlkampf, which detailed election
information and speaker notes for the party organizers at the regional and district
level. Between 20,000 and 25,000 of these election newspapers were distributed
by the central committee.34 In addition, the regional and district level organiza-
tions supplied propaganda material for local use.35 Generally, the locally supplied
propaganda concentrated upon introducing the local candidates through pamphlets
or leaflets. Meanwhile, propaganda for more nationally oriented issues flowed out
of the CDU/CSU’s central working group and its various subcommittees.
Adenauer and the CDU of the British Zone proved to be the crucial forces be-
hind the creation of the CDU/CSU’s campaign. Undoubtedly, the British Zone
CDU was the best organiz ed of all of the r egional CDU organizations. As head
of the CDU of the British Zone, Konrad Adenauer was named head of the elec-
tion committee and par ticipated actively on the press and propaganda commit-
tee. From the onset, Adenauer stressed that the SPD was the main opponent against
which all efforts must be focused.36 Adenauer feared that because the communist
vote would always be available to the SPD in the Bundestag, the major goal of the
campaign would be to pr event a combined majority of the SPD and the KPD
(Communist Party of Germany).37 With this in mind, Erhard and the social mar-
ket economy lent themselves to being used as political weapons against the SPD.
Adenauer made it very clear in a meeting of the press and propaganda committee
that Erhard and the Frankfurt economic policy were to take center stage and that
the campaign r evolved around the question of “Markt oder Plan” (Market or
Planned), contrasting the economic policies of the CDU/CSU and SPD. 38 The
challenge was to transform the economic policy into effective propaganda. 
But in most of the resulting propaganda, the social market economy was not
clearly defined in any theoretical or formal sense. Instead, the CDU/CSU’s pro-
paganda on economics center ed around two issues. F irst, the CDU/CSU por-
trayed its policies—the currency reform for which the party sought credit and the
social market economy—as unshackling the West German economy from Allied
controls, rationing, industrial dismantling, and SPD economic planning, and
thereby making the basic necessities available to a German populace that had suf-
fered severe postwar deprivations. By taking this position, the par ty affirmed its
capacity to run an effective government. Second, the CDU/CSU used the social
market economy to represent the establishment of individual freedom within an
organic West Germany community, in contrast to the tyranny and alienation as-
sociated with the SPD’s planned economy and the economic system of the Third
Reich. With this approach the CDU/CSU reconciled the free market ideas of the
social market economy with the party’s Christian Socialist roots. The newly avail-
able goods and economic expansion for which E rhard and the CDU/CSU
claimed credit were not merely to satisfy individual desires or necessities, but to
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help bring about the fundamental reconstruction of German social life after the
intense upheaval and dislocation of the Third Reich and crisis years—including
an idealized vision of family life and gender roles. The CDU/CSU’s propaganda
silenced any significant confrontation with the recent past and urged West Ger-
mans to look for ward to a ne w beginning free of Nazi guilt. By taking this ap-
proach, the pr opaganda positioned West Germans as po werless victims in the
immediate postwar period who now regained a sense of agency due to the CDU/
CSU’s economic policies. Finally, the CDU/CSU’s propaganda avoided any tech-
nical jargon regarding the intricate details of economic policy . Instead, like any
good political advertising, it translated the par ty’s ideas into concrete terms and
played upon the voters’ prejudices and predispositions.
Particularly important to West Germans at the time was the challenge of eco-
nomic reconstruction and securing sufficient food, clothing, and housing for sur-
vival. American-conducted public opinion surveys in January 1949 indicated that
six out of ten Germans valued economic security and the possibility of a good in-
come over free elections, freedom of speech, a fr ee press, and religious freedom.
In addition, 31 percent of Germans in the American Z one selected commercial
freedom as the most impor tant of all liber ties. Religious freedom followed with
22 percent, free elections with 19 per cent, and freedom of speech with 14 per-
cent.39 Clearly, larger, more abstract political ideas took a back seat to immediate
and pragmatic concerns. The CDU/CSU played up these sentiments with pr o-
paganda centered upon improving West German conditions, especially after the
currency reform of 1948.
In a 5 March meeting of the election committee, Dörpinghaus suggested that
the proposed propaganda committee design brochures “for the man on the street,
simple, uncomplicated with a lot of pictures.”40 Adenauer underscored this prin-
ciple in the 19 May 1949 meeting of the CDU’s press and propaganda commit-
tee. I n a discussion of the formulation of pr opaganda material, A denauer
suggested that, “ we take this as a principle of the pr opaganda: simple, not too
much, not too highbr ow.” Especially effective would be some form of pictorial
representation of the CDU/CSU program. Adenauer and Erich Köhler, the head
of the r egional organization in H esse, were particularly convinced of the effec-
tiveness of a primitive form of propaganda. In early 1949 they had seen a touring
theater group from Caux near Geneva, which proclaimed a Christian-based ide-
ology. Both were impressed with this group’s ability to captivate the West German
public. Adenauer commented about this fascination: “That is the best proof that
one must speak simply to the public, not too much, few thoughts, large ideas sim-
ply represented.”41 The Frankfurt economic policy proved easy to shape into this
simplistic approach. Walter Otto, a member of the CDU in the British Zone, em-
phasized the effect of graphics and pictur es on the public, adding that the par ty
propaganda, and posters in particular, should appeal not to the intellectuals, but
rather to the “primitive levels” of society: “I t is decisive that the simple man r e-
mains in front of these posters.” One of his suggestions, perhaps the crudest and
most successful of all of the CDU/CSU’s creations, was a poster depicting a Mon-
60 |   Selling the Economic Miracle
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
gol face hovering over Europe while a shield bearing the letters “SPD” crumbled
before the Asiatic threat.42
The ideas of the social mar ket economy were put together in the Düsseldorf
Leitsätze (Düsseldorf Principles). This program statement was to replace the old
Ahlen Program and kick off the CDU/CSU’s campaign. The Düsseldorf Princi-
ples were formulated mostly by members of the British Zone CDU. Franz Etzel,
the chairman of the economics committee of the CDU in the B ritish Zone and
chair of a supranational economics committee, initiated the drawing up of the
guidelines over the course of late 1948 and early 1949, with frequent consultation
with Erhard.43 On 30 March 1949, Etzel presented the rough draft to the British
zonal committee. He argued that the social market economy should lay claim to
the economic upswing since the curr ency reform. He went on to str ess that al-
though the conventional wisdom was that a weak and undercapitalized economy
plagued with shor tages must be r emedied by a centraliz ed planning, the CDU
must make clear that it stood for freeing the energy in the economy through the
social market economy. Etzel observed the need to define the concept of “ social
market economy” because of its multiple meanings. Interestingly, he pointed out
that although the new program statement had nothing to do with the Ahlen Pro-
gram, Adenauer desir ed that the old pr ogram be cited in the ne w proposal.
Throughout the meeting, committee members bantered about what the term ac-
tually meant. The conversation reflected both the difficulties of tailoring eco-
nomic concepts to a political campaign and the approach that the Adenauer and
CDU would take to campaigning. That is, the social market economy was not to
be about pure economic ideas, but a broad social, economic, and political vision
that the CDU offered to the electorate. 
At the end of the session, H einrich Lübke, a leader of the CDU in N orth
Rhine–Westphalia and later the federal president between 1959 and 1969, com-
mented: “Instead of saying planned economy, we should say centralized admin-
istrative economy or mor e popularly expr essed, simply contr olled economy
[Zwangswirtschaft]. We reject the controlled economy, everyone can understand
that. Central administrative economy would be better in my opinion than planned
economy.” Later in the meeting, committee members engaged in a heated dis-
cussion about what controlled and planned economies actually meant. The con-
clusion was that the term planned economy could be more easily associated with
economic conditions and organization befor e the currency reform and with the
SPD’s platform in particular.44 When suggestions were made later in June 1949
at meeting of the British Zone CDU to use the words “controlled economy,” Ade-
nauer reacted strongly against the hairsplitting o ver the economics behind the
terms. His advice was: “Speak simply. The public wants to be spoken to simply,
and don’t rack your brains so much on this matter.” Despite some disagreement
over campaign terminology, the term “planned economy” was employed over “con-
trolled economy.” The CDU utiliz ed the term “ planned economy” because the
SPD by this point had rejected the “controlled economy” and it was essential to
differentiate between the parties in the campaign.45 In particular situations, “con-
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trolled economy” was used because of the images that it could evoke, especially the
image of the N azi economy, the immediate postwar y ears, and the communist
system in the East. Clearly, the party was not concerned that its economic concepts
have theoretical purity, but rather was interested in what would best resonate with
the electorate. As A denauer argued at the z onal committee meeting, “ We ar e
writing the principles for the election, not for a scholarly work or textbook.”46
The Düsseldorf Principles were released in a press conference on 15 July 1949,
which also served as the start of the CDU/CSU election campaign. Adenauer in-
vited the leading representatives of the press for the “announcement of the CDU/
CSU’s program on economic, social and agricultural policies, as w ell as home
construction and the Eastern question.” 47 In his opening r emarks at the pr ess
conference, Adenauer gave the impression that the Principles were developed and
agreed upon by the entire party, although they were almost solely the product of
the CDU in the British Zone and the CSU had not, in fact, given its approval of
the Principles.48 The Düsseldorf Principles made clear that economic change was
an integral component of reconstructing the social and moral fabric of the German
community after the degradation of the Third Reich and the occupation period.
The document opened by describing the low point that Germans had reached in
the first half of 1948 when the struggle against hunger led to “ruthless self-interest”
and the corr uption in society awoke the “basest instincts.” I t did not str ess the
currency r eform, which was an American initiativ e, instead arguing that the
CDU/CSU economic policy led to a political-economic turning point when the
efficiency of workers at all levels rose and production climbed. It was the rejection
of the “ration card economy [Bezugscheinwirtschaft] that gave freedom back to the
consumer.” After 20 June, “The stores became full, courage, strength, and energy
were roused, and the whole nation was ripped out of its state of lethargy .”49 But
it was not the currency reform alone that had spurred the economic upturn. In-
stead, the mar ket reforms of the social mar ket economy that accompanied the
currency reform drove the Western Zones’ economic resurgence. Through this ex-
planation of the currency reform and the social market economy, the CDU/CSU
laid claim to the rising economy and made it a pr oduct of German, not Ameri-
can, measures, thereby projecting a sense of German agency. In addition, by iden-
tifying 20 June 1948 as a decisive moment in German economic and political life,
the document silences any references to the Third Reich and asks West Germans
only to look to the future with no meaningful reflection of their responsibility to
the recent past. 
But the Düsseldorf Principles also took care to devote much attention to so-
cial policy and to promise that the CDU/CSU policy would not revert “to a cap-
italist form and to an old liberalism of an unsocial, monopolistic type.” The
Principles proclaimed that “[t]he ‘social market economy’ is the socially commit-
ted constitution of commercial industry in which the performance of free and ca-
pable men is brought into a system that pr ovides a maximum of economic gain
and social justice.” F rom the perspectiv e of the Düsseldor f Principles, the fr ee
market, if its excesses were avoided, safeguarded the freedom of individuals and
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provided the most social justice for the citiz ens of West Germany.50 With this
concern for social issues, the CDU/CSU’s economic program maintained a con-
nection to the heritage of Catholic social policy while adopting a form of the free
market. Maria Mitchell has commented that the Düsseldor f Principles and the
Ahlen Program preceding it represented the CDU’s interconfessional consensus
formed by 1949. This consensus bound Catholics and Protestants together by an
antimaterialist view of society and an economy that focused on a spiritual recon-
struction of G ermany against socialism of any form—be it in the guise of the
SPD, the Communists to the East, or even Christian Socialism. She has persua-
sively argued that betw een 1946 and 1949 A denauer and the antisocialist ele-
ments within the CDU successfully defined antimaterialism as opposed to any
form of socialism—including Christian S ocialism. This position str engthened
the bond between liberal and conservative Protestants to Catholics with roots in
the Weimar Center Party, thereby maximizing the potential constituency for the
developing CDU.51
In the Düsseldorf Principles, the CDU/CSU propaganda created a connection
between the free market and overall individual freedom. In contrast to the social
market economy, “[t]he system of the planned economy robs the productive man
of his economic self-determination and fr eedom.”52 Yet, the principles also
stressed the fact that the social mar ket economy was not the same thing as the
“free economy” of a liberal bent. In many respects, support for a pure free market
system would have generated much resentment from potential voters. Instead, the
principles suggested that in order to avoid a relapse into the problems of the “free
economy,” the independent control of monopoly was necessar y to secure “com-
petition.” The program statement, with its use of the term “ social market econ-
omy,” was able to retain the resonance that both “market” and “social” might have
within the electorate.53 At the same time, the SPD, although not dir ectly men-
tioned, was associated with the planned economy and its system of statism, absence
of freedom, and scarcity. Although Maria Mitchell’s study of antimaterialism in
the CDU is focused on the par ty’s ideological foundations, especially in eco-
nomic areas, the CDU leadership was by no means concerned with maintaining
some sort of ideological purity or consistency . Not just in the 1949 B undestag
election, but also in futur e elections, the social mar ket economy proved to be a
pliable concept that went beyond its original antimaterialist definition.
With the social market economy as the focal point of the campaign, Erhard as-
sumed a central role in the CDU/CSU’s efforts, although he was not yet officially
affiliated with the party. As the director of the Bizone’s Economics Administration,
he was the per fect spokesperson to pr esent the adv antages of the social mar ket
economy to the West German electorate. By January 1949 Erhard had already af-
firmed that he would “go into the upcoming political party clashes with particu-
lar energy for the CDU.”54 Erhard proved to be the speaker most requested by the
regional and district party organizations during the campaign and made speeches
all over West Germany, from Schleswig-Holstein to Bavaria.55 Generally, Erhard’s
speeches were much better attended than other speakers’ rallies. For example, in
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the lower Rhine town of Krefeld, Erhard’s rally attracted over 3,000 listeners. In
comparison, the local par ty’s other speaker of national statur e, Anton S torch,
who was the CDU/CSU’s spokesperson on social issues, attracted only 300.56
The 13 J uly 1949 issue of Union im Wahlkampf introduced Erhard to the
rank-and-file party organizers. Erhard’s profile helped establish the image that Er-
hard himself would cultivate during the 1950s. It stressed his substantial role in
the rebirth of Germany by declaring: “Hardly another name is mentioned o ver
the last few years with so much passion as that of this man. . . . Everyone feels that
the rise or fall of the nation depends fatefully to a large extent upon this man.”57
It went on to define Erhard’s personal characteristics in a short profile: “Erhard is
a man of action, as our nation needs in these times.” It went on to emphasize Er-
hard’s incredible optimism and capacity for work. But it also presented him as “a
real person of constant amiability and humor .” All the while, E rhard was por-
trayed as an expert on economics who would help guarantee the continued eco-
nomic reconstruction of Germany. He was a man of the people, yet one with the
knowledge and understanding of economics to push Germany forward.58
In his stump speeches, Erhard reiterated many of the ideas that he had expressed
in some of his earlier speeches to CDU members. Economic freedom and political
freedom were inextricably linked and the social market economy was an essential
component in establishing individual agency and political self-determination. At
the same time, however, he was sure to hit issues that appeared more likely to res-
onate with the population as a whole. During his campaign tour over the course
of the summer of 1949, he outlined his economic vie ws in an address to an as-
sembly of voters in his home district, Ulm-Heidenheim. He opened the speech by
again drawing the strong dichotomy between the market and planned economies.
The central question of the election was whether the German people wanted “to
be subordinated under a soulless tyranny of a wanton bur eaucracy” or whether
“we are allowed to progress along the path marked by the social market economy,
which frees our people from the system of goods and human economic controls
[Güter und Menschenbewirtschaftung], the modern form of state slavery.”59
But also through this speech Erhard helped create a meaning of economics that
associated the CDU/CSU’s opponent, the SPD, with images of the Nazi past and
the communist regimes to the East. Erhard identified the SPD as the “keeper of
the controlled economy [Zwangswirtschaft],” something that no election campaign
maneuvering could co ver up . The socialist planned economy must ev entually
lead to the controlled economy, Erhard argued. He then blurred the lines between
the tenets of the SPD’s economic program and those in place in the Soviet Zone
of Germany. Erhard insisted that “[t]he socialist economy has never proved a suc-
cess in practice. I t has bestowed to us in the communist form the so-called fr ee
people’s republics.” The SPD, he maintained, sought to drive the people back to
a “gloomy mood of despair and a br ooding fear of life [Lebensangst].” But the
German people w ere not pr epared “to become enslav ed again b y a r evived bu-
reaucracy and rule by bigwigs and fatcats [Bonzokratie].”60 The speech continued
to blend the SPD with some of the images of G ermany’s recent past under the
64 |   Selling the Economic Miracle
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
Nazi economy and the occupation before the currency reform, a rhetorical strat-
egy that also implicitly distanced the CDU/CSU fr om the Third Reich. Erhard
declared, “ We want to help finally the G erman citizen get back civil courage,
which was beaten down for fifteen years, which allows the citizen to oppose the
wantonness of bureaucracy and the tyranny of the state in confidence of his per-
sonality, his worth, and his rights.”61 Therefore, Germans of all levels, classes, and
occupations should unite against this deadly danger pr esented to their ne wly-
acquired freedom through an oppressive bureaucracy. 
Along with Erhard’s speeches, posters w ere the chosen means to disseminate
the ideas of the social mar ket economy. They were perhaps the most po werful
form of communication that the party created, and the CDU/CSU placed great
emphasis upon their use throughout the campaign. Early in the planning of the
campaign, Adenauer underscored the necessity of having a poster on which “not
the Economics Council, not the Parliamentary Council, but instead the ideas of
the CDU must be featur ed so that ev eryone can understand them and commit
them to memory.” In any case, they w ere the most uniform sor t of propaganda
that the party utilized, with the press and propaganda committee developing the
same posters for use across West Germany, thereby creating a unified and coher-
ent party image that transcended local interests.62 They would give “the impres-
sion of the unity of the par ty from north to south.” 63 The central pr opaganda
committee developed the posters with the participation of the regional organiza-
tion managers, considering what they envisioned would be most effective within
their particular region. The regional organization managers then determined how
many posters they needed from the central committee. All told the central com-
mittee produced 1.7 million posters for the 1949 campaign.64
Although the working group of the CDU/CSU generated most of the posters,
the regional and district level party organizations also issued their own. There is
no way to know the precise number locally issued, but since these local organiza-
tions’ finances were severely limited, it was probably relatively small. For example,
the CDU/CSU leadership in F rankfurt distributed a total of about 300,000
posters to the Rhineland CDU. In contrast, the zonal and regional organization
distributed only 70,000 posters, not a great number considering that the Rhine-
land CDU was perhaps the best organized CDU/CSU branch in West Germany.
The content of the posters issued by regional and district-level organizations was
very different from those distributed b y the central CDU/CSU organization.
Most local-level organizations developed posters dealing with local issues or por-
traying the local candidates.65 Although there were posters addressing a variety of
issues—culture, refugees, home constr uction—most of the central committee ’s
posters concentrated on economic issues. I n fact, the Rhineland’s regional orga-
nization complained that the bulk of the posters issued fr om Frankfurt did not
focus on an important campaign issue in the predominately Catholic Rhineland:
political-cultural themes.66 The central leadership, although lacking direct control
over the conduct of the election campaign on the local level, could determine the
themes and issues that w ere core to the campaign. U ndoubtedly the local par ty
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organizations could push issues that were particularly important to their respective
districts, but the CDU/CSU working group shaped the main campaign themes. 
Those posters dealing with economics underscor ed two major themes. The
first echoed some of the sentiments in E rhard’s speeches that constr ucted a di-
chotomy between the planned and market economies. Using this dichotomy, the
posters helped spell out some of the political implications of both these economic
systems. The other major theme was the economic r econstruction and progress
over the course of the fe w years prior to the election. The improved economic
conditions were attributed to the CDU/CSU’s policies. Overall, the posters en-
couraged the creation of very crude and simplistic categories in the minds of vot-
ers that clearly differ entiated the policies of the CDU/CSU and those of its
opponent, the SPD. Implicit was the notion that the CDU/CSU was the mor e
responsible party and thus the one best qualified to govern West Germany and re-
construct a German community free from the taint of the Nazi past. In contrast,
the SPD was portrayed as a party incapable of defending the newly founded Fed-
eral Republic against the ev er present Asiatic, Bolshevik thr eat and as r etaining
economic policies associated with Nazism and communism.
One of the posters most widely distributed b y the Arbeitsgemeinschaft der
CDU/CSU entitled “ At the cr ossroads of the economy ” epitomized this di-
chotomy (Illustration 2.1). The poster incorporated a large black and white “X”
upon a field of blue. The words “reconstruction” and “work” were inscribed upon
the white axis of the “X,” while “ controlled economy” and “bur eaucracy” ap-
peared on the black axis, ther eby juxtaposing the two choices facing the v oters.
The poster possessed a certain visual unity, with the large “X” in the poster r ep-
resenting both the act of voting on the ballot and this economic crossroads con-
fronting West Germany. The vital importance of the vote was emphasized by the
slogan that tied the poster together: “Our vote leads to work and reconstruction.
We are voting CDU.” P erhaps an ev en more popular poster counterposed the
conditions from 1946 and 1949 by juxtaposing short phrases from 1946 on a black
field opposite a field of white with images of consumer products (Illustration 2.2).
The poster evoked memories of critical food shor tages, rationing, and the black
market following the war through messages such as: “no coal,” “ersatz coffee,” “50
grams fat for January,” and “5 kilograms potatoes.” The poster also elicited mem-
ories of the despair that was pandemic within G ermany with statements such as
“Exchange suit for something to eat.” and “Inquiries purposeless!” The mood of
1946 was clearly contrasted to the situation of 1949 as r epresented by the lower
part of the poster, which was overflowing with food and consumer pr oducts in-
cluding clothes and shoes, goods that were acutely scarce following the war. The
bottom slogan tied these images together with the bold letters “CDU” and “This
is what our economic policy provides you.” In many respects the poster’s layout
helped support the message that the period of social and economic emergency
had already passed in West Germany, and that the CDU was responsible for this
upswing and what could be construed as “normalcy.”
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The posters worked well together by setting up a series of dichotomies that un-
derscored the voters’ two alternatives in casting their lot with the CDU/CSU or
SPD. They helped heighten the sense that economics was a key par tisan wedge,
and enabled the CDU/CSU to define itself as the par ty that having alr eady
brought prosperity and r econstruction was r esponsible for carr ying West Ger-
many into the future. The posters never tried to clearly define what the alterna-
tives r eally entailed. They associated the SPD with the difficulties and the
seemingly hopeless situation of the crisis years. They simply sought to elicit sen-
timents toward economic developments that were not based upon any rational as-
sessment of the CDU/CSU’s policies but instead played upon the perceptions and
predisposition of the West German populace. The posters indicated the reestab-
lishment of some form of a r econstructed West German community in which
work and goods were now available. Even more importantly, they suggested the
regaining of agency for individual West Germans. Because of the CDU/CSU’ s
policies, the posters implied, West Germans would no longer need to face bu-
reaucracies and economic conditions that w ere completely out of their contr ol.
They could, therefore, begin to reconstruct their own personal, family, and social
lives. 
The most effectiv e of all the CDU/CSU posters was the one por traying an 
Asiatic-looking face ho vering over Western Europe, beneath which the slogan
read: “The savior: CDU” (Illustration 2.3). It resonated so strongly not only be-
cause it was visually striking but also because its meaning could be understood in
a number of contexts. Clearly, given the powerful image of the Mongol invader
from the thir teenth centur y and the r eligious term “ savior,” the intent was to
evoke a sense that a crucial historical moment confronted not just West Germany,
but all of Christian Western civilization. Turning back the Eastern threat would
shape the future development of the Occident for centuries. Undoubtedly it was
intended to exploit G erman racial prejudices and play off N azi propaganda de-
picting the godless, Bolshevik, Asiatic hordes from the East. As Elizabeth Heine-
man has pointed out, this poster also ev oked memories of the rape of hundr eds
of thousands, if not millions, of German women as the Soviet army moved into
eastern portions of the Third Reich at the war’s conclusion.67 One version of the
poster depicted a SPD shield splintering in the face of an Asiatic onslaught—an
image that dovetailed very well with the CDU/CSU’s self-image as the party of re-
sponsibility and protection. Not only was the CDU/CSU strong enough to safe-
guard West Germans from the threats from within—such as economic hardship
and the portrayed soulless bureaucracy of the SPD’s planned economy—but the
party also was a free and open Western Europe’s bulwark against the threats from
the East. I n the context of economics, it highlighted the contrast betw een the
“East,” with its controlled economy and the “West,” with the social market econ-
omy that permitted the reconstruction of personal freedom and a coherent West
German community. The poster aimed to disabuse the vie wer of any faith that
the SPD was up to the historical challenge. 
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The CDU/CSU message was reinforced by another important form of propa-
ganda for the campaign: the Flugblätter (political leaflets). These were distributed
in copious quantities in the days leading up to the 14 August election by the cen-
tral, regional, and district par ty organizations, although those leaflets dev eloped
by the regional or district organizations usually dealt with local issues or incor-
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porated information about the local candidates themselves. The central press and
propaganda committee provided three different leaflets, two dealing specifically
with economic issues and the other criticizing the SPD for attacks against
Catholic education. Clearly the effor ts of the Frankfurt leadership were insuffi-
cient, for only about 400,000 of the two economics-oriented leaflets were deliv-
ered to the Rhineland CDU, which had about 4.4 million v oters in its districts.
In addition, the regional party organizations complained that the leaflets arrived
too late to be distributed fully and that the quantities w ere nowhere close to the
millions promised by the central committee.68 To overcome this shortfall, the re-
gional organizations had to print their own copies of these leaflets.
Nevertheless, the leaflets reflected the way the central election committee was
trying to represent the ideas of social market economy and construct its meaning
in relation to the CDU/CSU. One of them warned West Germans to be sure to vote
in the upcoming election, going on to remind them that only four years earlier all
of Germany had lain in ruins. The last two years had seen a dramatic upswing in the
economy—which was created by the politicians with experience and responsibility
in the Economics Council of the Bizone. It stressed that the CDU/CSU was re-
sponsible for this economic upswing with the observation: “Think about it. It has
been exclusively politicians of the CDU/CSU, who with so much work to do, have
not had the time to put for th propaganda and grand claims.” The leaflet then
blended Cold War fears with suggestive conceptions of culture and the economy.
“Think about it, that in the countries on the other side of the iron curtain a regime
of terror rules, which disregards and ill tr eats religious belief, places agriculture,
small trade, and business under the socialist oppression of unity, and forces depor-
tation of workers into uranium mines.” The implication of this message was that
the alternative to the CDU/CSU would not necessarily be able to defend West
Germany against this threat, a point made most emphatically through posters. In
contrast, the CDU/CSU was the party of strength and achievements. Through its
policy of reconstruction it had distanced West Germany from its Nazi and occupa-
tion past, while at the same time pr otected the new state from threats from the
East. The last page of the leaflet concluded that one should vote for the “Party of
Responsibility—the CDU/CSU.”69 In this view, the social market economy and
economic reconstruction were not just matters of establishing basic living standards,
but rather were basic elements in the survival of the West German state and society. 
Another leaflet proclaimed: “You can’t do that! Why won’t the SPD recognize
the success of the CDU/CSU’s social market economy?” It went on to accuse the
SPD of spreading lies about West Germany’s economic reality in general and the
CDU/CSU’s economic policy in particular. In many respects, the leaflet echoed
some of the same sentiments as in the one discussed abo ve. The subtext of the
leaflet was that the CDU/CSU was the party of responsibility, while in contrast,
the SPD could not be tr usted to form an effectiv e government. The leaflet pur-
ported to expose and counter a series of false assertions made by the SPD with the
“truth” of the CDU/CSU’s successes. Its main thrust was to underscore the con-
nection among the CDU/CSU, the social market economy, and the upswing in
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the West German economy. It concentrated upon the CDU/CSU’s achievements,
including the rise in emplo yment over the past y ear. In contrast to CDU/CSU 
actions, the text commented, “As for the SPD, it’s about their party program and
not the improvement of the German economic situation.” Again, the leaflet’s pro-
paganda cr eated a clear dichotomy betw een the CDU/CSU’ s own action and 
results versus the inaction, rhetoric, and ideology of the SPD.70
In comparison to pr opaganda commonly disseminated during the Weimar
period, the CDU/CSU messages did not appeal to potential v oters in terms of
their class or profession.71 Instead, the CDU/CSU stressed that its achievements
and the advantages of the social market economy benefited not merely one seg-
ment of West German society, but all West Germans. In this way the CDU/
CSU’s propaganda played off the common perception that all members of soci-
ety had suffer ed equally in the r ubble economy following the war and that the
currency reform had smoothed over class differences. Furthermore, this approach
jibed with Adenauer’s strategy of molding the CDU/CSU into a true “Volkspartei.”
For the CDU/CSU to be successful, it must, from Adenauer’s perspective, be the
party for all West Germans rather than specific groups and subcultures. To Ade-
nauer and the CDU/CSU, politics of social division and class str uggle are what
characterized the rival SPD. Perhaps the exception to the CDU/CSU’s approach
was propaganda directed toward women and refugees. These were specific groups
that the party leadership sensed it must attract for electoral success. Overall, how-
ever, the material dealing with economic issues was not directed at any particular
class or group. Despite the central election committee’s approach, at the district
and regional level, propaganda was often directed towards specific professions and
groups of people.72 In this way, the party pursued a flexible, multifaceted approach
to the election. The national-level party organization produced propaganda that
represented the interests of the new West German nation. Meanwhile, the local
party organization, which usually stressed the local candidates, could better under-
stand the conditions and backgr ound of the voters in a par ticular district. Each
local organization could tailor the party’s appeal to local conditions without poten-
tially jeopardizing its opportunity for broad appeal on a national level. In any case,
for this election, the CDU/CSU did not y et have a statistical breakdown of the
sociological makeup and public opinion of the West German constituency, so it
lacked the information for formulating conclusions about the sentiments and mood
of the West German electorate as a whole. Local party officials, on the other hand,
were much better suited to make such conclusions about their own districts.
Although the CDU/CSU shied away fr om highlighting any differ ences in-
volving class, profession, or social status, the par ty clearly formulated its pr opa-
ganda in gender ed terms. U ndoubtedly, in the 1949 election, just as in the
elections during the 1950s, women voters were the CDU/CSU’s key supporters.
The first election to the West German Bundestag in August 1949 reflected a re-
emergence of voting and sociological patterns that had been pr esent during the
Weimar Republic.73 Claudia Koonz and Renate Bridenthal have argued that the
Weimar period, usually noted for the emancipation of women with the granting
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of their right to vote in 1918, retained a certain conservatism in terms of women’s
political and economic roles. Political parties sought the female vote, but they did
not encourage the incorporation of women into the party structures. The female
vote generally benefited the parties that had traditionally fought against women’s
rights, such as the Catholic Center P arty and the N ationalist Party. Although
women made gains in emplo yment during the 1920s, most jobs open to them
were unskilled and offer ed poor wages. K oonz and B ridenthal concluded that,
“[w]ithout an appealing alternativ e, women persisted in their lo yalty to the fa-
miliar Kinder, Küche, Kirche [children, kitchen, church] ethos and saw emancipa-
tion more often as a threat than a blessing.”74 In many respects, this attitude was
reaffirmed during the Nazi period. Nazi ideology underscored the separation of
spheres where women would remain within the household and ensure the regen-
eration of the race through their role as mothers. But Nazi ideology did not co-
incide with reality. Because of the demands of rearmament, women’s employment
continued to rise through the 1930s.75
With the founding of the Federal Republic, the patterns of women’s employ-
ment that emerged had links to conditions prior to the upheaval of war. After the
war, women continued to work in traditionally male jobs, such as construction or
skilled factory work. However, returning German soldiers and POWs increasingly
pushed women out of their jobs, especially in the y ears following the 1948 cur-
rency reform.76 In fact, by 1950 the percentage of working women was the low-
est it had been since the beginning of the tw entieth century, with about 31.3
percent of women wor king, down from 36.1 per cent in 1939, when G ermany
was mobilizing for war.77 As the 1950s advanced and the West German economy
expanded, the percentage of women working increased again as female employ-
ment patterns fell back into the larger tr end of the tw entieth century, although
the percentage did not reach the level of prewar Germany. In any case, employers
relegated women to jobs that were the lowest on the pay scale. In addition, pub-
lic policy discourse during the 1950s concerning issues such as go vernmental
family allowances for children, legislation protecting women’s participation in the
workforce, and family-law r eform attempted to cr eate the idealiz ed “complete”
family headed by a husband and wife that was supported by the male’s income.78
This conser vatism toward gender r oles suggested that although the Trümmer-
frauen represented the regeneration of the German nation, they did not signal a
fundamental change in public expectations for women and men in society. These
attitudes can be seen clearly in the political campaigns in West Germany during
the late 1940s and early 1950s.
Undoubtedly, the CDU/CSU leadership understood the impor tance the fe-
male vote was to hav e for the 1949 election. Alois Z immer, a founder of the
Rhineland-Palatinate CDU and a member of the CDU pr ess and pr opaganda
committee, commented in March 1949 that
I would like to suggest that the attitudes of women in politics and in respect to publicity be
taken in gr eater consideration in the coming months. That we listen exactly to what the
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Christian housewife says, so that we do not have to appeal to the Christian housewife in the
last 14 days [before the election], and indeed not just to house wives, but rather predomi-
nately to the Christian housewife . . . The election of the CDU will be decided through the
vote of the Christian housewife.79
The CDU/CSU made this appeal to the “Christian woman” through the selling
of the social market economy. As mentioned earlier, the party sought to package
its economic program in the form of the social mar ket economy by stressing its
antimaterialist, social aspects to the par ty’s core Catholic constituents, especially
Catholic women. As a r esult, the pr opaganda the CDU/CSU aimed to ward
women underscored the idea that the increased production and consumption re-
sulting from the social market economy were not part of an individualistic goal
of materialism, but instead allowed for the reconstruction of a secure West Ger-
man familial life in par ticular and the r egeneration of the G erman nation as a
whole following the chaos and moral degeneracy that had r eigned in the imme-
diate postwar years.
One of the CDU/CSU’ s most widely distributed series of posters compar ed
conditions in West Germany in 1947 and 1949 by juxtaposing sharply contrasting
photographs depicting West Germans in two opposing settings: one as victims of
economic and social catastrophe, the other as strengthened individuals taking part
in West Germany’s reconstruction. The 1947 photo under the wor ds “hunger,
want, misery” portrayed a woman in rags with a child by her side, marking her as
one of the approximately 10 million refugees and expellees who streamed into the
Western Zones between 1945–1949, or perhaps as someone who had endured the
destruction of their homes by Allied bombing (Illustration 2.4). The 1949 photo
under the words “forwards! upwards!” showed a woman standing over two chil-
dren eating at a food-laden table. A brochure distributed by the CDU/CSU por-
trayed the same photographs with text added: “I t cannot go on like this. The
suffering and burdens of the mother w ere immeasurable. Our girls and women
have particularly suffered and been sacrificed.” B y the next photo, the text pr o-
claimed, “Christian principles free and protect women in jobs and in the family.
The demands of the CDU/CSU: N ew and suitable pr ofessions and jobs for
women.” In this schema, women w ere spared the har dships of the immediate
postwar years and were now able to care for their children properly. The poster and
brochure acknowledged the need for women to work, a message directed mainly
to the millions of West German women “standing alone” (alleinstehend, the com-
mon German term for women without husbands) with their husbands dead, miss-
ing, or still held as POWs.80 The total absence of men in the illustrations and the
portrayal of a woman looking at her watch as her childr en eat, indicating press-
ing concerns outside the home, clearly suggests that this woman might be one who
was “standing alone.” However, the poster and brochure made clear that “suitable”
work for women was not to interfere with their primary task, raising children.81
This conception of gender roles within the context of postwar conditions was
reinforced by another widely distributed poster that proclaimed, “And again the
74 |   Selling the Economic Miracle
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
CDU, then: It should get even better” coupled with the graphic transformation
of a gaunt woman holding an empty shopping basket, her hand filled with ration
cards (Illustration 2.5). As the years progress and her basket fills, she becomes ever
more attractive, full figured, and younger looking, suggesting that the work bur-
den and hunger of the immediate postwar years had not only made difficult the
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task of meeting basic needs but also robbed her of her sexual appeal. Not surpris-
ingly, any reference to the common postwar occurr ences of rape, fraternization,
or cohabitation with a man not a woman’s husband were completely silenced in
the CDU/CSU posters, saving West Germans from a difficult confrontation with
the immediate past. Taken altogether, the CDU/CSU posters indicated the sense
that women w ere becoming mor e feminine as they r egained their r ole as con-
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sumers for the family. But this message was placed into a larger context than the
mere meeting of individualistic needs. I n one electoral appeal, couched in the
form of a letter written to a woman ’s family member in the Eastern Z one, eco-
nomic policies were clearly understood in terms of a wider, Christian worldview.
As the letter explained, the social market economy had made possible the recon-
struction of familiar life and av oided the “leveling” (Gleichmacherei) of women’s
roles that the SPD espoused. For that reason the woman was voting for the CDU
ensuring that “a Christian, German rump state can speak for y ou in the eastern
German zone.”82
The question r emains, however, whether the CDU/CSU intended these
posters and appeals for female or male consumption, or both. Were they meant
to attract the male voter, who might have been reassured by women returning to
recognizable, and in many respects, non-threatening roles? A female voter might
have been happily reminded of the relief from the taxing times immediately fol-
lowing the war. One cannot say with certainty because there exists neither explicit
discussion by the CDU/CSU of the propaganda’s persuasive techniques nor rele-
vant polling data. Like any good pr opaganda, it offer ed multiple r eadings de-
pending upon the vie wer’s perspective. Yet all of the interpr etations pointed in
one direction: the CDU/CSU had restored “normalcy” and a sense of agency to
Germans’ lives, conditions that were defined by the propaganda itself. Undoubt-
edly, the posters did not necessarily depict a r eality experienced b y many West
Germans whose liv es continued to be in upheav al. Instead they r eflected what
West Germans wanted to be, or at the v ery least, the way the CDU/CSU per-
ceived how people saw themselves. In any case, electoral appeals reaffirmed what
was depicted as women’s natural gender role of homemaker and suggested that by
fulfilling this role, women were regenerating the nation. 
The CDU/CSU propaganda contained little discussion or depiction of male
economic roles in the ne wly formed West Germany. Several posters por trayed
shattered factories and buildings dev oid of any human beings as transformed
spaces now inhabited b y working men (I llustrations 2.6 and 2.7). P arallel to
posters portraying women as someho w becoming more feminine, these posters
indicated that men were becoming more masculine upon their return to the pub-
lic sphere as producers after their absence as soldiers, POWs, and war-wounded.
Brochures contrasted men sprawled on the street in despair at the war’s end versus
men working as productive parts of the r econstruction of West Germany. This
transformation of men from their shattered existence after the war was a theme to
be developed fur ther in conser vative propaganda. But despite these examples,
most of the CDU/CSU’s propaganda dealing with economic reconstruction was
gender neutral or, if it was gender specific, dealt with women. U ndoubtedly an
important factor for this strategy was the Frauenüberschuss and the weight of the
female vote. At the same time, ho wever, the CDU/CSU propaganda echoed an
approach ascribed by Julia Sneeringer to the Center Party during the Weimar Pe-
riod, in which women voters were exhorted to heal the nation of its social and po-
litical ills in the privacy of the home. In addition, the CDU/CSU’s overall strategy
Market or Planned? The 1949 Bundestag Election   |   77
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
was much like that of conser vative par ties from Weimar, when, as K oonz and
Bridenthal contended, “[w]omen voters were regarded much as American politi-
cians might view the ‘ethnic vote.’ Their ballots were sought, but too large a par-
ticipation in party leadership was not encouraged.”83 For the most part, this was
the case with the CDU/CSU in the early postwar years.84
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What is striking about the pr opaganda pr oduced b y the national-lev el
CDU/CSU organization is that most of it did not, in general, deal head on with
the Christian concerns of the par ty. Only one of the Arbeitsgemeinschaft -
supplied leaflets touched upon such a concern. The Rhineland CDU, which was
battling the Center P arty for votes, complained that none of the posters dev el-
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oped by the CDU/CSU’s working group addressed “cultural-political” issues and
focused only on economic issues, which was pr oblematic since posters were the
main vehicles for projecting the par ty’s national image. 85 Brochures and leaflets
would mention that the party stood for “Christian responsibility” and “Christian
principles” but did not r eally develop these ideas fully. Just as in the Düsseldor f
Principles, the social market economy was not depicted pur ely in terms of sup-
port of the free market. Instead, the CDU/CSU propaganda portrayed the eco-
nomic system as giving West Germans freedom balanced with an undefined social
responsibility. In this way, the party was trying to avoid alienating more religious
voters who still advocated Christian Socialism. At the same time, by adopting the
social market economy Adenauer clearly wanted to create a new identity for the
CDU/CSU and break the perception that the party was merely the continuation
of the Catholic Center Party from the Weimar Republic. 
Undoubtedly, r epresenting Christian inter ests was an essential par t of the
CDU/CSU’s identification. At the party’s mass rally held on 21 J uly in Heidel-
berg, Adenauer concluded his speech that the election was a choice betw een a
Christian or socialist government within the context of emphasizing the SPD’s in-
ability to protect a Christian Western Europe against the threat of communism.
But this was after he had first highlighted the importance of this Bundestag elec-
tion for the future of West Germany, extolled the CDU/CSU’s economic achieve-
ments in the Frankfurt Economics Council and wor k within the Parliamentary
Council, and castigated the SPD for supporting the failed planned economy. Fol-
lowing Adenauer, Gustav Heinemann, the mayor of Essen and the F ederal Re-
public’s president between 1969 and 1974, spoke of the necessity to cr eate an
interconfessional Christian party made up of Catholics and Protestants and urged
Protestants to support the CDU/CSU and not to cast their votes for splinter par-
ties that would complicate building an effective government. But at the same time
the CDU/CSU leadership r ealized that str essing the Christian elements of the
party too strongly might scare off the nonreligious, middle-class, Protestant vote,
which was an essential component in cr eating broad support for the par ty. In-
stead, the CDU/CSU projected a vision in which those who desired, could clearly
see the Christian elements in the CDU/CSU message, but it was not put for th
too aggressively toward those it might alienate. E ven during the formulation of
the Christian Democratic movement and his struggle against Christian Socialism
within the CDU, Adenauer realized that the par ty could not excessively under-
score its Christian natur e.86 In fact, during the 1949 campaign members of the
press and propaganda committee suggested that the party should begin heavy dis-
cussion of its “cultural politics” (Kulturpolitik) only two or three days before the
election so as to undermine the SPD’ s claim that the CDU/CSU sought to be
elected through support from the Church.87
To some extent, the CDU/CSU could safely moderate the Christian elements
in its national-lev el propaganda without jeopar dizing its identity among many
voters as the “Christian party.” It is clear that within the individual dioceses through-
out West Germany, the Catholic chur ch mobilized their flocks for the CDU/
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CSU. Although national statistics are not available, the situation of the archdio-
cese of Cologne might well illustrate larger, national developments. In that arch-
diocese, which included the heavily Catholic areas of not only Cologne, but also
Düsseldorf, Essen, and Bonn, the Catholic Church held numerous rallies led by
church officials, sent tens of thousands of speech outlines to church and lay lead-
ers, and distributed 650,000 leaflets prior to the election.88 The Rhineland CDU
reported that the Catholic Church was leading an intensive propaganda campaign
to get nonvoters out to the polls and urging v oters to cast their ballots only for
“Christian candidates.” Undoubtedly, some of these v otes went to Center Party
candidates, but the Chur ch’s influence was also beneficial to the CDU/CSU as
the Center Party’s share of the vote continued to decrease compared to previous
state and local elections.89 In addition, party leaders emphasized the party’s Chris-
tian elements at the r egional and local lev el, since it was at these lev els that the
party generated pr opaganda that appealed to v oters in terms of their r eligious
background. The r egional par ty organization in the N orth Rhine ar ea com-
mented that leaflets targeting both practicing Catholic and Protestant voters were
created and distributed on the Sunday of the election. In addition, several leaflets
announcing rallies posed the question of “Christian freedom or Marxist compul-
sion [Zwang],” a change from the theme advanced by the propaganda from the
CDU/CSU’s working group.90 Other local party organizations pushed the idea of
the CDU/CSU as the Christian par ty, illustrated b y a leaflet distributed in
Dorsten, a small city on the northern edge of the Ruhr area. This leaflet presented
voters with the choice betw een the “cold materialism of the East thr eatening us
ever constantly” or the “Christian worldview.”91 This emphasis on cultural issues
was especially apparent in areas of the Rhineland and Westphalia where the CDU
was facing a strong Center Party presence and had to work hard to win over vot-
ers who might have lingering loyalty to the Center Party from the Weimar years.92
Local leadership from this area realized that gaining what were called “Christian
nonvoters” was a key element to the par ty’s success.93 From a br oader perspec-
tive, however, the CDU/CSU’s national leadership realized that ultimate success
lay beyond merely attracting v oters to the par ty on the basis of the “ cultural” 
elements. 
As in election campaigns ev erywhere, the district-par ty organizations carried
out much of the campaign’s grunt work. The district-level organizations were re-
sponsible for distributing pamphlets, placing posters, dev eloping leaflets for the
local candidates, maintaining contacts with the local press, getting supporters out
to vote, and generating the funds to r un the campaign. This meant that the
CDU/CSU campaign floundered in areas with weaker organizations—especially
outside of the CDU’s stronghold in North Rhine–Westphalia.94 But the CDU/
CSU’s loose overarching structure allowed the local party leaders to fine-tune the
campaign message according to local conditions and tastes. Bruno Dörpinghaus,
while forming the press and propaganda committee, entertained suggestions from
the regional party organizations regarding membership of the body and sought
committee r epresentatives from all r egional par ty organizations. 95 With this 
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approach, the CDU/CSU propaganda reflected the views of party members from
across West Germany. 
However, as pr eviously mentioned, the campaign also left a considerable
amount of room for the regional and district party organizations. This flexibility
was also indicated by the fact that the social market economy could be portrayed
in different contexts, depending on the local conditions. In a CDU election news-
paper from the northern, agricultural, Protestant area of Ostfriesland, the social
market economy was not portrayed as part of a defense against the godless mate-
rialism of socialism; rather , it was emphasiz ed that the economic pr ogram had
ended the ration-card economy and decreased unemployment. The newspaper re-
sponded to the challenge of the nationalist German Party, which enjoyed consid-
erable local suppor t, by portraying this riv al party as endangering the unity of
Germany and str essing that the CDU, although it r epresented multiple classes
and national interests, was attentive to the impor tance of the farmer in the na-
tional economy and national life. In this way, the CDU of Ostfriesland molded
its appeal to the local audience, although it still used the social mar ket economy
as a focal point.96
In the south, although there was considerable tension between the CDU and
the CSU, its Bavarian sister party, the two parties did coordinate the campaign to
a certain extent. Clearly the CSU wanted to maintain its autonomy from the CDU,
both organizationally and in the content of some of its propaganda, but the party
received from the Arbeitsgemeinschaft the same propaganda material and election
newspaper, Union im Wahlkampf, as the r egional and district CDU organiza-
tions. The CSU did not stress all of the same themes as the CDU and highlighted
certain “Bavarian issues,” but it placed a similar emphasis upon E rhard’s social
market economy as a defining division between itself and the SPD—as evidenced
by Erhard’s appearance at the CSU’s 16 July rally that launched its campaign.97
The SPD campaign organization was similar to the CDU/CSU’s in the sense
that it was the best organized of the parties in the field. If anything, the SPD was
more centralized than CDU/CSU. As early as late 1948 a Wahlkampfprogramm-
kommission (election campaign program commission) was created, on which the
leading figures of the party were represented.98 The campaign leadership was cen-
tered in the par ty headquarters in Hanover under the guidance of F ritz Heine,
who had coordinated SPD campaigns in the late Weimar period.99 In addition,
the SPD had a r elatively large number of par ty members (683,000 v ersus the
CDU/CSU’s 265,000 in 1950) whose dues and contributions enabled the party
to finance the campaign. 100 Although the local SPD leadership was r esponsible
for carrying out many propaganda activities, it was generally the top leadership of
the party that generated the propaganda itself.101
The SPD’s counterpoint to E rhard’s role as the personality r epresenting and
promoting the party’s economic policy was the party’s chairman, Kurt Schumacher.
Schumacher, who led the party until his death in August 1952, is best described
as having a powerful personality and dogged determination. He volunteered for
service in World War I and lost an arm fr om battlefield wounds. D uring the
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Third Reich he spent almost ten years between July 1933 and March 1943 in four
different concentration camps. Although physically shatter ed, in the spring of
1945 Schumacher set to wor k r econstructing the SPD in H anover, where he
stayed with his sister following his 1943 release from Dachau, and throughout the
three western occupation zones. His ideas and actions pr oved to be the decisiv e
force in the party’s theoretical and ideological positions even after his death and
until the adoption of the Bad Godesberg Program in 1959. Named chairman of
the party on 9 May 1946, Schumacher was a pragmatic Marxist who viewed Marx-
ist doctrine as mer ely a guide or method that would lead to social democracy .
With this view, he emphatically rejected communism in East G ermany as a de-
generate form of Marxism. Nevertheless, Schumacher continued to adhere to an
economic explanation for historical dev elopment and believ ed in a continuing
class struggle. In order to achieve an “economic democracy” he advocated the so-
cialization of certain key industries, such as raw material sectors. Mixed in his so-
cial democratic principles, he also r etained a sense of G erman nationalism
stemming from his West Prussian roots. He called for the reestablishment of Ger-
many’s 1937 borders and continually railed against Adenauer for his pro-Western
policy, often calling him the “chancellor of the Allies.”102
Schumacher’s view of the economy was clearly r eflected in the pr opaganda
produced by the SPD during the first Bundestag election. The Wahlaufruf (elec-
tion statement) issued in J uly laid out the par ty’s positions; much of the docu-
ment attacked the CDU/CSU’ s economic policies in terms of class conflict.
Among other things, it called for planning of the economy, full employment, im-
proved living standar ds, and socialization of specific industries. I t accused the
policies of the Bizone’s Economics Council of making “the poor even poorer, and
the rich even richer.”103 Schumacher endorsed these SPD positions in his speeches
throughout the campaign. I n one election addr ess deliv ered in K oblenz on 
28 July 1949, Schumacher described the “Frankfurt economic policies” as “class
struggle from above” (Klassenkampf von oben). They had merely heightened the
differences between the rich and poor. In addition, the bourgeois parties had noth-
ing to do with the economic upswing that West Germany had enjoyed since the
currency reform. The currency reform, Schumacher correctly asserted, was merely
the policy of the Allied po wers. In addition, Schumacher argued that any eco-
nomic improvement was the result of factors such as a milder winter in 1948/49,
a good potato harvest, and the influx of Marshall Plan funds.104 With the upswing
of the economy and the increased availability of basic consumer goods since the
currency reform, the SPD was alr eady on the defensiv e on economic issues, y et
the SPD leadership clearly wanted to pr ess the CDU/CSU on the issue. O ne
memorandum from the Parteivorstand (executive committee) of the SPD and
Fritz Heine to local party leaders, dated 4 August 1949, ten days before the elec-
tion, emphasized that they must make sur e to criticiz e the E rhard/CDU/CSU
economic policy. In addition, the memorandum stressed that the contributions of
industry and banking to the conservative parties, especially the CDU/CSU, pro-
vided good opportunities to attack.105
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Most of the leaflets distributed by the SPD concentrated upon the poor con-
ditions within Germany, trying to remind West Germans that circumstances for
many continued to be desperate. The leaflets did not delv e deeply into specific
economic policy, but instead highlighted the squalid living conditions, unem-
ployment, high prices, and dislocation that beset many West Germans. In con-
trast to the CDU/CSU’s portrayal of the economy, the SPD painted conditions
not as improving, but quite the contrar y, as becoming worse. The social market
economy was associated with failure and desperation, not prosperity. If left to its
own devices, the CDU/CSU would leave West Germany in ruins, illustrated in a
leaflet picturing Erhard with his head in a textbook on the social market economy
blindly leading the Western Zones over a pr ecipice surrounded by destroyed
buildings (Illustration 2.8). 
In addition, the SPD emphasiz ed the ties betw een large industr y and the
“bourgeois” par ties. One leaflet, and an accompanying poster , r ead: “Political
Power through Money.” It explained that leading industrial organizations had
met in July 1949 in order to gather funds for the “Erhard exploitation economy”
(Erhard’schen Ausbeuterwirtschaft). The leaflet pointed out that firms w ere ex-
pected to contribute DM 2 to 4 for each of their workers to the bourgeois parties.
Therefore, the SPD argued, industr y was tr ying to buy CDU/CSU r epresenta-
tives. In sum, parties that sold out to industry exemplified the exploitation of the
masses through high prices, mass unemployment to keep wages low, continuation
of the housing emergency, and the dismissal of the Lastenausgleich (a plan to even
out war damage costs across the population).106 Erhard was no more than a pup-
pet of industrial special interests, while the “average” person was left struggling to
make ends meet. 
The SPD’s propaganda was a bit mundane in comparison to the CDU/CSU’s.
The posters distributed by the SPD were less visually striking overall and much
of the SPD’s propaganda was based upon lengthy program statements about eco-
nomic planning and socialization that were relatively taxing to read. While both
the SPD and CDU/CSU pr opaganda exploited many of the pr ejudices and
stereotypes common among West Germans, the SPD concentrated upon the neg-
ative developments in the economy. As indicated by some public opinion surveys
taken between the currency reform and the August 1949 election, pragmatic eco-
nomic concerns were at the forefront of West Germans’ minds, surpassing any po-
litical idealism. The objections voiced by SPD against the CDU/CSU were rather
abstract in many respects. Appeals to the worker on grounds of social justice did
not appear as tangible as the CDU/CSU’s emphasis upon the real, material gains
that had been achieved allegedly as a result of its policies. In addition, claims that
conditions had gotten worse for West Germans were a tough sell. In fact, the gen-
eral trend in opinion among West Germans was that economic conditions w ere
improving. A July 1948 poll from the Institut für Demoskopie reported that 37
percent of r espondents believed that their economic conditions had impr oved
since the curr ency reform, versus 42 per cent who believ ed that they had wors-
ened. By March 1949, 47 percent indicated conditions had improved contrasted
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with only 3 percent who regarded their conditions as worse.107 Although circum-
stances were still undoubtedly difficult, the general mood was guardedly optimistic.
Within this context, the SPD’s message could appeal to only one social class: the
working class. Thus in the first Bundestag election, the SPD was wooing its tra-
ditional base of support but not attempting to reach out to new sources of elec-
toral support. This was in direct contrast to the CDU/CSU’s approach of creating
multidimensional propaganda that had br oader appeal. I n this r espect, the
CDU/CSU and the SPD w ere already diverging in their sense of ho w to work
successfully within the new political context of the Federal Republic of Germany. 
Another impor tant differ ence between the two main par ties had begun to
emerge by the 1949 campaign: the structure of party financing. The costs of the
campaign are very difficult to quantify pr ecisely because so much of the money
was spent on the district and regional level. It is clear that in the first federal elec-
tion of the new Federal Republic, the CDU/CSU’s financial resources were limited.
Early in the campaign, Adenauer stressed that the regional and district organiza-
tions had to gather their own funds for running the campaign.108 Adenauer rein-
forced this position in an 8 May meeting of the press and propaganda committee
when he commented that although the leadership of the CDU/CSU wor king
group was assisting individual regional party organizations in financing the cam-
paign, “this should not, however, divert attention from the fact that the main bur-
den of the election is to be carried b y the individual r egional organizations and
the local organizations respectively.”109 Udo Wengst, historian of the West German
political system, has suggested that the main CDU/CSU wor king group sought
to use its superior financial r esources to wield gr eater influence on the r egional
party organizations. Because of their poor financial situation, r egional party or-
ganizations were dependent upon the Frankfurt working group for much of the
campaign propaganda material. For example, the Rhineland CDU reported using
42,000 of their o wn posters in the campaign, while they w ere provided with a
total of 307,850 posters from the working group. With superior resources, Frank-
furt could dominate the themes pursued in the propaganda material, especially on
economic issues.110
However, the CDU/CSU did not raise sufficient funds to conduct the campaign
fully. A 19 May meeting of the press and propaganda committee described the fi-
nancial situation as “bad” and “a catastrophe.”111 A 21 June report from the Landes-
sekretariat (Regional Secretariat) of the Rhineland CDU to district organizations
complained that they had not been dev oting enough effort to raising the funds
needed to conduct the campaign. In addition, they had not been transferring the
agreed upon funds to the regional party organization. Without these resources the
regional organization would be unable to continue its election campaign work.112
One assessment by the CDU/CSU leadership estimated that the federal elec-
tion campaign cost DM 575,000.113 Presumably this figure represents the amount
that the working group spent on the campaign and not the money spent b y the
zonal, regional, and district organizations. In comparison, the SPD’s executive com-
mittee doled out DM 250,000 for the 1949 campaign, and over DM 1,000,000
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was spent by the entire SPD.114 Undoubtedly the CDU/CSU spent more on its
election campaign than its SPD rivals did. 
It is also difficult to estimate industry’s contribution to the CDU/CSU’s cam-
paign. Early in the campaign, Adenauer urged the regional and district party orga-
nizations to raise moneys fr om all lev els of society , including commer cial and
industrial interests.115 A final campaign report from the Rhineland CDU said that
in the spring of 1949 “ a circle of industry decided for a collection of a political
fund,” but it is not clear how much the group contributed.116 A collection of doc-
uments gathered together by the SPD, “Unternehmermillionen kaufen politische
Macht” (Industrial millions buy political power), reported that leading industri-
alists met in May 1949 in order to facilitate “the gathering of funds from indus-
try for the support of advertisements for the bourgeois parties.” Other meetings
of industrial leaders expressed the need to assist “the parties supporting the eco-
nomic policy of Professor Erhard.”117
But at the same time, Adenauer did not want the CDU/CSU to become too
close to industrial inter ests. At a 19 M ay meeting of the pr ess and pr opaganda
committee, Adenauer again emphasized the need for the regional party organiza-
tions to raise their o wn funds. When one r epresentative suggested local par ty 
organizations go to the respective Industrie- und Handelskammern (Chambers of
Commerce, IHK), A denauer r esponded quickly and sharply: “ We must abso-
lutely avoid the appearance that we are a party of business. . . . We must organize
a general, large group made up of bureaucrats, employees, workers, and farmers,
and along with that, we must attempt to attract large contributions.”118
In the end, Adenauer and the CDU/CSU were disappointed at the amount of
funds they managed to raise from industry. At the 19 May meeting, Walter Strauß,
head of the legal office of the Bizone, noted that he had approached leaders of in-
dustry regarding the funds they were willing to give to the campaign. Many of the
small and medium-siz ed companies could not contribute because the tax laws
hindered their taking campaign contributions as a tax deduction. 119 Adenauer
commented in a 2 June meeting of the CDU’s British zonal committee that all ex-
pectations of raising a great, central fund had been dashed. In general, the central
working group could only help the regional party organization in a few situations,
so that regional operatives must expect to finance themselves.120 Some estimates
of the funds contributed by industry range from DM 2 million to DM 4 million,
although that appears to be a bit high. I ndustrial associations eventually agreed
that their overall contributions would be divided as follows: CDU/CSU 65 per-
cent, FDP 25 percent, and the DP 10 per cent.121 Although the system was still
in its infancy as of 1949, the practice of industry contributing funds mainly to the
bourgeois parties already was forming. This system was to become much mor e 
effective and far-reaching in the federal elections of the 1950s. The difference in
funding between the bourgeois par ties and the SPD was not y et overwhelming,
but a pattern had been set nevertheless. 
The CDU/CSU achiev ed a slim plurality in the 1949 election, securing 31
percent of the vote to the SPD’s 29.2 percent. An analysis of the election sho ws
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that many of the patterns familiar to Weimar elections remained. The propaganda
was reminiscent of that produced during Weimar campaigns, in which platform
statements and crude, emotional propaganda played large roles. In addition, since
a large number of r elatively small parties had won seats, elev en different parties
were entering the Bundestag. But this situation was to change in the B undestag
elections of the 1950s. The major parties of the Federal Republic party system—
the CDU/CSU, SPD, and FDP—would emerge as dominant. In addition, in the
future elections the CDU/CSU would develop new, more modern, sophisticated
electioneering methods that were increasingly based upon techniques developed in
commercial advertising and public opinion polling. In many different ways, the
CDU/CSU was to fashion its image b y drawing upon the emerging mythology
surrounding the social market economy and the economic miracle. I n the 1949
election, the party successfully employed the dichotomy of “market or planned”
to act as a w edge issue against the SPD and positioned itself as the par ty estab-
lishing an antimaterialist, Christian West German community disconnected from
the Nazi past. In the future, the CDU/CSU increasingly sought to cash in polit-
ically by taking credit for the creation of West Germany as the “Wirtschaftswun-
derland” in which individual consumerist desires were fulfilled and consumerism
was safely defined as par t of waging a geopolitical war against the godless com-
munist East.
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Chapter 3
THE KOREAN CRISIS, 
THE SOCIAL MARKET ECONOMY, 
AND PUBLIC OPINION

The CDU/CSU had based its 1949 election campaign upon connecting the 
improvement of material conditions and the constr uction of a West German, 
organic Christian community to the intr oduction of the par ty’s social mar ket
economy. Following the election and the creation of a CDU/CSU-led coalition,
Ludwig Erhard moved from his position as head of the E conomics Administra-
tion of the Bizone to become the economics minister of the ne wly formed Fed-
eral Republic. Yet, the concepts of the social market economy were by no means
necessarily accepted by political leaders from either the left or the right, or by the
general public. As head of the Economics Administration, Erhard had had a rel-
atively free hand in developing policy. As economics minister, he now had to work
within a network of other ministries and under a highly capable, controlling chan-
cellor in Konrad Adenauer. Historians have argued that during the 1950s Erhard
lacked a Hausmacht (internal political base) to fully institute his policies r egard-
ing the social market economy, especially in terms of anticartel legislation. Many
of Erhard’s political rivals within the government possessed this power base, such
as the finance minister , Fritz Schäffer, who could always r ely on his par ty, the
CSU, for support in political battles over finance and investment policy. Erhard’s
problem was intensified by the fact that only 40 percent of his old Economics Ad-
ministration officials were transferred into the new Economics Ministry. 
Erhard personally did not possess the political instincts to wage the continual
bureaucratic turf and policy wars that are a fact of life in any political system. In
any case, he conflicted personally with A denauer, who did not r egard the eco-
Notes for this section begin on page 105.
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nomics minister as sufficiently diligent in his administrativ e duties within the
Economics Ministry and constantly attacked Erhard for his failings both publicly
and privately, through memorandums and in cabinet meetings. In many respects,
Adenauer’s criticisms of E rhard were on the mar k, as he had earned his w ell-
deserved reputation for avoiding bureaucratic paperwork. In addition, Adenauer
was highly critical of Erhard’s tendency to contradict in the press policies that had
been agreed upon privately within the cabinet. Perhaps most importantly for Er-
hard, Adenauer was not fundamentally committed to the free market and viewed
economic policy not in the more objective terms of a correct or faulty policy, as
Erhard did, but often as a matter of political expediency. As a result of these cir-
cumstances, some historians have argued, Erhard never achieved anything as far-
reaching as he had managed with his liberalization of goods in J une 1948 and
later as economics minister was constantly on the defensive when it came to pol-
icy formation.1
To be sure, Erhard faced daunting challenges. He confronted not only the ne-
cessity of instituting key aspects of the social market economy, such as limitations
of cartels, the complete end of economic controls, and the liberalization of trade,
but also the imperative of generating public support for these economic policies
as a consequence of the economic challenges generated b y the Korean War. The
experience of the economic turbulence caused b y the Korean War showed very
clearly to Erhard and others within the government the widespread West German
ignorance of the social market economy. Perhaps even more significantly, this eco-
nomic crisis and the accompanying rise in prices revealed the public’s tendency to
support a planned economy rather than an economic policy that allowed market
forces to influence prices. The so-called Korean Crisis, during which prices sky-
rocketed owing to the incr eased cost of raw materials, pr oved to be the turning
point in “selling” the social market economy and the economic miracle. 
In many respects, the experience of a drastic dip in public support for Erhard
and the social market economy, demonstrated by public opinion polls, galvanized
a variety of forces to intensify their efforts to “educate” the West German popu-
lation so as to shore up support for the free market system. The crisis helped unite
business interests within the consumer goods industry and neoliberal economists
interested in supporting the social market economy with the CDU/CSU’s polit-
ical leadership, which saw its party’s popularity drop in unison with public con-
fidence in the economy. The result was that all these groups perceived it to be in
their common interest to devise means of bolstering suppor t for the social mar-
ket economy. At the center of this on-going public relations campaign was Lud-
wig Erhard, who was connected to all thr ee groups. In response to the dr op in
public confidence in the fr ee market during the K orean Crisis, by 1952 for ces
supporting the social market economy began introducing new advertising tech-
niques that sought to produce a political meaning of the economic miracle. This
meaning not only provided support for conservative political interests and busi-
ness but also helped create a new, distinctly West German sense of nationality. In
addition, the K orean Crisis acted as a catalyst in the fur ther transformation of
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West Germany’s political culture as it adopted a more Americanized form of elec-
tion campaigning based upon public opinion polling and modern methods of 
political advertising. In conjunction with the swings in West German public
opinion, both business and political leaders sought new and more effective means
of communicating with the public, aiming not merely to understand, but also to
manage and manipulate their views. 
Following the June 1948 currency reform, the West German economy experi-
enced decidedly healthy economic growth. Between the first and second halves of
1948, industrial production rose 21.5 percent. Economic historians have identi-
fied this period as cr ucial to West Germany’s long-term economic gr owth, as
businesses enjoyed high pr ofits with the rise of prices and lo w corporate tax es.
This growth created an important source of investment in capital-poor West Ger-
many, money to be ploughed back into reconstruction and expansion. However,
six months after the currency reform, West Germany experienced a period of rel-
ative economic deflation and stagnation. Between January 1949 and March 1950
industrial production increased by 23 percent, but this constituted a relative slow-
down after the post–curr ency reform boom during which West Germans spent
their new Deutsche Marks on sor ely needed goods. B y February 1950 unem-
ployment in the F ederal Republic had r eached two million, or about 12.2 per-
cent. The relative economic slowdown and heightened unemployment generated
some concern among economic experts and the public alike, especially in light of
the relatively fresh memories of the end of the Weimar Republic and the danger
of high unemployment.2
A number of differ ent factors triggered the end of the post–curr ency reform
boom. The price increases outpaced wages and kept down consumption, budget
surpluses had accumulated, and the United States was experiencing a recession. In
the second half of 1949 the Deutsche Mark experienced relative appreciation be-
cause of the devaluation of many European currencies; therefore exports slumped
and West Germany faced the danger of becoming a dumping ground for foreign
exports. In September 1949 the exchange rate of the dollar was raised from DM
3.33 to DM 4.20—but this devaluation of over 20 percent did not keep up with
the devaluations introduced by France and Great Britain. The British pound, for
example, was devalued by over 30 percent.3 Moreover, although jobs continued
to be created in the wake of the currency reform, this increase was more than off-
set by the flood of r efugees from the S oviet Zone—about ten million b y early
1950—thereby elevating the unemployment figures. 
A number of proposed solutions to the problem of the relative economic slow-
down surfaced between the autumn of 1949 and the early spring of 1950. The
more extreme proposals for full-emplo yment policies, suppor ted by the S ocial
Democrats, trade unions, and even some members of Adenauer’s cabinet, advo-
cated a looser monetar y policy b y the West German central bank, the B ank
deutscher Länder. Budget deficits could be used to increase demand, while some
form of price controls could help curb possible inflation. Under political pressure,
in early 1950 a DM 2 billion make-wor k program was appr oved by the E co-
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nomics Ministry and the Bank deutscher Länder. By the time that plan was in-
stituted three months later, the economic situation had been transformed com-
pletely by the Korean boom. The economic slowdown also had an impact upon
Erhard’s political clout. The apparent lack of a speedy response to the downturn
on the part of Erhard and the Economics Ministry hurt Erhard’s political stand-
ing within the cabinet. 4 Erhard and the B ank deutscher Länder believ ed that a
more conservative fiscal approach would lead to continued gr owth of the West
Germany economy. From their perspectiv e, currency stability and a balance of
payments equilibrium should take pr ecedence over full employment. Although
imports were sure to flood into West Germany, Erhard was continuing to fight for
the liberalization of for eign trade—especially within Western Europe. A stable
currency and free trade, he was convinced, would encourage West German pro-
ducers to take adv antage of the high pr ofitability of expor ts. If West Germany 
remained competitive abroad, exports could contribute significantly to its eco-
nomic health, despite the short-term balance of payments shortages and excessive
imports of consumer goods.5 The reduction of trade barriers proved significant in
October 1949 as West Germany’s balance of payments to Western Europe went
from a positive $31.4 million to a negative $110.4 million between the summer
and autumn of 1949. Erhard began to feel political pressure from the U.S. High
Commissioner, the B ank deutscher Länder , and ev en some exper ts within the
Economics Ministry. They all called for trade restrictions, of which some minor
ones were introduced in early 1950.6
Even Adenauer began to question the soundness of Erhard’s economic policies.
In early 1950 Adenauer contacted the neoliberal economist Wilhelm Röpke, who
at the time was a professor in Geneva, asking him to assess West Germany’s eco-
nomic policy. Adenauer’s motives were not clear, since Erhard’s resignation might
have helped str engthen r umors of a grand coalition betw een the CDU/CSU 
and the SPD, a situation that was alr eady present in the state of N orth Rhine–
Westphalia. In any case, it could have been expected that Röpke’s response would
defend the ideas of the social mar ket economy. His memorandum to A denauer
was published along with an intr oduction by Adenauer. Röpke argued that the
unemployment West Germany was experiencing was str uctural, not cy clical. It
was the result of production bottlenecks, the inability of labor to mo ve to avail-
able jobs because of housing shor tages in the major urban and industrial ar eas,
and the continued overstaffing of industries lingering on from the wartime con-
trolled economy. Röpke supported Erhard’s economic policies and underscor ed
the fact that the market economy had fostered a general economic upswing fol-
lowing the currency reform. He stressed the need for further liberalization of for-
eign trade, r ealistic inter est rates, and the ev entual abandonment of for eign
exchange controls.7
But the outbr eak of the K orean War in J une of 1950 dramatically changed
West Germany’s economic situation. N ew orders for goods to suppor t the war 
effort streamed into the countr y. The industrial production index shot up fr om
100 in the fourth quarter of 1949 (1936=100) to 134 in the final quarter of 1950.
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This trend continued, with production reaching 146 by the end of 1951 and 158
by the end of 1952. 8 With the incr eased international demand for goods, the
West German economy now had to deal with the impact of inflation rather than
deflation. The source of the inflation was not internal, but instead external, as
West German industrialists hastily bought raw materials on the world market at
rising prices. Prices of basic materials rose by 13 percent within five months after
the outbreak of war, and they had incr eased by another 14 percent as of March
1951.9 By October 1950, West Germany had consumed its quota of $320 mil-
lion in credits via the E uropean Payments Union (EPU), an organization insti-
tuted in the summer of 1950 to act as a clearinghouse for credits in foreign trade
for nations participating in the Marshall Plan. The EPU was designed to encour-
age trade among European nations by avoiding problems of bilateral trade agree-
ments and foreign currency restrictions. West Germany was the r ecipient of an
extra credit of $120 million in November 1950, but also ran through this sum by
February 1951 because of the incr ease in raw materials r equired for pr oducing
war supplies.10 In contrast, the United States prepared for war through measures
similar to those instituted during World War II: by allocating resources under the
Defense Production Act and declaring a state of national emergency. All the while,
Erhard, despite the flood of impor ted goods into West Germany, continued to
struggle for the liberalization of trade.
Because of the increased price of raw materials vital to West German industrial
production, the Korean War produced a steep hike in prices. I n the autumn of
1949 the cost of living index equaled 105 (1950=100). This figure jumped to 119
in the second quarter of 1951, during the peak of the Korean Crisis. Gross hourly
wages also r ose during this period, fr om 95 (1950=100) to 117 in the second
quarter of 1951.11 In fact, the index of r eal weekly earnings continued to go up
during this period from 87 in 1949 to 115 at the end of 1952.12 But what would
prove crucial was the public’s perception of the increase in prices, rather than the
actual reality of the situation.
Erhard worried that spiraling inflation, caused b y rising prices and higher
wage demands, would lead to the reintroduction of price controls and rationing.
As he had done following the currency reform in June 1948 and in the midst of
the strikes of November 1948, Erhard went to the air waves to reach out to the
West German people. O n 15 S eptember 1950, E rhard presented a speech ex-
plaining the economic consequences of the Korean War. Prior to the Korean War,
he pointed out, West Germany was on the r oad to economic r ecovery as its ex-
ports rose and unemployment dropped. Surely, the boom situation stemming from
the war could thr eaten those gains. 13 Erhard argued that in or der to secure the
benefits from the Korean boom, West Germany had to retain a stable price index
in the face of the rising cost of raw materials. In other words, Erhard wanted the
importation of raw materials to be directed toward increasing the production of
exports and not to domestic consumption.
Erhard then got to the crux of his message: he was tr ying to explain the dan-
ger of the trade union demands for a general wage incr ease of 15 to 20 per cent.
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“We must also remember,” he argued, “that we are no longer living in an age of
economic isolation, but ar e part of a world economy and that, in consequence,
our economic policy must take account of developments in other countries.” Er-
hard went on to explain that “[t]he German worker must be made to see that he
risks his social security and his job if he expects social benefits from the action of
the trade unions.” H ere he pr esaged the position that he would take thr ough
much of the 1950s: the German worker must give up immediate gains for the fu-
ture benefits that would result from investment in increased productivity and ef-
ficiency. To forgo consumption no w would allo w West Germany to enter into
world markets and reap the benefits later. In addition, an increase in prices and a
subsequent drop in expor ts could lead to an attack on the mar ket economy by
those who supported the planned economy.14 In many respects, Erhard was ad-
vocating an economic program that he would support throughout his public ser-
vice both as economics minister and eventually chancellor. But at the time of the
Korean Crisis, Erhard did not hav e at his disposal public r elations and pr opa-
ganda instruments to manage public opinion effectively. The challenges that the
Korean War presented for the social market economy would help spur greater ef-
forts to devise a coherent public relations campaign for the benefit of Erhard and
his economic principles. 
In the fall of 1950 the Allied High Commission in West Germany also worried
that the Federal Republic of Germany was not devoting enough of its limited re-
sources to production for the war effort and was expending too much of its scarce
capital on the impor tation of consumer or luxur y goods. D espite these Allied
concerns, the West German government refused to commit itself to a policy of
economic controls. The Allies became even more worried about an emerging short-
age of coal, which actually was still under price controls, because of its vital role in
the overall economy. In February 1951 West Germany had run out of EPU credits
to import raw materials, despite the granting of an extra quota, and was forced to
institute import restrictions on all nonessential goods from EPU nations. By early
1951 the crisis had come to a head, with the Bank deutscher Länder withdrawing
a billion DM of credits from the banks of the individual states in order to stem in-
flation. In addition, the United States was dissatisfied with West Germany’s con-
tribution to the war effor t. On 6 March 1951, U.S. H igh Commissioner John
McCloy wrote Chancellor Adenauer to call for a significant modification of the free
market system in West Germany. McCloy demanded that “the Federal Govern-
ment must immediately work out the necessary system of administrative measures
for the control of priorities and allocations and for the control of selected prices.”15
At this time it appeared that Adenauer’s support of Erhard had begun to waver.
In February 1951 Adenauer declared before the CDU/CSU executive committee
that he was no principled adherent of the free market and would not advocate it
unless it was successful. I n fact, in M arch 1952 Adenauer convened a group of
economic experts to advise him from a position counter to Erhard’s own ideas on
economics.16 In a letter to Erhard, the chancellor attacked his economics minis-
ter, charging that his behavior was impossible and that he completely misunder-
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stood the nature of the federal government. Erhard was also chided for his overly
confident public pronouncements, especially regarding his handling of the emerg-
ing coal shortage and his public attacks on policy he had agreed to in cabinet ses-
sions. In addition, Adenauer held Erhard personally responsible for the economic
troubles that West Germany was experiencing. H e finally appointed L udger
Westrick as the new state secretary of the Economics Ministry and charged him
with the task of bringing or der to the ministr y. Adenauer also demanded that 
Erhard devote more time to the job of r unning the ministr y.17 Yet despite his
manifest displeasure, Adenauer retained Erhard as his economics minister . Per-
haps Adenauer regarded Erhard as a linchpin to the CDU/FDP coalition and con-
cluded that the risks of opening the door to a possible “ grand coalition” of the
CDU/SPD outweighed the benefits of sacking him.18
In spite of the serious confrontation between Adenauer and Erhard, the West
German economy began to improve after the crisis of early 1951. With the sus-
pension of trade liberalization, West Germany’s balance of payments situation im-
proved, and by May 1951 the country had repaid the European Payment Union
credit in full. By early summer of 1951 the Korean boom had leveled off. During
the boom West Germany’s exports had doubled and its factories’ productivity im-
proved. In the end the countr y experienced a r elatively small hike in prices and
wages. By 1952, the Federal Republic’s government resumed the liberalization of
trade with other European nations. A period of economic crisis had been averted,
and West Germany’s economy continued its boom through the 1950s. In fact, the
period of the Korean War could be seen as setting the stage for subsequent West
German economic growth. West German industry had excess capacity going into
the Korean War and could fill orders quickly. With this opportunity, West Ger-
many again reentered foreign markets and thereby was able to acquire the capital
for imports that fueled its economy.19
Werner Abelshauser has argued that the Korean Crisis constituted a significant
juncture in the development of West Germany’s political economy. During this
period, a system of “societal corporatism” emerged in which the true free market
was replaced by a political cartel. Key to this system was a process of interest rec-
onciliation in a triangular pattern among business associations, trade unions, and
the state. During the Korean Crisis of 1950–1952 the umbrella organizations of
business associations and trade unions won an important voice in the creation of
German economic policy, and in addition regained a role in economic planning
and control, both autonomously and in conjunction with the state. As a result of
the United States’ attack on E rhard’s liberalization policies and its demand that
West Germany allocate its raw materials for the war effort, the free market was fa-
tally undermined. The industrialist Gemeinschaftsausschuß der deutschen gewer-
blichen Wirtschaft ( Working Group of the G erman Manufacturing Industry)
provided a vehicle for direct controls on raw material allocation and inv estment
planning. At the suggestion of the Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie (Feder-
ation of German Industry, BDI), the main German industrial organization, Ade-
nauer’s government created the office of “Adviser to the Federal Government on
100 |   Selling the Economic Miracle
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
Raw Materials” in March 1951—a post filled by Otto A. Friedrich, head of the
Phoenix Rubberworks of H amburg. In addition, the Investionshilfe-Gesetz (In-
vestment Aid Law) of December 1951 lent DM 1 billion, extracted through a tax
on smaller business and the consumer industry, to heavy industry, the energy sec-
tor, and railroads to aid in their expansion.20
Abelshauser’s interpretation has come under fire from more recent scholarship.
In his biography of Otto Friedrich, Volker Berghahn has argued that Abelshauser
misunderstood the developments of the Korean Crisis in general and the context
of the letter ex change between McCloy and A denauer in par ticular. Berghahn
contended that in view of the ongoing discussion between the Allied High Com-
mission and the G erman government, McCloy’s letter to A denauer was not 
demanding the complete dismantling of the free market, but rather calling for gov-
ernment control of the raw materials devoted to the production of West Germany’s
export goods. He further argued that Friedrich was careful in his capacity as ad-
viser on raw materials not to undermine the West German market economy fun-
damentally.21 Others have gone on to argue that the contr ols imposed upon the
economy during the K orean Crisis were lifted in the ensuing y ears.22 In other
words, West Germany’s social market economy did not suffer fatal damage dur-
ing the Korean Crisis. James Van Hook has made a similar case with regard to the
1951 Investment Aid Law in which he contends that Abelshauser’s use of the term
“corporatism” is excessive in describing Erhard’s agreeing to government/business
involvement in raising needed capital for underinv ested sectors of the economy,
and that the scheme overall was “market conforming.”23
Whatever the impact of the Korean War on West Germany’s political economy,
its effects on the public at large w ere significant to say the least. P olling clearly
tracked the dramatic swing in public opinion during the Korean Crisis. A report
entitled Das Soziale Klima (The Social Climate) pr epared by a public-opinion
polling organization, the Institut für Demoskopie in Allensbach, showed a dra-
matic dropoff in the public’s optimism just prior to the outbr eak of the Korean
War. In one survey, respondents were asked, “If you compare your present situa-
tion with last year’s, are you better off today than a year ago, or worse, or would
you say that there is no difference?” In July 1948, following the currency reform,
West German optimism was r elatively high with 37 per cent of r espondents 
believing that things were better, while 42 percent reported things as worse and
11 percent saw no difference (10 percent responded with no answer). By March
1949 the positiv e figure had climbed to 47 per cent and the negativ e had de-
creased to 31 percent. Yet the economic conditions in late 1949 and during the
Korean War triggered a dramatic dr opoff in people ’s optimism. I n April 1951,
only 12 percent of the respondents considered themselves better off than a y ear
earlier. In comparison, 56 per cent believed that they w ere worse off . It was not
until April 1953 that respondents believing things were better (24 percent) out-
numbered those who saw things as worse (19 percent).24 This drop in optimism
was also reflected in a survey that asked, “Do you see the new year with hope or
with apprehension?” Only 27 percent in 1950 looked forward to the coming year,
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whereas 48 percent had done so in 1949. By 1953, in time for the next Bundestag
election, this figure had gone up to 60 percent.25
Clearly the inflation of the Korean Crisis had affected the population’s percep-
tion of economic stability and prosperity. During the time of the Korean War, the
fear that a new world war would break out spread dramatically. In April 1950 only
26 percent of the respondents believed that such a war would break out. By June
of 1950 this figure had increased to 53 percent and remained relatively high at 47
percent in January 1951. Meanwhile, the number of r espondents who believed
that war would not break out dipped from 74 percent in April 1950 to 47 percent
in June 1951.26 But insuring the peace was not the foremost concern of the West
German populace. In October 1951, 45 percent of respondents regarded the “im-
provement of the economic situation” as West Germany’s most important concern,
while only 20 percent thought that securing peace was the most important concern.27
In conjunction with this declining optimism among West Germans and the
heightened concern about the nation’s economic wellbeing, polling results docu-
mented a per ceptible dip in the suppor t of the fr ee market in r elation to the
planned economy. In a sur vey conducted b y the I nstitut für D emoskopie in
March 1949, less than a year after the currency reform, 41 percent of respondents
preferred the fr ee movement of prices, while 47 per cent favored controlled
prices.28 This percentage dropped significantly over the course of the economic
difficulties stemming from the Korean War. In March 1951 only 37 percent en-
dorsed the social market economy, and by October 1952 this figure had dipped
to 29 percent. During those years, those respondents favoring a form of planned
economy remained stable at around 47 percent.29
Meanwhile, the West German population attributed the rise in prices during
the Korean Crisis to the policies of their go vernment. In a survey conducted in
March 1951, a sample group of West Germans were asked, “What do you think
is the main reason for the rise in prices: increased prices on the world market or
the economic policies of the go vernment?” (multiple answ ers were possible).
Forty-six percent thought that the government’s economic policy was responsible,
while 37 percent attributed the rise to price incr eases on the world market. In a
follow-up question in May 1951, West Germans were asked, “Could the govern-
ment do something about the increase in prices if it wanted?” Seventy-five percent
responded yes, and only 9 per cent answered no.30 This assignment of blame af-
fected the public ’s perception of the CDU/CSU. A J anuary 1952 sur vey asked
West Germans, “Which party has done the most for people—I mean for people
in their living conditions?” Twenty percent responded by naming the SPD, while
only 12 percent favored the CDU/CSU.31 However, the results of this survey im-
proved for the CDU/CSU as the 1953 federal elections appr oached. A M arch
1953 survey showed that 24 percent believed that the SPD would most likely at-
tempt to impr ove the economic situation for all classes of society , as opposed 
to a much closer 22 percent for the CDU/CSU.32 Institut für Demoskopie polls
indicated that the CDU/CSU dropped below the SPD in popularity during the
summer of 1950 and r emained there until F ebruary of 1953. Clearly the eco-
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nomic problems of the Korean Crisis influenced the public’s opinion of both the
Adenauer government and the CDU/CSU.33
In addition, polls reflected the public’s general ignorance regarding the actual
nature of the social market economy. In a public opinion poll fr om April 1950,
respondents were asked the follo wing question: “ The social market economy is
discussed frequently in the newspapers and on the radio. According to your view
how should one understand the social market economy?” Only 12 percent of the
respondents answered the question in line with Erhard’s understanding, offering
responses that included notions of the “ free market, the economic policy of the
government and liberal economy .” Fifty-six percent of the r espondents had no
idea what the social market economy was, while 27 percent gave vague or incor-
rect answers.34 This pattern had not dramatically changed by November 1952 in
which 48 percent had no idea and 37 percent gave vague or incorrect answers on
the country’s social mar ket economy. This time only 8 per cent could corr ectly
identify the components of the social market economy.35
Despite the confusion surrounding the term “social market economy,” it had
the potential for political influence. In March 1952, a sample of West Germans
were asked, “What type of program must a par ty have, so that it wor ks well for
Germany?” Eighty-seven percent responded that it must be social, while 73 percent
were for democratic, 58 percent for Christian, and 25 percent for authoritarian.
Polls during this time demonstrated that most critics of the go vernment’s eco-
nomic policy concentrated on the idea that it was not social. Consequently , the
CDU/CSU needed to first associate the social market economy with the government
and then inculcate the belief that the social market economy was actually social.36
The survey also showed that the term “social market economy” had some form
of political currency, regardless of whether respondents had a clear idea of what
the term meant. The Institut für D emoskopie posed a follo w-up question to
those who had participated in the November 1952 survey, asking for a definition
of the social market economy. The respondents who gave some form of an answer,
be it correct or incorrect, were asked, “Which party would you vote for: a party
for or against the social mar ket economy?” Thirty-eight percent of the r espon-
dents believed they would support a party that endorsed the social market econ-
omy, while 6 percent would oppose it, 8 percent were undecided, and 48 percent
did not give any answer regarding the definition of the social market economy.37
Yet at the same time opinions on the social market economy were problematic for
the CDU/CSU’s prospects. Although there was a tendency among respondents to
support a par ty having such a pr ogram, regardless of whether they could accu-
rately identify the social market economy, a problem surfaced in linking the eco-
nomic policy with the corr ect political party. In March 1953, 12 percent of the
respondents of an Institut für Demoskopie survey thought that the SPD backed
the social market economy, while only 5 percent identified it as a CDU/CSU pol-
icy. More telling was that 40 per cent of the r espondents did not kno w which
party supported the social market economy and 41 per cent did not know what
the social market economy actually was.38
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These survey results could be interpreted as casting doubt on the cr ucial role
that the social mar ket economy play ed in the 1949 election campaign. H ow
could the “Markt oder Plan” issue have been a crucial platform if there prevailed
such widespread ignorance about the subject? One could also question the valid-
ity of the survey results, particularly since the polling techniques at the time were
relatively cr ude. The Institut für D emoskopie utiliz ed the quota method of
polling, instead of the mor e exact, and mor e expensiv e, random sampling
method.39 But the Institut für Demoskopie was accurate in much of its polling,
especially its pr edictions of the B undestag elections. I nstead of dismissing the
polling as invalid, one must examine its results in the context of the information
being disseminated on the social market economy. The poll asked respondents to
identify the social mar ket economy in technical terms. O ne must bear in mind
that the CDU/CSU couched its discussion of mor e abstract economic ideas in
tangible, real ways. Without ever defining it, the CDU/CSU associated its eco-
nomic program with the concrete examples of West Germany’s economic resur-
gence or with ideas about the cr eation of an organic, Christian West German
society. For a large portion of the electorate, the CDU/CSU was the party of eco-
nomic reconstruction and r esponsibility, above any consideration of the par ty’s
support for one economic system over another. 
It is also important to keep in mind not only that these polls were read and dis-
seminated by leaders in politics and business alike, but also that the surveys them-
selves were commissioned by the very same people. Those who viewed the social
market economy as crucial to continuing West Germany’s economic upswing, es-
pecially Ludwig Erhard, paid particular attention to the polls’ results. Aware of the
danger that the Korean Crisis presented to the social market economy, these same
groups began to realize the necessity of educating the West German populace on
the workings of the free market system if it was to continue. In addition, the 1953
and 1957 election propaganda espoused a clear connection between the burgeon-
ing West German economic miracle and the legitimacy of the West German state
in general, and also sought to convince West Germans more specifically of the
linkage between the new prosperity with conservative economic policies. In many
respects, the Korean Crisis was the turning point in the “selling” of the economic
miracle. Adenauer saw the popularity of his party drop precipitously in conjunc-
tion with the effects of economic crisis. 40 Although he lacked complete faith in
Erhard and did not ev en particularly like him, the chancellor was acutely con-
scious of the political capital that Erhard could provide him. The Korean Crisis’s
impact upon public opinion spurred the creation of private business public rela-
tions campaigns, active government propaganda campaigns, and new CDU/CSU
political advertising strategies to spr ead the ideas of the social mar ket economy
and the economic miracle. With these efforts, a new, uniquely West German po-
litical culture began to take shape. New American-style public relations and ad-
vertising techniques were utilized to drum up support for both the social market
economy and the CDU/CSU. I n this respect, developments in economics were
closely intertwined with the evolution of West Germany’s political culture. 
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Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard, as the personification of the economic
miracle, took center stage in these efforts. In October 1948, four months after the
currency reform, the Institut für Demoskopie surveyed West Germans regarding
their opinion of Erhard. Sixty-three percent of the respondents knew of Erhard,
as opposed to 37 percent who did not. Overall, 13 percent had a good opinion of
Erhard, while 18 percent regarded him as mediocre, 16 percent had a bad opin-
ion of him, and 16 per cent were undecided.41 By 1951, 14 per cent still had a
good opinion of Erhard, but the percentage of those holding a poor opinion of
him had climbed to 49 percent. By 1954 these results had reversed.42 This trend
was to continue through the 1950s. 
The Korean Crisis revealed the shaky support for the social market economy
on the part of both the government and public opinion. Clearly, over the course
of the early 1950s E rhard’s reputation grew enormously. Undoubtedly, this up-
swing in the public opinion of E rhard had much to do with the dramatic im-
provement in West Germany’s economic for tunes. But, also during this time,
Ludwig Erhard’s image and the creation of the mythology of the economic mir-
acle were carefully crafted b y both political and economic leaders, many times
with decidedly different goals in mind. Erhard was clearly interested in claiming
West Germany’s economic resurgence as a pr oduct of not only his policies, but
also his discipline, calmness, and foresight of future economic developments. In
his 1957 book Wohlstand für Alle, Erhard portrayed himself during the K orean
War as steadfastly defending the fr ee market in the face of political pr essure for
price controls. As he put it:
Because in Germany I kept to the rules of economic order and healthy commonsense, I was
asked: freeze prices now or resign. I neither resigned nor ordered a price freeze. That my so-
cialist opponents should have looked at things from a party political point of view I cannot
grudge them. It was worse that ev en good friends should hav e gone so wrong as to think
that my economic policy would land Germany in disaster. I argued that one should remain
quiet for a time, and this proved itself worth while.43
The campaign to mold public per ception of the economic miracle would con-
tinue through the 1950s. As a result of his own efforts, and of those politically al-
lied with him, E rhard came to personify the v ery idea of the economic miracle
and promoted this economic resurgence as a crucial aspect of the legitimacy of the
Federal Republic itself. 
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Chapter 4
PUBLIC RELATIONS FOR THE
SOCIAL MARKET ECONOMY: DIE WAAGE

The Korean War represented a turning point in the success of selling the social
market economy and the economic miracle. It galvanized the efforts of a variety
of political and economic groups to cultivate West German support for the free
market and to translate the ongoing economic upswing into electoral success for the
CDU/CSU. Their efforts demanded the revamping of political communication
and public relations techniques, including public-opinion polling and advertising
methods. The economic stress caused by the Korean War shook public confidence
in the economy as a whole and the social market economy in particular and weak-
ened support for the economic system within governmental circles, especially on
the part of Chancellor Adenauer. Public opinion polls from the period clearly in-
dicated that West Germans were distrustful of not only the free market economy
but also of industry’s role in society itself. In addition, within the government the
crisis raised the question of whether the social mar ket economy should be jetti-
soned in favor of a more politically palatable economic policy that involved some
form of price controls. The threatening emergence of a socialist government from
the 1953 Bundestag election appeared imminent to supporters of the social mar-
ket economy. By the spring of 1951, if not before, business and economic inter-
ests began to bolster support for the social market economy by engaging in public
relations measures that were distinct from, but complementary to the efforts led
by the CDU/CSU and the Federal government. These public relations campaigns
reaffirmed the social market economy and economic r econstruction as part of a
properly functioning West German society and in addition redefined them as an
essential element in the creation of a new West German identity. 
Notes for this section begin on page 139.
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The Wirtschaftspolitische Gesellschaft von 1947 (Political-Economic Society
of 1947, Wipog), founded in the autumn of 1947, constituted one of the first of
a multitude of organizations that aimed to conduct public relations campaigns on
behalf of the social mar ket economy. Comprised of r epresentatives of business,
self-employed professionals, and bur eaucrats, Wipog hosted numer ous confer-
ences and pr oduced multiple pamphlets that pr omoted inter est in political-
economic issues among the West German people.1 It sought the “political and
economic integration of the Western world with the goal of incr easing the na-
tional product, which would render harmless social opposition and unrest. Only
in this way was it possible to develop the moral strength necessary to counter the
expansive threat of communism.”2 Through its meetings, information bulletins,
and press contacts—par ticularly with the conser vative Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung—Wipog influenced public opinion r elatively indir ectly through what
might be called “ opinion makers.” One feature that differ entiated Wipog from
other organizations was its utilization of public opinion polls, the first of which
was conducted before the August 1949 Bundestag election, to get a sense of the
West German vie ws r egarding the economy , nationalization of industr y, busi-
nessmen, economic pr ospects, and the nation ’s political futur e.3 Despite its ef-
forts, by the mid 1950s Wipog had fallen apar t and its impact was limited. Yet
because of its use of polling and its founders’, contributors’, and advisers’ contin-
uing pursuit of public r elations for the social market economy, Wipog has been
characterized as a trailblaz er, an originator of the multiple organizations and
groups that defined and promulgated economic concepts throughout the 1950s.4
Another organization marshalling suppor t for the social mar ket economy in
the 1950s, the Aktionsgemeinschaft S oziale Marktwirtschaft (Action Group for
the Social Market Economy, ASM), was founded on 23 January 1953 in Heidel-
berg by mainly academics, journalists, and industrialists of the neoliberal school.
Its advisory committee included some neoliberal economists, such as Hans Illau,
Franz Böhm, and Alexander Rüsto w. One of its early solicitations to potential
members warned that action must be taken in the decisive election year of 1953
because “the supporters of the planned economy will make the totalitarian claim
to power with undiminished sharpness.” It went on to explain that in the months
leading up to the election, the ASM would pursue what it called the “Program for
Freedom” in a popular form. The organization was particularly concerned about
ensuring the efficiency of fr ee competition and sought the extension of limita-
tions on monopolies—an issue that was just coming to a head in the Bundestag.
To the ASM, economics and politics were inseparably connected as the competi-
tion of the free market was essential to the creation of a free democracy.5 Through-
out the 1950s, the ASM organiz ed conferences in defense of the social mar ket
economy, featuring talks b y prominent neo-liberals, including L udwig Erhard,
with titles such as “The Decision for Freedom” and “We demand from the gov-
ernment and Bundestag the completion of the social market economy.” Compared
to other propaganda campaigns promoting the social market economy, the ASM’s
efforts were rather modest. Its conferences were attended by a few hundred peo-
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ple each, and it printed sev eral thousand copies of its confer ence minutes. Al-
though the organization continues today, it was plagued by limited financial sup-
port in the 1950s.6 Undoubtedly it was active among certain circles of academics,
journalists, and politicians, but because of the natur e of its activities, it did not
reach the broadest audiences. 
The most significant, best financially supported, and most visible of these ef-
forts to dr um up suppor t for E rhard and the social mar ket economy was the
Gemeinschaft zur Förderung des sozialens Ausgleichs e. V. (Society for the Pro-
motion of Social Compromise), officially organized in 1952. It was more widely
known as Die Waage (The Weigh Scales), the symbol the organization adopted in
order to ev oke a sense of balance and cooperation betw een employer and em-
ployee.7 This group of businessmen launched what has been called the Germany’s
first modern public relations campaign.8 In a letter soliciting potential contribu-
tors to Die Waage, the executive board laid out the organization’s basic goals:
Die Waage/The Society for the Promotion of Social Compromise is a voluntary and private
organization that applies commercial advertising methods for the purpose of the common
welfare. Die Waage’s non-par tisan, public ser vice announcements [gemeinschaftsbildende
Aufklärungsarbeit] pursue the goal of convincing the entire population of the enduring va-
lidity of our economic system.9
Overall, Die Waage sought to convince the West German public of the adv an-
tages of the social market economy, to improve labor-management relations, and
to polish up the image of industrialists, which had been tarnished by the Depres-
sion and collaboration with Hitler. 
Die Waage sprang onto the public relations scene concurrently with a number
of industrial and business organizations meant not only to protect industry’s po-
litical interests but also to rehabilitate the industrialist’s image in West German so-
ciety. Most notable was the creation in 1950 of the Bundesverband der Deutschen
Industrie (Federation of G erman Industry, BDI), which constituted industr y’s
major political pressure group, and the Bundesvereinigung Deutscher Arbeitge-
berverbände (Federation of German Employers, BDA), which focused on social
and labor policy issues. Later in 1951, the D eutsches Industrieinstitut (German
Institute of Industry, DI) was founded to organiz e and conduct public relations
campaigns on the behalf of West German industry, especially to counter the threat
of labor unions and to por tray industrialists as striving to benefit not mer ely
themselves, but of all of society. The DI, which was coordinated closely with the
BDI and BDA, performed a variety of public relations tasks to improve the rep-
utation of the “Unternehmer,” particularly through its publications of numerous
pro-industry books, pamphlets, and newsletters.10
But compared to these industrial and business organizations, which often spoke
to other industrialists, academics, and journalists as much as the public at large,
Die Waage reached out more directly to the West German masses through mod-
ern advertising campaigns. D ie Waage conducted an extensiv e public r elations
campaign on behalf of the social mar ket economy—which indir ectly benefited
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Erhard and the CDU/CSU. Its public relations tools were wide-ranging, includ-
ing advertisements appearing in leading daily and weekly newspapers such as the
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Der Spiegel, a series of poster campaigns, and
a number of movies screened in hundreds of theaters across West Germany. In all,
a total of thirty print advertising series appeared between 1952 and 1965, but the
group concentrated its most intense activity between 1953 and 1957, which were
election years and crucial junctures in the formation of public opinion regarding
economics. 
The efforts of Die Waage constituted a vital component in the ambitious pro-
paganda and communicative efforts promoting Erhard, the social mar ket econ-
omy, and the economic miracle. The organization spearheaded the first tr uly
massive public r elations effor t to utiliz e extensiv e public opinion sur veys as a
basis for constructing advertisements that sought to mold West German concep-
tions on the economy with pr ecision. Moreover, Die Waage’s pioneering tech-
niques had an impact that transcended their primary task of shoring up support
for the social market economy. As this organization conducted its efforts over the
course of the 1950s, other political groups, including political parties such as the
SPD and the FDP, took notice of D ie Waage’s extensive application of public
opinion polling and modern adv ertising and began incorporating these tech-
niques into their o wn campaigns. Through this pr ocess, Die Waage’s influence
rippled through a developing West German political culture and helped it take a
more “Americanized” form. Furthermore, during the years of Bundestag elections,
Die Waage was effective in creating thinly veiled political propaganda for Erhard,
and through that effor t, for the CDU/CSU also . Although not formally con-
nected to the CDU/CSU or the Federal government, Die Waage became one of
many, albeit particularly important, propaganda efforts working for the benefit of
the Adenauer government. 
Die Waage’s public relations efforts tied the increased consumerism depicted in
their advertisements to the legitimization of the Federal Republic itself. The ad-
vertisements exalted the ne w West German prosperity as the r ebirth of the tr ue
German nation and its people. F urthermore, its adv ertising campaigns con-
tributed to an understanding of West Germany that pivoted on a uniquely West
German identity focused upon economic success. In the world of Die Waage’s ad-
vertisements, the fr ee market system facilitated the emergence of the ne w, free
West Germany. By establishing these connections, the propaganda not only sought
to improve the tarnished image of industry, but also to enhance the legitimacy of
the Federal Republic, par ticularly versus the riv al communist G erman Demo-
cratic Republic. Taken all together , Die Waage’s depictions of class, social, and
gender roles revealed the organization’s conception of an organic, r econstructed
West German society. Many of Die Waage’s founders were leading members of
the Bund der Katholischer U nternehmer (Organization of Catholic E ntrepre-
neurs, BKU), an organization founded in Cologne in March 1949 to “combat the
supposedly victorious and unstoppable forces of collectivism with the confidence
and truth of Christian thought.” As the organization’s guiding principles stated,
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the BKU sought the “ creation of a healthy social and living or der, based upon
Christian principles.” The organization endorsed “competition of the free market
economy and with that the connected necessity for a free, but socially-conscious
business community” with the ev entual goal of “ the establishment of the social
peace [Befriedung] through the overcoming of the proletariat.”11
This class-conscious vie w was clearly r eflected in D ie Waage’s efforts, which
were predicated upon the conser vative industrialists’ fears of both the social fis-
sures that had torn apart the ill-fated Weimar Republic apart and the threat that
Marxism presented to West Germany. Die Waage’s leadership had gr own up
under the Kaiser, come of age during the tumultuous Weimar Republic, and be-
come mature adults during the Nazi period.12 They had witnessed governments
rise and fall and experienced what they saw as the pernicious impact of the masses
upon the course of German history. Die Waage’s underlying assumption was that
social peace must be established not only to create a stable West German democ-
racy, but also to permit industry to enjoy a profitable business environment. Die
Waage’s advertisements therefore proposed a harmonious r elationship between
the sexes, among the classes, and especially between labor and management. Just
as the interaction of women in their consumer r oles and men as producers pro-
moted the harmonious functioning of the economic system, so too would labor
and industry, acting in concert, ensure increased living standards for all. Persuad-
ing workers to take up their natural r ole within the social mar ket economy and
illustrating to them that the economic system benefited all West Germans, not
just industrialists, were crucial steps, from Die Waage’s view, in overcoming the
class tensions that had spelled the destr uction of Weimar Germany and thwart-
ing the godless, alien threat of Marxism. The working class must be weaned from
its old radicalism and convinced that it shar ed in the social mar ket economy’s
benefits, a perspectiv e exemplified by advertisements showing members of the
working class who had acquired middle-class attitudes evidenced by their discus-
sions of the fr ee market, labor relations, and their effor ts to save money to buy
homes.13 Thus Die Waage’s advertisements depicted consumption not as an end
in itself, but instead as the expression of a properly functioning society in which
all were free to take up their natural roles, privileges, and duties. By endorsing this
organic view of the economy’s relationship to society, Die Waage echoed many of
the antimaterialist sentiments incorporated in the early CDU/CSU pr opaganda
trumpeting the social mar ket economy and West Germany’s economic r econ-
struction. I ronically, in its cr usade against a depersonaliz ed, mass society , Die
Waage drew upon public relations techniques that emerged as an integral part of
just such a society.
Die Waage’s founders, mainly businessmen fr om West Germany’s industrial
Rhineland region, first assembled in Cologne on 23 September 1952. The chair-
man of Die Waage was Franz Greiß, who also served as president of the Industrie
und Handelskammer Köln (Chamber of Commerce, Cologne, IHK) and chair-
man of the BKU. In fact, Greiß later reported that his inspiration for developing
Die Waage came fr om a Catholic social-scientist member of the BKU, Götz
112 |   Selling the Economic Miracle
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
Briefs, who commented to him in October 1951 that business seemed capable of
devising advertisements for all types of products, yet not appeals for appropriate
economic reforms.14 The organization’s vice-chairman was Dr. Fritz Jacobi, an ex-
ecutive with B ayer AG, and the tr easurer was Alphons H orten of G lashütte J.
Weck. The founders came mostly fr om the chemical and energy industr y along
with a large consumer-industry contingent, among them Philipp F. Reemtsma of
the Reemtsma Cigarette Company. Although Die Waage was officially registered
as a nonprofit organization on 25 November 1952, its founding process had begun
over a y ear beforehand when Greiß and Horten began r ecruiting possible con-
tributors and supporters to the organization. 
The three officially stated goals of Die Waage were: “1. A factual clarification
for the public of the social market economy and a demonstration of the economic
advantages that the social mar ket economy alr eady offers all lev els of society . 
2. Promotion of the social compr omise and with that the security of the social
peace, which is the basis for a lasting, healthy atmosphere between employers and
employees. 3. General improvement of the business community’s image and the
reduction of r esentments against the concept of fr ee enterprise [freien Unter-
nehmertums].”15 As the organization dedicated itself to this ambitious and com-
prehensive public relations campaign, it stressed that this undertaking intended to
enhance understanding of the social mar ket economy not only for “Lieschen
Müller” (John Doe) but also “D r. Lieschen Müller”—that is to the widest seg-
ment of society. Franz Greiß reasoned that industry should conduct a public re-
lations campaign as though the social mar ket economy w ere its o wn product,
because this inv aluable system ensur ed the industrialist ’s ability to per form his
economic functions effectively and fully.16
This group of industrialists looked to American business for a model to guide
their public-relations and goodwill activities. Most particularly, the American Ad-
vertising Council in the United States served as an inspiration.17 This so-called Ad
Council, formed in 1942, sought to disseminate advertisements for the national
or public good. It counted among its triumphs the wartime creation of the “Rosie
the Riveter” character and the later “S mokey the B ear.” The Ad Council was
mostly funded by voluntary contributions from industry. In fact, the Austrian ad-
vertising expert H. F. J. Kropff saw the emergence of the Ad Council as a crucial
step in r ehabilitating American adv ertising from its pr evious r eputation for
merely churning out exaggerations, fabrications, and deception. In addition, the
Ad Council’s success had demonstrated “that the principles, methods, and means
of commercial advertising could be applied as effectively for propaganda of gen-
eral, useful ideas or ideals as for sale of goods.”18 One 1953 article in the Frank-
furter Allgemeine Zeitung suggested that not only did the United States exemplify
a strong and stable democracy , but it also had dev eloped and made av ailable
methods of enhancing public tr ust in democracy. Applying the methods of the 
Ad Council, the article continued, was an important way that such trust could be
built up in West Germany. Die Waage, the article concluded, was perhaps the best
example of these American methods currently employed in West Germany.19
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From early on, Die Waage enlisted an advertising agency, the Gesellschaft für
Gemeinschaftswerbung (GfG), to craft and carry out its public relations campaign.
Hanns W. Brose had founded the Gf G in May 1929 in B erlin and consciously
developed the firm along American lines. D uring the late 1920s, American in-
fluence in public relations and advertising was growing in Germany, as in Europe
as a whole, with Anglo-American firms such as J. Walter Thompson, Lord and
Thomas and Co., H.K. McCann Co., and Erwin, Wasey and Co. opening Ger-
man branch offices.20 In fact, beginning in January 1928, Brose worked in Berlin
for Erwin, Wasey and Co. as an advertisement copy-editor. Given the absence of
any formal training programs in Germany for advertising, it was with Erwin, Wasey
and Co., Brose would later claim, that he absorbed the American style and ap-
proach to advertising.21 On several trips to the United States, Brose also picked up
knowledge of American advertising techniques, which he held as the inspiration
for his own advertisements.22 In 1935 Brose became involved with the Gesellschaft
für Konsumforschung (Society for Consumer Research), then under Wilhelm Ver-
shofen’s direction, and made contact with economists such as Ludwig Erhard, who
was working with Vershofen at the time. This organization was conducting trail-
blazing work in market research and the sources of consumer motivation—an es-
sential part of what Brose called the “history of the discovery of the consumer.”23
After the war, American advertising firms reopened many of their branch of-
fices in West Germany while many of the West German agencies themselves in-
corporated an American influence into the style of their adv ertisements and the
structure of their agencies, which now became “full-service” operations—that is,
they provided market r esearch, ad lay out, and ad placement. As B rose would
later comment in 1958, “ When one vie ws the dev elopment of adv ertising in
Germany over the last 30 years, one cannot overestimate the example and influ-
ence of American advertising agencies.”24 In 1945 Brose transferred his advertis-
ing firm’s headquarters from Berlin to Frankfurt am Main in the American Zone
of occupation. Perhaps one reason the GfG proved so attractive to Die Waage was
that Brose had previous experience with “Gemeinschaftwerbung” (cooperative ad-
vertising), advertising developed for an association of businesses in pursuit of
some common goal. During the Second World War Brose had spearheaded the
“Glückauf-Aktion,” a project in which business interests donated funds to support
a public relations campaign aimed at attracting apprentices to enter coal mining
work and invigorating an occupational self-consciousness among miners. As part
of this effort Brose helped craft twelve different advertisements that were to ap-
pear once the war had ended. 
Key features of Brose’s advertisements from the 1930s and 1940s, such as pic-
torial headers, long texts, and recurring themes, layouts, and graphics in succes-
sive advertisements, would appear in the advertisements Brose developed for Die
Waage’s actions. B rose insisted that ads must r ecount and narrate (erzählen) so
that the r eader could feel informed—other wise they would, like mer e posters,
“shine and gleam and make noise with no effect.” 25 This style of adv ertising
closely mirrored the ads appearing in American magazines in the 1920s and
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1930s. These ads, with r elatively long texts, invited r eaders to identify with the
ads’ characters through a shared conversation, experience, or special kno wledge
created by a compelling “human-interest” story. The underlying idea was to sell
not the pr oduct itself, but rather some sor t of individual benefit, both rational
and emotional, that the prospective consumer gained from the product. Although
such advertisements retained factual and “ objective” elements, the shift was to-
ward a more subjective perspective set in a clear social context that appealed to the
readers’ desires, fears, and hopes and allo wed them to par ticipate in the adv er-
tisements themselves. Often the ads would feature a testimonial by a respected so-
cial leader—a doctor , for example—or a befor e-and-after scenario that would
highlight how the product had changed a consumer’s life. By replacing the more 
product-centered approach of early-tw entieth centur y American adv ertising,
which seemingly constituted mere announcements describing the goods, the ul-
timate hope was that the reader would now begin to identify with the advertiser
in relation to some common problem or situation.26
This quintessentially American approach to advertising ran counter to the ad-
vertising traditions that had developed in Europe. Victoria De Grazia has posited
that the unique E uropean advertising style that had dev eloped in the late nine-
teenth and early tw entieth centuries r eflected Old World market conditions—
namely “authentic” craftsmanship in the pr oduction of goods and their sale
within established, narrow markets to customers who alr eady knew these prod-
ucts. This orientation contrasted star kly with the American pattern of mass-
producing standardized articles for a mass market. Consistent with “Old World”
market circumstances, European advertising through World War II still generally
followed what has been described as the “Ding an sich” (thing in itself) approach.
This approach emphasized the inher ent qualities of the pr oduct as contrasted
with the common American practice of placing the product within a social con-
text to create its value and meaning. In Europe, poster art with scant text remained
the preferred medium of this Ding an sich style because graphics facilitated an in-
tuitive process by which, as De Grazia explained, “goods should be animated by
symbolic, evocative pictorial traditions, using subliminal r eferences and psycho-
logical suggestion to activate latent desire.”27
In contrast, in the American style products were portrayed much more realis-
tically and the ads emphasiz ed what the product could do for the consumer . As
De Grazia pointed out, Americans faithfully r eproduced products in their ads,
while Europeans translated them graphically in a seductive manner.28 The Amer-
ican mode of advertising continued to creep into Europe during the 1920s and
the 1930s. In fact, one effect of the American influence of advertising on German
and European advertising was to help legitimate the adv ertiser and adv ertising
agency within society as businesses that w ere somehow more “scientific” in ap-
proach rather than charlatans trying to dupe the unsuspecting public with alluring
images and colors in artful posters. Clearly, the European style of advertising crossed
into the political realm by using eye-catching posters to influence voters and cit-
izens of the state—an appr oach used by not only the N azis, but other political
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parties during the Weimar Republic. To Europeans the line between advertising
and propaganda was thin, if ev en existent. The American influence, ho wever,
caused advertising to become more “scientific,” with carefully constructed layouts
based upon statistical analysis of income, tastes, and consumption, and frequent
reliance on the work of the behavioral psychologist John B. Watson to better un-
derstand the connection between social behavior and emotions.29
During the Third Reich, German advertising was placed under the dir ection
and control of the Nazi regime, as was the case for all the media within Germany.
In September 1933 the regime established the Werberat der deutsches Wirtschafts
(Advertising Council of the German Economy), composed of about eighty repre-
sentatives from a range of branches of industry and the advertising business. The
council, which answered to Josef Goebbels’s notorious Nazi propaganda machine,
the Ministry of Propaganda and Public Enlightenment, carried out the “Aryaniza-
tion” of the advertising industry by purging it of Jews. It also oversaw ads to ensure
that they reflected proper German thought and ideals and that they used German
words rather than foreign alternatives. Through its policy of Gleichschaltung (co-
ordination) of advertising, the Nazi regime completely obliterated the difference
between advertising and political pr opaganda as many adv ertisers were put to
work generating state pr opaganda.30 In addition, the Nazi suppression of hun-
dreds of newspapers and magazines, Nazi limitations on billboard space, and the
growing state control of the economy rendered advertising both increasingly dif-
ficult and unnecessary. Firms spent increasing amounts of their advertising bud-
gets in state-sponsored media, such as the Nazi newspaper Völkischer Beobachter
or Hermann Göring’s journal on the Four Year Plan. Despite the limitations and
controls imposed upon German advertisers during the Third Reich, one does find
evidence of the fur ther refinement of German advertising as it adopted a mor e
American style. For example, text-centered magazine advertising increased during
the Third Reich, for the poster medium was tightly contr olled and dev oted
mostly to political pr opaganda purposes.31 Despite the Nazi intrusion into ad-
vertising, many of the adv ertising agents, among them B rose himself, quite ef-
fortlessly made the transition from the Nazi regime to the Federal Republic.32
Ultimately, the incorporation of American-style advertising, which really took
off in the 1950s, manifested itself in the shift fr om a more producer- or sender-
oriented advertising to a more consumer- or receiver-oriented advertising. With
this shift advertisers increasingly took into account the views and predilections of
the consumer rather than focusing on the qualities of the good in and of itself .
When developing ad layout and copy, American advertisers were urged to think
of themselves as speaking to individual consumers and to consider their views and
beliefs.33 By contrast, throughout the first half of the twentieth century European
advertisers and pr opagandists talked about their craft in “ mass psychological”
terms in which they stressed the irrational qualities of the amorphous, undiffer-
entiated masses—often evoking the French social psychologist Gustave Le Bon
and his analysis of the herd mentality of the crowd. Hans Domizlaff, a leader in
German advertising from the 1920s thr ough the 1950s, dr ew heavily upon Le
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Bon’s insights as he cr eated a “brand identity” for such firms such as R eemtsma
and Siemens. In his quest to “Ins Gehirn der Masse kriechen” (creep into the mind
of the masses), he envisioned the essential pr oblem of adv ertising in biological
terms: it involved introducing an idea into the masses through simple repetition
as if injecting a contagion into an organism so that it could spread on its own. He
saw himself as an artist giving life to a brand name’s own identity and meaning—
and thereby imprinting that identity and meaning upon the goods pr oduced
under that brand name. As he later commented, “A brand name has a face like a
person.”34 To be sure, the idea of attributing cer tain qualities to firms, and with
that their goods, was also an essential par t of American adv ertising. But on the
other hand, during the 1920s and 1930s American adv ertising firms inv ested
heavily into getting to “kno w” the individual consumer v ery precisely through
painstaking market research, polling, and analysis of the readership of the maga-
zines and newspapers that ran their ads—techniques that were almost nonexistent
in Germany. Clearly Brose saw the American techniques as crucial in the process
of selling the social market economy. Yet, Brose retained an element of the Euro-
pean tradition thr oughout his ads during the 1930s and thr ough the 1950s:
rather than adopt the American use of a universal vernacular of advertising, he re-
tained a “G ermanness” throughout his adv ertisements—often, for example, b y
having the characters in the ads use colloquial or class-specific language. As Brose
argued in his memoirs, successful adv ertisements needed to pitched to the local
mentality—an idea that, he claimed, was resisted by the American firms who be-
lieved in utilizing in ads what they saw as a universal vernacular that transcended
region and class in the selling of goods.35
Brose’s more American-style advertisement that spoke to the subjectiv e expe-
riences of readers is illustrated in his extensive use of polling. Early in its forma-
tion, Die Waage drew heavily upon public polling research, both to get a sense of
public opinion in West Germany and to craft its adv ertisements with precision.
Especially crucial was the public opinion r esearch generated b y the Institut für
Demoskopie in Allensbach—which during the 1950s was to become the most
important of the West German organizations conducting polling on political
views. The Institut für D emoskopie was formed in 1948 b y Elisabeth Noelle-
Neumann and her husband, Erich Peter Neumann, whom she married in 1946.
Noelle-Neumann, who had studied journalism and the emerging field of public
opinion polling at the University of Missouri in the United States between 1937
and 1938, earned a P h.D. from the University of Berlin with a disser tation ex-
amining the press’s role in the formation of American public opinion. Once back
in Germany, she published her 1940 book, Researching Opinion and the Masses in
the USA: Surveys on Politics and the Press. Her role within the Nazi state has r e-
cently come under intensive scrutiny. Noelle-Neumann joined a Nazi student or-
ganization in 1935, and the fact that the authorities allowed her to study abroad
in the late 1930s demonstrates her political reliability. During the war she wrote
for Das Reich, a w eekly journal for G erman intellectuals founded b y Josef
Goebbels. She produced articles for the journal that were characterized by strident
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völkisch (nationalist or racist) and anti-Semitic sentiments, such as one in which
she explained that Jews controlled the American media and had fostered a hostile
American public opinion to wards Germany. Immediately after the war N oelle-
Neumann worked with the French military intelligence organizing some surveys
in 1946/47. Early in 1948 she incorporated the I nstitut für Demoskopie in Al-
lensbach on Bodensee; much of the I nstitut’s work involved research for adver-
tising. In addition, during the 1950s she became a key adviser and pollster in the
service of the conservative CDU/CSU.36
Particularly important for Die Waage’s public relations campaign was a sum-
mary of surveys conducted by Noelle-Neumann’s Institut für Demoskopie between
1948 and 1951. These sur veys were compiled for the Gf G in a single r eport
called Das Soziale Klima (The Social Climate). This survey investigated four basic
questions: What did the populace know about the social market economy? How
were the opposition and the go vernment viewed by the public? What was the 
relationship between the v arious social par tners, especially industr y and labor? 
Finally, what were the views on the trade unions and codetermination in plants
and factories? The Institut für Demoskopie also included as part of the survey a
report on “Public Relations and Opinion Research in the United States of Amer-
ica and Great Britain.” Drawing on experiences in the U nited States and Great
Britain, this short report underscored the need for business and large industry to
involve themselves in public relations.37
Das Soziale Klima documented a prevailing ignorance among the West Ger-
man populace about the social market economy, with only 12 percent of respon-
dents able to corr ectly identify the economic system (see also the figur es from
chapter 3 of this v olume). This report also revealed a widespread distrust of the
industrialists. A J une 1950 sur vey queried whether most manufactur ers think
“only of their profit, or are also socially-minded.” Sixty percent believed that in-
dustrialists were concerned only about pr ofits, versus 16 per cent who r egarded
them as socially minded. In addition, 59 percent believed that manufacturers would
have to be forced to watch out for their workers’ interests.38 Despite this negative
view of industrialists, the wor kers also appear ed to be r eceptive to a system of 
industrial relations that was mor e advantageous to management. M ore than 73
percent of workers could not correctly identify the demands of the trade unions
regarding the issue of Mitbestimmung (codetermination), the proposal that worker
representatives sit on the supervisory boards of firms. One had to consider that a
third of workers believed that only consultation with management, not codeter-
mination, should be instituted. I n addition, another thir d argued that wor kers
should have input only upon matters of shop-floor management. 39 In general,
people were more concerned with issues involving their own economic well-being
than more abstract worker representation issues such as codetermination. 
More significantly, perhaps, the report stated that the June 1948 currency re-
form was a “Nullpunkt” (starting point) in influencing public opinion. Views the
German populace held toward the economy were distorted by the catastrophe of
the war and defeat, but with the impr oved living conditions accompanying the
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currency reform, the population was more open to industry’s arguments.40 After
examining various factors affecting West Germany’s social conditions, the report
concluded: “The themes discussed her e give the final answ er to the question of
whether there is a chance in Germany to improve the masses’ views of the current
economic system. The answer is, with a number of qualifications, affirmative.”41
But the r eport warned that the divisions betw een haves and hav e-nots and be-
tween the government and the governed were continually widening. A “contin-
ual analysis of the mentality of the masses ” was cr ucial to impr oving public
opinion of the social mar ket economy. The report stressed that because public
opinion is not easily moved, a systematic approach must be adopted in order to
change it. In addition, such a public relations action must be taken even where it
represented a dramatic departure from past practices on the part of business, which
tended to stay out of politics. A government averse to the market economy would
lead to extensive economic and political “displeasure” (Unwillens) for business.42
Having sketched out of the contours of West German public opinion, Das
Soziale Klima was, in fact, used by Die Waage’s executive board as a tool to recruit
donors. An early action plan for Die Waage, designed to attract potential donors,
was entitled “S omething Must Be Done,” summed up Das Soziale Klima, and
provided data depicting the rising discontent among the West German populace
regarding economic developments of the last two years in a self-described “scien-
tific” fashion. This report, put together by the GfG, was meant to encourage busi-
ness interests to contribute to D ie Waage’s efforts; therefore, it emphasiz ed the
political implications of D ie Waage’s proposed public r elations campaign. I t
opened with, “In the German business community, the understanding is growing
that something must be done, that something must be done soon in order to en-
sure an anti-Marxist majority in the 1953 Bundestag.” 
The report went on to point out that the Adenauer government was viewed in
an ever more negative light, and because of this the government’s economic sys-
tem based on the social market economy and its representatives, the industrialists,
were viewed negatively. If the head of the SPD, Kurt Schumacher, came to power,
the proposal underscored, it would mean the socialization of key industries, in-
cluding coal and steel, follo wed by banking, transpor tation, insurance, energy,
and large chemical industries—which w ere exactly the industries upon which
Die Waage concentrated its fundraising efforts. In addition, those industries not
threatened by socialization, the report warned, should be wary of the effects that
codetermination could have on their firms. Therefore, it was imperative that an
anti-Marxist majority of at least ten to twenty representatives in the Bundestag be
secured in the 1953 federal election. This could be done by winning over the vac-
illating or undecided mass of people. But the report left open the question of which
party Die Waage’s campaign should support. Although Die Waage was emphati-
cally anti-Marxist, the organization was not officially tied to any political party or
religious community.43 The report proposed a series of advertisements that high-
lighted the increased living standards since 1948, the r elationship of employers
and employees in solving the age’s social problems, and the progress that indus-
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try provided humanity. Die Waage envisioned a campaign consisting of 26 ad-
vertisements appearing in 78 differ ent newspapers and costing DM 6.3 million
over the course of 1952. The report then jumped into a summary of Das Soziale
Klima.
One is struck by how this proposal stressed that Die Waage’s goals and meth-
ods were based upon empirical and scientific research conducted by the Institut für
Demoskopie. Within the context of fundraising, the I nstitut für D emoskopie’s
surveys were crucial tools for demonstrating both the legitimacy of Die Waage it-
self within a newly founded democracy and the need to organize such an under-
taking. The proposal was also meant to counter the common businessman ’s
perception of advertising and public relations as a disreputable pursuit conducted
by commercial hucksters or propagandists—especially after the deluge of propa-
ganda churned out during the Third Reich. This description of Die Waage’s ini-
tial advertising plan stressed that “Die Waage’s proposal does not star t with any
subjective opinions, unclear conceptions, or unr ealistic ideas—it starts with the
facts and exact kno wledge.” After examining the sur vey r esults, the pr oposal
commented that, “The dissatisfaction of the broad masses with the economic con-
ditions is, according to the Institute [für Demoskopie], the result of a lack of infor-
mation.”44 Now that it knew precisely what information the “broad masses” lacked,
the report implied, Die Waage could turn these masses in a favorable direction. 
In order to demonstrate the empirical necessity of cr eating a public relations
campaign, the r eport summariz ed the sur vey r esults compiled in Das Soziale
Klima. For example, it stressed that in April 1951, 56 percent of the West German
population reported that conditions were worse than the y ear before, whereas in
November 1950 only 27 percent maintained this position. Seventy-eight percent
of respondents believed something must be done to stop the rise in prices, and al-
most half (46 percent) held the government responsible for this rise. In addition,
most workers were dissatisfied with businessmen, with 69 percent seeing them as
“unsocial.” Overall, according to the report, the public was generally ignorant of
Economics Minister Erhard’s policies, basic economic issues, and the advantages
that the social market economy provided. The proposal reported that close to a
third of the population was politically indecisiv e, evidence showing the need to
launch a public relations campaign before the next federal election in order to win
this group over to the bourgeois parties. A large percentage of West Germans were
dissatisfied with the Adenauer regime and did not expect better conditions with-
out a change in government. In addition, Die Waage’s public relations proposal
stressed the idea that workers were not necessarily interested in class struggle, but
their ability to withstand class warfare slogans was undermined by a lack of edu-
cation. The message of the summary was that people were to a certain extent dis-
satisfied and ignorant of many economic and political issues, but formed in
essence a “tabula rasa” and were open to a public relations campaign on the behalf
of industry. The dissatisfaction of the broad masses with the economic situation,
the report claimed, was the r esult of a lack of information on the social mar ket
economy.45 It concluded that “the government and business community—so says
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the Institut für Demoskopie—need the support of public r elations, which does
not only give the public a view of the disadvantages of system [as the opposition
gives], but shows the advantages that are not presently being brought to the at-
tention of the masses. The opposition is developing more daring and vision than
the government and business community. All of the parameters have been given
so that this now can be reversed.”46
But in many r espects, by 1952 Die Waage had softened the o vertly political
overtones of its appeals to businessmen, while it began to use Erhard’s position as
economics minister to lend legitimacy to Die Waage’s efforts. Since Die Waage’s
inception, its founders had been in close contact with Erhard, who because of his
experience at Professor Vershofen’s Society for Consumer Research in the 1930s
was accustomed to concerning himself with the mentality of the consumer . 
Already by early M ay 1952, D ie Waage had pr epared letters to be sent out b y
Ludwig Erhard to “financially strong” leaders of industry such as August Oetker,
Continental Gummiwerke, Merck, and Otto Friederich, head of Phoenix Gum-
miwerke. Die Waage’s vice-chairman, Fritz Jacobi, explained to E rhard that the
advertisements would not be polemical and aggr essively political; such an ap-
proach must wait for an election y ear. Instead, he argued, “ the long neglected,
true clarification of the ideas, nature, and goals of the social market economy in
a positive form had to make up for lost time in seeking the approval of the entire
nation.”47
In these solicitations, Erhard warned that ignoring public opinion in the new
democratic state could not be tolerated. H e cautioned to businessmen that the
stakes were too high for them to ignore the efforts of Die Waage: “Even a contri-
bution that appears difficult to afford in respect to the financial situation of your
firm will appear acceptable when you consider what is at stake. It is about the un-
derstanding of the nation for the great service that independent businesses achieve
through competition for the consumer and for people rising in income and posi-
tion.” This was, in many respects, an appeal for the industrialists to become more
overtly involved in politics—an unfamiliar role to many of them. But at the same
time, Erhard’s letter emphasized that this public relations campaign would be “in-
dependent of all party election slogans and independent of group interests.” Un-
doubtedly Erhard took this position because prospective contributors supported
not only the CDU/CSU, but also the FDP and the DP. A public relations cam-
paign meant industrialists should accept a cer tain sense of r esponsibility for all
bourgeois par ties, or at least this was what the ex ecutive board of D ie Waage
wanted to stress to prospective contributors.48
The Institut für Demoskopie also played a direct role in Die Waage’s fundrais-
ing. On 14 April, Erich Peter Neumann, a political consultant to the CDU and
the husband of D r. E lisabeth Noelle-Neumann, the head of the I nstitut für
Demoskopie, presented a talk in Cologne on “The responsibility of the business
community for public relations.”49 Together, over 200 politicians, journalists, and
businessmen were invited to hear him speak. 50 Neumann outlined the business
community’s role in public relations, beginning his talk with the idea that busi-
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nessmen perceived themselves to be engaged in a fight to pr otect certain princi-
ples, without regard to whether those principles were correct or valid. They were
in a combative position and had to ensur e that their inter ests remained in har-
mony with the dev elopment of the larger worldvie w (Weltbild) of society as a
whole. In order to help businessmen accomplish this task, Neumann proclaimed
that he was putting forth this “impartial, objective finding.”51
Neumann pointed out, that in fact, he and the businessmen dealt with the
same concern—humanity and then went on to demonstrate the need for public
opinion research and its power to make human society understandable. H e un-
derscored that the rules of society and its workings remained hazy at best. Com-
pounding this problem was the fact that the masses had exerted an ever growing
influence on politics over the course of the twentieth century. One had no mea-
sure, other than in a general way, of the attitudes of society as a whole. But since
the 1920s new and more exact methods of empirical social research had been de-
veloped. In fact, Neumann maintained, “The representative polling method al-
lows us to measur e the cir cumstances of society , whose r esults, and this is the
decisive point, permits us to generalize as a laboratory analysis from some mater-
ial.” Clearly, the tools of polling research could not be ignored. As Neumann con-
tended, “We are engaged not with the investigation of opinions, but instead with
discovering the patterns of behavior stemming from knowledge and ignorance.”52
Neumann highlighted not only the possibilities of public opinion research, but
also the dangers that business inter ests were facing. The SPD drew funds fr om
such a wide membership that it could finance its own ongoing propaganda cam-
paigns. He did not mention, of course, the fact that the business contributions to
the CDU/CSU far surpassed the funds the SPD raised thr ough party member-
ship dues. I n addition, the trade unions “ were constantly effectiv e in r egard to
shaping opinion, therefore in influencing public opinion.” He argued that, “No
matter what goodwill the industrialist may have developed with the workers, it is
dissipated the moment that the union members decide to strike, because they do
so out of discipline. The unions have several million in their hands and the ability
to quickly influence the opinion of these men. Somehow the industrialists must
have a way to respond.”53
By citing a series of public opinion sur veys, Neumann demonstrated that a
more informed population tended to be less radical in its political views. One of
these surveys asked West Germans, “What do you think: should people demon-
strate and make a commotion in Bonn more often than they do now, or don’t you
think about it?” Forty-six percent of the uninformed population thought “more
often” would be good. In contrast, only 30 percent of the well informed thought
such disturbances w ere positive, while 64 per cent regarded them as damaging.
The survey did not clearly define what it meant b y an “uninformed” versus an
“informed” individual; however two interesting assumptions are revealed in this
poll. First, Neumann implicitly set up a relationship between a decline in radical
behavior and the information that would be pr ovided by Die Waage’s proposed
public relations campaign. Neumann assumed that the information supplied by
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Die Waage would automatically pr oduce an output of less radical behavior . In
other words, he took for granted that if informed, an individual would agree with
industry’s views. At the very least the individual would be mollified, if business
and industry were the gatekeepers of that information.54 Second, the variables of
information provided and any drop in support for radical behavior could be ef-
fectively monitored and manipulated through empirical polling surveys. The cre-
ation of a public relations campaign would be useless without a proper, systematic
means to test the effectiveness of such a campaign. From this perspective, surveys
were not so much about taking the pulse of the people as about directing and ma-
nipulating public opinion.
Despite Neumann’s call for a business-led public relations campaign, there were
surely dissenting views regarding industry’s appropriate role in strengthening sup-
port for the policies of political leaders. Undoubtedly, by 1952 industry had con-
tributed considerable funding to political par ties for their election campaigns,
especially to the CDU/CSU, FDP, and DP in the 1949 Bundestag campaign. But
as one RAND Corporation report concluded in 1954: “While the support among
businessmen for the West German Republic is strong, German business still lacks
a tradition of democratic conviction and of civic responsibility. The political atti-
tudes of German businessmen may be best described as cautious and as distrust-
ful of all forms of political enthusiasm.”55 The industrial leaders of the early 1950s
had seen a number of governments come and go over the course of their lifetimes
and were wary of binding themselves too closely to any political group. Their own
experience had taught them to be skeptical of any idealism or enthusiasm about
politics. In general, they held a fundamental cynicism toward politics, much like
the public at large, and favored concentrating upon narrow business interests. The
report also concluded that business leaders avoided any real discussion of politics
and thought that political activity was generally bad for one ’s character.56 Given
the many companies’ collaboration with the Nazi regime, war crimes trials pros-
ecuting some leading industrialists, and a generally negativ e public opinion to-
ward industry, West German industry had every reason to be leery about openly
engaging in politics. There is no doubt that in the circumstances of postwar West
Germany, where critical issues concerning industry such as dismantling, denazi-
fication, decartelization, and codetermination w ere being hashed out, industr y
was, in fact, extremely active in politics—albeit most businessmen tried to con-
ceal such activities fr om the glar e of public vie w.57 In the guise of a r eportedly
nonpartisan organization, Die Waage was asking business and industry to openly
back a political figure. Neumann’s solicitations on the behalf of Die Waage illus-
trate well that businessmen had to be carefully goaded into such participation. 
Clearly, business was willing to contribute money anonymously to political
parties, although the CDU/CSU was disappointed by the total contributions dur-
ing the 1949 campaign.58 Fearing the socialization of certain industries that would
ensure a SPD victory in the 1953 Bundestag election, by the autumn of 1952 the
national industrial association, the BDI, and its accompanying emplo yer associ-
ation, the BDA, had decided to cr eate so-called Fördergesellschaften, or promo-
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tional associations, to better organize business influence within the political realm.
In contrast to the centralized organization of the BDI and the BDA, these Förder-
gesellschaften were formed at the Land (state) level for more effective fundraising
and served as conveyer belts carrying funding to the bourgeois political par ties.
The purpose of these associations was to better coordinate political contributions
from economic groups in anticipation of the 1953 B undestag election. Defined
formally as trade associations, the membership dues they collected were deductible
as business expenses. The dues paid b y individual businesses w ere based upon
total payroll for an industrial firm and turnover for a commercial firm. These pro-
motional associations would exploit contacts with local business and industry and
then funnel money to state-level party organizations for state elections and to the
national-level political parties for the federal elections. In return, the active busi-
nessmen r unning these associations would hav e the personal oppor tunity to 
approach the politically po werful personally r egarding the passage of whatev er
economic and social legislation they were interested in.59
One problematic question was what the r elationship was to be betw een Die
Waage and the Fördergesellschaften, particularly how these two organizations
would coordinate fund raising. In a letter to the CDU’s propaganda chief, Otto
Lenz, Erich Neumann reported on an O ctober 1952 meeting of the Förderge-
sellschaften at which the business representatives had attacked Die Waage because
they had no way to influence D ie Waage’s activities. In fact, the BDI and BDA
had been raising this issue for the last month. N eumann believed that his argu-
ment that it was absolutely necessary for business to conduct public relations had
fallen on deaf ears and that 90 percent of these businessmen understood nothing
about propaganda.60 Die Waage and the Fördergesellschaften met early in the de-
velopment of Die Waage, in December 1952, to explor e their future collabora-
tion. The Fördergesellschaften were apparently worried that contributions to D ie
Waage would divert funds that normally went through the umbrella business or-
ganizations of the BDI and BDA to political parties. It was suggested, apparently
by Die Waage, that about DM 100,000 to 150,000 per month could be allocated
from the Fördergesellschaften to Die Waage. The representatives of the Förderge-
sellschaften replied that this idea would r equire approval by the v arious associa-
tions.61 This proposal was never put into effect, presumably because the associations
saw no reason to divert their own funds to Die Waage. 
It appears that, in fact, the relationship between Die Waage and the Förderge-
sellschaften soured further over the course of late 1952 into 1953. At a March 1953
meeting of Die Waage’s Vorstand (executive board) and Beirat (advisory board),
Die Waage decided that it should clearly explain to firms that a contribution to the
organization did not r eplace one to a Fördergesellschaft.62 During the election
summer of 1953, concerns surfaced that Die Waage’s actions were unnecessarily
dividing industry’s resources.63 At a December 1953 meeting of Die Waage’s con-
tributors, Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard advised against Die Waage getting
involved with Fördergesellschaften lest this jeopar dize the unity that pr evailed
among Die Waage’s leadership. Erhard’s position, of course, must be understood
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within a larger context. At this point he was caught up in his struggle with the BDI,
which most strongly represented heavy industry, over the proposed anticartel leg-
islation making its way thr ough the Bundestag. In the spring of 1952, an anti-
cartel bill, largely formulated b y Erhard and bur eaucrats in the E conomics
Ministry with the aim of completely outlawing cartels, was introduced to the Bun-
destag for initial reading and discussion. However, it did not reach committee until
February 1953, in par t because of political pr essure applied b y the BDI. After
many acrimonious exchanges between Erhard and the BDI, the Bundestag passed
a watered-down version of the initial bill that limited but did not outlaw cartels,
but this was not until the summer of 1957, long after the 1953 elections.64 In the
meantime, Otto Friedrich of P hoenix Gummiwerke, an activ e member of the
BDI, supported Erhard’s view of keeping Die Waage independent from the Förder-
gesellchaften. To document the dangers such a connection posed for D ie Waage,
Friedrich asserted that he ascer tained from his dealings with the D eutsches In-
dustrieinstitut, the public relations arm of the BDI he had helped found, that the
BDI would like to snuff out (abzuwuergen) Die Waage. Erhard agreed that the
Fördergesellschaften must to be left to their o wn activities, but D ie Waage must
continue with its task of educating the public on the social market economy.65
In February 1954 leaders of Die Waage, including Greiß, Jacobi, and Horten,
met with r epresentatives of the BDI in Cologne and tried to convince G ustav
Stein, a prominent figure in the BDI, that their organization would not detract
from the contributions to the Fördergesellschaften. In addition, the question arose
whether some of the Fördergesellschaften had appealed to individual firms and po-
tential contributors in the guise of operators soliciting contributions for D ie
Waage. It was decided that the Fördergesellschaften in the future needed to closely
coordinate with Die Waage to prevent such cases from recurring. In addition, it
was agreed that Stein would attend the Beirat (advisory board) meetings of Die
Waage and that Horten would sit in on the meetings of the central Fördergesell-
schaft organization. Although Die Waage and the Fördergesellschaften had learned
to coexist, the two organizations apparently never truly saw eye to eye in respect to
fundraising goals and the public relations actions that were to be taken by indus-
trial interests.66 In general, this comes as no surprise. Regarding it as an essential
part of developing the social market economy, Erhard wanted to pursue anticar-
tel legislation that the representatives of the BDI feared. In addition, Die Waage’s
membership tended to come fr om the chemical, automobile, and consumer in-
dustries, often medium-sized firms that were clearly familiar and comfortable with
the methods of adv ertising. On the other hand, the BDI r emained a bastion of
heavy industrial interests born and developed in a tradition of business collusion—
particularly in the coal and steel industry. Die Waage represented an expression of
Erhard’s belief in public relations, in an open and free market economy, and in a
consumer orientation that was at odds with the BDI’ s efforts to revive business
practices and labor relations from the prewar period. Simply put, Die Waage’s di-
rect public relations campaigns would generate the type of publicity that the BDI
did not want. 
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Despite the tense r elations with West Germany’s main industrial organiza-
tions, Die Waage proved relatively successful in its fundraising efforts. In a spring
1952 letter to Die Waage’s chairman, Franz Greiß, Brose estimated that the or-
ganization would require about DM 12.5 million to support its advertising cam-
paign for the Bundestag election through the late summer of 1953.67 Clearly, the
heads of D ie Waage had to scale back the grandiose plans of their adv ertising
agent. Die Waage took in about DM 3.8 million over the course of 1952/53, with
the costs of its publications totaling DM 3.78 million. 68 Die Waage faced the
challenge that contributions to the organization did not qualify as tax-deductible
under the West German tax code. However, Die Waage’s treasurer Alphons Horten
devised a clever scheme to encourage contributions. He allowed corporate donors
to channel their contributions directly to Die Waage’s advertising agent, thus en-
abling the individual firms to write off the funds since they fell under the category
of normal advertising expenditures for the firm. This facilitated corporate contri-
butions and thereby ensured a stream of funds that allo wed Die Waage to con-
tinue its massive public relations campaigns well into the 1960s.69
One is str uck by the high pr oportion of those contributions (totaling DM
425,000) that came from the firms created out of the former I.G. Farben firms,
namely BASF, Hoechst, and Bayer. Other large contributors included Robert Bosch
GmbH (DM 100,000), B rinkmann GmbH (DM 200,000), Chemie Werke
Huels (DM 100,000), Continental Gummi (DM 100,000), Daimler Benz (DM
100,000), Esso AG (DM 151,000), Karstadt AG (DM 150,000), Kaufhof (DM
150,000), Opel AG (DM 200,000), and Reemstma (DM 250,000). Overall, the
auto, chemical, r etail goods, and consumer goods firms w ere well represented.
The notable absence of any contribution fr om coal, iron, steel, and other heavy
industries was the consequence, one can surmise, of Die Waage’s ongoing conflict
with the BDI. As pr eviously mentioned, the two organizations w ere deeply di-
vided in terms of both Die Waage’s methods of public relations and its support of
Erhard’s antimonopoly and anticartel philosophy.70
Once it had “sold” the idea of a public relations campaign to certain sectors of
the West German economy, Die Waage’s next main challenge was figuring out how
to portray the abstract ideas of the social mar ket economy for consumption b y 
a broad audience. The plan was that Die Waage’s advisory and executive boards
would develop and discuss the basic concepts of the campaigns, establish the
general guidelines for transforming their ideas into advertisements, and make the
final decisions r egarding the adv ertisement. Brose and the Gf G were charged
with the technical planning of the advertisements and selection of media to uti-
lize for the campaign.71 As things worked out, however, Brose elaborated some of
the conceptual dimensions of the campaigns and provided Die Waage’s leadership
with preliminary materials. 72 Clear constraints determined ho w the economic
ideas were transformed into suitable advertising materials for the consuming pub-
lic. The advertisements had to be constructed so as to avoid offending the sensi-
bilities of contributors by appearing too “political” or overly glorifying a certain
political figure, such as E rhard, at the expense of the ideas of the social mar ket
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economy.73 All the while, the adv ertisements had to clearly communicate their
antisocialist message.
From early on, Die Waage’s leadership ruled out any substantive or precise dis-
cussion of the social market economy in the advertisements. At a November 1952
executive board meeting, some members objected to a possible advertisement with
the title “Das ist Soziale Marktwirtschaft” (That is the social market economy) be-
cause it treated the term “purely theoretically,” and decided to postpone its pub-
lication. Dr. I llau, an economist associated with neoliberal theor y, maintained
that the advertisements should clearly define the term “social market economy.”
But the executive board endorsed Brose’s advice to “avoid dry definitions and point
the readers to practical examples of their own advantages from the social market
economy”—a stance clearly r eflecting his American-style appr oach to adv ertis-
ing.74 Nevertheless, Die Waage constantly agonized over the proper relationship
between image and substance within its advertisements. This question often pit-
ted Brose, Chairman Greiß, and Treasurer Horten against Vice-Chairman Jacobi.
Jacobi once bitterly complained to Greiß that one proposed brochure was “so de-
ficient in its actual execution that it could not be tolerated by people of even mod-
erate education.” Some of the Die Waage’s financial contributors backed Jacobi’s
view and continually criticized the advertisements’ lack of substantive content.75
Indeed, during this time the question arose whether the phrase “social market
economy” should be incorporated into the adv ertisements at all, since the term
“social,” often associated with the SPD, could unduly confuse the intended au-
dience. A November 1952 survey conducted for the GfG, Über die soziale Mark-
twirtschaft (On the Social Market Economy), underscored the problem that the
vast majority of the West German population did not hav e a good grasp of the
phrase’s meaning. But in a December 1952 executive board meeting, Horten re-
ported a conversation with Economics Minister Erhard in which Erhard insisted
that the adv ertisements retain the term “ social market economy.” Hanns Brose
warned against “changing horses in mid-gallop,” lest opponents of the social mar-
ket economy seize the oppor tunity to claim that the “ social” aspects of the fr ee
market system were on shaky ground. Greiß decided to continue employing the
term “social market economy” unless the coalition parties formulated a substitute
term.76 Ultimately, in the ads appearing before the 1953 Bundestag election, the
term was changed to “Erhard’s social market economy,” although his party affili-
ation was not mentioned.77
Die Waage’s initial campaign between 9 October and 31 December 1952 fea-
tured a series of ten advertisements that ran in 445 daily and weekly newspapers,
for a total circulation of around 12 million newspapers.78 These ten advertisements
incorporated five different titles with two illustration and text variations for each
title-type. The Institut für Demoskopie claimed about 36 percent of the popula-
tion saw and recognized these advertisements between 5 and 15 December 1952.79
The advertisements included the basic elements of commercial advertising: slogan,
illustration, and logo. The ads’ titles were “Wie schnell der Mensch vergisst” (How
quickly people forget), “Das deutsche ‘Wunder’” (The German ‘miracle’), “Wir
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ziehen alle am gleichen Strang” (We are all in the same boat), “Der deutsche Arbeiter
wägt sein Schicksal” (The German worker weighs his o wn fate), and “Fragt die
Frauen” (Ask the women). The top half of each advertisement depicted a scene from
everyday West German life above the title. The remainder of the ad consisted of
the text, Die Waage’s logo, the scales, and the general slogan for the campaign,
“Zum Wohlstand aller durch geeinte Kraft—führt die soziale Marktwirtschaft” (The
social market economy leads to prosperity for all through unified strength). 
These advertisements created a narrative of the economic and social history of
the newly formed Federal Republic. The currency reform legend proved to be a
central element in Die Waage’s advertisements, as had been in the CDU’ s 1949
election campaign. An I nstitut für Demoskopie survey asked West Germans in
April 1952 whether West Germany had experienced an economic upswing since
the currency reform. Eighty-eight percent of the respondents answered yes, while
only 4 percent thought no and 8 per cent were undecided. The survey observed
that “[f]rom a mass-psychological perspective, there should be a resonance within
the population of the economic ascent since the currency reform, or is the mem-
ory of the developments since 1948 displaced by newer, fresh impressions? And
to whom, should the occasion arise, could the credit for this upturn be attributed?
These two questions are of principal importance in respect to Die Waage’s adver-
tisements.”80 Die Waage’s ads left no doubt as to who or what should take credit
for the economic upturn.
The advertisement “Wie Schnell der Mensch vergisst” (Illustration 4.1), the most
widely published of this series, opened with text that evoked images of everyday
life immediately following the conclusion of the war: “Trading molasses for shoes—
it was scarcely a few years ago. There were 1050 calories daily on the ration card
and 100 grams of textiles on the script. In the Bizone in 1947 there was a pair of
new shoes for every 30 people.”81 The text went on to paint a picture of despair,
hardship, and deprivation. Ironically, the ad urged the reader not to forget how far
West Germany had come since the end of the war but silenced any r eference to
the Third Reich, thereby placing West Germans in the roles of victims. But there
came a dramatic change in 1948: “and then in the summer of 1948 came the cur-
rency reform. . . . We had a hard currency again”—ignoring the American role in
the Deutsche Mark’s introduction. Without ever mentioning him by name, Die
Waage portrayed Economics Minister Erhard as the savior of the West German
nation and economy. It was his ideas of the social mar ket economy that secured
West Germany’s economic recovery: “the social market economy unshackled the
entire energy of our nation for the reconstruction.”
Throughout the text, the idea of “ free” was emphasized and defined. Having
noted the adv ent of the curr ency reform, the adv ertisement affirmed that with
solid money in hand, “What we needed was work. We wanted to produce again
and earn money. Our desire for work wanted the go ahead [freie Bahn].” The in-
troduction of the social mar ket economy cr eated the oppor tunity to wor k and
earn money. The same advertisement commented that money was not rationed but
earned, and “[f]or that reason, every person, be it worker or industrialist [Unter-
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nehmer] should earn on the fr ee ‘market’ what ability and desir e to work brings
him.” The alternate text of “Wie schnell der Mensch vergisst” (Illustration 4.2) stressed
the acquisition of new freedoms tied to the social market economy: 
Who saved us from our misery? There is only one level-headed answer: our workers and in-
dustrialists, through their cooperation in the fr eedom of the social mar ket economy. This
democratic action then unleashed the energy for the r econstruction: One Man ended the
script economy [Bezugsscheinwirtschaft], the rationing, and standing in lines. . . . H e said:
Money is the only script [Bezugsschein] of free people!
In this way, the free market was inextricably linked with the acquisition of some
form of German self-determination and the reconstruction of a smoothly work-
ing, organic society, all of which w ere ascribed to E rhard’s actions. Having eco-
nomic fr eedom was tantamount to the founding of West Germany itself and
distanced the new state from the Nazi past. Clearly, the message was that West
Germans should not overlook how far both worker and industrialist had come in
securing both their economic fr eedom and a better living standar d. The ad ex-
plained that “[w]e should nev er forget what wor ker and industrialist hav e ac-
complished in courageous cooperation since those days. No one should deny the
shared benefits. No one should disturb this social peace!” By implication any de-
mand from the left, be it socialization of heavy industry or higher wages, was not
only disruptive, but downright un-German. 
The advertisements’ illustrations str engthened the texts ’ message. They pre-
sented images that resonated with the West Germans. The illustrations hinted at
what the concept of “freedom” meant in the new West Germany by creating an
image of life under the Zwangswirtschaft (controlled economy). One illustration
depicted a scene in the Alltagsleben (everyday life) of Germans during the years be-
fore the currency reform. In the foreground a sullen old man walks by with what
appears to be a CARE package under his arm. A forlorn-looking woman with
sunken cheeks and a recently released prisoner of war examine notes posted on a
tree, perhaps seeking family or loved ones, which reflected a common experience
since in O ctober 1946, 10 million G ermans in the Western Zones were still
searching for next of kin. 82 In the background a r elatively well-dressed man
smokes a cigarette, which was the basic form of exchange in pre–currency reform
Germany, and converses with a y oung woman, suggesting perhaps a mor e sala-
cious relationship and the prevalent view of moral degeneracy during the rubble
years. The other version of “Wie schnell der Mensch vergisst” portrayed haggard old
men and women and small, emaciated childr en clothed in rags ar ound them,
standing in a food line under the watchful eye of what appears to be a police of-
ficer. From the perspective of the illustrations and the creation of a narrative that
recounts the r ebirth of the G erman economy, the emphasis of the concept of
“free” could be linked to freedom from the misery and despair depicted here. In
this way the advertisement was linking the “freedom” unleashed by the social mar-
ket economy not only with some form of state so vereignty, but also with a fr ee-
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dom from the burdens that were inflicted upon Germans by the Allies during the
war, by occupying forces in the immediate postwar years, and implicitly from the
burdens of guilt for the N azi past—thereby suggesting the founding of a ne w
Germany on political, social, and familial levels.
Although Die Waage’s advertisements were aimed at both “reeducating” West
Germans to support the free market and creating a political meaning of the eco-
nomic reconstruction since the currency reform, they simultaneously helped de-
fine “ideal ” gender r oles within West G ermany’s social mar ket economy ,
particularly for the male worker. Two of the ten advertisements of the Die Waage’s
first campaign w ere targeted specifically to ward the male wor ker, although
women’s roles in the economy w ere also depicted with the slogan, “Fragt die
Frauen” (Ask the women, I llustration 4.3). A ppearing in magazines just befor e
Christmas of 1952, these advertisements meant to portray the tangible results of
the economic ideas expressed in previous advertisements. One of these ads con-
tained an illustration that lured readers into the advertisement’s message. It shows
women, laden with bags and packages, window shopping along a crowded street.
The store windows are crammed with ne w goods available for purchase. In the
background stand what appear to be pr osperous, r ebuilt stores and buildings.
Meanwhile, a Mercedes-Benz drives down the street crowded with pedestrians. In
the center of the illustration, a woman who draws our attention glances to ward
one of the store windows, as if some good within has captured her fancy.
The accompanying text developed further the concept of freedom within this
vision of a new West German society that Die Waage was constructing. Initially
it explained that women occupied a crucial role in the economy. It was for women
that men made houses, chur ches, motors, and soap . As the illustration clearly
demonstrated, the text defined women’s role in the economy as that of the con-
sumer. And as consumers women held an important responsibility in West Ger-
many’s new economic system, especially since they constituted the majority of
voters. Therefore, “it depends upon them, whether fr eedom is preserved for our
nation.” As consumers, women, along with wor kers and industrialists, had be-
come the “third power” in the economy and, perhaps decisively, determined the
economic path that West Germany would follo w. They were privy to a cer tain
knowledge of the meaning of the “free” market. The advertisement explained that
women had experienced firsthand how the social market economy had achieved
the liberation fr om the ration-car d economy. The word “free” was r epeated
throughout the advertisement. It was free competition that paved the way for the
free selection of goods of ever increasing quality, and at better prices. The adver-
tisement extended the definition of “ freedom” established in earlier adv ertise-
ments. Freedom was not only freedom from the misery of the immediate postwar
years, but also the freedom to consume, an activity in which women were partic-
ularly involved. From the perspective of the advertisement, workers should “ask
the women” to find out what this freedom meant. 
Other advertisements in Die Waage’s initial campaign underscor ed the need
for cooperation betw een management and labor , all the while conv eying ideas
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about masculine gender roles in postwar West Germany. One advertisement pic-
turing men reconstructing a building, against a backdrop of factories with billow-
ing smokestacks, pr oclaimed, “Das Deutsche ‘Wunder’” (The German ‘miracle,’
Illustration 4.4). According to the text both the hard work and skills of manage-
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ment and labor had created this “miracle”—reflecting a common sentiment among
Erhard and his supporters, neoliberal economists, and businessmen to challenge
the concept of a miracle and rather underscore work and economic policy as the
sources of West Germany’s economic reconstruction. This advertisement went on
to comment that “[s]everal brave men summoned worker and entrepreneur, bear-
ers of the German economic energy, to free competition based on per formance.
They answered the call. I n true solidarity, from the y oungest apprentice to the
leader of the largest factory, together they built up their work shops.” Male work-
ers contributing their strength and energy to the reconstruction of the West Ger-
man economy was to be a recurring motif throughout Die Waage’s advertisements.
The process described almost resembled a soldier’s call to arms, reflecting a shift in
“duty” for men in postwar West Germany from soldiers during the Third Reich
to producers in the new free society: “In unanimous cooperation—under the sign
of the social market economy, industrialists and workers have produced together
continually more, better, and cheaper goods—for the benefit of all.” The adver-
tisement attributed a certain agency to the West German worker after the defeat
of the Second World War, the subsequent “hour of the women,” in the immediate
postwar years, and the Allied occupation. It was he, the German man, who rebuilt
the economy, while the American-instituted curr ency reform and the influx of
American capital through the Marshall Plan were ignored by the advertisement.
Together, these advertisements presented Die Waage’s vision of the new West
German society: one featuring a harmonious balance between employers and em-
ployees and the reconstruction of “natural” gender roles with men taking up their
role as producers and women as consumers. In future advertisements Die Waage
would develop more fully this theme of a balanced, organic West German society
and attempt to appeal more directly toward women. But in this initial campaign,
Die Waage’s ads were primarily directed toward men. In any case, the ads laid out
the organization’s basic conceptual frame work. In a nod to major contributors
from the consumer industr y, D ie Waage’s adv ertisements emphasiz ed con-
sumerism more than the CDU/CSU’s propaganda from the 1949 campaign had,
but they both underscored the same idea: the social market economy established
basic freedoms and facilitated the reconstruction of West German society.
In January 1953, the Institut für Demoskopie conducted a series of surveys to
assess the effectiveness of Die Waage’s first campaign. The Institut’s report com-
mented that the goals of D ie Waage’s advertisements had differed from those in
commercial advertising. They sought to popularize a political concept and create
goodwill over an extended period of time. Therefore, the survey sought to estab-
lish a baseline of people ’s knowledge of and attitudes to ward the social mar ket
economy in relation to whether or not they had seen the advertisements. The sur-
vey results showed that of the men who had seen the advertisements, 55 percent
favored the social mar ket economy as opposed to 43 per cent among those who
had not seen the advertisements. For women the figure was a 44 percent endorse-
ment of the social market economy among those who had seen the advertisements,
while only 32 percent of those who had not seen them supported the social mar-
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ket economy. Evaluation of these data raises the question of whether such diver-
gent assessments of the social market economy were simply a function of exposure
to the advertisements or a function of the audience that had seen the adv ertise-
ments. In all likelihood that audience was disproportionately well-educated, from
a higher social class, and more likely to support the social market economy in the
first place. The report concluded with a call for a mor e exact study of the social
structure of the groups reading Die Waage’s advertisements.83
For the publicist H. F. J. Kropff, the advertisements’ strength was their clear di-
vision of the lay out space, creating a strong overall impression. He thought the
unified quality of the entire series and the continual appearance of the advertise-
ments enhanced their effectiveness in shaping public support for the social mar-
ket economy. By developing such successful materials, Die Waage in effect created
a brand name for itself . But Kropff did observe that the similarity of the adv er-
tisements’ layout might cause some to overlook the individual advertisements. In
addition, the quiet tone of the advertisements might not be ideally tailored to the
audience that the industrialists were trying to win over. Perhaps, Kropff suggested,
the layout of the advertisements might have appealed to the aesthetic sensibilities
of the industrialist rather than those who were the target of the advertisements—
primarily, members of the working class.84
In Kropff ’s opinion Die Waage confronted a particularly difficult task: it was
not enough for the advertisements to be noticed; they also must have the power
to decisively influence people’s opinions and overcome many of their prejudices—
that is, they must appeal to r eaders on a rational lev el. It would be misguided,
however, for the ad makers to r each out to the br oadest masses in r egard to the
“social compromise” without appealing to their emotions as w ell. Thus, the key
to successful adv ertisements was to combine rational and emotional elements.
Die Waage’s use of illustrations, clearly, was designed to appeal emotionally, while
the long text was to convince rationally. All the same, the rational advantages of
the social mar ket economy had to be expr essed in a “ popular [volkstümlicher]
form.” The advertisements’ forceful titles and interesting illustrations combined
with a logically built text could achieve this. Through the skillful combination of
emotional and rational elements, the advertisements, from Kropff ’s view, achieved
a psychological and aesthetic unity that appealed to the sensibilities of a cer tain
readership.85
The key question was whether the ads w ere reaching the intended audience 
of the “broadest masses.” In this regard, Kropff viewed Die Waage’s ads as prob-
lematic. The first series of adv ertisements appeared to be too didactic. They re-
sembled “speeches which managers deliv ered to the wor kers—as a some what
one-sided conversation between dir ect superiors and wor kers in the factor y.”
Moreover, the logic and length of the advertisements took for granted readers’ rel-
atively sophisticated interest and patience on the subject of social tensions. This
shortcoming prevented the advertisements from reaching the widest segment of
society—in particular, one could surmise, members of the working class. Overall,
Kropff suggested that the advertisements were a bit indirect, since they were more
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likely to appeal to opinion makers and not the groups that Die Waage was most
interested in persuading.86
As the summer 1953 B undestag election appr oach, the heads of D ie Waage
continued to grapple with the problem of reaching their key target audience: the
working class. Early that year they devised a possible solution: crafting a series of
advertisements in the form of a dialogue between two stereotypical West German
men.87 The advertisement’s tactic was to explain the worker’s role in the free mar-
ket economy and management-labor relations through the creation of two “aver-
age Joes” whom the public could identify with and tr ust. The ads would invite
readers to enter into a conv ersation with these two characters—ther eby making
abstract economic policy mor e humanized and personal. To explore the effec-
tiveness of such an adv ertising format, D ie Waage employed the I nstitut für
Demoskopie to run a series of test surveys, which were reported in March 1953.88
One of the goals of this survey was to determine how to best shape the characters
in the advertisement—particularly in terms of their physical attributes and cloth-
ing. The chief objectiv e, however, was to test the effectiv eness of this dialogue-
type approach.
In the test advertisements (Illustration 4.5), the characters of “Querkopf” and
“Klarkopf,” roughly translated as “ wrong-headed fellow” and “clear-headed fel-
low,” discussed what the social market economy was, “debated” its merits, and re-
counted the economic progress West Germans had made since the currency reform.
In general, the ads depicted the slightly mor e middle-class–appearing Klar kopf
explaining the advantages of the social market economy to a questioning, prole-
tarian-looking Querkopf, although both were still recognizable as working men.
Querkopf ’s identity was easily detected b y most of those sur veyed (83 percent),
while the social background of Klarkopf was not as clear (60 percent said white-
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collar worker, bureaucrat; 16 per cent, self-employed; and 13, per cent worker).
Generally, most readers sensed that Klarkopf was from a higher social class, but
52 percent of respondents thought that two such characters could be friends. The
survey revealed that most people saw the worker Querkopf as a more likable, de-
cent, and convincing character . In addition, seeing Q uerkopf ’s rounded face,
people viewed him as being more friendly, good-natured, open, and not so con-
ceited. In contrast, although many people saw Klarkopf as intelligent, a large per-
centage also consider ed him as a bit snobbish. D espite the fact that Q uerkopf
appeared more believable, 56 percent of respondents with an income under DM
250 a month and 55 percent of those with incomes exceeding DM 250 thought
Klarkopf ’s position was the more convincing. In addition, 48 percent of respon-
dents concluded that Querkopf left the two characters’ conversation convinced, as
opposed to 33 percent for neither being convinced and 8 percent for Klarkopf.89
The report concluded that the qualities of the two characters were reversed in
terms of which was the more sympathetic from the readers’ perspective. The higher
social class of one of the figures created some resentment among the readers. The
report argued that the ar twork must be r edone so that the two characters ap-
peared to be from the same social class. Querkopf ’s hat tended to bring about the
“proletariatization” of Querkopf, while Klarkopf ’s more managerial hat tended to
imply a mor e middle-class status. I n future advertisements the figur e of Q uer-
kopf, who was renamed “Otto,” wore a hat that implied the same status as Klar-
kopf, who was renamed “Fritz.” In addition, some of Klarkopf ’s sharper features
were softened and he was made older, so as not to seem like a y ounger man lec-
turing the older , working-man Querkopf.90 In the advertisements that actually
ran beginning in May 1953, Die Waage’s executive board decided to follow the
report’s findings and blur the characters’ class origins. 
The Institut für Demoskopie also concluded that the adv ertisement’s picture
format was effective. About half the respondents reacted in a way that the adver-
tisers wanted, including 55 per cent of the r espondents who believ ed that
Klarkopf was correct. Fifty-nine percent of all respondents could correctly char-
acterize the advertisement as backing the social market economy, and 48 percent
said that the adv ertisement supported cooperation between workers and indus-
trialists. At the same time, however, 19 percent responded that the advertisement
backed a planned economy and 16 per cent thought it fav ored socialization. I n
conclusion, the sur vey commented that 36 per cent of the r espondents found 
the advertisements interesting, which may not seem like a large number. But, the
report commented, one must r emember that in a sur vey conducted in J une of
1952, only 27 percent of respondents expressed an interest in politics. Therefore,
on balance the advertisements positively resonated among the public.91
With the creation of Fritz and Otto as the principal characters of its advertise-
ments, Die Waage was primed for the upcoming 1953 federal election. It was at
this point that Die Waage’s activities shifted into high gear to support Erhard and
his social market economy. Fritz and Otto embodied key qualities of Die Waage’s
new ideal West German male. Both were veterans who had been prisoners of war
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but had seamlessly integrated into the ne w democratic society. They were to be
depicted in masculine places—on the job , in bars, fishing, or picking up their
paychecks. Although they were defined by their role as producers in the economy,
they had shed any radical tendencies of the pr oletariat. In this way, Die Waage
projected a vie w of the social mar ket economy and a r econstructed West Ger-
many where “natural” labor and gender roles were reaffirmed—clearly jibing very
well with the CDU/CSU’ s vision of the 1949 campaign. These advertisements
also helped define a political meaning of the social mar ket economy. This eco-
nomic system was equated with the establishment of political fr eedom in West
Germany and implicitly associated the SPD with a potential loss of that freedom.
In the future the social market economy would be tied not only to West German
freedoms, but also to the legitimacy of the West German state itself. 
But Die Waage also represented a change in the shaping of public opinion that
had occurred between the 1949 and 1953 elections. N o longer did it suffice to
produce propaganda that merely appealed to the “primitive levels” of society as in
Adenauer’s approach in the 1949 campaign. Now, Die Waage could lend support
to the CDU/CSU cause through a battery of carefully tested advertisements that
aimed to resonate with the West German population. Private business interests had
taken an important step in the “Americanization” of the West German political
culture. Following Die Waage’s lead, the CDU/CSU and the Federal government
began transforming their approach to electoral and public relations campaigns. 
Notes
1. See Hans Edgar Jahn, Lebendige Demokratie: Die Praxis der politischen Meinungspflege in
Deutschland (Frankfurt am Main, 1956), 229–231.
2. Wipog document quoted in Gerhard Schmidtchen, Die Befragte Nation: Über den Einfluß der
Meinungsforschung auf die Politik, 134–135.
3. Ibid., 135
4. Schindelbeck and Ilgen, “Haste Was, Biste Was!” Werbung für die Soziale Marktwirtschaft, 33–35.
5. Das Programm der Freiheit, ZSg 1 1/1, BA Koblenz. 
6. For example, by September 1953, the organization had r eceived only DM 57,000 in contri-
butions since its founding in January 1953. This paled in comparison to other propaganda ef-
forts. Protokolle der Vorstandsitzung, 14 September, 1953, VI-059-277 (Aktionsgemeinschaft
Soziale Marktwirtschaft), ACDP.
7. For an in-depth look at D ie Waage, see Schindelbeck and I lgen, “Haste Was, Biste Was!” Wer-
bung der Soziale Marktwirtschaft.
8. H. F. J. Kropff, “Die erste Public Relations Campagne in Deutschland. Erfolgreiches Beispiel
der Anwendung von Prinzipien, Methoden, und Mitteln Wirtschaftswerbung zur Ausbreitung
nationaler, sozialer, und kultureller Ideen,” ZSg 1 36/2, BA Koblenz.
9. Die Waage, Zugang 121, Ludwig Erhard Stiftung, Bonn (hereafter LES). 
Public Relations for the Social Market Economy: Die Waage   |   139
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
10. For more on industry’s public relations efforts during the 1950s, especially in regard to its re-
lationship to the Nazi regime and its role in the new West Germany, see S. Jonathan Wiesen,
West German Industry and the Challenge of the Nazi Past, 1945–1955 (Chapel Hill, 2001). On
the creation of the Deutsches Industrieinstitut, see 101–119. For more on the changing atti-
tudes and structures of West German industry, see Berghahn, The Americanisation of West Ger-
man Industry, 1945–1973. For more on the founding of the BDI, BDA, and the DI, see Gerard
Braunthal, The Federation of German Industry in Politics (Ithaca, 1965). 
11. Klaus-Dieter Schmidt, Soziale Gerechtigkeit durch unternehmerische Initiative: Der Bund der
Katholischer Unternehmer, 1949–1990 (Munich, 1994), 32–35.
12. Most of Die Waage’s original members and contributors were born in the early twentieth cen-
tury. See Schindelbeck and Ilgen, “Haste Was, Biste Was!” Werbung der Soziale Marktwirtschaft,
49.
13. For more on the r econstruction of the middle class in the F ederal Republic, see Volker R.
Berghahn, “Recasting Bourgeois Germany,” 326–340. 
14. Schindelbeck and Ilgen, “Haste Was, Biste Was!” Werbung der Soziale Marktwirtschaft, 13. 
15. Die Waage, Zugang 127, LES.
16. Franz Greiß, “Erhards Soziale Marktwirtschaft und Die Waage,” in Ludwig Erhard: Beiträge zu
seiner Politischen Biographie, Festschrift zum Fünfundsiebzigsten Geburtstag, ed. G. Schroeder, Al-
fred Müller-Armack, Karl Hohmann, Johannes Gross, Rüdiger Altmann (Frankfurt am Main,
1972), 96–97. 
17. Ibid., 96–97; and S imone Schüfer “D ie deutsche M edienkampagne für die S oziale Mark-
twirtschaft: Dokumentation der Waage/Gemeinschaft zur Förderung des sozialen A usgleichs
e.V.” (M.A. Thesis, University of Mainz, 1992), 31–32.
18. H. F. J. Kr opff, “Werbung im Z eichen der Waage: Die Deutsche Werbung tritt in ein neue
Phase,” Die Anzeige 3, no. 29 (1953): 318.
19. Ibid., 316–318. See also “Werbung für Alle,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 20 January, 1953.
20. Brose, Die Entdeckung des Verbrauchers, 15. For more on the influence of American advertisers,
see Victoria De Grazia, Irresistible Empire: America’s Advance through Twentieth-Century Europe,
Cambridge, 2005.
21. Brose, Die Entdeckung des Verbrauchers, 34–38. 
22. Broschüre Brose, 3, Die Waage, Zugang 136, LES. See also Kropff, “Werbung im Zeichen der
Waage,” 316–318.
23. Brose, Die Entdeckung des Verbrauchers, 55–58.
24. Harm G. Schröter, “Die Amerikanisierung der Werbung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland,”
Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgechichte (1997): 93–115; and Brose, Die Entdeckung des Verbrauchers,
36. 
25. Hanns W. Brose, “20 Jahre Deutscher Azeigengeschichte,” Die Anzeige (April 1949): 144–147.
26. Compare advertisements in B rose’s Die Entdeckung des Verbrauchers with those contained in
Roland Marchand’s Advertising the American Dream: Making Way for Modernity, 1920–1940
(Berkeley, 1985). See pages 9–24 for the communicative approach in American advertising. 
27. De Grazia, Irresistible Empire, 251.
28. Ibid., 265–267.
29. Ibid., 226–283. F or more on the dev elopment of G erman advertising through Weimar, see
Dirk Reinhardt, Von der Reklame zum Marketing: Geschichte der Wirtschaftswerbung in Deutsch-
land (Berlin, 1993).
30. Uwe Westphal, Werbung im Dritten Reich (Berlin, 1989), 1–90.
31. De Grazia, Irresistible Empire, 275–279.
32. Westphal, Werbung im Dritten Reich, 158–163.
33. Marchand, Advertising the American Dream, 10. 
34. Rainer Gries, Volker Ilgen, and Dirk Schindelbeck, “Ins Gehirn der Masse kreichen”: Werbung
und Mentalitätsgechichte (Darmstadt, 1995), 45–73.
35. Ibid., 37–88. For more on the development of a “universal vernacular” in ads, see De Grazia,
Irresistible Empire, 237–238.
140 |   Selling the Economic Miracle
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
36. Christopher Simpson, “Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann’s ‘Spiral of Silence’ and the Historical Con-
text of Communication Theory,” Journal of Communication 46, no. 3 (1996): 148–171; Leo
Bogart, “The Pollster and the N azis,” Commentary 92, no. 2 (1991): 47–49; and E lisabeth
Noelle-Neumann, “Political Opinion Polling in Germany,” in Political Opinion Polling: An In-
ternational Review, ed. Robert M. Worcester (London, 1983), 44–60. 
37. Public Relations und M einungsforschung in den USA und in E ngland, Institut für D emo-
skopie, ZSg 132/154 II, BA Koblenz.
38. Das Soziale Klima, ZSg 132/154 I, BA Koblenz.









47. Die Waage, Zugang 124, LES. 
48. Ibid. 
49. Protokoll über die Sitzung von Vorstand und Beirat der Waage, 9 March 1953, Die Waage, Zu-
gang 127, LES.
50. Die Waage, Zugang 128, LES.
51. “Die Veantwortung des Unternehmers für die öffentliche Meinung,” Vortrag von Erich Peter




55. Gabriel Almond, The Politics of German Business (Santa Monica, CA, 1955), iii, 29–35.
56. Ibid., 52–58.
57. For more on the political involvement of West German industry, see Wiesen’s West German In-
dustry and the Challenge of the Nazi Past and Volker R. Berghahn and Paul J. Friedrich, Otto A.
Friedrich: Ein Politischer Unternehmer.
58. German industry had a tradition of giving money to political parties. See for example, Henry
Ashby Turner, German Big Business and the Rise of Hitler (Oxford, 1985).
59. Almond, The Politics of German Business, 34; and Arnold J. Heidenheimer and Frank C. Lang-
don, Business Associations and the Financing of Political Parties: A Comparative Study of the Evo-
lution of Practices in Germany, Norway, and Japan (The Hague, 1968), 44–48.
60. Letter from E. P. Neumann to Otto Lenz, 30 October 1952, I-172-32/2, (NL Lenz), ACDP.
61. Besprechen zwischen Vertreten der Fördergesellschaft und der Gemeinschaft “Die Waage,” 10
December 1952, Die Waage, Zugang 124, LES.
62. Protokoll über die Sitzung von Vorstand und Beirat der Waage, 9 March 1953, Die Waage, Zu-
gang 127, LES.
63. This sentiment was reported by BASF general director Dr. Karl Wurster along with members
of the executive board. Aktennotiz: Besprechung mit Herrn Generaldirektor Dr. Karl Wurster,
2 June 1953, Die Waage, Zugang 124, LES. 
64. Berghahn, The Americanisation of West German Industry, 1945–1973, 155–181. 
65. Bericht über die Besprechung des Waage-Förderer-Kreises am Dienstag, 15 December, 1953,
Die Waage, Zugang 129, LES.
66. Notiz am BDI Besprechung, 2 February 1954, Die Waage, Zugang 129, LES. 
67. Letter from Brose to Greiß, 24 April 1952, Die Waage, Zugang 61, LES.
68. Letter to Dr. Haberland, Generaldirektor Bayer, 18 February 1954, Die Waage, Zugang 124,
LES.
69. Schindelbeck and Ilgen, “Haste Was, Biste Was!” Werbung für die Soziale Marktwirtschaft, 68–71.
Public Relations for the Social Market Economy: Die Waage   |   141
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
70. Die Waage, Zugang 129, LES. 
71. Die Waage—Ein Bericht über die Tätigkeit in den Jahren 1952–1960, Abt 16, Nr 1, Fasz 2,
RWWA.
72. Schindelbeck and Ilgen, “Haste Was, Biste Was!” Werbung für die Soziale Marktwirtschaft, 82–83.
73. Karl Wurster, the general director of BASF, complained that the ads from the summer of 1953
were glorifying Erhard and that readers who remembered the “Führerkult of the Third Reich”
might find the ads tasteless. Aktennotiz: B esprechung mit H errn Generaldirektor Dr. Karl
Wurster, 2 June 1953, Die Waage, Zugang 124, LES.
74. Sitzung, 3 November 1952, Die Waage, Zugang, 127, LES. 
75. Schindelbeck and Ilgen, “Haste Was, Biste Was!” Werbung für die Soziale Marktwirtschaft, 82–85.
76. Bericht über die Sitzung von Vorstand und Beirat der Waage, 1 December 1952, Die Waage,
Zugang 127, LES.
77. See Protokoll von Vorstand und Beirat, 19 January 1953, Die Waage, Zugang 127, LES.
78. Die Waage—Ein Bericht über die Tätigkeit in den Jahren 1952–1960, Abt 16, Nr 1, Fasz 2,
RWWA.
79. Die Waage, Die Betrachtung einer Anz eigen-Serie, January 1952, I nstitut für D emoskopie,
ZSg 132/218, BA Koblenz.
80. Die Wirtschafliche Aufstieg—Verdienst der Arbeiter oder U nternehmer? Über die S oziale
Marktwirtschaft, Institut für Demoskopie, November 1952, Abt, 16, Nr 4, Fasz 1, RWWA. 
81. An Allensbach sur vey estimated that the two forms of “ Wie Schnell der M ensch v ergisst”
reached 13.5 million people. Die Waage, Die Beachtung einer Anzeigen-Serie, January 1953,
Institut für Demoskopie, ZSg 132/218, BA Koblenz.
82. Kramer, The West German Economy, 10–11. 
83. Die Waage, Die Beachtung einer Anzeigen-Serie, January 1953, Institut für Demoskopie, ZSg
132/218, BA Koblenz. 
84. Kropff, “Werbung im Zeichen der Waage,” 310.
85. Ibid., 310.
86. Ibid., 310–312. 
87. Ibid., 319. 
88. Eine Untersuchung über die v oraussichtliche Wirkung eines A ufklärungs-Feldzugen, March




142 |   Selling the Economic Miracle
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
Chapter 5
CREATING A CDU/CSU 
PUBLIC RELATIONS MACHINE: 
THE 1953 BUNDESTAG ELECTION

A number of historians of the Federal Republic’s party system have identified the
1953 Bundestag election as a “ critical election” in the dev elopment of the West
German political system. This is undoubtedly valid from the perspective of how
the major par ties fared at the polls. These historians note that the F ederal Re-
public’s party system was fully established b y the 1953 election with the major
parties of the CDU/CSU, SPD, and FDP coming to the for e. When West Ger-
mans went to the polls on 6 September, these three parties collected 83.5 percent
of the vote compared to 72.1 percent just four years earlier. The CDU/CSU and
the SPD alone captur ed 74 percent of the v ote compared to 60.2 in 1949 (the
CDU/CSU was up to 45.2 per cent from 31 per cent, and the SPD declined
slightly to 28.8 per cent from 29.2 per cent). In addition, a total of six par ties
gained seats in the 1953 B undestag compared to eleven in 1949 as many of the
small bourgeois par ties had declined in str ength. From the perspectiv e of the
number of viable par ties, the 1949 election was, like Weimar elections, charac-
terized by numerous splinter parties, while the 1953 election usher ed in a party
system (developed further in the 1960s) in which the larger parties of the CDU/
CSU and SPD struggled against each other and the FDP acted as a crucial linch-
pin in the formation of coalition governments.1
The 1953 Bundestag campaign also represented an important transition in the
West German political culture. In many of the technical aspects and its tone, the
campaign were similar to the 1949 campaign, but it clearly sho wed the begin-
nings of an evolution of politics based increasingly upon image, mood, and par-
Notes for this section begin on page 199.
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ticular issues instead of clearly articulated ideological positions. In regard to both
technical aspects, including the use of new opinion polling and advertising tech-
niques, and substantiv e aspects, such as an incr eased emphasis on the par ty’s
image, the 1953 campaign was an impor tant step in the Americanization of the
West German political culture—a process that would intensify in the 1957 cam-
paign. By 1953 much of the old ideological strife focused on differences between
rigid party programs meant to appeal to the parties’ bases, which had prevailed in
the 1949 election and Weimar elections, was beginning to fade. To be sure, the
tone of the election still echoed Weimar elections, par ticularly with par tisan
defamation of the opposition, not least by Adenauer himself. But Bundestag elec-
tions were now becoming mor e like r eferenda on the personalities r unning for
chancellor.2 As the party that was truly driving this transformation for ward, the
CDU/CSU had begun to develop a party image based in large part on Chancel-
lor Konrad Adenauer. In conjunction with the focus on par ty personalities, the
1953 campaign r eflected an emerging transformation in the tools of political
communication. Spurred on by a resurgent SPD, the CDU/CSU developed new
methods for understanding and connecting with the electorate. The media of the
Weimar and 1949 elections—the speech, the leaflet, and the poster—were being
supplemented and updated by the infusion of new public opinion polling and ad-
vertising techniques. The application of these ne w techniques usher ed in what
could be called the “ consumerization” of West Germany’s political cultur e. In
hopes of r eaching a br oader constituency, the CDU/CSU’s campaigns incr eas-
ingly sold its image by carefully tracking and catering to the views and opinions
of the electorate, rather than barraging the voters with the party’s ideology itself.
With the threat of an SPD victor y looming, the CDU/CSU dev eloped a whole
network of public relations institutions at its direct disposal, or working on its be-
half, to influence public opinion. Ironically, it was the 77-year-old Adenauer who
encouraged his conser vative party to campaign in an inno vative style that bor-
rowed heavily from the United States. At the same time the SPD remained stag-
nant in its appr oach to electoral campaigning and accor dingly began to lag
behind the CDU/CSU at the ballot box.
The 1953 Bundestag election did not hinge upon the issue of economics, as
had the 1949 campaign with its theme of Markt oder Plan. Instead geopolitical is-
sues, such as the threat of communism, Adenauer’s policy of aligning the Federal
Republic with the West, the question of West German rearmament, and German
unification emerged as the main focal points of the campaign. The CDU/CSU
cultivated and capitalized on the public ’s faith in A denauer to orchestrate West
German diplomacy and to establish the nation as a r espected member of the in-
ternational community. Even in light of Adenauer’s longer-term diplomatic poli-
cies, events in East Germany in the summer before the election most substantially
set the tone for campaign. O n 17 J une, only eight w eeks before the election,
worker protests demanding greater availability of consumer goods erupted in East
Berlin and spread throughout East Germany to some 270 villages and cities, in-
volving upward of 400,000 pr otesters. By that ev ening Soviet troops had been
144 |   Selling the Economic Miracle
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
called out to crush the protests. This particular episode illustrated starkly to the
electorate what appeared to be the imminent S oviet threat not only to G erman
unity but to the West German state itself. Further evidence of the Soviet regime’s
brutality was its r efusal to accept foodstuffs as humanitarian aid offer ed to East
Germans by the American and West German governments in late J uly. Within
this context of Cold War tensions, Adenauer’s quest for close cooperation with the
West and especially the United States was continually highlighted throughout the
campaign—starting with Adenauer’s visit to the United States in April 1953 and
culminating in Secretary of State John Foster Dulles’s comment, three days before
the election on 3 S eptember, that the defeat of A denauer’s government would
jeopardize prospects for German unification. 
After the election, the CDU/CSU clearly acknowledged that the key factors in
the party’s success were Adenauer’s foreign policy and leadership within the con-
text of the increased public goodwill toward the government resulting from West
Germany’s economic resurgence.3 Given the importance of foreign policy in the
campaign, economic r econstruction proved an adaptable political tool. The
CDU/CSU shaped the meaning of the social market economy and the burgeon-
ing economic miracle to demonstrate the party’s achievements within the context
of heightened tensions between the two Germanys. In contrast, the party depicted
the controlled economy in East Germany as a natural outgrowth of Marxist ide-
ology. With this stance, the CDU/CSU por trayed the SPD as a danger to West
German security—both fr om within and fr om without. The CDU/CSU cam-
paign centered increasingly upon its concrete political, diplomatic, and economic
accomplishments, as opposed to any ideological program. Clearly subdued in its
propaganda were the Christian roots of the party—an issue that had played more
prominently in its antimaterialist position in 1949. I nstead of stressing that the
social market economy allowed the creation of an organic, Christian society, the
CDU/CSU began to talk more explicitly about how its economic policy enabled
consumerism to grow in the “Wirtschaftswunderland” of West Germany. With its
new approach to campaigning, the 1953 election reflected the CDU/CSU’s abil-
ity to transcend programmatic politics and create an ever developing image of it-
self that appealed acr oss sociological and economic divisions in West German
society. Clearly, in this election the CDU/CSU had acquired the tools to under-
stand and r each the broadest constituencies, ther eby enabling it to emerge as a
Volkpartei.
After the 1949 election and par ticularly during the K orean War with its ac-
companying rise in prices, the CDU/CSU found itself lagging behind the SPD in
the opinion polls. From late 1950 through early 1953, the SPD continually held
an advantage over the CDU/CSU of betw een 15 and 3 per centage points, with
an average lead of about 9 points.4 Public opinion polling showed at the time that
the CDU/CSU’s popularity fluctuated in conjunction with the public ’s confi-
dence in the economy—a point not lost on Adenauer.5 The SPD performed well
in the elections on the Land (state) level. In each of the Landtag elections held be-
tween the 1949 and 1953 Bundestag elections, the CDU/CSU lost ground in its
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overall percentage of the v ote, with the SPD v ote increasing in all of the states 
except Schleswig-Holstein. Clearly, by 1953 the SPD was threatening the CDU/
CSU’s position as the coalition-building party in the government.6
It was within this context of the growing SPD challenge that the CDU/CSU-
led government erected a network of institutions to influence and shape public
opinion. Outside of governmental organizations, industry reacted quickly to the
drop in confidence in the social market economy and the Adenauer government
by creating its own public relations campaigns—most notably the activities of Die
Waage. The government’s most importance effort to shape public opinion was the
establishment of the Bundespresse- und Informationsamt (Federal Press and In-
formation Agency). The founding of the Federal Press Agency began in October
1949 when H erbert Blankenhorn, Adenauer’s personal advisor and the general
secretary of the CDU in the British Zone, explained to Federal Finance Minister
Fritz Schäffer that such a body was essential to governmental activities.7 Adenauer
commented that the organization would be necessar y “to develop a good r ela-
tionship with newspapers and journalists.”8 The Federal Press Agency was soon
established, although it consisted at first of only one man, H einrich Böx, who
acted as the Bundespressechef (federal press officer). Despite its modest beginnings,
the Federal Press Agency became an impor tant tool for the chancellor because
until 1958 it functioned as par t of the Chanceller y, and therefore acted directly
under the chancellor’s orders and in his interests.9
The Federal Press Agency performed what has been described as “Hörrohr- und
Sprachrohrfunktion” (ear horn and megaphone functions) for the go vernment,
one of its chief tasks being to gather information from leading international news-
papers and magazines, along with almost all of the German-speaking media. The
agency made this information av ailable to the chancellor , ministers, state secr e-
taries, and other high government officials through short reports called “Nachrich-
tenspiegel” (mirror of news reports). In many ways, in fact, the agency’s “Sprachrohr”
function was a secondar y one, especially during its first y ears. The most impor-
tant ongoing function was the government’s official information sheet, “Bulletin,”
which was distributed to journalists and pr ovided updates on the go vernment’s
activities.10
Despite its one-man beginnings, the Federal Press Agency grew quickly during
the early 1950s, and its reach lengthened noticeably as the 1953 Bundestag elec-
tions approached. In these first years, the Federal Press Agency experienced a quick
succession of leadership as Adenauer searched for what he unfortunately termed
“a democratic Goebbels”—an indication that he had not yet completely compre-
hended the fundamental transformation of public relations that was currently un-
derway in West Germany.11 It was not until January 1952 that the go vernment
named a permanent head of the Federal Press Agency: Felix von Eckardt, a rela-
tively unknown figure among journalists in Bonn. The organization’s funding grew
quickly through the 1950s. In the fiscal year 1949/50, the agency had a planned
budget of DM 450,000. This expanded to about DM 12.5 million b y the fiscal
year 1956/57.12 During the 1950s the Federal Press Agency also grew quickly in
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size. In October 1951 the Federal Press Agency employed a staff of 22, which by
February 1957 had swelled to 419.13 With the increased funding and manpower,
the Federal Press Agency’s influence grew apace through the 1950s as it conducted
a variety of public relations campaigns on behalf of the chancellor’s government. 
One of the challenges of the Federal Press Agency’s “Sprachrohr” functions was
to generate public r elations materials for the go vernment that the public would
deem cr editable. Aware of the public ’s distr ust of official go vernmental an-
nouncements after the experiences of the Third Reich, the Federal Press Agency
very seldom issued propaganda directly for the government. Instead, the Federal
Press Agency constr ucted a number of “ camouflaged” organizations so that the
propaganda produced by these organizations, be it br ochures, leaflets, informa-
tion bulletins, films, or posters, would not be obviously linked to the government.
These organizations, including gr oups producing propaganda on issues such as
European integration, NATO membership, and West German rearmament, com-
prised a wide variety of agencies at the government’s disposal to manufacture sup-
port for its policies. The most important of these organizations in terms of West
German politics was the Arbeitsgemeinschaft demokratischen Kr eise (Working
Group of Democratic Circles, ADK).14
Adenauer’s state secretary in the Chancellery, Otto Lenz, named to the post by
Federal President Theodor Heuss on 29 March 1951, sat at the center of this web
of propaganda activities on the go vernment’s behalf. Born in 1903 in Wetzlar,
Lenz was trained as a lawyer and had been an active member of the Center Party
from the 1920s until its dissolution by the Nazis in 1933. In October 1944 he was
arrested by the Gestapo and sentenced to four y ears in prison because of his as-
sociation with some Catholic opponents to the Nazi regime. As one of Adenauer’s
closest advisors on domestic politics, Lenz counted among his responsibilities the
major task of expanding the government’s press and propaganda activities, creat-
ing what Adenauer described as “propaganda with popular appeal ” and coordi-
nating the propaganda activities of the Federal Press Agency and the CDU/CSU.
In many respects, he functioned as the public r elations manager of A denauer’s
government. Clearly, Adenauer’s choice of Lenz signaled his wholehearted accep-
tance of an American-style approach to campaigning and public relations.
Lenz maintained close contacts with Erich Peter Neumann of the Institut für
Demoskopie and was instrumental in promoting the use of public opinion sur-
veys within the government and the CDU/CSU.15 In addition, he played the de-
cisive r ole in the transformation of the go vernment’s and CDU/CSU’ s
propaganda. As early as August 1952, he was warning Adenauer that the party’s
propaganda was deficient and adv ocating a fundamental r econceptualization of
the CDU/CSU’s preparations for the 1953 B undestag election. Although the
CDU/CSU should continue to develop a platform (Wahlprogramm) disseminated
through the press, the party should begin to concentrate upon “mass propaganda”
featuring attention-grabbing slogans that stuck with people and proved convinc-
ing. To reach the broadest masses, Lenz explained, propaganda must appeal to the
emotions—as statistics fr om psychology had r ecently documented. As par t of
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such an approach, the CDU/CSU should emphasize its personalities—including
Economics Minister Erhard.16 Throughout 1951 he had already underscored that
the government must not mer ely rely on the pr ess to influence public opinion,
but rather must utilize what he termed “modern methods.”17 Clearly, Lenz’s mod-
eled his public relations on American methods. He clearly expressed his support
of this philosophy in a November 1951 letter to Frau Dr. Heilmann, the head of
the Gesellschaft für Auslandkunde, an organization founded in 1948 whose goal
was to create contacts between West Germans and foreigners with similar inter-
ests. That summer H eilmann had visited the U nited States to study American
public relations techniques and had established contacts with public relations ex-
perts and scholars. To draw upon Heilmann’s expertise, Lenz requested a detailed
letter from her on how Americans conducted public relations, commenting that
“I would really like to organize something similar in Germany.”18
As par t of Lenz ’s driv e to transform the CDU/CSU’ s electoral practices, a
process clearly revealed in the 1953 campaign, public opinion polling assumed an
increasingly important role. Overall, by the early 1950s, such polling had made
serious inroads into West German politics; in fact, various groups were employ-
ing public opinion polling as early as 1948. In that year Ludwig Erhard, as head
of the Economics Administration of the Bizone, had commissioned surveys from
the Institut für Demoskopie to get a sense of the public’s reaction to the currency
reform.19 The FDP, in pr eparation for the 1950 state elections in N orth
Rhine–Westphalia, was the first political par ty to commission polling sur veys.20
Die Waage’s exploitation of public opinion polling on a massive scale to track so-
ciopolitical views and the effectiveness of their advertisements constituted a major
innovation in the implementation of public opinion surveys. In the ensuing years,
the CDU/CSU was the foremost political party in the scope of its use of public
opinion surveys and thereby contributed significantly to the transformation of the
West German political culture. As these methods took hold, parties were less and
less inclined to plumb the opinions of the amorphous masses in an unsystematic
or haphazard manner. Instead, armed with polling statistics, par ties could no w
differentiate specific segments of the electorate and appeal to them with gr eater
precision. Political advertising became less focused upon the par ty itself and its
ideology, and more on the views and predilections of the targeted groups of vot-
ers. In many respects, this change was analogous to the way commercial advertis-
ing was transformed fr om the 1920s thr ough the 1950s fr om a pr oducer- to a
more consumer-centered perspective. 
Modern political polling dev eloped in the 1930s in the U nited States when
such pioneers as G eorge Gallup, Elmo Roper, and Archibald Crossley began to
conduct “scientific” polls tracking pr esidential elections. During the late 1930s
and 1940s American political parties, interest groups, and candidates quickly ac-
cepted polling and incorporated it into their campaigns. But faith in the pollsters
faltered with the 1948 presidential election, when polls predicted Thomas Dewey
would defeat the incumbent Harry Truman. The problem lay in their use of the
“survey” method, which polled a cr oss section of the larger population, but left
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each individual interviewer to decide whom to poll. As a r esult, those who were
easily accessible were more likely to be interviewed, thereby skewing the sample.
Very quickly polling groups took up the random polling method, which also in-
terviewed a cross section of the population but ensured that this group was ran-
domly selected, thereby enhancing its reliability.21
In contrast to the United States, in Germany polling research was practically
unknown prior to the Second World War. Yet before and during the war, the Nazi
regime was inter ested in gathering information on public opinion. O ne of the
regime’s most ambitious effor ts was led by SS Colonel Otto Ohlendorf and the
internal ideological security arm of the party and state, the Sicherheitsdienst (se-
curity service, SD). To evaluate the effectiveness of Nazi propaganda and strengthen
the regime’s hold on power, the SD utilized a network of secret interrogators to
gather information on Germans’ opinions on the Nazi Party and morale in regard
to the war. In the course of these investigations, which clearly were not grounded
in social scientific methods, the interr ogators talked to or dinary Germans in
trains and other public places in order to sound out German public opinion.22
As part of its democratization effor ts after the war, the American occupation
government established the Opinion Survey Section, which carried out seventy-two
surveys between October 1945 and September 1949 testing German opinions on
the economy, politics, and the recent past. Meanwhile, once the war was over, a
number of West German polling institutes were established. In 1945 Karl-Georg
Stackelberg set up the EMNID Institut in Bielefeld (Ermittlungen, Meinungen,
Nachrichten, Information, Dienste; Ascertainment, Opinion, Communication,
Information, Services), followed by Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann and her Institut
für Demoskopie in Allensbach am Bodensee, which began conducting surveys for
the French in 1946 and was incorporated in 1948. The Institut für Demoskopie
served as an important conduit of American polling techniques to West Germany,
for Noelle-Neumann had studied journalism in the 1930s at the U niversity of
Missouri, where she learned about the wor k of early pollsters such as G eorge
Gallup and Elmo Roper.23
West German political leaders took immediate notice of these homegrown in-
stitutes. The government along with the CDU/CSU began utilizing polling sur-
veys in early 1951 in order to monitor the pulse of West German public opinion
and learn how to “sell” its policies more effectively. Since the Institut für Demo-
skopie was not just involved in tracking West German opinion in regard to poli-
tics but also conducted consumer research, the Institut quite naturally facilitated
the transfer of commercial advertising practices into the political realm. Accord-
ing to one estimate, out of the 131 Institut-conducted surveys in 1952, 34 dealt
with politics, 32 with market research, and 30 with radio listener research.24 Erich
Peter Neumann, Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann’s husband, director of the Institut für
Demoskopie, and a CDU member of the B undestag between 1961 and 1965,
had indicated to Chancellor Adenauer in September 1949 that the Institut could
“provide political information with the help of modern, r eliable psychological
methods, which could not be obtained in any other way.” Indeed, Neumann vol-
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unteered to make a presentation explaining the usefulness of public opinion sur-
veys.25 Although Adenauer did not accept the offer, the Chancellery’s reply to Neu-
mann indicated that the chancellor “hoped to hav e the oppor tunity for such a
presentation at a later time.”26
Clearly, Erich Peter Neumann accorded public opinion polling an essential role
in establishing a West German democracy in light of G ermany’s recent past—
especially the failur e of the Weimar Republic and the rise of the N azis. In De-
cember 1951 Neumann addressed a convention of West Germany’s leading pub-
lic opinion polling exper ts. He underscored the impact that polling could hav e
upon the future of the West German democracy. Speculating about what might
have been in the midst of G erman democracy’s darkest hour in the early 1930s,
he asked his audience, “H ad the R eichsgovernment been w ell informed that a
great danger was at the door, would it have been able to stop this dev elopment,
and what could it have done?”27 Neumann emphatically believed that the Reichs-
government, if armed with the appropriate information, could have stemmed the
Nazi tide and rescued the Weimar democracy. The parallel he drew to the present
situation was doubtlessly clear to the conservative members of the audience, who
in the context of the Cold War would have regarded the SPD as a potential threat
to the West German democracy. The key, from Neumann’s perspective, was that
the government must acquir e the right information to kno w and dir ect public
opinion.
In 1963 Noelle-Neumann and Gerhard Schmidtchen, a sociologist who had
worked at the Institut für Demoskopie, published an essay entitled “The Signif-
icance of Representative Public Opinion Polling in an Open Society”—an essay
that explored the issues of polling in a democracy. Much of their article focused
on defending polling against charges that it cheapened politics by forcing politi-
cians to say and do only what the public demanded—thereby subordinating solid
policy to political expediency. Polling data, they argued, could inform politicians
who needed to do a better job communicating with the public and convincing it
that their policies were the best options. In an era of “psychological democratiza-
tion, in which the broad social classes long for a sense of worth,” they explained,
bureaucratic statistics, personal reports on the public mood, and the secret service
(Geheimdienst) were no longer sufficient to guide political par ties and go vern-
ments. Their essay echoed the speech of Noelle-Neumann’s husband by evoking
the breakdown of the Weimar Republic. This failure of democracy in G ermany
would not be repeated, they contended, if a determined political leadership con-
tinually observed the ongoing political-psychological situation.
The assumption in Schmidtchen’s, Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann’s, and her hus-
band’s views, is that the broad social classes are fundamentally a dangerous force
whose irrationality needs to be understood if they ar e to be contr olled. In this
view, the essential danger in the early 1930s was not the Nazis themselves, but the
fact that the population believ ed in and suppor ted the N azis. In other wor ds,
these experts defended the use of sur veys as a scientific and empirical means of
understanding the fundamental irrationality of the electorate and removing what
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they called the randomness of social speculation in the political decision making
process. As Noelle-Neumann and Schmidtchen put it: “In a nation in which con-
tinuous political surveys are done, there will be no more latent trends. Potentially
radical trends in the population of the German Federal Republic will be constantly
controlled.” Scientifically based research would enable the political leadership to
deal with ne w social pr oblems emerging in a dynamic society and “ to r ealize
progress without paralyzing social conflict, without coups and revolutions.”
Ultimately, Schmidtchen and Noelle-Neumann’s vision was very much a top-
down view of democracy. Surveys would have a pedagogical value for the political
leadership in determining how to direct society in a democracy and in creating a
“reservoir of energy for democracy” by “providing the public spirit [Gemeinsinn] of
the people with convincing political themes.” Schmidtchen and Noelle-Neumann
were critical of the classical Enlightenment conception of a rational, open society.
They concluded that “[w]e kno w today, that the electorate does not possess the
rational qualities, which accor ding to classical democratic theories it must pr o-
vide.”28 It would be political leadership, armed with scientific knowledge derived
from public opinion surveys, that would supply those essential rational qualities.
Overall, these polling experts were redefining public opinion surveys and propa-
ganda, dissociating them fr om the o verpowering instr uments of a totalitarian
regime, like the Third Reich, and repositioning them as necessary tools in a func-
tioning democracy. 
At first, Adenauer hesitated to accept public opinion polling. Upon receiving
the first polling results, he reportedly commented: “This public opinion polling
is the devil ’s work! How can it be possible to find out so pr ecisely what people
think politically, or what they think about the political parties and how they will
vote. I distrust clairvoyants and people who claim they can read the future.”29 Yet,
Adenauer eventually came to embrace public opinion polling. Throughout his
chancellorship, he was constantly briefed with extensive polling data. In fact, one
is struck by his deep familiarity with the information, as reflected by his comments
in various minutes of party and governmental meetings, letters, and memoranda.
Given his overall mistrust of the West German people because of their support of
the Nazis, Konrad Adenauer found in polling the perfect tool for managing pub-
lic opinion in the newly established democracy. But it was not only a method of
entering into a discussion with the West German people. In the 1949 campaign,
Adenauer and other party leaders urged that the CDU/CSU pr opaganda appeal
to the “primitive levels of society” and present simple ideas requiring little thought.
Clearly, Adenauer did not hold the electorate’s intellectual abilities and rationality in
high regard. Public opinion polling offer ed a r eputedly empirical and scientific
method to tap into the sentiments of the amorphous, irrational, and potentially
dangerous masses. Accordingly, the new techniques described by members of the
Institute für Demoskopie jibed very well with Adenauer’s assumptions on politics
and views of the German people. Adenauer, the CDU/CSU, and economic lead-
ers alike viewed polling as means not only of tracking public opinion but direct-
ing it, obtaining power, and holding onto that power. 
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Through the spring of 1950, N eumann continued to appr oach Adenauer
about the possibility of the I nstitut für Demoskopie’s working on behalf of the
government of the Federal Republic of Germany. He suggested that every month
the institute deliver two information reports on the development of public opin-
ion in the Federal Republic at a cost of DM 2,000 per month.30 By July 1950, the
Federal Press Agency had already commissioned the Institut für Demoskopie to
conduct a survey costing DM 5,000, although as yet there was no formal contract
for establishing an ongoing relationship. In November 1950 Dr. Heinrich Brand,
an official within the Chancellery, indicated in his notes that Adenauer wanted to
test public opinion r egarding the issue of an ev entual West German contingent
within a European army.31 Brand suggested that both the Institut für Demosko-
pie and the EMNID Institut, a larger and at that time a more established polling
group based in B ielefeld, be put under contract for a testing extending fr om 1
November 1950 to 28 F ebruary 1951.32 The relationship with the I nstitut für
Demoskopie and EMNID continued through the 1950s, with the amount spent
on both institutes’ surveys continually increasing. A March 1957 report indicated
that a y early budget of DM 150,000 was av ailable for public opinion sur veys,
with DM 49,000 going to EMNID and DM 90,000 to the I nstitut für Demo-
skopie. Overall, the government and the CDU/CSU accumulated a vast and de-
tailed body of information on public opinion covering an array of topics.33
Utilizing knowledge acquired from the polls, the government and the Federal
Press Agency set about influencing and dir ecting public opinion thr ough their
network of public relations organizations. The above-mentioned Arbeitsgemein-
schaft demokratischen Kreise (ADK) acted as a key organization distributing the
material produced by the Federal Press Agency. Since its founding in December
of 1951 the ADK had pursued its goal of dev eloping the West Germans’ belief
and trust in democracy. It saw itself as the “‘I nstitute of Publicity’ charged with
the task of distributing of democratic information and educational works with an
emphasis on the r epresentation of domestic and for eign policies of the go vern-
ment and opposition according to an understanding of Anglo-Saxon public rela-
tions techniques”34
The head of the ADK, Hans Edgar Jahn, has explained that one challenge con-
fronting politics in West Germany was overcoming the “ohne mich” (without me)
attitude among its citizens. This “ohne mich” sentiment was meant not just in re-
gard to West Germans’ reluctance for rearmament, but also referred to their gen-
eral apathy vis-à-vis the state, political par ties, and politics in general. P olling
statistics clearly supported Jahn’s view. A June 1952 survey indicated that only 27
percent of G ermans registered interest in politics, while 41 per cent responded
“not particularly interested” and 32 percent “not at all interested.”35 Voting par-
ticipation was generally high in West Germany—usually with around 80–85 per-
cent voting in Bundestag elections—but a sense prevailed that voting constituted
the citizen’s sole obligation.36 Jahn believed that integrating West Germans into
political life would be a difficult task and that Allied methods of “ reeducation”
should be rejected. “The government” he argued, “must make its policies trans-
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parent with the most modern methods fr om technology and publicity . Good
policies with advantages for the population must also be sold well.”37 Although it
was packaged as a grass-roots organization helping develop West German civil so-
ciety and democracy, in actuality the ADK functioned as one of the most impor-
tant organizations promoting the policies of the Adenauer-led government, while
its links to the government were deliberately kept obscured. 
Clearly, Jahn and the ADK based their public relations philosophies on prac-
tices developed in the U nited States. The United States had been the center of
modern public relations methods since the beginning of the tw entieth century.
With the growth of a mass, increasingly urban, industrialized society, public rela-
tions was regarded by politicians and businessmen alike as an essential means of
managing an increasingly influential public opinion. In 1904 Ivy Lee, a Princeton-
trained financial journalist who emerged as the leader in the field, began doing
public relations work primarily for big business and industrialists—in part to help
large capitalist enterprises explain and defend their inter ests vis-à-vis the rising
challenges of working-class radicalism and middle-class, progressive muckrakers.
Lee helped develop a methodology called the “ two-way concept” of public rela-
tions whereby his client would listen as well as communicate information to the
public. This contrasted sharply with American business’s traditionally tight-lipped
stance toward the public and the pr ess—most notably expressed by the railroad
magnate Cornelius Vanderbilt’s infamous retort, “The public be damned.” 
By contrast, Lee stressed building public trust by truthfully reporting the facts
and maintaining an open attitude. To enhance such tr ust-building, Lee subse-
quently added another concept: convincing the public that the company was
working for the public’s benefit. Yet one could never be certain just what, for Lee,
constituted “truth” and “openness.” While on John D. Rockefeller Jr.’s payroll,
Lee spun the so-called Ludlow Massacre of 1914, during which fourteen miners
were shot down by strikebreakers acting on behalf of Rockefeller’s Colorado Iron
and Fuel Company, in the most fav orable light. That summer Lee r eleased a 
series of bulletins that reported the facts of the strike in a most distorted and mis-
leading fashion—suggesting that the strikers pr ovoked violence and that one of
strike supporters, Mother Jones, operated a house of prostitution.38 Through the
1920s until his death in 1934, Lee continued r epresenting big business, includ-
ing efforts to improve I.G. Farben’s image in the United States in the midst of in-
creasing Nazi aggression and anti-Semitism.39
During World War I, the United States government utilized public relations to
bolster support for the war, spur military recruitment, and sell war bonds. I t re-
lied heavily on the famous Committee on P ublic Information—known more
often as the Creel Committee, after its civilian director, George Creel. Established
immediately following the United States’ entry into the war, the Creel Commit-
tee exploited all forms of media—the printed word, film, posters, radio, the spo-
ken word—to advance its efforts and produced some of the harshest propaganda
of the war. Perhaps its most notable product was the wave of posters, articles, and
films vilifying the G ermans as “the Hun.”40 One of the hundr eds of journalists
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and publicists working for the C reel Committee was E dward Bernays. Born in
Vienna in 1891, B ernays—who was a nephe w of Sigmund Freud—became the
driving force in the dev elopment of public r elations techniques in the postwar
United States. Describing himself as “counsel on public relations,” Bernays combed
thought from psychology, sociology, and market research and produced his semi-
nal work, Crystallizing Public Opinion, in 1923. 
Bernays rejected Lee’s belief in swaying the public through rational arguments
and fully embraced the notion that the public opinion was driv en by prejudice,
emotion, and the subconscious. Crystallizing Public Opinion built upon and more
formally developed Lee’s “two-way concept” of public relations in which the pub-
licist enters into a discussion with the public and tries to understand it. A t the
same time the book explor ed ideas of the “her d mentality” and irrationality in
public opinion—clearly drawing upon G ustave Le Bon’s analysis of the cr owd.
For Bernays, sound public relations required careful psychological and sociologi-
cal study of the public mind. The public was not to be challenged with a dir ect
argument, but instead must be led indirectly to a particular point of view or be-
lief. This process was par t of what B ernays termed “ engineering consent”—re-
flecting his belief in public relations’ important social function in shaping public
opinion. Public relations’ principal task, as he saw it, was not to engage a public
of heterogeneous opinions with ideas, since that may spawn fur ther debate and
possible confusion. I nstead, the public r elations expert must attract the public
with symbols and pictur es that touch upon deep emotions—ther eby creating a
homogenous public perception of an issue, not a rational debate. O ften appeals
would be articulated by so-called “opinion makers,” such as doctors, sports stars,
and celebrities, in whom the public could unthinkingly place its tr ust. Bernays
was renowned for staging the “created event” that would attract media attention,
thereby generating publicity and influencing people’s opinions. Perhaps the best-
known of Bernays’ creations was the so-called “torches of freedom” demonstration
staged on Easter Sunday in 1930 as a protest against women’s inequality. For this
media event Bernays organized a group of women, many of whom w ere former
suffragists, to mar ch down Fifth Avenue in New York smoking cigar ettes. This
public flouting of the taboo against women smoking in public generated consid-
erable media attention throughout the nation. This event, Bernays later claimed,
helped break down social barriers against women smoking and increased cigarette
sales. In any case, by transforming cigarettes from mere consumer products into
symbols of freedom, Bernays creatively demonstrated his technique of reshaping
the public’s perception of r eality not thr ough debate but thr ough symbols and
thereby changing public opinion.41
The concept of public relations, although it first spread to German industry in
the prewar era, did not begin to fully pervade the Federal Republic’s political cul-
ture until after the war. In 1951 one of the trailblazers and popularizers of public
relations for West Germany’s industry, Carl Hundhausen, published Werbung um
öffentlichen Vertrauen (Winning the Public Trust in English translation), which served
as the handbook for West Germans interested in conducting American-style pub-
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lic relations. Between the wars Hundhausen had spent time in the United States,
where he absorbed American public r elations techniques—especially those of
Bernays. Following the Second World War, he handled considerable public rela-
tions work for a variety of firms, including Krupp, and also wrote several books
on the subject. 42 His efforts familiarized a broad range of West German indus-
trialists, journalists, advertisers, and politicians with American public relations ef-
forts. These American public r elations principles were increasingly employed to
defend conservative political-economic ideologies. Die Waage’s efforts to promote
the social market economy clearly represented a public relations campaign based
upon Lee’s and Bernays’ ideas. The Federal Republic’s government also began to
utilize such techniques. In May 1951, the ADK chief H ans Edgar Jahn made a
presentation to Adenauer’s state secretary, Otto Lenz, on “Democratic Informa-
tion and Educational Work [Bildungsarbeit] on the Basis of Anglo-Saxon Public
Relations Techniques”—followed up b y a meeting in J une in which they dis-
cussed publicity for the broad masses. Jahn then provided Lenz, at Lenz’s request,
with a report on American public relations techniques sometime during 1952. In
fact, until 1963, Jahn would meet with the chancellor’s state secretary to discuss
the government’s policies and their reception among the public. Jahn contended,
perhaps exaggerating, that his influence upon Lenz was the key factor in the in-
troduction of American public relations techniques into the government and the
CDU/CSU.43
Much of what Jahn’s various books would treat as the basis of American pub-
lic relations techniques harked back to Ivy Lee and his “two-way concept” of com-
munication. Public relations materials, Jahn stressed, must address the reader as
an individual rather than as part of the “masses,” utilize illustrations to make pub-
lications more attractiv e to the r eader, and take adv antage of public opinion
polling to initiate a “discussion” with the public—echoing some of the public re-
lations and adv ertising techniques dev eloped and implemented in the U nited
States. Such techniques, J ahn observed, were originally emplo yed by economic
and business interests but could also be applied to the world of politics. In other
words, the techniques used to sell goods could easily be transferred to sell politi-
cal ideas. In the memoirs he wrote years later, Jahn argued that “[i]t is the goal of
public relations to come to a common identity of common political action in ac-
cordance with the will and desire of the population. That assumes that politics is
driven not according to a doctrinaire program, but instead that one shapes poli-
tics from the rich vitality of social existence.”44
In many respects Jahn’s philosophy reflected the CDU/CSU’s move away from
a “doctrinaire program” to more modern public r elations techniques that com-
bined citizens and state institutions in a living, organic whole. Only the creation
of trust and a common sense of cause betw een individual citiz ens and state, in
part created by active public relations, could effect this union. J ahn placed this
conception of public relations within a distinctly German context. As he explained
in his 1956 analysis of public relations work in West Germany, Lebendige Demo-
kratie (Living Democracy), humanity had reached a crucial point at which indi-
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vidualism and fr eedom stood befor e the burgeoning thr eat of collectivism and
tyranny. To counter the depersonalization (Vermassung) of society and the associ-
ated danger of collectivism, new methods of speaking to the people must be de-
veloped. The defeat of G ermany in 1945 had destr oyed the G erman people ’s
political faith (politische Glaube) and now politicians must act more as psycholo-
gists or doctors than as dogmatists. To develop democratic roots where there were
none, politicians had to maintain constant contact with individual people and
convince them that their interests coincided with those of the larger community
and political system.45
Jahn regarded the ADK as having a crucial role in creating this organic union
between citizens and state. The ADK built up its organization over the course of
1952/53. By the middle of 1952, it already had hundreds of workers throughout
the Federal Republic organizing meetings and pr esentations that explor ed such 
issues as rearmament, the European Coal and Steel Community, and German re-
unification. The organization also had a number of experts at its disposal to pre-
sent speeches and lead discussions. At these meetings, the ADK would distribute
its own political information bulletins and br ochures supplied b y the F ederal
Press Agency or other organizations. By 1953 the ADK was reported to have held
over 2,200 assemblies and discussions that drew in almost 200,000 people, a fig-
ure that would grow over the next few years. In addition, the ADK distributed 1.1
million brochures, pamphlets, and books in 1953.46
Perhaps its most unusual effort in public relations was its use of film, with 40
percent of its public ev ents featuring films—mostly pr oduced on behalf of the
Federal Press Agency. The ADK utilized a newly founded firm named Mobilwer-
bung to scr een these films. C reated at Lenz ’s suggestion, M obilwerbung dis-
patched over a dozen Volkswagen buses equipped with projectors and screens to
town squares and other public places. This firm performed considerable work for
the CDU/CSU during the 1953 B undestag campaign, informing audiences
about such themes as r econstruction, reunification, the Schuman P lan, the 17
June uprising in East Berlin, and Adenauer’s 1953 trip to the United States.47 Per-
haps most importantly, the ADK staged these events not as didactic instruction on
the part of government, but instead as grassroots discussions among citizens con-
cerning the future of their nation. Although few of the ADK’s public discussions
and presentations dealt with economics, by distributing pro-government materi-
als the ADK helped support the government’s economic policy.48
The Federal Press Agency itself was also activ e in support of the government
as the 1953 Bundestag election neared. In August of 1952 Felix von Eckardt, the
head of the agency , outlined for A denauer its strategy for the upcoming cam-
paign. The key to success, he argued, was “to convince the man on the street that
the economic upswing, unquestionably caused by the policies of the government,
has not benefited only cer tain groups, but all lev els of society .” The agency’s 
propaganda should highlight the benefits of the go vernment’s economic policy
particularly to those who had suffered severely during the war. Von Eckardt coun-
seled the chancellor that this display of the economic upswing should not be con-
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veyed through any logical argumentation. Instead, the populace wanted to see the
government take concrete measures that would appear to guarantee a higher liv-
ing standard. Von Eckardt suggested one such measur e, lowering the tax es on
basic groceries, such as milk, br ead, meat, butter, and sugar, would accomplish
this—and it was, in fact, a policy that the government instituted prior to the elec-
tion.49 As the election neared, the Federal Press Agency geared up its public rela-
tions efforts, especially providing material to journalists recounting the work and
successes of the Adenauer’s government. Von Eckardt reported that between Jan-
uary and July 1953 the Federal Press Agency spent around DM 2.2 million and
disseminated over 100 new publications. Many of these dealt with economic is-
sues, for example brochures supporting the social market economy.50 Thanks to
the go vernment’s public r elations machiner y, pr opaganda on behalf of the
CDU/CSU was increasingly professionalized, coordinated, and ubiquitous com-
pared to the 1949 campaign. 
As the government churned out an array of pr opaganda materials in support
of its own policies, the personality of Chancellor Adenauer played the central role
in the election campaign—clearly a departure from the 1949 campaign. During
the years prior to the election, Adenauer’s popularity had grown rapidly. Accord-
ing to the polls, respondents naming him the “most capable German politician”
climbed from 5 percent in September 1948 to 33 percent in August 1952. This
contrasted with Schumacher ’s positiv e assessment befor e his death in A ugust
1952 hovering around 12 per cent.51 By June 1953, 51 per cent of r espondents
named Adenauer as the “most capable,” in comparison to a mer e 6 percent for
Erich Ollenhauer, the main SPD candidate.52 As the popularity of Adenauer rose,
that of the CDU/CSU gr ew apace. Party leadership after the election identified
Adenauer’s trip to the U nited States in A pril 1953 as the campaign ’s turning
point, arguing that the trip “crystallized” the public’s perception of Adenauer as a
statesmanlike figure.53 Polling results backed up this assessment. Particularly re-
vealing were the responses to a running poll by the Institut für Demoskopie’s that
asked: “ Which par ty do y ou suppor t?” A t the time of A denauer’s trip to the
United States, the CDU/CSU’s popularity climbed from 37 to 39 per cent with
the 17 June uprising, and up to 45 percent by the time of the election.54 Percep-
tions of Adenauer’s policy also shot up dramatically: witness the 27 percent of re-
spondents suppor ting his policy in late 1951, compar ed to the 52 per cent
favorable figure by the summer of 1953.55 The West German public increasingly
perceived Adenauer and his leadership as signifying gr owing respect and accep-
tance for West Germany abroad and greater stability at home. 
In no small measur e, Adenauer’s enhanced r eputation was the r esult of the
public relations work orchestrated by the Federal Press Agency and its associated
organizations. Adenauer’s trip to the U nited States itself , hosted b y President
Eisenhower, was largely conceiv ed and carried out with political pr opaganda in
mind. Lenz and the Federal Press Agency did their utmost to convert the trip into
political capital. Most notable among their efforts was the production of the film
Ein Mann wirbt für Sein Volk (A Man Promotes his Nation), a somewhat clum-
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sily crafted, half-hour documentar y depicting A denauer’s visit. I t por trayed a
strong and vibrant leader who was building a close friendship and partnership be-
tween West Germany and the U nited States—a theme dev eloped especially
through “photo ops” of such ev ents as President Eisenhower’s White House re-
ception for A denauer and the chancellor ’s dramatic wr eath-laying at Arlington
National Cemetery. The film, like much of the agency ’s propaganda, was pr o-
duced and screened by the Mobilwerbung firm and its subsidiaries, although the
Federal Press Agency’s von Eckardt oversaw its final content.56
Despite his dislike for journalists, Adenauer cultivated his relationship with the
press during the run-up to the election by granting a number of interviews with
selected journalists. In addition, a special rail car, used by Hermann Göring dur-
ing the Third Reich, hustled Adenauer across West Germany during the campaign.
Accompanying the chancellor was his publicity team and a group of hand-picked
reporters who rode in a dining/sleeping car on Adenauer’s train with the expecta-
tion that they would help fav orably shape A denauer’s image on the campaign
trail. Finally, the Federal Press Agency effectively orchestrated Adenauer’s stops at
towns and villages into “events” that sparked intense interest among the local in-
habitants. Loudspeakers at local gatherings would announce his much antici-
pated arrival, replete with brass bands, flags, and the mass distribution of leaflets
and other pr opaganda materials. U pon seeing ho w well villagers, r efugees, and
common people received Adenauer during the campaign, Herbert Blankenhorn
made a telling obser vation. He had feared that the middle classes “ would never
produce a personality who possessed the mystic quality of leadership for a state of
the masses” and that totalitarian r egimes understood the need for a “ dynamic,
powerful character who satisfies people ’s fantasies and their inner need for pr o-
tection. Without a shadow of doubt, the Chancellor has something of these qual-
ities, so difficult to define.” A denauer rarely disappointed the cr owds thanks in
part to his aggressive style of speaking, which was filled with ferocious and often
personal attacks against his political opponents—especially the SPD.57
Not only was Adenauer the focal point of the election, but as in the 1949 elec-
tion, he had an impor tant role in plotting the CDU/CSU’ s campaign strategy.
From Adenauer’s perspective, the stakes w ere high for the 1953 election. The
chancellor was absolutely adamant in his belief that the defeat of the union par-
ties and a subsequent coalition led by the SPD would prove calamitous for West
Germany. As indicated by many of the polls taken in the early 1950s, an SPD vic-
tory was a distinct possibility . As A denauer explained in a J anuary 1952 CDU 
executive committee meeting, “The debate in the Bundestag has shown that the
CDU alone carries the responsibility for democratic politics. . . . I f the SPD be-
comes the str ongest party [in the B undestag election] that would mean a cata-
strophe for democratic politics.” 58 On other occasions he underscor ed the
CDU/CSU’s focus in the election: “The 1953 Bundestag election should be the
decisive election. It requires, therefore, careful preparation. If we do not win this
election, then without a doubt, socialism and materialism will take o ver.” For
Adenauer, the SPD constituted a “ totalitarian party” that would undo all of his
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work to integrate West Germany with the West. So deep was Adenauer’s animos-
ity toward the SPD that he did not even attend the funeral of his bitter SPD rival,
Kurt Schumacher, in August 1952.59
As in the 1949 election, the SPD bor e the brunt of the CDU/CSU’s attacks,
which this time around were conducted by a broad network of institutions built
to influence public opinion. H owever, Adenauer not only had to contend with
the SPD from the left, but also had to thwart the aspirations of the bourgeois par-
ties from the right. As former Nazis had regained voting rights by the 1953 elec-
tion, the FDP and DP, coalition par tners of the CDU/CSU, had str engthened
their nationalist platforms and, for enhanced electoral suppor t, created stronger
ties to veterans’ groups for support. Adenauer hoped to contain these nationalist
sentiments as they would threaten his policy of integrating West Germany with
the West and revitalize what to him were the worst elements in Germany’s past.
A key challenge he faced in the 1953 campaign would be to restrain some of these
nationalist elements within the mor e moderate confines of the CDU/CSU as a
whole, or at a minimum within a coalition led b y the par ty. Consequently, the
CDU/CSU’s propaganda attempted to attract more nationalist opinions. To ap-
peal to the gr owing number of militar y associations, Adenauer visited the Werl
prison, where the British still detained some military officers for war crimes, and
spoke personally with the Waffen SS General Kurt Meyer to ensure that his con-
finement conditions were appropriate. In addition, the chancellor traveled to the
town of Friedrichsruhe outside of Hamburg to lay a wreath at Bismarck’s grave.60
Even with these side issues, public opinion surveys indicated early on that the
public was disgruntled over the rise of prices resulting from the Korean War and
directed its resentment toward the government. During the Korean Crisis, Insti-
tut für Demoskopie surveys showed that many West Germans held the govern-
ment as responsible for the price hikes (46 percent), while 37 percent assigned the
blame to world mar ket prices. In addition, 75 per cent responded that the go v-
ernment could do something about the rise in prices if it wished.61 This criticism
of the government remained, although its intensity declined as the election ap-
proached. In July 1953, 25 percent of respondents regarded economic problems,
wages, prices, and curr ency as the most impor tant questions facing West Ger-
mans, down from 45 percent in October 1951. Meanwhile the issue of r eunifi-
cation as the primary concern grew from 18 to 38 percent over the same period.62
By September 1953, 36 per cent of the population believ ed the go vernment
should concern itself with the solving economic pr oblems, compared to the 32
percent believing German reunification was the most pressing problem.63
In the Federal Press Agency, the government had an instr ument to influence
public opinion on an ongoing basis. As noted earlier, part of the agency’s strategy
was to obscur e its link to pr opaganda by publishing materials that did not ac-
knowledge the agency as their originator and then supplying these materials to
various organizations for distribution. One such example during the Korean Cri-
sis was the brochure Preisfibel (Price Primer), which was designed to instruct West
Germans, especially women, about the mechanisms of the free market. In 1952,
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the Federal Press Agency printed over 100,000 of these br ochures with funding
from the German Chamber of Commerce. The publication proved quite popu-
lar. In fact, the Deutscher Hausfrauenverband (League of German Housewives)
requested 100,000 copies, although it received only 50,000, with the remainder
going to various political and economic organizations, universities, and libraries.
In exploring the workings of supply and demand, the brochure positioned the
female homemaker as a student of the free market. It opened with “Ten short sto-
ries on prices! Unbelievable, but true!” which tried to delve into the irrationality
of “buyers’ psychoses” and at the same time intr oduce the concept of the West
German consumer citizen. Among the stories were examples of consumers buy-
ing more expensive products because they were marked as “special,” along with il-
lustrations of how a planned economy disr upted the natural flow of supply and
demand. The brochure stressed how consumers’ actions influenced the workings
of the market and had larger political-economic implications for West Germany
as a whole. The Preisfibel’s influence was relatively limited since its distribution
was not extensive, and it was probably read only within select circles. Neverthe-
less, it was but one of a number of br ochures published and distributed b y the
Federal Press Agency in the years following the Korean Crisis. All of them had a
common theme: the rise in prices and the economic challenges presented by the
Korean Crisis were not actually so severe but rather were a matter of perception,
and a planned economy would only worsen economic conditions. The brochures
had titles such as “ Aufstieg oder Katastr ophe” (Ascent or Catastr ophe), “Verdi-
enen wir zu w enig” (Do We Earn Too Little?), “Acht Jahre danach . . . S oziale
Sicherheit für alle” (Eight Years Afterward . . . Social Security for All), “Anderen
haben auch Sorgen” (Others Also Have Concerns), and “Haben die Anderen es
besser?” (Are Others Better Off?).64
Economic conditions markedly improved for the CDU/CSU in the months
leading up to the election. As a report from the CDU/CSU’s central party office
indicated, “Then in the spring 1953 the general trends in the areas of foreign and
economic policies had progressed so that the growing weight of their positive ef-
fects for the entire population appeared, and only such a crystallization point was
needed to cause a decisiv e swing in the public opinion.” 65 Undoubtedly the
shocks from the Korean Crisis, especially the rise in prices, had undermined sup-
port for both the government and its economic policy of the social market econ-
omy. By 1953, however, the effects of the Korean Crisis had begun to wane and
public perception was catching up with economic statistics. I n early 1953, pub-
lic opinion in regard to the rise in prices improved. A survey asked, “Do you have
the impression that the prices in the last quar ter year have for the most par t re-
mained the same, risen, or fallen?” The percent of r espondents believing prices
had risen dropped from 50 percent in late to 1952 to 24 per cent in September
1953, the month of the election. M eanwhile, those convinced prices had r e-
mained constant r ose from 35 to 52 per cent over the same period. E ven those
contending that prices had declined went up to 12 percent by election time.66 In
addition, in July 1953 85 percent of respondents indicated that their economic
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condition had gotten better or r emained the same during the last y ear. This fig-
ure had jumped up from only 43 percent in May 1951.67
This shift in public opinion resulted from the fact that price indexes had fallen
to levels not significantly higher than at the start of the Korean Crisis. For exam-
ple, the cost of living index dropped to 108 in the summer of 1953 from a high
of 119 in the first half of 1951 (1950=100). 68 Moreover, in or der to giv e con-
sumers the impression that prices were falling during the months before the elec-
tion, the government tactically lowered taxes on consumer products such as coffee,
tea, and tobacco—a mo ve suggested b y von Eckardt and described b y some as
motivated purely by polling results. The unemployment figure also fell below 5.5
percent, with the total unemployment under 1 million by the time of the election.
Given these dev elopments, the CDU/CSU’ s claims that times w ere improving
rang true with the public.69
In addition to the Federal Press Agency–supplied public opinion polls that func-
tioned as market research of the electorate, the CDU/CSU began commissioning
specific surveys to test the resonance of particular pieces of propaganda—just as
was often done for advertising spots. One such survey explored the effectiveness
of political leaflets. The survey concluded that the effectiveness in convincing the
public of its ideas was not dependent on the leaflet ’s content, but rather on its
propensity to be noticed by the public.70 This survey reflected a number of devel-
opments. First, it showed how the Institut für Demoskopie was transferring tech-
niques from commercial advertising to the political realm. Increasingly, a party’s
program was a pr oduct to be sold to the electorate. S econd, the sur vey also
demonstrated the more “scientific” efforts on the part of the CDU/CSU to craft
its image, rather than to base its political campaigns upon a political program or
speculation about the public mood. Clearly , the CDU/CSU was inno vating in
terms of the techniques used to shape its message and image for public con-
sumption. In fact, for the first time, the party utilized a private advertising firm,
that of Dr. Hegemann from Düsseldorf, to distribute its posters—allo wing the
party leadership to concentrate on running the campaign.71
A crucial requirement for this development of a CDU/CSU “image” was the
construction of a more centralized party structure to direct and organize the elec-
tion campaign—a move accomplished at the October 1950 Goslar Congress. The
CDU federal party organization now consisted of the Parteitag (party convention),
made up of representatives from the regional organizations, the Bundesparteiauss-
chuß (federal party committee), which included chairpersons and leading mem-
bers from the r egional organizations, the chairpersons of the federal and state
Fraktionen (parliamentary factions), and members of the Bundesparteivorstand
(federal executive committee). The Bundesparteiausschuß elected the ex ecutive
committee members, while the Parteitag elected the par ty chairperson and two
deputies. At the G oslar Congress Adenauer was v oted chairperson b y an o ver-
whelming majority of 302 ayes with 22 abstentions and 4 nays. Part of creating a
national party organization was the formation of the Bundesgeschäftsstelle (central
party headquarters). The Bundesgeschäftsstelle took over the party’s administrative
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duties, including coordinating election campaigns, but was financed mainly from
the regional organizations. Heading the Bundesgeschäftsstelle was Bruno Heck, a
relatively unknown politician fr om Swabia Adenauer named to the post in the
spring of 1952. Despite the efforts to construct a federal-level party machinery, in
many respects much of the actual political and administrativ e power within the
party, as with the Arbeitsgemeinschaft der CDU/CSU in 1949, r emained with
the regional organizations. 
The CDU did not achiev e a highly organiz ed par ty bureaucracy until the
1960s. In contrast, during the 1950s it remained an association of regional orga-
nizations, since many of the party members associated party bureaucracy and cen-
tralization with past totalitarianism, the SPD, or the East German Marxist party,
the SED (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, Socialist Unity Party). Through-
out the 1950s, the CDU leadership contemptuously referred to SPD “functionar-
ies” to draw a contrast to what they saw as their party’s more grassroots workings
and doggedly sought to retain that dynamic. For example, the regional organiza-
tions made certain that the federal party proceeded through them to contact the
district organizations. In addition the r egional organizations drew up the list of
candidates for both state and federal elections. In many instances serious rivalries
divided the regional parties—especially among regional organization within the
individual states, such as the Rhineland and Westphalia-Lippe organizations in
the state of North Rhine–Westphalia. In addition, regional organizations in the
southern part of West Germany tended to resist centralization more determinedly
than those in the north.72 The most striking element in the regionalization of the
CDU/CSU’s campaigning was the Christian Social Union (CSU), the CDU’s sis-
ter party in the Bundestag parliamentary faction. It was an autonomous political
party that had allied itself with the CDU at the national level. Overall, because of
Adenauer’s popularity on the national scene, the CSU tended to fall in line with
the CDU in the formulation of its Bundestag campaigns. 
It was primarily in elections, ho wever, that the CDU’ s federal organization
came to life and ex erted its power. Despite the political impor tance of regional
politicians, the leadership in Bonn, especially the powerful presence of Adenauer
and his staff, established the party’s public positions and propaganda for the elec-
tion campaigns. The Bundesgeschäftsstelle asserted itself prior to the 1953 election
with efforts representing a clear mo vement toward the centralization of CDU/
CSU campaigning—especially in comparison to the 1949 campaign. In many in-
stances the district organizations were quite weak owing to low membership and
became active only during election campaigns. The Bundesgeschäftsstelle wanted to
direct the district organizations as much as possible; for example, it dispatched to
every district organization a detailed “Wahlhelfer” (election guide) describing the
work that needed to be done before the election.73 In any event, despite the cen-
tral leadership’s desire to control not only the conceptual but also the technical as-
pects of the campaign, the regional-level organizations still constituted the major
force directing the actual campaigning within their r egions.74 They also exerted
some influence on the conceptual framework of the campaign. As the strategy for
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the campaign was coalescing, in January 1953 Heck met with the regional party
managers to discuss their r equirements for the campaign and the r espective re-
sponsibilities of the federal and r egional par ty organizations. This session also 
decided that several regional party managers would participate in the committee
charged with drawing up par ty propaganda—along with members of the Bun-
desgeschäftsstelle and commercial advertising experts.75
In addition, considerable tension sometimes divided the federal and r egional
levels of the party with regard to financing. Income from monthly party dues in
the CDU was miniscule: for example, about 210,000 members contributed
roughly DM 100,000 a month in 1953—with most of that money remaining at
the district levels. For election campaigns, the lion ’s share of the CDU’s money
came from the so-called Fördergesellschaften, the promotional associations, that or-
ganized industrial and business fund raising in the individual states.76 In a March
1953 meeting of the CDU’s executive committee, Adenauer commented that the
party’s regional organizations had ensured that the promotional associations were
closely tied to them rather than to the par ty’s national-level organization, which
presented a serious problem for the running of a national campaign. At that point
the party had negotiated with the promotional associations to contribute DM 6
million to the CDU for 1953, with 4 million going toward operating costs for the
party (3 million to the regional organizations and 1 million to the central party)
and 2 million going to the central par ty organization for the election campaign.
At this juncture the CDU treasurer Ernst Bach estimated the federal party’s cam-
paign costs at about DM 2.6 million. A denauer stressed that the campaign be
centrally dir ected and “ must display the same poster in Kiel and Constance,”
meanwhile acknowledging that propaganda must also incorporate featur es with
local and regional appeal or otherwise fall flat.77 Despite the drive for centraliza-
tion of the campaign, by the summer of 1953 B ach realized that DM 1 million
earmarked for the central party campaign fund was being diverted directly to the
regional organizations—especially in North Rhine–Westphalia. Adenauer did not
hesitate to express his extreme displeasure at his party treasurer’s allowing such a
diversion to occur and str essed the impor tance of the funds to r un an effectiv e
campaign.78 Apparently, the central par ty eventually made up the differ ence by
pursuing deficit spending and r elying on income deriv ed from subscriptions by
industry to the so-called Wirtschaftsbild—an information sheet co vering eco-
nomic developments.79 Despite these conflicts and pr oblems in financing the
central party, the Bundesgeschäftsstelle controlled enough of the funds and pos-
sessed sufficient leadership to shape the main campaign concepts.
Planning for the 1953 campaign began in earnest in O ctober 1952, almost a
year in advance of the election, when the “ Wednesday circle” consisting of Ade-
nauer, Heck, Lenz, Bach, and von Eckardt began holding weekly meetings to dis-
cuss campaign strategy .80 Heck and the centraliz ed par ty leadership of the
Bundesgeschäftsstelle formulated the main vision that the party would project, while
regional- and district-level party organizations did much of the campaign wor k.
For example, the Bundesgeschäftsstelle had ensured that each of the 195 district 
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organizations had a par ty chairman, who was to be paid DM 400 a month, to
oversee and direct the upcoming campaign. In addition, the Bundesgeschäftsstelle
established a press section to more effectively coordinate publicity for the CDU/
CSU at the national level, while the regional party headquarters created press bu-
reaus to pr ovide neutral journalists with pr ess r eleases, ne ws confer ences, and
contacts with the important regional-level CDU/CSU politicians. The so-called
Heimatzeitungen, local papers friendly to the CDU/CSU, w ere supplied weekly
with a variety of interviews, reports, and candidate portraits; they printed much
of what was provided word for word. More importantly, by the autumn of 1952
a survey of the sociological makeup and political development of each of the in-
dividual election districts was conducted and made av ailable to all lev els of the
party. The par ty was car efully monitoring the “ mass-psychological situation”
within the electorate as well through public opinion polling.81 In fact, during the
campaign, Bundesgeschäftsstelle manager Bruno Heck regularly sent to r egional
party leaders updates drawn from public opinion surveys in order to keep them
abreast of the dev eloping political situation. 82 Throughout the campaign the
Bundesgeschäftsstelle had at its disposal a wide v ariety of public opinion polling
from the Institut für Demoskopie, along with survey data from EMNID analyz-
ing party support as a function of sociological background.83
Public opinion surveys clarified a number of key points regarding the election
campaign. The Bundesgeschäftsstelle reported that sur veys indicated the CDU/
CSU as a whole must secure the trust of the electorate through the trust that was
given to the party’s leading personalities. The party’s propaganda must not make
promises that would lack credibility. Instead, party propaganda had to concretely
communicate to the electorate the party’s great successes over the last four years.
Particularly important in shaping public opinion, the report argued, was the sta-
bilization of prices since the K orean Crisis and the dr op in unemplo yment to
under 1 million. Clashes with political opponents, par ticularly the SPD, had to
demonstrate that the SPD’s ideological approach to political problems accounted
for its sterility and w eakness. In addition, the CDU/CSU had to convince the
electorate that the SPD had single-mindedly follo wed a program of negation in
regard to the government’s successful policies.84
Overall, the CDU/CSU should play do wn any notion that the election r e-
volved around ideological conflict between the CDU/CSU and the SPD. In fact,
the CDU/CSU consciously sought to deemphasiz e what w ere called “ cultural-
political questions”—religious issues in other words—for fear of scaring away po-
tential voters by appearing solely as the “Christian party.”85 As in the 1949 cam-
paign, the CDU/CSU could count on the chur ches, especially the Catholic
Church, to urge their flocks to vote for the “Christian party.”86 Instead of engag-
ing in ideological conflict, the CDU/CSU wanted to sell the party image that was
embodied by its leadership, particularly Adenauer or even Erhard, and its accom-
plishments, especially in the diplomatic and economic realms. In this respect, the
party’s approach utilized the advertising technique of selling not the product itself,
that is, the party and its leadership, but rather a benefit of the product, such as in-
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creased living standards or an enhanced sense of security, that would subjectively
appeal to the consumer/voter. 
In the course of the 1953 campaign, the CDU/CSU had acquired the tools to
understand and reach out to the br oadest constituencies, thereby facilitating its
emergence as a Volkspartei. Its approach tending toward issue- and mood-based
campaigning reflected the growing American influence on the West German po-
litical culture. Dr. Robert Tillmanns, chairman of the Berlin CDU, clearly voiced
this philosophy of politics when he commented at a CDU ex ecutive committee
meeting that only a quite limited gr oup of people could be r eached through
clumsy political slogans. People no longer wanted to hear mere party squabbling.
Instead, Tillmanns suggested, “We must take into consideration totally different
social strata and different attitudes. . . . For the Bundestag election we don’t need
an extensive, vague program for all our economic and social policies, but instead
we need clearly worked out and impressive goals and points for the present situ-
ation of our nation.” 87 Taking this appr oach, the CDU/CSU pr opaganda con-
tinually hammered away about the SPD as a danger to the future security of West
Germany, while at the same time it tr umpeted the CDU/CSU’s diplomatic and
economic achievements since 1949. 
This political propaganda utilized some of the approaches the party exploited
in the 1949 B undestag election. D uring that election the CDU/CSU had em-
phasized economics as an ideological “ wedge” between itself and the SPD. The
underlying message of its campaign was that the two economic systems presented
a choice: the organic, antimaterialist, Christian society of the CDU/CSU v ersus
the atomized, materialist, godless society of the SPD. As previously mentioned, in
1953 the CDU/CSU was consciously trying to broaden its constituency—espe-
cially among nonreligious, antisocialist voters. As a result, instead of associating
the social market economy with pulling West Germany out of total despair and
fostering the regeneration of “natural” gender roles, familial life, and a Christian
community, the CDU/CSU began emphasizing mor e consumerist visions of its
economic policy. In addition, the party exploited developments in East Germany,
especially the Soviets’ use of brutal force to suppress the 17 June 1953 worker up-
rising in East Berlin, to bolster its image as the party of strength. Throughout its
propaganda, the CDU/CSU defined the SPD as unr eliable by blurring the dis-
tinctions between the SPD in West Germany and the SED in East Germany. In
this way, the issue of economics was combined with the Cold War threat of com-
munism—albeit in a different vein from the antimaterialist message of 1949. In-
stead, West Germany’s economic vitality, along with the rise of consumerism, was
what made the new state dynamic and legitimate in comparison with its eastern
counterpart. 
Although its continued emphasis on traditional pr opaganda materials—
posters, leaflets, and rallies—ate up 28, 14, and 9 percent of the federal-level cam-
paign budget r espectively, the CDU/CSU also began emplo ying new forms of
political advertising that were clearly influenced by decidedly American forms of
advertising. One of the most impor tant propaganda pieces distributed b y the
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Bundesgeschäftsstelle was an illustrated magazine, Die Entscheidung (The Deci-
sion), which boasted a circulation of 5 million copies and consumed 21 per cent
of the campaign budget.88 The magazine’s tone echoed the advertising techniques
developed in the United States during the 1920s and 1930s—especially the cre-
ation of “human-interest” stories in which the reader is invited to share a story or
experience with the ad’s characters. In clear contrast to the “har d-sell” approach
taken with most leaflets and posters b y projecting an o ver-the-top mood, the
cover depicted an attractiv e, young-looking, smiling woman holding a pen
against her forehead—apparently about to cast her ballot. M uch of the election
magazine dealt with the division of Germany, the 17 June uprising, and the eco-
nomic and social adv ances achieved by the CDU/CSU, but these issues w ere
couched in very human terms. Chancellor Adenauer was featured prominently in
the magazine. He was depicted, for example, inv olved in meetings with for eign
leaders (one picture showed him on the U.S. Capitol steps), addr essing a crowd
in West Berlin after the 17 June uprising, and engaged in personal activities such
as tending his beloved rose garden. Erhard was portrayed lighting a cigar with the
caption, “Always calm, with a good cigar , and the right economic policy , Eco-
nomics Minister Erhard tore up the ration cards.” 
Intermingled among the depictions of Adenauer and his accomplishments, the
magazine portrayed West Germany’s economic advancement since the curr ency
reform, and more importantly illustrated how these achievements improved the
conditions of individual West Germans. The message of economic reconstruction
was particularly geared toward female voters, who were the central pillar of CDU/
CSU support. One example of this pitch to female voters recounts the “diary” of
the woman on the front of the magazine from the summer of 1945 to the sum-
mer of 1953 (Illustration 5.1 and Illustration 5.2). The text and photos depicted
experiences common to many Germans after the end of the war: flight from the
Russians, internment camps, death and destr uction in the cities, squalid living
conditions, hunger, and the black market. This woman had to work as a rubble
woman clearing the mounds of debris from the streets of Schweinfurt in order to
earn ration car ds to eat. As with other conser vative propaganda, the narrativ e
started after the defeat of the Third Reich. The story placed Germans into the role
of victims of terrible har dships following the war and ther eby distanced them
from any responsibility for the crimes of the Third Reich. In addition, it high-
lighted the fear this woman had of the Russians in 1945, making an implicit par-
allel to the contemporar y threat from the East in 1953. The ad also echoed the
popular narrative of the curr ency reform: West Germans now suddenly earned
money worth something and w ere able to buy pr eviously unavailable food and
goods. Women had been transformed from powerless victims of shortages to now
active consumers. The narrator, apparently a single, wor king women, vowed to
herself, “I will never be disheartened and never forget this dreadful time. And I will
also never forget, when I am full, how much hunger hurts.” Then, in late spring
of 1953, the narrator gushed about the new material goods that she was enjoying.
She had acquired a new typewriter at work, a bicycle for traveling around the city,
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and a pair of stylish (todschicke) shoes from a store with so wide a selection that it
was hard to decide which pair to buy . In the last entr y, dated 7 June 1953, the
narrator was even planning a long vacation and trying to stick to her plan of read-
ing a book a week. But it had been difficult to select the books “[s]ince the selec-
tion is enormous—and there is so much that one simply must have.” The lesson
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of the whole article was clear: West German living conditions had improved in-
credibly in the last eight y ears and ensur ed the end of the depriv ations of the
postwar years. Both this individual woman’s and West Germany’s prospects had
been dramatically transformed. To continue this upward trajectory West Germans
must vote CDU/CSU. 
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The technical layout of the advertisement was decidedly more advanced than
the brochures and leaflets from the 1949 campaign. Die Entscheidung had the feel
of a r eal magazine and interspersed actual adv ertisements for consumer goods
among the ar ticles and photographs—both giving it an aura of legitimacy and
helping defray some its costs.89 This was not a dry announcement of the CDU/
CSU policies and a list of figur es describing West Germany’s economic growth,
nor was it a provocative visual image meant to shock or scare the audience. Instead,
the reader was invited to share very personally in the story of a young refugee who
was rebuilding her life in West Germany. It was selling a political message in a way
that did not seem overtly political or heavy-handed. Clearly the CDU/CSU was
responding to cer tain polling that indicated women w ere even less likely than
men to talk about politics. O ne spring 1952 poll indicated that 64 per cent of
women never spoke about politics, in comparison to 23 percent of men.90 In ad-
dition, the diary of this young woman placed economic developments since the
end of the Second World War in a much more individualistic context than pro-
paganda from 1949. E conomic r econstruction as a means of satisfying con-
sumerist, individual desir es was clearly str essed, while the mor e antimaterialist
conceptions of the social mar ket economy were subdued, if not completely ab-
sent. The idea of a reconstructed family life was muted, as this woman continued
to “stand alone” eight years after the end of the war but had found fulfillment in
pursuing new opportunities for consumerism. Clearly this ad was aimed more to-
ward voters outside the CDU/CSU’s base of religious-minded citizens. 
The “German miracle,” as the CDU/CSU termed it, also had o vertones that
placed West German economic reconstruction within a larger geopolitical context.
Even before the 17 June uprising in East Berlin, it was clear that foreign policy and
the threat of communism would continue to play a central role in the campaign.
A poll from July 1953 indicated that West Germans were deeply concerned with
issues such reunification, preservation of peace between the East and West, and
rearmament (34, 16, and 15 per cent of r espondents r espectively saw these as
West Germany’s most impor tant issues), while the issue of economics had de-
clined in importance since the middle of the K orean Crisis (from 45 percent in
October 1951 to 25 percent).91
The issues of German reunification and West German foreign policy had heated
up since the 1949 election. I n November 1949 Adenauer signed the Petersberg
Agreement which allowed West Germany to reenter international organizations
and establish consulates in other countries among other things. Within the con-
text of the demands of the K orean War, French Minister President René Pleven
proposed in October 1950 to combine Western military forces, including elements
from West Germany, in the so-called European Defense Community (EDC). In
May 1952 West Germany and the thr ee Western powers of the U nited States,
Great Britain, and F rance signed the G eneral Treaty that r ecognized the so ver-
eignty of the Federal Republic, pledged to work toward a unified Germany mod-
eled on the existing Federal Republic, and anchored the Federal Republic within
the growing framework of Western international institutions. Adenauer pushed
Creating a CDU/CSU Public Relations Machine   |   169
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
through acceptance of the EDC and the General Treaty in the Bundestag, and the
treaties were passed by March 1953. The General Treaty was developed in con-
junction with West German contributions to the EDC. Therefore, when the
French parliament refused to ratify the EDC treaty in August 1954, new talks en-
sued with the three Western powers, producing a new General Treaty in October
1954 and granting final West German sovereignty in May 1955. All the while,
the Soviet Union tried to block, or at least slow down, Adenauer’s policy of West-
ern integration. B etween March and M ay 1952 S talin issued a series of thr ee
“notes” calling for the unification of a so vereign, neutral Germany with free na-
tional elections supervised by the four powers. Although some, particularly on the
left, interpreted Stalin’s overtures as potentially genuine, Adenauer saw these ac-
tions as mer e propaganda on S talin’s par t and demanded that unification be
achieved through Germany’s integration into the West. 
In the early 1950s the SPD under both Schumacher ’s and Ollenhauer’s lead-
ership had vigor ously attacked A denauer and the CDU/CSU as pawns of the 
occupational forces working for West Germany’s integration into the West. They
particularly pointed to, for example, the driv e for rearmament initiated by Ade-
nauer in the spring of 1950, talks about Western economic integration with the
European Coal and S teel Community, and the ultimately unsuccessful plan to
create the EDC. To the SPD, Adenauer’s Western policy ensured the continued
division of Germany and heightened the risk of another catastrophic war. Instead,
the SPD argued, West Germany must remain free of commitments on either side
of the Iron Curtain and continue negotiations among the four Allied powers and
Germany. With the death of Stalin in March 1953 and Winston Churchill’s call
for renewed four-power discussions, the issue of reunification once again came to
the fore. The SPD made use of these developments; one of the main points of its
1953 campaign platform proclaimed, “Peace and security through communica-
tion—not danger of war through an arms race.”92
The CDU/CSU zeroed in on what might come across in a heated election cam-
paign as a weak and indecisive SPD position. It wanted to blur the distinctions
between the SPD of West Germany and the communist SED of East G ermany.
This was done by a variety of means. One article from Union in Deutschland, the
CDU/CSU’s information bulletin, pr oclaimed in A pril 1953, “ They r emain
Marxists.” The article painted a picture of the SPD internal reform of economic
policy as a veiled attempt to gain votes.
They [the SPD leaders] want to fish widely for votes in the “bourgeois” waters, in order to
pursue a socialist economic policy with the help of these v otes. These policies ar e not as
crassly Marxist as on the other side of the Elbe, but are along the same lines—especially in
regard to the state seizure of the workings of the economy and labor policies.93
Articles in the Union in Deutschland published closer to the election were not so
subtle. One simply announced the conclusion of a refugee from the Soviet Zone,
“Socialism leads to communism.”94
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The 17 June revolt in East B erlin only heightened this sense of contrast be-
tween the two Germanies and the threat of communism. In the Bundestag debate
that followed 17 June the SPD proclaimed that the brutal suppression of the up-
rising proved the failure of Adenauer’s foreign and German policy and called for
more negotiations among the four powers. In mid August, just weeks before the
election, Adenauer claimed that two SPD functionaries had received funds from
the Soviet Zone. The accused pair initiated court proceedings against Adenauer,
and the chancellor withdrew his statements months later before a court. But nev-
ertheless his attacks hit their mar k, coming as they did just befor e the election.
The CDU/CSU put pressure on the SPD by leadingly releasing to the press “Four
Questions on Reunification” in an attempt to force the SPD to clarify its foreign
policy position. In response on 28 August the SPD issued a paper entitled “The
European Policy of the Social Democrats.” It reaffirmed the SPD’s position that
the various efforts for European cooperation sought “to make [Germany] into an
instrument of the Cold War.” German policy must be dir ected toward German
unification in freedom, an advancement that “required an agreement among the
four occupying powers.” Willie Eichler explained in an ill-conceiv ed press con-
ference that negotiations among the four po wers were preferable to a victorious
nuclear war. Although privately Adenauer desired a four-power conference on the
German question at some futur e date, he wanted it to conv ene after the 6 S ep-
tember elections, for fear of the Soviets exploiting the talks as propaganda to de-
feat the CDU/CSU. In fact, in July 1953, Adenauer successfully appealed to the
United States to postpone such a conference.95 However, not wanting to lose an
opportunity to make political hay , the CDU/CSU pounced on the SPD’ s pro-
nouncement. The SPD foreign policy, Adenauer proclaimed, “would be a betrayal
of the German people.” According to a CDU/CSU press release, the SPD advo-
cated “that the four powers, just as it was demanded by Moscow at the Potsdam
Agreement, would negotiate with each other o ver the position of the futur e 
Germany.” Therefore the SPD’s policy would sell out G ermany’s political self-
determination. The release concluded that “[t]he SPD appears to be ready to take
on the political conceptions of Moscow on one of the most crucial issues and in-
cur risks that no r esponsibly minded government could ever accept.”96 Overall,
the CDU/CSU sought to convince the electorate that the SPD was at best incapa-
ble of governing or at worst untrustworthy, treasonous, and “un-German.” Simul-
taneously the CDU/CSU touted itself as the only tr ue defender of the West
German state and society against a red tide poised to engulf the nation.97
This sentiment that the SPD could not be trusted was expressed quite clearly
in the most widely distributed CDU/CSU pr opaganda: leaflets, speeches, and
posters—and especially in the campaign ’s most infamous poster , “All roads of
Marxism lead to Moscow” (Illustration 5.3). With a landscape of lines all drawing
the viewer’s eyes to a half seen, half unseen Bolshevik lurking in the background,
this poster exemplified the anticommunist tone of the CDU/CSU campaign as a
whole. Like some of the posters from the 1949 election, this poster offered mul-
tiple readings to the electorate, although each evoked a sense of fear of alien forces
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from within and from without West Germany. Fundamentally the poster erased
any distinctions betw een the SPD and communism and implicitly defined the
Social Democrats as a dangerous internal political element whose ultimate loyal-
ties lay outside the Federal Republic. The poster’s title, suggesting the well-known
saying “All roads lead to Rome,” played off the common sentiment that a glori-
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ous element of Germany’s cultural heritage lay in its ability to r esist and remain
outside the ancient empire—just as West Germany was now resisting the incur-
sion of the totalitarian Soviet regime. Clearly, the 17 June uprising gave the poster
special potency. Even though it was pr obably designed befor e the r evolt, West
Germans, especially refugees from the East, could interpret the poster as an affir-
mation of Adenauer’s policy of West German security being tied to the West. To
social conservatives it represented the danger to the “natural” order of gender and
family roles in the face of the “Gleichmacherei” (leveling) of East Germany. From
the perspective of economics, it illustrated the CDU/CSU’ s charge against the
SPD that a policy of socialization led to the controlled economy of the commu-
nist states to the East. 
The CDU/CSU’s leaflets, aimed at the electorate ’s most impr essionable and
least educated segments, launched strong attacks against the SPD. In many ways
the CDU/CSU’s leaflets heeded the lesson from the Institut für Demoskopie sur-
vey: a political leaflet’s principal task was to attract notice. M ost of their leaflets
incorporated eye-catching illustrations on the fr ont and back pages, while the
middle two pages offered more factual arguments. But compared to the illustrated
magazine, they clearly r epresented a r elatively crude “hard sell” approach filled
with exaggeration, personal attacks, and innuendo. 
One leaflet opened with the words, “Attention, Swindler!” above a drawing of
grotesque-looking figures whispering into the unsuspecting voters’ ears. It tainted
the political r eliability of the SPD b y urgently warning the population “ of red
agents who are up to no good and are attempting to abuse the people’s faith. The
red agents whisper: The poorer have gotten poorer! The rich have gotten richer!
Protect yourselves from these wolves in sheep’s clothing.” The rest of the leaflet
provided statistics as evidence of the go vernment’s incr eased social spending,
showing how the CDU/CSU was a “social” party. The final page evoked Biblical
images by depicting an apple labeled “SPD” dangling fr om the tr ee of “Rising
wages—falling prices,” “Lowering of taxes,” and “40-hour week.” All the while,
a snake labeled “inflation” smiles at a disconcerted-looking voter. The message was
clear: the SPD could not be trusted. The accusatory references to “swindlers” and
“red agents” portrayed the SPD as a sinister, insidious force. The party represented
the infiltration of danger ous elements that would lead to West Germany being
cast out from economic and social security, while in contrast the CDU/CSU sold
itself as reconstructing a whole, prosperous West German “Eden.” 
The leaflet that perhaps made the clearest link between the SPD of West Ger-
many and the Communists in East Germany was one that blasted the Deutsche
Gewerkschaftsbund (German Federation of Labor Unions, DGB), the West Ger-
man trade union, for disseminating political pr opaganda prior to the election, a
move of questionable legality since unions were required by law to remain polit-
ically neutral in election campaigns (Illustration 5.4). In the summer of 1953 the
DGB’s leadership called on West Germans to “Vote for a better Bundestag.” Be-
sides leaflets, the DGB produced glossy magazines with an estimated circulation
of 14.5 million copies, explaining the DGB’s unfulfilled demands, the increase in
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prices, and what it claimed was the government’s inadequate social policy. Just be-
fore the election the organization placed an ad in ne wspapers playing off D ie
Waage’s advertisements in which two wor kers concluded they would v ote for a
better Bundestag. The CDU/CSU leaflet exploited the DGB’s call to “Vote for a
better Bundestag” with a list of accusations against the DGB and the SPD. B e-
neath the text, a drawing depicted Ollenhauer and a DGB representative blowing
174 |   Selling the Economic Miracle
Illustration 5.4 The CDU has said for y ears:
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
a trumpet labeled “SPD.” Meanwhile, a Soviet officer claps his hands in approval
in the background. Again, as in other examples of the CDU/CSU pr opaganda,
the boundaries between the SPD, the DGB, and the Communists in East G er-
many were blurred. This leaflet was even more effective, given the accusations of
the left’s connections to the SED that were flying around before the election. In
fact, at a political rally in August, Adenauer claimed that the DGB’s appeal “reeked
suspiciously of communist infiltration” and that the DGB’s board of directors was
contaminated by communism.98
The CDU/CSU leaflet concentrating on economics built upon this motif b y
utilizing the slogan “Whoops Comrade!” and citing examples of the SPD’s “false
prophecies,” such as their dir e predictions of Germany’s not becoming “ viable”
because of its economic policy. As in other leaflets, its middle pages provided sta-
tistics tracing the rise of production in West Germany and the increased buying
power of wor kers’ wages. The back page depicted E rich Ollenhauer and Carlo
Schmid as bloated SPD “ functionaries” sitting at a table gorging themselv es 
(Illustration 5.5). The text below, written as a satirical poem, por trayed the two
SPD leaders as indifferent to the real conditions of West Germans. Instead, they
were willing to attack Erhard’s economic policy for their own political gain, even
though they enjoyed the very benefits of that policy. 
The CDU/CSU’s attacks on the SPD proved effective. After the election, the
Bundesgeschäftsstelle sent out questionnaires to all of the district party organizations
inquiring about their propaganda’s effectiveness and the how well organized the
campaign had been. This leaflet, along with the poster “All roads of Marxism lead
to Moscow,” were reported by district-level CDU/CSU organizations to be ex-
tremely effective, resonating deeply with the population.99 Taken as a whole, the
CDU/CSU’s propaganda captured the spirit of the times and the o verall mood
and fears of the electorate. The events of the summer of 1953 heightened the per-
ceived threat from the S oviet Union. In July 1952 an I nstitut für D emoskopie
survey indicated that 66 percent of West Germans felt threatened by the Soviet
Union. Although there are no surveys that pursue this question into the summer
of 1953, undoubtedly this sentiment remained high, especially after the 17 June
uprising. In September 1955, 56 percent of West Germans believed that the Rus-
sians still wanted to make Germany communist.100 But perhaps more importantly,
the CDU/CSU had created a coherent theme for their campaign. Economic re-
construction, the SPD’s unreliability, and the thr eat of communism w ere fused
together to demonstrate to West Germans the need to stay the course. 
In the 1953 election campaign not only did the CDU/CSU take credit for West
Germany’s economic upswing and link it to the par ty’s foreign policy, but eco-
nomic propaganda increasingly focused upon the idea that r econstruction and
economic success were a source of national identity and central to the legitimacy
of the newly formed Federal Republic of Germany. The functioning of individ-
ual men and women within the fr ee market was represented not only as satisfy-
ing individual needs or desires, but also as an essential element in the creation of
the new West German state. As the CDU/CSU politician who spoke for the con-
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sumer, Ludwig Erhard took center stage in marketing this ideology to West Ger-
mans—particularly to women voters. A year prior to the election, in a 28 June 1952
speech opening the exhibition of “Die Wirtschaft im Dienst der Hausfrau” (The
Economy in Service of the H ousewife), in Frankfurt, Erhard clearly ar ticulated
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the importance of economics in a free society. Addressing a mostly female crowd,
Erhard proclaimed that “[t]he mass of consumers is the judge of the economy, as
well as the economic system. . . . This economic system has given back to you the
first, the most basic, but also the most impor tant right of a democratic system,
that is the fr ee choice of consumption.” 101 From Erhard’s perspective, women
controlled the cr ucial element in democracy—the fr eedom to consume—and
were consequently positioned as the key upholders of the ne wly formed Federal
Republic. For E rhard, consumer choice not only defined the West German
democracy, it set West Germany apart from both its eastern counterpart and the
Nazi past.102
This conception of economic gender r oles played itself out in the political
arena as revealed by the CDU/CSU’s electoral propaganda. In the last days before
the election, the CDU/CSU distributed a letter from Erhard addressed to house-
wives all o ver West Germany—a distribution totaling 5,280,000. 103 The letter
opened with: “You know what it means to be an economics minister. No one else
is so entrusted with the troubles and anxiety of keeping house. As the economics
minister of your family it is not much different for you as for me, the Federal Eco-
nomics Minister.” Erhard went on to explain that housewives’ challenges, such as
making ends meet, taking care of purchases, and keeping the house in order, re-
sembled the problems the economics minister faced. The letter finally connected
the public and political implications of women ’s private role as the “ economics
ministers of the household.” Erhard outlined the substantial material improvements
achieved in West Germany since the 1948 currency reform and warned women
that the gains from the previous five years could be lost by failing to vote correctly
in the upcoming election. The letter concluded with the words, “Help me to re-
move this danger, before it is too late. In the din of the election, do not follow a
voice [a clever pun since Stimme can also mean “vote”] other than your conscience
as the economics minister of your family.” 
As he had done on other occasions, Erhard spoke in the letter not as a politi-
cal r epresentative of the CDU/CSU, but rather as a F ederal Republic cabinet
member. Erhard’s appeal helped create a gendered sense of the go vernment and
civic duty by suggesting that women possessed a special insight into political and
economic developments. With their experience and kno wledge in making daily
economic decisions within the priv ate sphere, women had a r ole that paralleled
Erhard’s public role in the federal government. By making the correct decisions in
consumption, women w ere str engthening the ne wly founded West German
democracy. This knowledge demanded that they exert what was defined as their
civic duty of v oting for the CDU/CSU. Yet in no way did the letter hint that
women should extend their political influence bey ond their v ery clearly delin-
eated realm within the home and at the ballot box. 
Economic production and consumerist prosperity were means by which West
Germany’s Cold War rivalry with East Germany was carried out, and propaganda
regarding this issue was also constructed in a specifically gendered context. In Er-
hard’s letter to house wives, one means of legitimizing the F ederal Republic of
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Germany was to compare its economic development with that of East Germany.
Erhard asser ted that those who had doubted the social mar ket economy in
1948/49 and supported the planned economy only had to r emember the “spar-
row portions” of food available at the time and look to the “perfectly terrible con-
ditions of our sisters and brothers in the East” to appreciate that West Germany
had pursued the correct path and constituted, in fact, the legitimate Germany.104
In contrast to the 1949 campaign, in 1953 the CDU/CSU enjoyed the luxury
of propaganda campaigns r unning parallel to its o wn. Perhaps having a wider
reach than the propaganda generated by organizations affiliated with the Federal
Press Agency, Die Waage, the business-funded organization advertising the social
market economy, geared up its effor ts for the upcoming B undestag election.105
While much of the CDU/CSU’s 1953 propaganda concentrated on foreign pol-
icy issues, Die Waage exploited the growth of the West German economy to lend
support to the “bourgeois” parties, with Economic Minister Ludwig Erhard as-
suming a pivotal role in the campaign. Die Waage’s advertisements echoed and re-
affirmed the CDU/CSU’s vision of the social market economy and the economic
miracle—both with regard to the SPD’s dangerous connection to developments
in the East and in a gendered understanding of economic reconstruction. In addi-
tion, by extensively utilizing public opinion surveys and contracting a professional
advertising agent to shape its campaign, D ie Waage, if anything, was ev en out
ahead of the CDU/CSU in the application of modern public relations techniques.
As an organization representing private business, rather than any particular po-
litical party, Die Waage had a difficult time formulating its advertisements in a way
the contributors found acceptable. In non-election years its campaigns focused on
strengthening support for the social market economy, improving labor-management
relations, and promoting social tranquility in West Germany. In election years,
however, the circumstances were decidedly different. Early in 1953 Die Waage’s
executive board decided its advisements should emphasiz e “Erhard’s social mar-
ket economy” rather than mer ely the “social market economy,” because surveys
from the I nstitut für D emoskopie had indicated the danger that some r eaders
would associate the social market economy” with the SPD due to the inclusion of
the word “social.” For that reason, Die Waage decided to personify the social mar-
ket economy with Erhard in its advertisements prior to the Bundestag election.106
But this route created more problems. Most of Die Waage’s earlier advertising
had stressed more abstract economic ideas or promoted peaceful industrial relations
by depicting the rising prosperity enjoyed by West Germans. Some contributors
were concerned that an emphasis upon E rhard would naturally lend suppor t to
the CDU/CSU, at the expense of smaller bourgeois par ties. Die Waage’s adver-
tising agent, Hanns Brose, suggested that one of its pre-election posters proclaim,
“We’re casting our votes with one of the par ties that stand for L udwig Erhard’s
policy of the social market economy: CDU/CSU, DP, FDP.”107 Die Waage’s ex-
ecutive board vehemently rejected this in favor of focusing upon Erhard and not
mentioning any par ticular political par ty. This controversy illustrated a funda-
mental problem facing Die Waage. Its contributors were a varied group of indus-
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trialists and entrepreneurs who wanted to promote the social market economy and
avoid the election of a SPD-led coalition, but did not necessarily want to support
the CDU/CSU explicitly. At the same time the organization was closely aligned
with Economics Minister Erhard—a leading political figure in the party. In non-
election years this conflict could be avoided because Erhard’s party allegiance was
secondary to his support of the social market economy. But this dilemma came to
the fore in 1953. 
Leading up to the election, D ie Waage geared up its fundraising effor ts in
order to support its public relations efforts for the campaign. In March 1953, Die
Waage’s executive board sent out 30,000 letters across the Federal Republic ask-
ing for donations. They also planned for Erhard to contact the leadership of larger
firms, such as Volkswagen and Siemens, more directly through personal letters.108
The letters sent to prospective donors explained that DM 2.5 million was needed
for Die Waage’s upcoming action. 109 Overall, Die Waage expended about DM
3.78 million in the 1952/53 campaigns, including about DM 3 million on maga-
zine and newspaper advertisements, a considerable sum given that the entire SPD,
including local, r egional and national lev el organizations, spent about DM 3.5
million on its 1953 campaign.110 With this sum, Die Waage produced four major
advertising series between November 1952 and S eptember 1953, two of which
ran during the summer runup to the election. These two series featured eight dif-
ferent ads that appeared in over 450 magazines and newspapers with a total cir-
culation of almost 20 million. I n addition, Die Waage distributed two different
posters and three films—which were generally short enactments of the ads.111
On 5 September 1953, the day befor e the election, D ie Waage published its
final campaign advertisement. It presented a stereotypical view of Erhard, with a
slight smile and his trademark cigar in his mouth (I llustration 5.6) and a slogan
that read “Wohlstand Aus Eigener Kraft” (Prosperity from one’s own efforts). Er-
hard figured prominently in the text: “Professor Dr. Ludwig Erhard, responsible
for the German economy, stands before us. He has achieved something decisive
for us.” The text recounted the dramatic rise of the West German economy, com-
paring living conditions in 1948 with 1953. On the day of the currency reform,
it was Erhard who did away with the ration cards of the controlled economy. The
end of the text proclaimed: “Not all of the wounds from the war have healed. Not
all of the dangers threatening our economic health have been averted. It is a mat-
ter of securing our peaceful reconstruction and tomorrow we’ll give our vote to a
party which stands by ERHARD’S SOCIAL MARKET ECONOMY.” Although
giving the credit for West Germany’s economic boom to the social market econ-
omy, and not the CDU/CSU, the advertisement clearly dovetailed tidily with the
party’s emphasis on personalities and achiev ements. In addition, without men-
tioning the SPD it implicitly castigated that party as a danger to the progress West
Germany had achiev ed. The advertisement built upon earlier campaigns that
identified Erhard as the linchpin in West Germany’s economic success. In many
respects Die Waage was at the forefront of public relations efforts directly associ-
ating the economic miracle with the personality of Ludwig Erhard, despite some
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contributors’ objections to suppor ting a political figur e. His appearance on the
cover of Der Spiegel, accompanied by a six-page article published just prior to the
election, attested to Erhard’s growing popularity. 
The article typified the image that industrialists, journalists, and politicians
had built around Erhard. Like Die Waage’s advertisements, the cover depicted Er-
hard smoking his trademark cigar with the caption “ There is no German mira-
cle.” Economic prosperity, the ar ticle explained, was based upon good ideas,
proper policies, and har d work. The article identified Erhard with the qualities
that many West Germans envisioned him possessing: optimism, decisiv eness, a
belief in his policies, and a connectedness with the common citiz en. The article
recounted many of E rhard’s actions that had become almost legendar y in West
Germany—especially the story of how he had “audaciously” ended many of the
economic controls and the rationing of many consumer goods after the currency
reform of June 1948. He stuck to his guns by retorting to General Clay’s and the
American military government’s accusations that the rationing r egulations had
been changed without the proper authority, that “I have not changed them. I have
rescinded them.” E rhard, the ar ticle explained, possessed an uncanny ability to
predict the future course of the economy, such as when he proclaimed that con-
sumer goods prices would fall after the initial wav e of post–currency reform in-
flation. As the text explained, “that was the first in a series of predictions, whose
most mysteriously exact fulfillment gav e to the economist E rhard an odor
[Odeur] of which every African medicine man would be envious.” But most im-
portantly, Erhard was portrayed as the consumer ’s main defender. As the ar ticle
opened, Erhard was becoming irate with a waiter , accusing him of unfair pr ofi-
teering when he informed Erhard that the price of a cup of coffee would sink only
5 pfennig after an upcoming Erhard-engineered tax reduction. The article also re-
lated how Erhard was always quizzing his secr etary about the av ailability and
price of goods for ordinary consumers.112 This rising popularity was reflected in
the polls. Back in May 1951, in the midst of the Korean Crisis, only 14 percent
of respondents held a good opinion of Erhard, against 49 percent who recorded
a poor opinion. By May 1953, 37 percent had a good opinion of him. This fig-
ure had grown to 50 percent by May 1956.113
In addition, although they w ere planned independently of the CDU/CSU,
Die Waage’s advertisements not only jibed w ell with the par ty’s blurring of the
boundaries separating socialist planning in East G ermany and the SPD in West
Germany, but also they used the social mar ket economy as a means of defining
West German legitimacy itself. One advertisement appearing before the election
asked, “Would we earn more if . . .” (Illustration 5.7). The advertisement depicted
Fritz and Otto, the two working-class characters who had been developed in early
1953, lounging on a hill smoking cigarettes; standing in the background is a mo-
torbike, symbolizing West Germany’s rising prosperity. Creating a scene in which
the reader is invited to share in what appears to be personal discussion, Fritz and
Otto debated the adv antages of the fr ee market v ersus the planned economy .
When the puzzled Otto, representing the undecided voter, suggested to the “wise”
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Fritz that workers and employees would be better off in a planned economy, Fritz
reacted strongly. “ You think so?” F ritz asked, “ What then does the individual
worker have in countries where the socialist planned economy has ‘planned’ every-
thing?” Every aspect of the economy would be planned from above and the avail-
ability of goods would be limited. O ne would get only “a standardized German
suit, for your wife, a standardized dress, color gray.” No explanation was needed
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as to which country he meant. From a Cold War perspective, the advertisement
clearly blended the distinction between the SPD’s policies in West Germany and
the SED in communist East Germany. The two were identified as seeking the same
policies, and the advertisement implied that the West German worker would se-
cure the same results. Only weeks after the Soviet tanks crushed the 17 June worker
protest calling for mor e consumer goods, this adv ertisement provided a str ong
message. The advertisement, playing off the West German sense of anxiety r e-
garding both geopolitics and economics, concluded with: “Decide yourself: either
the dangerous experiment of the planned economy—or continued pr ogress and
the increase of our standard of living through Erhard’s social market economy.” 
In one of its last advertisements before the election, Die Waage declared that
“The people hav e the last wor d” in another dialogue adv ertisement featuring
Fritz and Otto (Illustration 5.8). The advertisement, based on the original F ritz
and Otto test ad, depicted the characters in a “Stammkneipe,” or their local bar,
listening to Erhard on the radio—creating the sense, as in other F ritz and Otto
ads, that the reader was invited into the characters’ inner circle of space. All eyes
in the bar looked intently at the radio, as if hanging on the minister’s every word.
Clearly the context of the advertisement suggested that they were listening to one
of his campaign br oadcasts, thereby injecting E rhard’s spirit into the adv ertise-
ment, despite his physical absence. B y stressing that the “ people have the last
word,” the association of radio with that N azi propaganda that had spewed out
of Goebbel’s “Volksempfänger” (people’s receiver) in the Third Reich was replaced
with the idea that Fritz and Otto (and implicitly the readers) were participating
in another episode of Erhard’s and the voters’ ongoing “discussion.”114 In the ad’s
opening, Erhard proclaimed that one of his tasks was to give the German people
courage and confidence. By claiming that cer tain unnamed elements desir ed to
push the German people into doubt and worry, Erhard was clearly referring to the
SPD campaign propaganda and the DGB’s recent denouncements of the social
market economy. “They want these hard-working people never to become satis-
fied in their lives,” Erhard argued. At this point Erhard’s speech trailed off to Fritz
and Otto’s dialogue. 
In this context, O tto, who thr oughout the series r epresented the undecided
voter, now agreed with Erhard. Both Fritz and Otto were convinced that much
had been accomplished since the war, both by workers and industrialists. “But we
are not over the hump, and the tr oublemakers are stirring things up ,” Otto ex-
plained. It was easy for such “ troublemakers” to talk, since they did not hav e to
shoulder any r esponsibility. Moreover, as Fritz added, they can pr omise “every-
thing under the sun” (Blaue von Himmel)—an attempt to undermine the SPD’s
attacks against the Adenauer government. The text led the reader to two choices:
“State controlled economy of the functionaries—or progress in freedom and fur-
ther improvement of our living standards through our economic system, tested in
the most difficult times, through Erhard’s social market economy.” The message
was the same: the SPD was composed of “ functionaries” who were more inter-
ested in ideology than the welfare of Germans. The bourgeois interests were send-
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ing a clear message: they were beyond ideology and concerned only with concrete
results.
The advertisements identified the 1948 currency reform and the introduction
of the social market economy as crucial turning points in the fates of both char-
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acters and West Germany itself. Fritz and Otto could reassert their proper roles as
men because the ne w economic order gave back to them their ability to earn a
wage. In one advertisement celebrating the five-year anniversary of the introduc-
tion of the Deutsche Mark, Otto dismissed the whole currency reform as a mere
“fraud.” Fritz responded incredulously, “Would you rather return to the time of
the controlled and planned economy when w e worked only for calories, home-
grown tobacco [Siedlerstolz], and shoddy goods?” The social mar ket economy
had pulled Fritz and Otto out of the bad times. It was Erhard who “brought pro-
duction and buying power back into balance and helped us all to work again, to
buy, and to consume.” The r eturn of a stable curr ency had r estored meaning
back to these men’s lives by giving them the ability to work and produce. Thus the
advertisements aimed to show how workers such as Fritz and Otto had benefited
concretely from the introduction of the fr ee market, and in fact, become mor e
middle class, as seen by the portrayal of Fritz in more middle-class clothing, by his
efforts to buy a house in subsequent advertisements, and by Fritz and Otto’s more
management-friendly views of labor relations. The underlying message was that
their hard work and Erhard’s social market economy had ensured “progress and
social peace.” 
Not surprisingly, an initial test survey showed the Fritz and Otto series as less
effective with female than male readers. Women, for instance, were more likely to
believe either that the doubting Otto was correct or that each character was right
in his o wn way—a per ception Die Waage did not want to cr eate. In addition,
women were less likely to grasp the main point of the advertisement. In general,
the survey indicated that women were not interested in abstract ideas about the
economy.115 In response, Die Waage began developing new advertisements geared
to a female audience, with an early example appearing just prior to the second
Bundestag election in the fall of 1953 (Illustration 5.9). The advertisement’s slo-
gan proclaimed, “ We women hav e forgotten nothing, and fur thermore have
learned a thing or two .” By addressing the reader in the first person plural, D ie
Waage hoped to get women to identify with a common female experience—sim-
ilar to what been achiev ed in the text of the CDU/CSU’ s illustrated magazine,
Die Entscheidung. The ad opened with, “Really, is it already five years ago that we
began to lead an existence worthy of humanity?” It continued with recollections
from the immediate postwar years, most notably women’s experience as “contin-
ually overtired, undernourished, perpetually standing in lines,” along with tr eks
to the countryside in search of food to feed their families. 
As in the Fritz and Otto series, this advertisement pointed to the currency re-
form of 1948 as the turning point for women ’s experience. With the curr ency 
reform women could now become “normal housewives.” Suddenly they had been
transformed from “ration card holders” into valued customers. Once the shelves
were suddenly filled with goods, the pain of the early postwar y ears was sw ept
away: “Can a man at all understand, what this change immediately meant for us
women, who had suffered most bitterly under conditions that not only broke the
remainder of our self confidence, but also brought us to the brink of total despair
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having to view the begging eyes of our children?” The advertisement linked eco-
nomic development with what was portrayed as a fundamental source of identity
for a woman: the r ole of housewife, mother and nur turer of children, and con-
sumer. Harking back to the some of the themes of the CDU/CSU campaign, es-
pecially Erhard’s letter to housewives, the availability of consumer goods did not
just satisfy personal needs or desir es but allowed women to per form their “nat-
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ural” domestic roles. The economic dislocations of the postwar years had cast these
roles into doubt, or at least had undermined women ’s ability to per form these
functions fully. The advertisement, like some of the posters fr om the 1949 elec-
tion campaign, implied that women became more feminine when they regained
their domestic duties. As with the Fritz and Otto advertisements, the underlying
message was that difficult times w ere associated with the “ planned economy”
when ration car ds were used, while economic r ebirth and r econstruction of a
properly functioning society were connected with the introduction of the social
market economy. It was thus in defense of this conception of femininity that: “We
women have decided—for ERHARD’S SOCIAL MARKET ECONOMY.”
In using varied strategies tailored to women and men, Die Waage constructed
different meanings of the social market economy and the economic miracle. Al-
though the F ritz and O tto advertisements did not incorporate many abstract
ideas on the economy because Die Waage’s board sought concrete examples of im-
provements resulting from the social market economy, they did try to impart to
men some sort of basic knowledge of how the economy works, including discus-
sions on inflation, the determination of a currency’s value, and the importance of
exports for West Germany. Despite using more slang, the Fritz and Otto adver-
tisements also were somewhat preachy and didactic. In contrast, advertisements
directed toward a female audience tended to go dir ectly to personal experiences
particular to women, as opposed to mor e general and abstract ideas about eco-
nomics. However, advertisements for both men and women clearly linked their
private actions as pr oducers and consumers to public conceptions of the legiti-
macy and strength of the Federal Republic itself and the effectiv eness of the so-
cial market economy. Indeed, the advertisements defined their economic roles as
their primary civic duties: to produce and to consume was to take par t in creat-
ing the new Federal Republic and to erase all vestiges of the recent past. 
These strategies for male and female r eaders were perhaps best illustrated
through a set of brochures available by mail to readers of Die Waage’s advertise-
ments. The most widely circulated booklet appealing to men, “Steigende Produk-
tivität, wachsender Wohlstand” (Increasing Productivity, Growing Prosperity),
gave a short lesson on free market economics. It addressed the importance of rais-
ing production so that prosperity for all could be achieved. Increased production,
the pamphlet proclaimed, meant “the end of class struggle,” and would “make life
worth living.” The brochure for women, entitled Lieber Leserin . . . (Dear [female]
Reader . . .), took a different tack. It explained that “[i]n the social market econ-
omy, women have a special mission. S ince 80 percent of the pay is managed b y
women, it can be said: All of economic development is determined in large part
by women.” Again, women ’s impor tance in the economy was not defined b y
their function in the economy through production, but rather through their role
as consumers in what were considered their natural domestic duties of child rear-
ing and purchasing consumer goods for the family. 
Taken together, during the 1953 campaign D ie Waage and the CDU/CSU 
effectively portrayed the rising level of consumption in West Germany to get Ade-
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nauer’s government r eelected. They both utiliz ed Cold War tensions to raise
doubts about the SPD’s capacity to govern. In addition, they expressed the civic
values of economic reconstruction in clearly gendered terms. For men, the strong
West German economy reaffirmed their masculine role as strong producers able
to provide for their families. Their nation’s and their own fates were interlinked.
For women, economic gro wth and the ability to take car e of the consumption
needs in the priv ate sphere underscored the legitimacy of West Germany as a
whole. The CDU/CSU and Die Waage thus offered a sense of personal and na-
tional identity rooted in a gendered understanding of the economy that pr oved
highly effective with the electorate. 
There ar e undoubtedly parallels betw een the CDU/CSU’ s campaign tech-
niques and those used in the Weimar Republic, particularly by the Nazis during
their rise to po wer.116 First, like the N azis, the CDU/CSU sought to become a
Volkspartei that crossed the traditional social, religious, and regional divisions that
plagued German politics from the middle of the nineteenth century through the
demise of the Weimar Republic. Both par ties’ propaganda evoked the idea of 
regenerating a sense of Germanness, be it a racial Volksgemeinschaft in the Third
Reich or a productive/consumerist community in West Germany, meant to unify
the nation across traditional social and cultural divisions. A t the same time they
both created a polarizing wedge between themselves and those outside their vision
of the G erman community—especially against M arxists—and they por trayed
themselves as protecting the nation from the Marxist threat from within and with-
out. Second, Nazi and often times early CDU/CSU pr opaganda was character-
ized by over-the-top accusations, slander, and emotional appeals in attempts to
move the amorphous masses b y psychological means. This was accomplished
within the context of a highly organiz ed and effective propaganda machine that
was centrally directed but allowed for more grassroots initiatives according to the
prerogatives of the local population.117 
Adolf Hitler wrote in Mein Kampf (My Struggle) that the rational abilities of
the masses were quite lacking and that all effective propaganda must “be limited
to a few points and must harp on these in slogans, until the last member of the
public understands what you want him to understand.” Josef Goebbels, the Nazi
Party’s propaganda leader beginning in 1930 and the minister of public enlight-
enment within the Third Reich, echoed Hitler’s views in his notion that pr opa-
ganda had to be simple, r epetitive, and often symbolic. 118 Although the
CDU/CSU’s propaganda was clearly more muted than the Nazis’, Adenauer re-
flected a similar philosophy in 1949 when he spoke of r eaching the “primitive”
levels of society and argued that pr opaganda “must speak simply to the public,
not too much, few thoughts, large ideas simply represented”—an approach most
notably illustrated by CDU/CSU posters such as the hovering Mongol face from
the 1949 campaign and the “All roads of Marxism lead to Moscow” from 1953.119
Ultimately, their propaganda did not attempt to rationally engage the public about
specific ideas, but sought to attract attention emotionally and to pound the pub-
lic with the parties’ ideological views. 
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Third, in order to reach the broadest markets, both parties borrowed heavily
from commercial advertising to modernize their political propaganda. They both
saw themselves as selling a political pr oduct to the electorate on a mass mar ket
scale. Josef Goebbels commented in a 1930 essay on N ational Socialism and
modern political propaganda that “we shall utilize the most modern advertising
means in service of our movement” and wanted local Nazi propaganda offices to
study commercial advertising methods and apply them in the par ty’s electoral
campaigns.120 Clearly all political par ties during the Weimar Republic were in-
fluenced by commercial advertising, but by virtue of their extensive use of sym-
bols and logos, such as the swastika, continuously repeated slogans, and attempts
to influence “opinion makers” in society, the Nazi propaganda methods were the
most up-to-date. As Sabine Behrenbeck has suggested, after 1930 the focus on the
“Führerkult” around Hitler could be seen as a key aspect of creating a brand name
reflecting the “corporate identity” of the Nazi Party through the same means used
in commercial advertising. A strikingly similar phenomenon was emerging in
1953, as the CDU/CSU emphasiz ed its leadership, and in par ticular Adenauer,
who functioned as a brand name for the par ty symbolizing its character and
themes of stability, security, and reconstruction.121 This approach would only be
intensified in the 1957 campaign. 
There were, however, important differences in the experiences of the two par-
ties. By 1953 the CDU/CSU campaign was lessening the importance in its pro-
paganda, especially its graphic media, of appeals characterized solely by emotional,
evocative, and symbolic associations that sought to r elease inner psy chological 
desires of the masses. In this regard, the Nazi and earlier CDU/CSU posters r e-
flected longer-term traditions in E uropean poster art.122 During the 1953 cam-
paign, armed with more precise public opinion and sociological data, tools that
the Nazis lacked, the CDU/CSU began to transform its pr opaganda techniques
based upon more American-style public relations and advertising—especially in
print advertisements and party-illustrated magazines. European advertising tradi-
tions dictated a focus upon selling the aesthetic and emotiv e qualities of the
“Ding an sich” (thing in itself ), such as Hitler in the case of the Nazis. But now,
the CDU/CSU’s propaganda efforts, and those of like-minded groups such as Die
Waage, became concerned with the vie ws of the individual v oter and sought to
enter into a discussion with that voter on what benefits the party offered within
a clear social context. Both appr oaches ar e ultimately manipulativ e, but the
method centered more upon the “two-way concept” resulted in less heavy-handed
and more sophisticated propaganda that sought to wor k on the r eader both ra-
tionally and emotionally. 
Both Goebbels and Hans Domizlaff, the German advertising giant of the first
half of the twentieth century, drew heavily from the work of the French sociolo-
gist Gustave Le Bon on the irrationality, gullibility, and unconscious malleability
of the crowd as a guide for influencing the amorphous masses in political and ad-
vertising campaigns.123 In contrast, a CDU/CSU after-report on the 1953 cam-
paign commented that Le Bon’s view of the masses no longer had validity because
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he viewed public opinion as simply too irrational. Instead, from the CDU/CSU’s
perspective, public opinion was more complicated, yet also more knowable using
the right tools. It was a function of r eligious beliefs, worldviews, family and na-
tional circumstances, and historical dev elopment intersecting with a par ticular,
present social situation. Therefore, within this complicated social situation, the re-
port concluded, the executive committee of the CDU/CSU and the F ederal Press
Agency used public opinion surveys to determine which issues possessed particu-
lar importance for voters in the campaign. It was upon these responses that the party
based its campaign.124 The CDU/CSU increasingly took into account a pluralis-
tic society whose individual members had to be understood and mor e carefully
spoken to, resulting in more receiver-oriented rather than sender-oriented elec-
toral appeals. As shown by the “All roads of Marxism lead to Moscow” poster, the
CDU/CSU did not completely abandon the older style of electioneering, but re-
tained a mix of styles in its campaigning during the 1950s. B y the time of the
1957 campaign, however, American-style public relations and advertising that in-
cluded a more “two-way concept” of communication was coming to the fore. 
The serious preparations for the SPD election campaign began in early 1952.
The SPD yearbook reported that “the plan for the direct election propaganda was
drafted in the summer of 1952, decided in the autumn of 1952, and carried out
from the beginning of 1953 on.” Compared with the CDU/CSU’s efforts to cen-
tralize its own campaign, the SPD campaign was ev en more centralized than its
rivals, due in large par t to a dev eloped party organization with a clear chain of
command under the Parteivorstand (executive committee) consisting of Bezirke
organizations (district), Unterbezirke organizations (subdistrict), and Ortsvereine
(local associations).125 In the autumn of 1952, the pr ess and pr opaganda com-
mittee under the leadership of executive committee member Fritz Heine began to
put together drafts of posters and leaflets in preparation for the election. During
late 1952 and early 1953 the executive committee and the various Arbeitgemein-
schaften (working groups) began to review the work of the press and propaganda
committee. Also during this time, the 240 party secretaries and local party repre-
sentatives pored over the pr opaganda material with the pr ess and pr opaganda
committee, in or der to familiariz e the par ty organization with the conceptual
plans of the party leadership and to solicit suggestions for fur ther refinement of
the material. In preparation for the campaign, Heine visited a number of regional
party organizations to instr uct them regarding the technical and organizational
planning of the campaign. In comparison to the CDU/CSU, the SPD made lit-
tle use of polling or professional publicists to produce campaign material, and in
many cases the par ty leadership inv olved itself in some of the most technical
campaigning details. As a consequence of the involvement at the various levels of
the party’s organization, the propaganda was planned well in advance of the elec-
tion and unmistakably r eflected the sentiments of the par ty’s leaders, member-
ship, and core constituents, although not necessarily those of potential voters.126
With the death of Kurt Schumacher in August 1952, the SPD entered a period
of transition, particularly in terms of its economic policy as it moved away from
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its support of a planned economy. At its September 1952 Parteitag (party confer-
ence) in Dortmund, the SPD issued an Aktionsprogramm (action program) that
called for socialization of basic industries alone, incr eased living standar ds for
everyone in society, and a mor e just distribution of the economic w ealth. Most
importantly, the program endorsed economic planning of the political economy,
but competition within individual industries. F ollowing the announcement of
the Dortmund program, Karl Schiller, a leading SPD economics expert, summed
up the party’s position with the phrase: “Competition as much as possible, plan-
ning as much as necessar y.”127 Clearly, the SPD was not y et endorsing the fr ee
market, but in 1952 the party had already begun the long and painful road to the
1959 Bad Godesberg Program whereby it gave up its Marxist ideology.
The party’s leadership reiterated these positions at the SPD’s official opening
of the campaign in a May 1953 Wahlkongreß (election congress), held in a Frank-
furt hall decked out in a sea of r ed flags and banners. In the culminating speech
of the congress, Erich Ollenhauer, the SPD’s leading candidate for chancellor and
chairman of the ex ecutive committee, laid out the major themes of the cam-
paign. As Ollenhauer explained, because the SPD had been in opposition for the
last four years, the par ty could not base its pr opaganda upon its r ecord in gov-
ernment. Accordingly, Ollenhauer concentrated on pointing out the deficiencies
of the government and at the same time highlighting the par ty’s corresponding
goals in the next years. Much of Ollenhauer’s speech critiqued the government’s
foreign policy, including its support of the European Defense Community and its
inability to achieve unification. In the economic realm, Ollenhauer lashed out at
the government as pursuing “the policies of the retention and strengthening of the
political and economic position of po wer for large pr operty [Großbesitz]. It is a
policy of the restoration.”128 In many respects the speech set the tone for the SPD
campaign by situating the party as negating CDU/CSU policies—a natural posi-
tion for a party in opposition, but never really fully articulating a constructive and
positive platform to be offered as an alternative. This problematic approach sur-
faced in the SPD’s economics propaganda that concentrated on negativ e devel-
opments of the economy, especially the rise in prices. 
One of the challenges confronting the SPD was that in contrast to the federal
government, and b y extension the CDU/CSU, the par ty in the 1950s did not
fully utilize public opinion surveys to conceptualize and formulate its campaigns
strategies. In June 1948 Karl von Stackelberg of the EMNID Institut in Bielefeld
wrote the head of the SPD, Kurt Schumacher, explaining the importance of the
growing field of public opinion research. Although not showing exactly how, Von
Stackelberg stressed that EMNID could tailor surveys for the SPD’s specific use.
It does not appear, however, that Schumacher responded to the letter.129 Accord-
ing to Elisabeth Noelle-Neumann, Carlo Schmid, one of the leading S ocial De-
mocrats, tried in 1949 to persuade Schumacher to wor k with the I nstitut für
Demoskopie, but to no avail.130
It was not until after its defeat in the 1953 B undestag election that the SPD
began r etaining polling institutes to supply polling data used par ticularly for
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preparation of its election campaigns. 131 In October 1955, F ritz Heine, who
headed the SPD election campaigns, approached von Stackelberg of EMNID to
request a public opinion sur vey for Baden-Württemberg in preparation for the
1956 state election.132 Stackelberg regretted to inform Heine that EMNID was
already under contract to conduct two surveys before the election.133 At this point,
it appears, the SPD contacted the opinion research group DIVO (Deutsches In-
stitut für Volksumfragen, German Institute for Public Opinion) to conduct its
surveys for the 1957 Bundestag election campaign, along with subscribing to the
general surveys from EMNID. In any case, in 1953 the SPD subscribed to the
EMNID Institut’s regularly conducted polls on public opinion trends, but it did
not yet receive specialized surveys on specific topics such as those the CDU/CSU
contracted from the Institut für Demoskopie. Although leer y of the v alidity of
these surveys because they were not sufficiently representative and their questions
were rather limited, the SPD’s leadership regarded the surveys as somewhat use-
ful for guiding their campaign in the most general way. 
In a June 1953 meeting with the par ty secretaries, the press and propaganda
committee was par ticularly struck by the sur vey’s findings that, as of A pril, 33
percent of the population was still undecided and therefore represented potential
SPD voters. Yet to their chagrin, it also showed that a higher percentage of voters
were already committed to the CDU/CSU compared to the party’s results in the
1949 election, and that their rival’s popularity had been growing since July 1952.
Also alarming was the committee’s discovery that workers were more likely to be
still undecided than were core elements of the CDU/CSU’s support, such as the
independently employed, farmers, white-collar wor kers, and bureaucrats. Thus,
the committee concluded, the SPD had to redouble its efforts “to lift the haze of
government propaganda lies” for all to see the pr esent situation clearly.134 Un-
doubtedly this message had a potential audience, for EMNID sur veys did show
that West Germans were concerned about such issues as incr eased prices and a
shortage in home construction.135 It was the issue of prices that the SPD would
use to go on the attack, but as the par ty secretaries’ meeting revealed, the work-
ing class was still the party’s principal target audience. 
Not only did the campaign’s target audience reflect traditional SPD concerns,
its propaganda material reflected older approaches. Although the SPD expressed
a desire “to test and apply new advertising and propaganda methods,” the bulk of
campaign materials w ere of the traditional sor t. The organization leaned most
heavily upon posters, leaflets, and election newspapers, which had a circulation of
6.6, 8.2, and 8.5 million copies r espectively. However, the SPD did utiliz e new
audio recordings and films. The recordings included relatively short political talks
intermixed with musical cabaret. But the results proved disappointing due to the
recordings’ poor sound quality and the inadequate sound equipment for project-
ing the recordings. The films, on the other hand, were regarded as particularly ef-
fective. The party distributed three films, one of which was a short cartoon under
two minutes long. The 35-minute-long Jahre der Entscheidung (Year of Decision)
depicted West Germany’s post-1945 dev elopments interspersed with Schu-
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macher’s protests and demands on the par ticular issues of the day . The twelve-
minute Für Deutschland und Europe (For Germany and E urope) contained ex-
cerpts of Ollenhauer’s address at the Frankfurt election congress. An after-report
of the campaign concluded that although the films w ere effectiv e at cer tain
events, their cost might hav e outweighed their usefulness. 136 Special election
newspapers in four different issues played an especially important role in the elec-
tion campaign for no other reason than their mass circulation of about 1 million
copies each.137 One of them, Das deutsche Wunder (The German Miracle) dealt
particularly with economics. 
The newspaper was typical of the SPD’s attacks against the CDU/CSU: it de-
picted the stress caused by the rise in prices, questioned the social security ofWest
Germans, and por trayed Adenauer’s leading economics exper ts, especially E r-
hard, as merely serving the interests of large industr y. Das deutsche Wunder sup-
plemented other SPD attacks against the CDU/CSU in r egard to industr y’s
contributions to its campaigns. O ne such example was Unternehmermillionen
kaufen politische Macht (Industrial Millions Buy Political Power). This rather
lengthy pamphlet published for the 1953 campaign supplied documentar y evi-
dence, including memos, letters, and meeting notes, of industry’s contributions to
the bourgeois parties. Other pieces of propaganda made the same point, although
in a form more accessible to the public. 
A prominent feature of Das deutsche Wunder was that it took direct aim at Die
Waage’s advertisements with a weakly constructed satire of Fritz and Otto. Em-
ploying a tone that was decidedly r eminiscent of Die Waage’s advertisements, a
questioning Otto, crafted to represent the average West German who believed Er-
hard was responsible for the German miracle, asked Fritz what was the source of
the production increase in West Germany. Fritz informed Otto that the effort of
West Germany’s workers, not Erhard’s, had brought about this economic recon-
struction. The myth of the currency reform was bunk, Fritz claimed, because the
subsequent rise in prices had dir ectly hurt consumers. Finally, Fritz asked Otto
whether “you think it’s right that a small group of Germans live better today com-
pared to before the war, while millions live much worse?” In the end, Otto went
away converted, agreeing with Fritz that a new economic policy must be found.
This dialogue, like much of the SPD’s propaganda as whole, aimed to show the
negative side of the economic miracle, including the government’s responsibility
for the growth in economic inequality.138
If this article demonstrates anything, it is the SPD’ s acute awar eness of D ie
Waage’s effective campaigns and the party’s conviction that it had to provide some
sort of response. Seizing upon Fritz and Otto from the dialogue advertisements,
the party concluded that the characters w ere so well known that they could use
their actual names when satirizing them. With the growth in the economy and
the West Germans’ perception that their conditions were improving, the SPD was
clearly on the defensive in terms of the issue of economics. Although West Ger-
many’s ongoing economic reconstruction and expansion could not be denied, the
SPD tried to demonstrate in Das deutsche Wunder that this process was benefiting
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only a few. This special campaign newspaper underscored the fact that the SPD
was still attempting to appeal only to the core of its traditional support. The fig-
ures depicted throughout Das deutsche Wunder tended to be working-class types
positioned at the lower end of the economic ladder. Accordingly, the messages in
this campaign newspaper were attractive only to this segment of the electorate. 
But it was doubtful that this message achiev ed much r esonance among the
general West German populace. As one CDU/CSU report commented after the
election, with the incr eased economic gr owth, ever expanding segments of the
population were accepting the government’s market policies and becoming increas-
ingly skeptical of the SPD’s planned economy slogans.139 Evidence of economic
improvement abounded. Income increased at an average annual rate of 9.7 percent
between 1950 and 1959. Between 1950 and 1954, employees’ gross income grew
40 percent. In the 1950s the Federal Statistics Office conducted an ongoing study of
an “average consumer group” made up of a sample of 250 families from a middle-
level income bracket with two par ents and two childr en. The study found that
“fixed expenses,” consisting of food, housing, heat, and lighting, continued to de-
crease through the 1950s from 62.3 percent of expenses in 1950 to 49.8 percent
in 1957, thereby allowing these families to spend more on consumer and luxury
goods. Critics of these surveys, mostly from research institutes supported by the
trade unions, doubted whether these groups were truly representative. Clearly bud-
gets remained tight and luxury spending was limited in the first half of the 1950s,
but the trends in the figures did reflect an expanding living standard for a substan-
tial group of West Germans.140 Although it was true that a few in West Germany
were becoming very rich from economic reconstruction, the overall improvement
of most people’s conditions was hard to deny. Pre-election polling indicated that
the vast majority of West German perceived their economic conditions as either
improving or r emaining the same since the y ear before.141 Undoubtedly, pen-
sioners and women “standing alone,” groups left out of the Federal Statistics Of-
fice’s study, continued to struggle, but for most the trend was clearly upwards.
The SPD also played into the hands of the CDU/CSU through its focus in the
campaign upon personalities. Early on in the campaign F ritz Heine stressed the
necessity of highlighting the SPD’s leadership with slogans such as “N o to Ade-
nauer—Yes to Ollenhauer” and “Out with Adenauer—We vote Ollenhauer.”142
Eventually the slogan “Ollenhauer instead of Adenauer” was featured on one of the
SPD’s main posters.143 Adenauer’s popularity, evidenced by public opinion polls,
doomed this strategy to failur e. A J une 1953 I nstitut für D emoskopie poll in-
dicated that 51 percent of respondents believed Adenauer was the most capable
German politician, compared to only 6 percent endorsing Ollenhauer.144 Ollen-
hauer could not match Adenauer’s charisma on the stump or his forceful person-
ality that projected through the media, not to mention A denauer’s advantage of
a huge publicity machine geared to generate his positive image. Even at the time,
the SPD’s strategy appeared fatally flawed to anyone familiar with the polling re-
sults, and the CDU/CSU’s success in the election confirmed the folly of placing
Ollenhauer as Adenauer’s main antagonist.145
194 |   Selling the Economic Miracle
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
The SPD’s share of the vote fell short of expectations, with the party securing
28.8 percent compared to the CDU/CSU’s 45.2 percent. At the first postelection
executive committee meeting, Ollenhauer expressed disappointment, although he
optimistically pointed out that the SPD’s votes had increased by 1 million. He in-
dicated a sense of SPD isolation by comparing the current political situation with
the threat of the H arzburg Front, the amalgamation of right-wing gr oups in-
cluding the Nazis that had formed in 1931 in opposition to a centrist government
and contributed to the collapse of the Weimar government. He feared that a “co-
ordination process” (Gleichschaltungprozess) of the right’s control of the radio and
press would ensue in West Germany. Perhaps most despairingly, Fritz Heine, the
press and propaganda committee chairperson, commented that he did not believe
there would be another fr ee election in four y ears and that this mar ked the be-
ginning of the end for democracy in West Germany. The SPD had to become
more aggressive, he said—in many respects reflecting the old guard’s conception
of harsh ideological war fare with political opponents that had pr evailed in the
Weimar era. 
However, other voices were raised at the meeting. Fritz Henßler, an executive
committee member fr om North Rhine–Westphalia, sharply attacked H eine by
stating that in the future a man under such psychological pressure should not be
the party’s press chief. Others commented that the party’s organization was weak,
and it had made mistakes in its pr opaganda. Ernst Reuter, the reforming mayor
of West Berlin, observed that “[t]he people haven’t responded to our anti-Erhard
propaganda. We must now lead our campaign positively and Hamburg [the site
of the next local elections] is the first test. Perhaps the electorate heard too much
of our ‘no’ and not our positive efforts.” Waldemar von Knöringen concurred that
“during the campaign the SPD was too much on the defensive, its attacks on Er-
hard economic policy were not convincing, and its policies were too much about
negation” (Nein-Parole).146
After the SPD’s defeat in the election, this dissatisfaction per vaded not only
the executive committee, but the entire party apparatus as well, especially among
the party’s reformers. A combined session of the executive committee, party com-
mittee, control commission, district secretaries, parliamentary fraction, and state
ministers on 17 September analyzed the mistakes and lessons of the 1953 cam-
paign. Some of the reformers of the party, such as Willy Brandt, complained that
“[o]ur slogans did not always draw any enthusiasm. We must become a catch-all
party [Volkspartei] without giving up being a workers’ party.” Other reformers also
voiced dissatisfaction with the way the campaign had been run. Karl Schiller, one
of the main reformers in the area of economics, commented that “[s]ocialization
has been discredited by its misuse in the Eastern Zone. The slogan of social secu-
rity was a flop with the people. It must be appended with the demand for social
improvement.” 
At the end of the meeting Ollenhauer defended the SPD’s propaganda meth-
ods. He commented that he was proud that the SPD had conducted a fair elec-
tion campaign and added that a campaign of the type led by Adenauer was out of
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the question.147 Clearly the par ty was not r eady to r evamp its pr opaganda ap-
proach. Nevertheless, in other quar ters of the SPD, par ty members began criti-
cizing the orientation of the party’s “vocabulary of agitation.” The social minister
of Lower Saxony, Heinrich Albertz, commented in the SPD organ Neue Vorwärts
that the language of the SPD’s propaganda was directed entirely toward the pro-
letariat. The party had to develop new methods to attract the broad masses so that
it could jump the 30 percent hurdle.148 The process of reforming the SPD’s pro-
paganda was underway, but the effects of this undertaking would not be notice-
ably apparent in the 1957 election. I n many r espects, the SPD was operating
within a vastly different paradigm from that of the CDU/CSU, which clearly sup-
ported Noelle-Neumann’s view that public opinion surveys were a form of social
control. Instead, the SPD subscribed to a method that sought to rationally engage
the electorate in order to convince it of the benefits of the party’s political vision.
Unfortunately for the SPD this vision spoke only to the working class. 
The CDU/CSU tallied huge gains in the Bundestag election on 6 September
1953, snaring 45.2 percent of the vote, up from 31 percent in 1949. International
issues such as the r eunification of G ermany, West Germany’s rearmament, and
the political fallout fr om the Soviet suppression of the 17 J une uprising played
crucial roles in the campaign. Nevertheless, some postelection surveys did suggest
the impor tance of other issues—including economics. 149 One question asked
CDU/CSU voters why they had cast their ballot for the CDU/CSU. Their an-
swers were varied. The leading reply, with 30 percent, was Adenauer’s personality
and his pr estige in the world—r eflecting to a cer tain extent the impor tance of
geopolitical issues in the campaign. The second-ranking r esponse was r eligious
reasons, with 21 percent. Economic progress came in third at 19 percent, while
satisfaction with the CDU’ s successes, which could include economic dev elop-
ment, ranked fourth with 17 percent. By contrast, when the same question was
posed to SPD voters, 69 percent expressed their belief that the SPD represented
the interests of the worker.150 What is striking is the difference in the diversity of
responses. While CDU/CSU voters cited a number of r easons for casting their
ballot for the CDU/CSU, SPD voters were attracted to the party predominately
for one reason: it defended the interests of the worker. This response reflected the
fact that the SPD was a party limited to a single issue that could attract voters. In
many respects, the SPD propaganda reaffirmed the narrow basis of the party’s ap-
peal. It could be seen as inspiring its cor e constituents to get out and cast their
ballots rather than attracting new supporters. 
This greater diversity of reasons for voting for the CDU/CSU was also reflected
in the par ty’s sociological suppor t. Given the backgr ound of the CDU/CSU,
Catholics constituted a large part of the party’s vote, reflecting a clear continuity
in Catholic voting behavior between Weimar elections and the 1953 election. In
the 1924 Reichstag election, 55 percent of all Catholic votes were cast for the Cen-
ter Party, while in 1953 about 52 per cent of all Catholics v oted for the CDU/
CSU. In other words, the CDU/CSU won over the base of the Weimar-era Cen-
ter Party. But it was significant that the CDU/CSU was able to branch out to new
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groups without losing support from its core group of Catholics. In the 1953 elec-
tion a little over 35 percent of the CDU/CSU’s vote came from Protestants, by no
means an insignificant figure. The CDU/CSU was still the “Christian par ty” in
the Federal Republic’s par ty system, with 58 per cent of its v oters regularly at-
tending church.151 However, most of the par ty’s propaganda ignored or play ed
down religious or cultural issues in fav or of highlighting international or eco-
nomic issues so as not to alienate less devout, often times Protestant voters. It was
the churches, especially the Catholic Church, that made the preferred party and
candidate clear to their congregations. 
The CDU/CSU’s ability to reach out to groups outside its core also came into
play with regard to electoral support and social class. Although the SPD was clearly
the workers’ party, surveys indicated that the CDU/CSU was able to garner 24
percent of the workers’ vote. This still ranked below the 36 percent enjoyed by the
SPD, but nevertheless the figure was a significant factor in the CDU/CSU’s vic-
tory.152 This translated into 26 percent of the CDU/CSU’s ballots coming from
the working class, who formed the largest single gr oup suppor ting the CDU/
CSU. The next largest groups were pensioners (19 percent), farmers (17 percent),
and civil ser vants and white collar wor kers (15 per cent).153 One interpretation 
of this voting behavior was that the religious loyalty of the Catholic working class
toward the CDU/CSU was greater than class loyalty toward the SPD. Particularly
decisive for the CDU/CSU was its advantage in the female vote—a clear target of
much of its pr opaganda. In the election, 47.2 per cent of women v oted for the
CDU/CSU compared to 38.9 per cent of men. Considering that women cast
53.7 percent of the v alid second ballots, this differ ence was significant.154 With 
its relative diversity of support, by 1953 the CDU/CSU was becoming a Volks-
partei in a way that the SPD could not.
Although economics does not appear to be as cr ucial a factor as A denauer’s
personality in gaining votes for CDU/CSU, it was nevertheless an important ele-
ment in many voters’ minds. For example, 46 of 100 CDU/CSU voters cited eco-
nomic prosperity as either the first, second, or thir d most impor tant reason for
voting for the party. In comparison, 59 percent listed Adenauer’s improvement of
West Germany’s standing in the world and 47 percent cited Adenauer’s leadership
qualities as within the top three reasons for supporting the CDU/CSU.155 In light
of these figures, the strategy of mixing the issue of economic success with geopo-
litical issues was an effective means of selling the party. The CDU/CSU molded
economics to accentuate both the thr eat of communism and the idea that A de-
nauer and the CDU/CSU represented the legitimacy of the West German state it-
self. Planned and controlled economics, whose distinctions were regularly blurred
by the CDU/CSU, offered an example of what a socialist alternative would mean.
West Germany’s economic success proved that it constituted the “real” Germany.
Therefore, economic reconstruction not only directly lent support to the CDU/
CSU, but also could be blended with other issues that were important in voters’
support of the party. As seen from the variety of its economic propaganda, the CDU/
CSU successfully employed economics as a multidimensional issue that possessed
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the potential to attract voters from across religious, class, and gender divisions. In
this important regard, the CDU/CSU enjo yed a significant adv antage over the
SPD. As a par ty created in the rubble of Germany’s defeat, the CDU/CSU was
not beholden to a particular class or group of core supporters, as was the SPD to
a large extent, and as a consequence it had the flexibility to position itself in a num-
ber of different ways. 
Although the CDU/CSU targeted the SPD in most of its attacks, most of the
CDU/CSU gains did not stem fr om losses in SPD v otes. In fact, although the
SPD’s share of the v ote dropped from 29.2 percent in 1949 to 28.8 per cent in
1953, the party collected a greater total number of votes (6.9 million versus 7.9
million).156 The West German electorate was growing, from 24.5 million in 1949
to 28.5 million in 1953, thr ough young voters coming of age and the flo w of
refugees from the East. The CDU/CSU was outdistancing the SPD in capturing
these new voters. A study of the 1953 election r evealed that v oters might drift
within the Marxist or bourgeois camps, but not betw een them. In other words,
the CDU/CSU’s increase in votes was not necessarily due to former SPD voters,
but instead to voters who had previously voted for bourgeois splinter parties. The
FDP, DP, and Center par ties all declined in 1953, along with sev eral splinter
bourgeois/conservative parties that had met the 5 percent threshold for entering
into Bundestag.157 In this perspective, the CDU/CSU’s propaganda against the
SPD did not win over former SPD voters. Instead, the propaganda won over the
splinter-party vote by por traying the CDU/CSU as a par ty strong enough to
protect West Germany against a Marxist threat at home and abr oad. Therefore,
Die Waage’s ads, which were often criticized by the organization’s contributors be-
cause they appear ed in the bourgeois pr ess and would not r each the wor king
class, might have had a str onger impact on potential CDU/CSU v oters than if
they had been placed in more working-class oriented media. 
Finally, the 1953 election campaign also demonstrated that the CDU/CSU’ s
electoral techniques were in transition. Faced with the imminent thr eat of a so-
cialist victory in the 1953 election, the CDU/CSU built up not only a networ k
of propaganda organizations that allowed the party to promote itself more effec-
tively, but it also consciously made the decision to increasingly center the campaign
upon the party’s self-image as reflected by its leadership and their achievements.
In conjunction with this development, the 1953 election saw the first widespread
use of public opinion polling in election campaigns, ther eby allowing the con-
struction of a par ty image that was pitched mor e carefully at the West German
population. This desire for a br oad-based constituency also was r eflected in the
decreased emphasis upon the antimaterialist conceptions of the party’s economic
policy that had figur ed so prominently in the 1949 election. I nstead, the par ty
adapted to larger socioeconomic trends and began to trumpet the more individ-
ualist pleasures of consumerism. Clearly, the 1953 election was a transitional step
both in the transformation of the West German political culture and in how the
economic miracle was sold. This transformation emerged fully in what would be
the greatest triumph of Adenauer and CDU/CSU: the 1957 Bundestag election. 
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Chapter 6
THE TRIUMPH OF THE ECONOMIC MIRACLE:
THE CDU/CSU AND THE
1957 BUNDESTAG ELECTION

On 16 September 1957, the day after the CDU/CSU’ s historic victor y in the
election to the third Bundestag, Chancellor Adenauer spent part of his day “ re-
viewing” a triumphant victory parade before the Chancellery in Bonn. This vic-
tory parade, however, was a bit out of the ordinary: it was not made up of adoring
West German citizens celebrating the reelection of their chancellor. Instead, with
military music blaring, A denauer reviewed a procession of thir ty-six blue Volk-
swagen buses belonging to the adv ertising firm M obilwerbung. These buses,
equipped with the latest film pr ojection and audio equipment, had spent the
summer crisscrossing West Germany, in cities and to wns both big and small,
screening campaign films and organizing public relations activities on the behalf
of Adenauer and the CDU/CSU. This ceremony was arranged, Der Spiegel com-
mented, because Adenauer wanted to officially acknowledge and honor what had
earned his election victor y: par ty propaganda. As A denauer approached the
Chancellery, one of the VW buses sped through the streets of Bad Godesberg and
Bonn announcing “The chancellor is coming!”—as it had done so often in prepa-
ration for Adenauer’s rallies during the campaign. During the ceremony Adenauer
was in such a jubilant mood that he even raised a glass of champagne in celebra-
tion, a most uncommon occurr ence for the chancellor , who rar ely drank. The
chancellor then solemnly presented the firm with a medal engraved with his pro-
file in relief and the inscription: “In deep gratitude for your service.” However in
the midst of the festivities, the dour chancellor quickly turned serious, declaring
Notes for this section begin on page 250.
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that “the celebration is over” since the state elections in North Rhine–Westphalia
were the following year and the party must commence its preparations.1
Adenauer had every reason to celebrate after the election. The 15 September
1957 Bundestag election was unquestionably the high point of the CDU/CSU’s
electoral success during A denauer’s government.2 The CDU/CSU’s winning of
50.2 percent of the vote marked the first and only time in the F ederal Republic
of Germany that a political par ty gained a majority . In many ways, the tr end
begun in 1953 of transferring votes from splinter parties to the main parties of the
CDU/CSU, SPD, and FDP continued in the 1957 election, although the FDP’s
share of the vote did decline slightly to 7.7 percent. In 1949, splinter parties had
captured almost 28 per cent of the v ote. By the 1957 election this figur e had
dropped to just over 10 percent. The CDU/CSU picked up most of these votes,
ensuring the party its greatest electoral victory.3 Without a doubt, the 1957 elec-
tion was the zenith of what has been termed the “Adenauer Chancellery.”
This election also proved to be a crucial juncture in the SPD’s painful and dif-
ficult road to reform that led to the Bad Godesberg Program in 1959, in which it
finally abandoned any form of socialism as par t of its economic platform. S ince
the 1949 election, the SPD had gained in terms of o verall votes (6.9 million vs.
9.4 million in 1957) and the percentage of the vote (29.2 vs. 31.8 percent). Nev-
ertheless, the par ty fell fur ther behind its main competitor , the CDU/CSU,
whose share of the vote skyrocketed from 31.0 to 50.2 percent during that same
period. The SPD could not break out of its “thirty percent ghetto” made up pri-
marily of the working-class vote, and the resulting defeat spelled dramatic changes
in the party’s platform and personnel. 
The 1957 election was also a landmark in terms of the evolution of West Ger-
many’s political culture and the project of selling the economic miracle. Over the
course of the campaign, the CDU/CSU’ s application of public opinion sur veys
and advertising principles developed in the transitional 1953 campaign came to
full fruition. In 1953 the CDU/CSU had used polling that sketched out the broad
contours of West German public opinion to shape its campaign. I n the 1957
campaign the party utilized polling far more intensely in both the planning and
execution of the campaign. The CDU/CSU now precisely researched the socio-
logical structure of the supporters of the various parties. In addition, the CDU/
CSU began to r esearch particular pieces of pr ospective propaganda to ascer tain
their exact resonance with the West German population—thereby allowing the
party to tailor its pr opaganda to speak to specific sociological gr oups and maxi-
mize its campaign ’s effectiv eness. In this way , the CDU/CSU fully embraced
techniques, borrowed from commercial advertising, of carefully investigating the
“target” consumer of its product, in this case a party image. This approach to po-
litical ideas traces back to the growth of organizations such as Die Waage, the In-
stitut für Demoskopie, and the Federal Press Agency, which all looked to practices
in the United States for guidance, resulting in what could be termed as the “Amer-
icanization” of West German campaigning. Although only eight y ears removed,
the crude propaganda instruments of the 1949 campaign that spoke primarily to
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the party’s base were long gone. With the new propaganda tools, Adenauer and
the CDU/CSU master fully crafted a campaign center ed around the themes of 
security, stability, and prosperity. 
The CDU/CSU initiated planning for the 1957 election almost immediately
following the 1953 victor y. The so-called Wednesday circle of leading national
party leaders began meeting over a year in advance of the election to begin hash-
ing out strategy . In order to coor dinate the national election strategy with the
CSU, Adenauer asked the CSU chairman H ans Seidel to send CSU representa-
tives to the meetings. 4 By January 1956, the CDU’s leadership realized that the
party’s organization must be revamped to succeed in the upcoming election. Ade-
nauer voiced concern at an ex ecutive committee meeting that the 1953 victor y
might negatively affect party members’ motivation to strengthen their party be-
cause all appeared to be going well. 
North Rhine–Westphalia Interior Minister Franz Meyer was named the
CDU’s campaign manager and under took, along with the CDU par ty manager
Bruno Heck, to strengthen the party’s organization during 1956. Their efforts to
increase the par ty membership fr om its 1956 lev el of about 230,000 pr oved
somewhat disappointing as par ty membership r emained under 250,000 at the
time of the campaign. A considerable number of the 195 Kreisgeschäftsführer (dis-
trict party managers) hired in preparation for the 1953 campaign had been let go
because the district, regional, and federal party organizations could not afford to
pay them. With increased financial contributions from industry in election years,
the party was able to ensure that every district party organization had a manager
back in place to pr epare for the 1957 campaign, and in fact, each manager was
provided with an auto to facilitate campaign activities. Meyer spent much of the
summer of 1956 traveling through West Germany, working to build up district
party organizations. With considerable success, in November 1956 he pushed the
CDU’s executive committee to install election leaders (Wahlleiter) in each voting
district to help organiz e and direct campaigns. Also months befor e the election
Meyer worked to educate and train local par ty leadership in ho w to distribute
campaign materials, including leaflets and posters, and ho w to maintain par ty
membership lists.5
Not only did the CDU want to strengthen its organization, it sought to coor-
dinate the campaign more effectively with lower echelons of the party, and espe-
cially with its individual B undestag representatives. In late 1956, B runo Heck
sent out a number of polling and sociological surveys to the state and local orga-
nizations to help them formulate a campaign strategy for their o wn regions and
districts. Also, starting in January 1956 the central par ty headquarters began an
extensive sociological and statistical study of the West German electorate. This
study included a sociological analysis of the West German population in terms of
gender, religion, education, class, and size of home town/city; a statistical analy-
sis of the previous Bundestag and Landestag elections; and finally a sociological
and political analysis of each election district to be giv en to the respective Bun-
destag r epresentative or candidate. 6 The r eports generally r eaffirmed what the
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party already knew in terms of its v oters’ background: the party’s strongest sup-
port came fr om smaller to wns, rural areas, Catholics, women, and older West
Germans.7 Nevertheless, this systematically quantified analysis of each voting dis-
trict endowed the CDU/CSU candidates with a w ealth of data to campaign ef-
fectively at the local level. In addition, it gave the central leadership a broad view
of the general characteristics of the electorship so that it could begin to formulate
strategies for making inroads into groups less likely to support the CDU/CSU. 
In late winter 1957 the CDU/CSU commissioned the Institut für Demosko-
pie to research the sociological str ucture of the CDU/CSU’s, SPD’s, and FDP’s
support. The organization’s analysis, “Parteien unter der Lupe” (Parties under the
Microscope), broke down the supporters of the various parties into three groups
of “strong,” “middle,” and “weak” according to age, sex, education, income, reli-
gion, and occupation, among other categories. Overall, it indicated that both the
CDU/CSU and the SPD enjoyed support from about 29 percent of the popula-
tion, respectively, with the FDP coming in at 5 percent. Fifty-nine percent of the
CDU/CSU’s supporters described themselves as “weak” or “middle” supporters
while 34 per cent were self-described as “ strong” supporters and 7 per cent pro-
vided no answ er. The sur vey discovered a fe w tendencies in the sociological
makeup of CDU/CSU supporters: its Protestant followers were more likely to fall
into the “middle” or “weak” category, while 68 percent of the “strong” supporters
were Catholic (58 percent total of CDU/CSU supporters were Catholic). The re-
port echoed the earlier r eports that the str ongest CDU/CSU suppor ters, those
least likely to change their v otes, tended to be Catholics, especially Catholic
women from rural areas. In addition, a majority (67 percent) of the CDU/CSU’s
strong supporters attended chur ch frequently. Interestingly, this sur vey did not
categorize suppor ters of the par ties according to their possible backgr ound as
refugees from East Germany or other areas of Central or Eastern Europe.8
In addition, the survey identified the voters who appeared to be solidly in the
SPD’s camp. The typical “strong” supporter tended to be male (57 percent), not
highly educated (91 percent Volkschule only, that is education up to about age 14),
and from the working class (78 percent). This group of “strong” SPD voters con-
stituted, by the Institut für Demoskopie’s estimates, about 11 percent of the West
German population. The survey indicated that along with these “strong” voters,
the “middle” and “weak” SPD supporters were probably not going to drift into
the bourgeois parties’ camp.9
Perhaps most importantly, the survey analyzed the sociological makeup of un-
decided voters. Sixty-nine percent of these r espondents self-identified with the
CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP, and other parties. In addition, 21 percent of respondents
did not identify with any specific par ty yet were still planning to vote, while 10
percent were not planning to vote. This group of undecided voters was generally
heterogeneous, but nev ertheless a fe w characteristics did emerge. The CDU/
CSU’s weakest supporters and those who were undecided were heavily weighted
toward women (56 per cent vs. 54 per cent of the total population), P rotestants
(68 percent vs. 59 percent of the total population), the better educated (28 per-
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cent with higher education vs. 22 per cent of the total population), and persons
not attending church regularly (49 percent seldom or never vs. 43 percent of the
total population). 
It was to this undecided segment of the population that the CDU/CSU had
to gear its message. It constituted the key “swing vote” that would determine suc-
cess or failure in the election—in which the message of economic success along
with the Adenauer’s leadership would be crucial issues. The survey clearly showed
that the CDU/CSU had str ong support from Catholic voters, but this was not
sufficient to get elected. Besides, since the 1949 Bundestag election the Catholic
churches in West Germany had left no doubt about which par ty they wanted
their flocks to vote for. Such insight into the makeup and views of the electorate
clearly explains why the CDU/CSU did not emphasiz e its r eligious roots in its 
national-level propaganda. A strong showing from the Catholic and religious Prot-
estant vote was almost guaranteed to the party. Thus, propaganda on economics
was directed toward the decisiv e “undecided” segment of the population, espe-
cially women, that would act as the swing vote. While surveys indicated that 43
percent of the general population saw r eunification as the most impor tant issue
in West Germany, economic issues (economic conditions, prices, wages, and cur-
rency) was a clear second (30 percent of the general population vs. 21 percent of
CDU/CSU supporters).10
In the 1957 election the wor k of pr ofessional advertising agencies, together
with the application of ever more precise sociological and polling analyses of the
electorate, contributed to a mor e exact, deliberate constr uction of the CDU/
CSU’s image. Although the advertisers’ impact might have been relatively limited
in the 1957 campaign in comparison to their role in the 1960s elections and be-
yond, their presence was quite significant for the very first time.11 In the 1957 cam-
paign two adv ertising agents, D r. Hegemann of Düsseldor f and D ie Werbe of
Essen, designed and distributed two important components of the CDU/CSU’s
propaganda: posters and magazine advertisements that profiled CDU/CSU lead-
ers and highlighted West German consumerist prosperity.12 Their role was clearly
defined and significant: the advertising agents did not help provide the basic con-
ceptualization of the campaign, but instead transformed the par ty’s ideas into 
effective propaganda. 
In addition, although political parties, governmental organizations, and vari-
ous interest groups had utilized public opinion surveys since 1948, the 1957 elec-
tion was the first one in which the exploitation of the sur veys became extensive.
The CDU/CSU had been tracking the general tr end of public opinion since 
the Federal Press Agency had contracted the I nstitut für D emoskopie and the
EMNID Institut in 1951 to conduct r egular surveys for the go vernment. The
Bundesgeschäftsstelle also contracted with EMNID to conduct specific sur veys in
preparation for the 1957 election.13 But compared to the 1953 campaign, in 1957
public opinion surveys were used far more precisely to test even particular pieces
of propaganda. The CDU/CSU researched its main campaign slogans, including
“Keine Experimente” (No experiments) and “Wohlstand für Alle” (Prosperity for
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all), through polling surveys conducted by the Institut für Demoskopie.14 In fact,
“no experiments” was formulated b y the commer cial advertising agent H ubert
Strauf, who had masterminded Coca-Cola ’s famous “Mach mal Pause!” (Take a
break!) advertising campaign of the 1950s.15 Heidrun Abromeit, in his analysis of
campaigning practices in West Germany, commented that a good slogan must
“focus a campaign. It should express what the impending election is really about
and in the best case provide the motive for electing a party or person.”16 With the
aid of advertising agents and polling, the CDU/CSU’s slogans accomplished this
goal by powerfully expressing the themes of security and prosperity. In her defense
of the use of polling r esearch as par t of the political pr ocess, Elisabeth Noelle-
Neumann likened surveys to plebiscites, a most basic form of democracy. But in
many respects, the CDU/CSU increasingly used public opinion surveys not only
to monitor the mood of the nation, but to better sell its political product by means
of pretesting the party’s propaganda to determine how it resonated with the pub-
lic. The surveys were used not so much to understand public opinion so that the
party could engage in a tr ue dialogue with it, but rather in or der to manage, 
direct, and exploit it.
Undoubtedly, the use of polling sur veys and modern adv ertising techniques
had a significant impact on the campaign’s tone and focus. As in the 1953 cam-
paign, in 1957 the CDU/CSU concentrated its election focus upon the persona
of Chancellor A denauer. Particularly important was the CDU/CSU’ s emphasis
on its leading personalities as “brand names” of the party representing the party
image, a break from older German electoral traditions of emphasizing a par ty’s
program. In large part, this was a lesson learned from the American-style election
campaigns, such as the “We like Ike” slogans in Dwight D. Eisenhower’s 1952 and
1956 presidential campaigns.17 In fact, the CDU campaign chief B runo Heck
made two six-week trips to the United States to observe the 1952 and 1956 pres-
idential campaigns and drew heavily from these experiences in shaping the CDU/
CSU’s campaigns.18 There he would have observed campaigns’ emphasis on the
creation of a pr esidential candidate’s image, a characteristic of American cam-
paigns since the early nineteenth century. In addition, by the 1952 campaign, the
two main American political parties were utilizing professional advertising agents
to shape their campaigns, a technique that the CDU/CSU picked up for the 1957
campaign. 
Particularly effective in the United States was the use of television spots to pro-
ject Eisenhower into the consciousness of the American public.19 Clearly, one thing
that Heck had brought from America was the focus placed upon personalities in
political campaigns.20 By drawing upon a more American approach to campaign-
ing, the CDU/CSU led the shift taking place in West Germany in the 1950s from
an overtly ideological politics to one incr easingly based on personalities and the
party image. In large measure to reach out to different sociological groups of vot-
ers, the CDU/CSU in 1957 concentrated upon West German Chancellor Kon-
rad Adenauer and his cabinet with one of the campaign’s main slogans, “Adenauer
und seine Mannschaft” (Adenauer and his team). In the realm of economics, the
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CDU/CSU no longer espoused, as it had in 1949, the more ideological position
of the social market economy and its relation to the creation of an organic, Chris-
tian community. Instead, the party focused more upon newly gained opportuni-
ties for individualistic consumption, a sentiment personified b y Economics
Minister Ludwig Erhard and likely to attract key undecided v oters. In contrast,
the SPD’s campaigns were still based on narrow ideological positions focused on
its base—mostly male, Protestant workers and failed to attract a br oad range of
interests. 
But by early 1957 it appeared that Adenauer’s popularity had somewhat waned
since the 1953 election. For example, polls in April 1953 and January/February
1957 asked whether Adenauer should remain as chancellor or relinquish the po-
sition to someone else. I n April 1953, 48 per cent thought Adenauer should re-
main, against 26 percent who thought someone else would be better. In contrast,
by January/February 1957 only 36 per cent of r espondents believ ed that A de-
nauer should r emain chancellor, while 41 per cent preferred that someone else
take up the position. It seemed that most of the respondents who wanted a new
chancellor regarded Adenauer’s age as a liability .21 Nevertheless, Adenauer still
possessed a po werful resonance with the public opinion, a point of which the
party was quite conscious, having monitored the party’s and the chancellor’s pop-
ularity with a batter y of ongoing polls since the F ederal Press Agency had con-
tracted the Institut für Demoskopie in 1951.
In conjunction with the swing in Adenauer’s popularity, the CDU/CSU’s sup-
port dipped from the second half of 1956 through about late spring 1957. In fact,
the SPD’s support surpassed the CDU/CSU’s between August 1956 and January
1957. It then remained about even until April 1957, when the CDU/CSU began
pulling ahead.22 Nevertheless, Adenauer’s reputation drew support exceeding that
of his party. In the first quarter of 1957, a period when the CDU/CSU was lag-
ging behind the SPD in the polls, 45 percent of West Germans agreed with Ade-
nauer’s policies v ersus 23 per cent who disagr eed and 31 per cent who w ere
undecided.23 In December 1956, 56 percent of West Germans believed that Kon-
rad Adenauer was West Germany’s most capable contemporar y politician, in
comparison to the 6 percent of support garnered by Erich Ollenhauer. Adenauer
commanded a clearly defined image among the West German population. A c-
cording to a December 1956 Institut für Demoskopie survey, West Germans were
most likely to describe Adenauer as “clever,” “diplomatic,” and “persistent, tough.”
In the election campaign the CDU/CSU played off Chancellor Adenauer’s image
among the West German people.24 Adenauer represented an authoritative, patri-
archal figure, someone who brought legitimacy to the West German state—qualities
that the public felt no other West German politician could match. As Hans-Peter
Schwarz has commented, the v oters demanded “ a successful, har d-boiled, be-
witchingly enter taining, fully self-assur ed patriar ch, who pr omised them all
would be well if only they voted for the CDU.”25
The CDU/CSU realized that for the West German population, Adenauer rep-
resented a sense of security that could be translated into electoral success. O ne 
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report from the CDU’ s Bundesgeschäftsstelle commented that in A denauer the
CDU/CSU possessed a figure representing experience, authority, and the estab-
lishment of the Federal Republic of Germany. The key to the campaign was to de-
velop and exploit the personalities of “Adenauer and his team,” who exemplified
“independent men” and “not functionaries and pawns of the par ty apparatus.”
This image of the CDU/CSU being composed of capable men with genuine ac-
complishments was built to dir ectly contrast with the CDU/CSU’s portrayal of
the SPD leadership as party hacks and ideological apparatchiks. The CDU/CSU
had to run a campaign stressing that West Germany should not change horses in
midstream. “Training new personnel is in general expensive and means continued
risks (experiments!),” one campaign strategy report commented.26
Until his death in May 1957 from an infection contracted in Africa, Otto Lenz
proved critical in the formation of the CDU/CSU campaign, much as he had
been in the 1953 election. I n preparation for the election, he activ ated the nu-
merous parallel propaganda efforts that had been developed for the previous 1953
campaign. In early January 1957, at a low point in the party’s popularity, Lenz re-
ported to Adenauer that an immediate “advertising action” was necessary since it
would be impossible to achieve such a steep climb in the party’s popularity in the
final months before the election. Lenz outlined the challenges and tasks of pr o-
paganda, including v arious brochures to be published b y the F ederal Press
Agency, a poster campaign backing NATO and the support of Hungary, and a de-
crease in import taxes on tobacco—all to be enacted in order to boost Adenauer
and his government’s popularity. As in the 1953 campaign, M obilwerbung, the
organization outfitted with equipment-laden VW buses, roamed the Federal Re-
public screening pro-government films—especially ones dealing with West Ger-
many’s NATO membership. But the main thrust of Lenz’s activities was to elevate
the popularity of Chancellor Adenauer, including strategies such as sending a let-
ter from the chancellor to all West German households asking for their vote and
launching a campaign train that carried A denauer across West Germany to give
speeches in each town and city where the train stopped.27
In terms of economics, the CDU/CSU feared that the favorable public opin-
ion toward economic progress had dulled. A February 1957 report indicated that
although the party’s economic policy was no less successful between 1953 and 1957
than it had been between 1949 and 1953, the public’s confidence had somewhat
decreased. The report commented that “[t]he memory of the years between 1945
and 1948 has faded and the fulfillment of material needs has led the population
decreasingly to a corresponding contentment. Instead, what is detected is a con-
tinual extension of what ar e considered needs.”28 In other words, expectations
grew even more quickly than the rise in living standards. The campaign must give
a “representation of the economic successes since 1949 thr ough 1953 with the
help of graphic and numerical examples.” 29 The key to the campaign was con-
vincing West Germans of the material improvement they had enjoyed since 1948.
As in the 1953 election campaign, the issue of prices play ed a crucial role in
the formation of public opinion on the economy . The Institut für Demoskopie
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saw this as perhaps the chief pr oblematic issue for r eelecting the Adenauer gov-
ernment. Leading up to the election, public opinion surveys revealed great anxiety
over the rise of prices. In March 1957 the Institut für Demoskopie produced a re-
port, “Das Zentrum der Krise” (Center of the Crisis), that analyzed public opin-
ion regarding prices. The majority of West Germans (72 percent) believed that
prices would rise in the ensuing quarter year. The report posited that prices were
a critical issue in v oter attitudes. “One must,” the I nstitut’s report commented,
“come to terms with the realization that the stability of prices for the majority of
the population also is the symbol for economic and political stability.” The West
German population fear ed that the economic gains of the past y ears would be
lost. In addition, only 18 percent of West Germans regarded their economic con-
ditions as being better than the y ear before, despite the fact that r eal wages had
been rising throughout the 1950s. To a certain extent, the CDU/CSU was facing
attitudes that had been present since the Korean Crisis of 1950–1952, so the re-
port merely reiterated the importance of the West German public’s view of prices.
Overall, the report concluded that although living standards were rising with the
improvement of the West German economy since 1948, the public’s expectations
had correspondingly risen.30
Nevertheless West Germans were not completely pessimistic. Thirty-three per-
cent of respondents to an Institut für Demoskopie survey believed that economic
conditions were good, while another 48 per cent believed they w ere middling.
That left only about 10 percent who thought conditions were bad.31 In addition,
all through the 1950s there was a guarded optimism in terms of personal living
standards. For example, in the summer of 1956, 25 percent of respondents to an
Institut für Demoskopie survey believed that their situation was better than the
year before, up from 12 percent in May 1951. Perhaps more tellingly, only 16 per-
cent in the summer of 1956 believed conditions were worse than the year before,
compared to 56 percent in 1951. By 1956 the vast majority of respondents (84
percent) perceived either no difference or an improvement in their condition from
the year before. By the summer of 1957 this figure had climbed to 90 percent.32
Part of the guarded optimism was perhaps the result of strategic policies insti-
tuted by Economics Minister Erhard that helped keep the rise in prices in check.
From late 1956 into the summer of 1957, consumer prices r emained relatively
stable, especially for such goods such as food, bev erages and tobacco, and hous-
ing.33 Erhard, who was fully familiar with the latest polling data, per ceived the
danger of higher prices in an election y ear. In a M arch 1957 letter, Erhard ex-
plained to Adenauer that the opposition and trade unions were pushing for higher
wages, driving the rise in prices, and creating an unfavorable climate for the gov-
ernment. Since Erhard had no faith that industr y would hold firm against the
unions’ demands, he proposed two ideas to the chancellor. First, Erhard wanted
to assemble 1,500 to 2,000 leaders of industry, crafts, wholesale trade, and retail
to inform them of the dangers curr ently threatening the free market system. He
hoped to obtain their pr omises not to contribute to inflation b y raising wages
prior to the election. S econd, Erhard wished to assemble r epresentatives from
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forty to fifty firms “whose products every housewife knows” and persuade them
to not raise prices, then proclaim their intent through advertisements appearing
in leading newspapers.34 Over the spring of 1957, r etailers embarked on a pub-
licity campaign explaining that their goods w ere cheaper or no mor e expensive
than in 1955. In addition, leading brand-name manufacturers’ advertisements in
West German newspapers declared that their prices would not rise befor e the
year’s end. Then other manufacturers and retailers fell into line and announced
similar efforts. In addition, the government lowered import duties on coffee and
tobacco, a measure suggested by Otto Lenz that provided a visible example of the
decrease in prices. 35 With these actions, West German consumers, especially
women, saw prices stabilize in the decisive period prior to the election. 
Furthermore, in January 1957 the Bundestag passed a reform of pension laws,
a piece of legislation that contributed to creating favorable conditions for the CDU/
CSU. Despite Erhard’s objections that it would spur inflation and ultimately cre-
ate a welfare state, the reform instituted what has been called a “dynamic” or “pro-
ductivity pension” system. Pension payments were linked to the pr oductivity of
the economy and the per capita income of those employed. This meant that pen-
sions would rise with increases in the real social product. With this measure, pen-
sions were immediately incr eased by 60 to 90 per cent for West Germany’s 7
million pensioners, allowing them to actually live on their payments. The change
was calculated back to 1 January, so many pensioners received a monetary lump
sum in the spring of 1957. Undoubtedly, this pension increase and the additional
money in pensioners’ pockets meant stronger support for the CDU/CSU. Insti-
tut für Demoskopie surveys demonstrated that this was a hugely popular action,
and not merely for the pensioners themselves. In general, a large percentage of the
West German population supported generous pensions. One February 1957 sur-
vey indicated that 79 percent of respondents supported a “good pension” coupled
with high taxes over low taxes and a poor pension. 36 In other words, West Ger-
mans valued the long-term security of solid pensions o ver more money in their
pockets in the short term. This support for the pension system, which continued
through the end of the 1950s and into 1960s, became a cornerstone in the
CDU/CSU’s social policy. But in early 1957, the CDU/CSU pushed the reform
forward chiefly with an eye to the upcoming election.37
Perhaps more than in any of its pr evious Bundestag campaigns, the CDU/
CSU framed its campaign message around a highly developed and clearly articu-
lated metaphor of “Adenauer and his team” as protective parents who provided se-
curity, stability, and pr osperity to the West German family.38 They were to be
portrayed as capable leaders and exper ts who offer ed a pr otective insulation to
West Germans in the face of a painful past and a dangerous present, all the while
enabling West Germans to avail themselves of the pleasures of a rising consum-
erism. As one CDU r eport on the main campaign themes suggested, the par ty
must present itself as the one with “experienced, expert statesmen.” This idea ran
through all aspects of the campaign. The party was to represent security in foreign
policy by touting its ability to o vercome the bur den of the N azi and war past
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through its European policy and relationships with the West, while still acting as
a “speaking partner” (Gesprächspartner) with the Soviet Union—as seen by Ade-
nauer’s 1955 trip to Moscow to negotiate the r elease of German POWs. Unset-
tling issues, such as the possibility of arming West German troops with tactical
nuclear weapons, were muted and pushed off stage. Although Adenauer secretly
thought that the West German Bundeswehr would need to equip itself with such
weapons in the futur e, West Germans were disturbed b y this pr ospect, as polls
clearly indicated when the issue enter ed into public and political debate in the
early part of 1957.39 Social security was represented by the creation of new jobs,
strengthening of pensions, and improvement of health insurance. This approach
dovetailed with the emphasis upon Chancellor A denauer as a symbol of the na-
tion’s—and not least, the party’s—security and stability.40 Overall this metaphor-
ical approach to campaigning not only attracted voters by inviting them to share
the party’s worldview; also, through the creation of a coherent image of the party,
it helped shape voter perception of the CDU/CSU itself, while at the same time
directing voter perceptions of the SPD and the Federal Republic. 
Central to this metaphor of the party’s leadership representing paternalistic se-
curity was the exploitation of West Germany’s economic expansion as one of the
party’s main achiev ements. In essence, the CDU/CSU did not tr eat economic
prosperity and the accompanying rise in GNP and consumption levels as merely
positive developments in and of themselv es. Instead they linked economic ex-
pansion with deeper, cultural currents—as West Germans’ desire for security and
stability. As one outline of campaign themes explained, the idea of economic 
security had to be str essed using the slogans, “P rosperity for all—Stability—No 
Experiments—Continue Upwards—All should live better!”41
Since Economics Minister Erhard possessed a powerful and positive resonance
with the West German public, he became, next to Adenauer, the most important
symbol in the campaign. I n July 1957, 51 per cent of r espondents in a poll ex-
pressed a good opinion of him while he was unkno wn to only 12 percent, mak-
ing him the most consistently w ell-known minister in A denauer’s cabinet. 42
Erhard was described b y the CDU/CSU “ as the Minister of the consumer , the
first German Economics Minister with wide popularity.”43 The CDU/CSU saw
that one of its chief tasks for the election was to shape and exploit E rhard’s pop-
ularity and his image as the father of the economic miracle, an image that he had
cultivated since his days as head of the Economics Administration of the Bizone
in 1948. This campaign emphasis on E rhard as representing not just economic 
reconstruction but a growing prosperity and consumerism signalled a clear shift
in terms of the meaning of economics to West Germans. Not so much was eco-
nomic reconstruction or the social mar ket economy r epresented as par t of the 
reconstruction of an organic, Christian community , as in the 1949 campaign, 
or as part of the legitimacy of the F ederal Republic, as had been the case in the
1953 campaign. I nstead, open consumerism was highlighted mor e extensively
and portrayed as not only the satisfaction of individual desires, but as manifesta-
tion of an overall sense of national and personal security. As the CDU report con-
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cluded, propaganda should highlight “ownership for everyone as additional pro-
tection of the general prosperity and the independence of the individual and his
family.”44
In many respects, the CDU/CSU was borrowing the commercial advertising
approach that one sells not the product itself, in this case Adenauer and the party,
but instead some sort of individual benefit, both rational and emotional, that the
prospective consumer, in this instance the v oter, gains from the product. In the
case of 1957 the party was selling the idea of security and stability as represented
by its “brand names” of the party leadership, who clearly articulated the identity
of the party. Commercial advertising’s influence is r evealed not only by the fact
that the party retained two advertising firms to develop its propaganda, but also
by the way the par ty allocated its r esources. Central to the CDU/CSU’s under-
taking was a massive advertising campaign in popular magazines and newspapers
aimed at popularizing Adenauer’s’ cabinet. Out of the DM 6.5 million budget for
the central party, DM 1.9 million (30 percent) was expended on the ad campaign
and another DM 1.6 million (25 per cent) went to its poster campaign—which
was organized and run by the advertising firm of Dr. Hegemann.45 Die Werbe,
the CDU/CSU’s advertising agent in charge of the magazine and newspaper cam-
paign, commented early on in the campaign that, “It is continually to be kept in
mind, that propaganda for these personalities must also be propaganda for Kon-
rad Adenauer.” The initial advertisements portrayed Adenauer with the leading
cabinet personalities who had spoken at the par ty’s May 1957 conv ention in
Hamburg. Later advertisements depicted the cabinet members themselves, espe-
cially the best-known ones, creating a sense of each as a capable individual.46 Prior
to launching the campaign, the D ie Werbe provided a detailed analysis of the
readership of the various popular magazines, including the total circulation, gen-
der, and size of the cities of the readership. The circulation of the proposed mag-
azines was quite large, totaling 10.8 million copies. Through the summer of 1957
the CDU/CSU placed the heaviest concentration of their adv ertisements in il-
lustrated magazines, such as Der Stern, Quick, and Hör zu, which were noted for
their colored photos and easily-read articles of general interest. In the two weeks
before the election, the ad campaign’s focus shifted to local, regional, and national
newspapers, including Die Welt am Sonntag and Bild-Zeitung, with a total circu-
lation of over 11 million copies.47 In all, the party generated twenty-three differ-
ent advertisements that appear ed in a total of o ver 21 million ne wspapers and
over 80 million magazines. Meanwhile the overall number of leaflets distributed
actually declined—from over 22 million in 1953 to 20 million in 1957. 48 By
comparison with these magazine adv ertisements, the leaflets w ere blunt instr u-
ments. Armed with compr ehensive information on each magazine ’s readership,
the CDU/CSU was able to precisely direct its message to targeted potential vot-
ers—much as commercial advertising targets potential consumers.
The application of commercial advertising techniques represented an impor-
tant step in the “Americanization” of West Germany’s political culture, a process
in which the CDU/CSU conducted more issue- and personality-based campaigns
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to attract broad-based support. One of the party’s slogans from the campaign suc-
cinctly summed up the overall spirit of the campaign: “Our Performance Is Our
Program.” Eschewing inflexible, ideological program statements in favor of many
different, image-centered advertisements gave the party the ability to modify its
message slightly for each prospective group of readers, thereby calculatedly reach-
ing key groups of undecided swing voters. An Erich Peter Neumann report to the
Bundesgeschäftsstelle of the CDU clearly reflected this use of commercial advertis-
ing in the political realm. Neumann’s Institut für Demoskopie maintained many
connections to the adv ertising industr y through its sur veys, which w ere often
commissioned by advertising agents. In this report for the CDU/CSU he filled in
the details inv olved in a full-blo wn advertising campaign. N eumann suggested
that the CDU/CSU pr epare upwards of thir ty different advertisements for the
campaign. That strategy contrasted sharply with campaigns for commercial prod-
ucts that repeated a given advertisement over and over again. Since there was so
much overlap in the magazines ’ readership, Neumann believed that continually
republishing the same advertisements during a concentrated period prior to the
election would bore the readers and lessen the effectiveness of the advertisements.
New advertisements that resembled one another in layout and conceptualization
would continually attract the public’s interest as well as maintain coherence in re-
gard to the campaign’s major themes. In addition, Neumann urged the CDU to
test the r esonance of many of the adv ertisements through test sur veys before
adopting them for the campaign.49
In fact, the Institut für Demoskopie conducted a series of surveys to test the ef-
fectiveness of some of the particular pieces of CDU/CSU’s propaganda. Although
undertaken after the CDU/CSU had formulated its adv ertising campaign, one
survey clearly demonstrated that propaganda incorporating the name “Adenauer”
achieved more resonance than material mer ely bearing the label “CDU,” or at
least was less likely to trigger a negativ e reaction. This survey, conducted in July
1957, showed that respondents were more likely to agree with statements such as
“Adenauer has br ought Germany back onto its feet ” than ads r eplacing “Ade-
nauer” with “CDU/CSU.” 50 In addition, advertisements depicting the v arious
cabinet members were tested to ensur e that readers went away with the desir ed
image. Other aspects of the advertisements were tested as well, such as their clar-
ity and whether they generated inter est.51 Generally speaking, what the CDU/
CSU learned from these surveys was that personalities sold the party better than
the party could sell itself—an insight that clearly play ed itself out in the cam-
paign, much as it had in 1953. I n 1957 Adenauer’s extensive campaigning ma-
chine once again trav ersed the countr y—replete with his special election train,
dramatic processions escorting his black Mercedes into villages, rallies accompa-
nied by martial music, and posters proclaiming in anticipation, “HE comes!” be-
fore his arrival at a rally.52
This personification of the CDU/CSU was carried out largely in gender ed
terms. The CDU/CSU played off the resonance that Chancellor Adenauer com-
manded as an authoritativ e, patriarchal figure who pr ovided legitimacy to the
The Triumph of the Economic Miracle   |   217
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
West German state. In contrast, Erhard, the most popular member of Adenauer’s
cabinet, was portrayed as the approachable and amiable, yet capable economics min-
ister who had secur ed West Germany’s economic miracle. Clearly , CDU/CSU
campaign managers wanted to take advantage of Erhard’s image as a minister of
the people who represented the interests of average West German consumers, and
not merely industry.53 No longer, as it had done in the 1949 campaign, did the
CDU/CSU attempt to attract the “Christian housewife” by evoking an organic,
humanist West German society achieved through economic reconstruction. This
group was already solidly in the CDU/CSU camp . Instead, the CDU/CSU ap-
pealed to the female swing voters, who were more likely Protestant and nonreli-
gious, by illustrating the opportunities for consuming newly available products,
such as fashionable clothing, more varied foods, washing machines, and refriger-
ators, that satisfied the desires of individual women and their families. Back in the
1953 election, public opinion surveys had taught the CDU/CSU to avoid “cultural-
political issues” in the campaign for fear of alienating the nonr eligious members
of the electorate; instead the party stressed its leadership’s achievements in bring-
ing economic prosperity and security to West Germany.54 Most effectively, per-
haps, the CDU/CSU created and exploited Erhard’s image through an advertising
campaign entitled “Männer um Adenauer” (Men surrounding Adenauer) that high-
lighted Adenauer’s leadership and the support of his capable cabinet.
Since Erhard was the focal point of the CDU/CSU’ s pitch to female v oters,
particularly the undecided female v oters, the party’s advertising agent suggested
that Erhard be portrayed “as the defender of the consumer, optimally in a scene
with housewives”; thus one advertisement depicted Erhard at an outdoor market
among women doing their shopping (I llustration 6.1).55 The text, like that of
many other CDU/CSU advertisements, evoked the memory of the currency re-
form as the turning point in the narrativ e of West Germany’s economic r esur-
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gence. It recalled how Erhard had reassured the West German public with con-
vincing calls for reason in the face of uncertainty. This advertisement gave Erhard
masculine attributes b y linking him to A denauer and the CDU/CSU-led go v-
ernment. As it pointed out, “ Adenauer named the bold [mutagen] professor in
1949 as the Economics Minister in the first, freely elected government of the Fed-
eral Republic.” Erhard was referred to by both of his titles—“Professor” and “Fed-
eral Economics Minister”—thereby giving him an aura of authority and expertise
that helped legitimate his policies. Voicing Erhard’s concern for the consumer, the
advertisement noted that “[t]he good and sufficient car e [Versorgung] of con-
sumers, according to Erhard, is the basis of a healthy economy.” 
The text also forged a connection between Erhard and housewives, softening his
image and even giving it feminine characteristics. “Eighty percent of the wages and
income,” it commented, “go through the hands of the housewives. Therefore the
Economics Ministers especially likes to speak to them. For them he personally con-
cerns himself with prices. Housewives are his most important partner”—unmistak-
ably evoking the stories, retold in magazines such as Der Spiegel in 1953, of how
he would visit the local markets in Bonn and converse with the throngs of customers
there. He was described as one of them, but simultaneously a figure who moved
within the halls of power defending women’s interests as consumers. From this van-
tage point, Erhard’s image was slightly androgynous. The advertisement’s illustra-
tion encouraged this sense by placing Erhard among women in the feminine space
of the marketplace as he listened to their concerns, but meanwhile dressed him in a
formal suit and tie, indicating his involvement in the masculine world of politics.
The Institut für Demoskopie ran a survey that tested the public ’s reaction to
the advertisement—including whether readers found the ad interesting, visually
attractive, and informative, and how it affected their opinions. The final version
appeared with two changes fr om the draft. The title was changed to “Männer
neben Adenauer” (Men beside Adenauer), thereby suggesting a stronger connec-
tion to “Adenauer and his team” than the draft title of “Men around Adenauer.”
In addition, Erhard was without his trademark cigar in the final version because,
as the test sur vey indicated, r eaders were disturbed b y Erhard’s speaking with
housewives with a cigar in his mouth—another example of the softening of E r-
hard’s image. Forty percent of the respondents who had seen the advertisement re-
membered Erhard’s connection with the housewife and the consumer, the main
image that the CDU/CSU leadership wanted people to retain.56
An alternate advertisement portrayed Erhard in a more masculine light with a
stronger-looking profile of the economics minister looking over a scene of trucks,
cars, and foot traffic crossing the West German border and a text that explained
Erhard’s accomplishment of establishing West Germany’s position in the world
economy. Test surveys indicated that this advertisement possessed more resonance
with the public than the first Erhard advertisement, especially among men.57 Ap-
parently, however, the CDU/CSU more widely published the advertisement depict-
ing the “softer,” more approachable Erhard with housewives—particularly in the
leading women’s magazines with a clearly consumerist bent, such as Brigitte, Con-
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stanze, and Ihre Freundin. Not only did these magazines have a predominantly fe-
male readership, they also tended to have a heavier readership in larger cities and
in more Protestant areas such as Lower Saxony—where the CDU/CSU hoped to
peel away votes from the bourgeois par ties of the FDP and DP.58 Evidently the
party realized that the undecided female vote was key to its success and sought to
construct an image of E rhard with which women could identify and, giv en the
background of the magazines’ readership, deliver its message directly to a targeted
audience. Together, the campaign created a gendered sense of stability within the
CDU/CSU family, or as the slogan expressed it, “team.” Each member had his spe-
cific responsibility. Adenauer provided the political str ength to lead West Ger-
many’s diplomatic r elations in turbulent times, while E rhard’s policies enabled
West Germans to enjoy enhanced living standards at home. 
Another example of the “M en beside Adenauer” series, which was published
following the CDU’s May 1957 party conference, portrayed Erhard and Adenauer
in the midst of what appears to be an intense policy discussion (Illustration 6.2).
The visual depiction of E rhard’s working so closely with A denauer lent itself to
the CDU/CSU’s idea of building “Adenauer and his team.” Through his associa-
tion with Adenauer, Erhard assumed an image of stability and authority, a point
backed up with title “Professor” before Erhard’s name. The illustration put Erhard
physically close to Adenauer, but clearly in a subordinate role with Erhard posi-
tioned behind Adenauer and looking slightly up to him. The text emphasized the
visual impression. It made sur e to point out that A denauer had specifically se-
lected Erhard for the position of economics minister. Although the advertisement
clearly stressed the Erhard-Adenauer connection and put A denauer in the posi-
tion of authority, Erhard did take center stage, with the vie wer seeing the eco-
nomics minister’s face straight on, contrasted to the profile of Adenauer. 
Like much of the contemporary conservative propaganda that drew upon and
helped create the mythology surrounding the 1948 curr ency reform, the adver-
tisement recounted the massive change in economic fortunes since 1948. But in-
stead of merely talking about economic policies, the advertisement was crafted to
give the reader an impression of personalities. As in other ads, the text was devised
to portray Erhard as a man of action, a “bold” man. “He freed us from the guard-
ianship of ration car ds,” the ad exulted: “H e produced room in which healthy
competition could operate. He made the Deutsche Mark into one of the hardest
currencies in the world.” The beneficiaries of his labors are identified not as indi-
viduals, but as all Germans. Economic reconstruction helped establish West Ger-
many as the legitimate German state within the German nation. The text claimed
that “[n]ow and in the futur e we can help all G ermans only if we continue un-
deterred on our path. O nly this way will w e achieve reunification.” Via the ad-
vertisement’s text, Erhard and economic reconstruction are linked to Adenauer’s
statesmanship and stability. Although polling data are unavailable for this partic-
ular advertisement, data fr om similar adv ertisements suggest that male v oters
were the target audience of this appeal, especially given its placement of economic
issues in the context of the more masculine world of foreign affairs. 
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The magazine and newspaper advertising campaign was not the only approach
to creating the party’s image. With the help of the professional advertising firm of
Dr. Hegemann, the CDU/CSU launched an extremely effective poster campaign
in the months leading up to the election featuring painted portraits of Adenauer
and his cabinet. Like the whole campaign, the posters reaffirmed a sense of secu-
rity and stability under str ong leadership . Adenauer’s por trait, painted b y the
Austrian ar tist Professor Aigner, dramatically depicted a tanned, vibrant, and
young-looking 81-year-old chancellor whose pier cing blues ey es locked in the
viewer. In the bottom left-hand corner the slogan “No Experiments!” was boldly
inscribed over Adenauer’s name. A poster of the same series pr oclaiming “Pros-
perity for All!” portrayed Erhard as a determined and serious member of Adenauer’s
team. All the politicians ’ por traits were placed on a blank, white backgr ound,
drawing the viewers’ attention to the serious faces themselv es. In this important
respect, the poster campaign r eflected the “Ding an Sich” (thing in itself ) tradi-
tions of European poster art and advertising in which the focus of the ad was on
the inner qualities of a pr oduct, expressed through an evocative, aesthetic sensi-
bility. This approach contrasted with the CDU/CSU’s American-style magazine
ads, which created a meaning of the party’s political products—Adenauer and his
team—in a clear, social context. 
As U. W. Kitzinger commented in his analysis of the 1957 election, “Most ob-
vious to the casual observer—and most voters must have come into that category—
was the CDU’ s poster campaign. I t was an epitome of the whole, brilliant in
conception, executed professionally, centralized, expensive, and complete.” 59 In
contrast to the SPD, which relied on party members to place its posters, the CDU/
CSU farmed this time-consuming task out to a professional advertising firm. In-
deed, the firm was contracted so early that it was able to reserve the desirable lo-
cations in cities and towns; then, during the first week of August, it began placing
the posters. The mass saturation of posters was unpr ecedented. The advertising
agency that orchestrated the CDU/CSU’s poster campaign boasted in its after-report
that “[o]n all advertising pillars and billboards one saw the picture of the Chancel-
lor, whether in large cities or in the countr yside.” By the advertising firm’s esti-
mates, over ten million posters were mounted in towns and cities that were home
to 90.8 per cent of the West German population. I n fact, 53 per cent of those
queried in October 1957 remembered seeing the CDU/CSU’s handiwork.60
This report illustrated the model arrangement of the posters for the campaign
(Illustration 6.3). Adenauer was positioned at the top left of any r ow of posters.
Interspersed among portraits of Adenauer’s cabinet were the main campaign slo-
gans: “No Experiments,” “Actions count,” “On the 15th of September,” and “Vote
CDU/CSU.” Since the economics minister was the second most impor tant fig-
ure in the campaign, Erhard’s portrait was invariably placed to the right of Ade-
nauer above the slogan “Wohlstand für Alle” (Prosperity for All). Taken as a whole,
the poster campaign constituted a striking visual statement of the campaign ’s
central concepts. The portraits themselves depicted serious, take-charge men, an
effect intensified by the coloration of the portraits. The lining up of the multiple
222 |   Selling the Economic Miracle
This open access edition has been made available under a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 license thanks to the support of Knowledge Unlatched. Not for resale. 
portraits, punctuated by the key campaign slogans, communicated to the nation
an image of a unified team of responsible leaders. The SPD’s poster campaign con-
trasted sharply with the CDU/CSU’s. In this decidedly more understated cam-
paign, with portraits often half the size of Adenauer’s, the SPD’s Ollenhauer looked
inconspicuous and ineffectual in comparison to the towering chancellor.61
In addition to linking Erhard with Adenauer to symbolize West German pros-
perity and security, the CDU/CSU propaganda stressed the rising consumerism
enjoyed by many individual West Germans. The link between economics-related
propaganda and Adenauer was designed to convey a sense of security for the na-
tion as a whole. Economics helped underscore the legitimacy of the Adenauer
government, and by association the whole West German state, in the eyes of the
electorate. Yet much of the CDU/CSU’s propaganda did not allude only to secu-
rity and stability in the public sphere, but also to the enhanced fulfillment of in-
dividual desires for consumer goods and with that the creation of a sense of
security within the private sphere. In this respect, the 1957 campaign fully devel-
oped the approach begun in the 1953 campaign of portraying the private action
of consumption as the actualization of Adenauer and Erhard’s public policies. The
sense of private economic security engendered by consumption paralleled an over-
all sense of public security created by the CDU/CSU’s leadership and its policies.
The CDU/CSU propaganda linked these two spheres by showing how its policies
created the opportunity for individual West German citizens to pursue new lev-
els of consumption—thereby achieving their sense of private security. In turn, 
by pursuing consumption, West Germans were proving and strengthening the 
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validity of CDU/CSU policies. By making this connection, the CDU/CSU oblit-
erated any distinction or difference between what might be considered private de-
cisions of consumption and more public acts of civic par ticipation. To consume
passively was tantamount to civic par ticipation in the ne wly formed West Ger-
man democracy, and other than casting v otes all that was asked for b y the Ade-
nauer government. 
In preparation for the campaign, the CDU sought to investigate public percep-
tions of consumption, prosperity, and security. It arranged in March 1957 for the
Institut für Demoskopie to conduct what amounted to a focus-group testing of the
slogan “Prosperity for all.” That slogan was already closely associated with the CDU/
CSU’s main economic spokesman, L udwig Erhard, who earlier that y ear had
published a book b y the same title that r ecounted the social mar ket economy’s
principles and successes. The Institut’s survey interviewed 50 men and women
who were considered to be working-class with the primary goal of comparing the
relative effectiveness of the slogans “Prosperity for all” and “Property for all.”62
The sur vey initially explor ed what “ prosperity” meant to the r espondents.
Generally speaking, they conceived of prosperity as “the securing of the most im-
portant requirements of daily life, such as food, work, clothing, and caring for the
old.” During free time it inv olved going to the theater or mo vies, pursuing a
hobby, and taking a vacation. For them, the concept of “prosperity” very seldom
extended to luxuries or higher-end ar ticles such as automobiles and homes. A c-
cording to the survey, the slogan “Prosperity for all” strongly resonated with this
group. Most of the respondents (27 out of 50) had a positive reaction to a poster
bearing that slogan. Perhaps most significantly for the CDU/CSU campaign, 30
out of 50 respondents regarded the slogan as attainable. In other words, the ma-
jority believed that economic security was at hand for West Germans. In addition,
the respondents favored the slogan “Prosperity for all” over “Property for all” (29
vs. 6, with 15 no opinion). 63 Opinion surveys translated directly into campaign
strategy. One campaign planning r eport commented that “P rosperity for All ”
should be favored over other slogans because the Institut für Demoskopie survey
deemed it “not as annoying or provocative” as “Property for all.” Informed by this
survey, the CDU/CSU w ent forward with “Prosperity for all” as one of its cor e
slogans of the campaign.64
Beginning in August and through the duration of the campaign, the CDU/
CSU capitalized on the survey’s insights by running a barrage of advertisements
in newspapers and illustrated TV, radio, and women’s magazines. Designed by the
Dr. Hegemann advertising firm, the same outfit that had planned and conducted
the CDU/CSU’s poster campaign, the adv ertising series pr oclaimed “It’s going
better for all of us.”65 With their combination of illustrations, slogans, and text,
the ads had the feel of commercial advertising common in newspapers and mag-
azines. Each ad invited the reader into a shared experience of consumerism, one
supposedly common to all West Germans with the three variations proclaiming
that, “The clothing closet attests:” “ The paycheck attests:” and “ The shopping
bag attests:” (I llustration 6.4, I llustration 6.5, and I llustration 6.6). The telling 
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illustrations depicted scenes of the new prosperity, consumerism, and familial se-
curity: a woman clothes shopping on a busy str eet packed with cars and pedes-
trian traffic, a man returning home to his family bearing a gift for his child, and
a woman shopping for food with her baby in front of a market overflowing with
goods. In contrast to the 1949 campaign, the 1957 election propaganda featured
no “women standing alone.” I nstead, the adv ertisements suggested each figur e
was part of a stable, “ complete” family enjoying the material benefits and com-
forts of the economic miracle. 
The text of each adv ertisement recounted the incr eased availability of con-
sumer goods and the establishment of a stable, hard Deutsche Mark. Linking these
developments together were Erhard’s economic policies. The ads asked the reader
to look to the back to the days of the immediate postwar period when there were
shortages of food, clothing, and jobs; then it contrasted the situation at the pr e-
sent. The last paragraph of the text was identical in all three variations of the ad-
vertisements. Building upon the r esults of the I nstitut für D emoskopie’s focus
group, the advertisements proclaimed: “‘Prosperity for all’ is no longer a slogan.
‘Prosperity for all’ is and will become reality—for many already today, surely for
all tomorrow. It will continue upwards as it has up until now, step by step, if we
avoid all experiments.” These advertisements packaged economic expansion as
fulfilling individual materialistic desir es. Economic prosperity was not about
achieving reunification or the reconstruction of a new organic, Christian German
community, but instead about increasing personal consumption. All one had to
do was “Look around your household. Open your closet. That attests: It’s going
better for us, much much better for all of us.” However, this individualistic con-
sumption did have more public ramifications: b y participating in consumption
and supporting the party that had brought it about, the adv ertisement implied,
the individual consumer/voter was encouraging impr ovement in conditions for
West Germans of all social classes—ther eby bringing all citizens together in the
West German community. In this respect, much as had been done in the 1953
campaign, individual consumerism was defined not only as a private act of choice,
but also as one with more public and civic dimensions. Individual prosperity was,
in fact, “prosperity for all.” 
Not only did the ads simultaneously emphasize the new consumerism emerg-
ing in West Germany as a goal in itself and also as a practice having more public
implications, but they also played off the mythology and image that had emerged
around Erhard as part of “Adenauer and his team.” As two of the ads commented,
Erhard had kept the promise he made, back in the darkest days following the war,
of better times ahead. The party was not selling any economic policy or ideology,
but personalities. In fact, at this point the CDU/CSU made no r eal mention in
the campaign of the social mar ket economy or its sociopolitical implications.
This economic policy was now merely personified in the figure of Ludwig Erhard
and manifested by the consumer goods themselves. 
In many respects the CDU/CSU’s advertisements reflected some of the senti-
ments created and disseminated through Erhard’s various public relations efforts.
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Ever since his work in the 1930s with Wilhelm Vershofen at the Society for Con-
sumer Research, Erhard had clearly grasped the importance of public opinion and
sentiment not only in patterns of consumption but also in politics and public pol-
icy. Throughout the 1950s Erhard had been very active in managing public opin-
ion. Clearly, Adenauer and the CDU/CSU sometimes r esented Erhard’s public
relations machine, since it did not always adhere to the party policy positions (es-
pecially on the issue of anticar tel legislation) and could potentially div ert finan-
cial contributions from the party. 
However, by the 1957 election the CDU/CSU was clearly tapping into the
image that had been created around Erhard. On the level of influencing the opin-
ion of politicians, journalists, and educators, Erhard benefited from the work of
the Aktionsgemeinschaft S oziale Marktwirtschaft (Action Group for the S ocial
Market Economy) that had been activ e since 1953. In addition, he enjoyed the
support of the so-called Erhard Brigade, a group of journalists and Bundestag rep-
resentatives working to spr ead Erhard’s ideas of the social mar ket economy.
Named after the “Brigade Ehrhardt,” a Freikorps unit involved in the failed Kapp
Putsch of 1920, this group acted as a pressure group supporting Erhard’s ongoing
efforts for increased economic liberalization and effective anticartel legislation.66
In early 1957 Erhard published his book Wohlstand für Alle (published in English
as Prosperity through Competition), which r ecounted the dev elopment of the 
social market economy in West Germany and its successes. In terms of more im-
mediate impact on the 1957 election campaign, industrial and commercial inter-
ests distributed 12 million copies of the illustrated magazine Wir Alle (All of Us).
This visually attractiv e publication contained accounts of “ average” West Ger-
mans r eflecting on adv ances in wages and oppor tunities in consumerism that
West Germany had enjo yed. Like other pr o-Erhard propaganda it str essed his
deep concern for av erage consumers in a highly personal way—for example
through his answ ering letters with questions fr om individual West Germans.
Meanwhile, SPD leaders w ere connected to crass M arxism—perhaps most
crudely by including a photo of O llenhauer sitting in front of a portrait of Karl
Marx and allowing the readers to reach their own conclusions. 
At the forefront of effor ts to constr uct a mythology ar ound Erhard was, of
course, Die Waage’s advertising. S ince 1953 it had conducted publicity cam-
paigns with advertising series handling issues such as prices, work hours, and the
relationship of productivity and living standards. These efforts were considerable
as the organization spent DM 1.1 million, DM 1.6 million, and DM 900,000 in
1954, 1955, and 1956 r espectively. Although in non-election y ears Die Waage
concentrated on more purely economic issues or labor relations, in many respects
the organization helped prepare the ground for the CDU/CSU to r eap the har-
vest in the 1957 election. One of the Die Waage campaigns starting in 1955 cen-
tered on ads depicting Erhard making appeals directly to the West German people
or segments of the citizenry—such as housewives, small savers, workers, and in-
dustrialists—while also responding to current developments in the economy. Die
Waage’s executive committee hesitated to under take such a campaign, since the
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organization wanted to focus on the adv antages of the social mar ket economy
rather than generate publicity for a single political figure. However, given the in-
sistence and financial suppor t from Erhard’s camps, D ie Waage assisted in the
technical development of the “Erhard Column.” There were clearly advantages to
focusing on Erhard. One of Die Waage’s reports on the campaign explained that
Erhard “counts as the most popular member of the federal cabinet, and indeed
not only because his ministerial work has brought visible fruit for everyone, but
also because his unique temperament, his occasional inclination toward impulsive-
ness and not least because of his Bonhomie.” 67 However, as the election neared,
Erhard exerted more pressure on Die Waage to change their tactics. I n an April
1956 meeting with Die Waage’s executive committee, he argued that the Fritz and
Otto ads should be ended. 68 He later pushed for the “E rhard Column” ads to
come to the for e in pr eparation for the election campaign and for D ie Waage’s 
financial resources to be directed to such an effort.69
Despite this conflict in the 1957 campaign, the CDU/CSU and D ie Waage
worked much more closely than in 1953 to coordinate the themes developed in
their propaganda. A letter from Erich Peter Neumann, the political liaison for the
Institut für Demoskopie, to Die Waage’s treasurer, Alphons Horten, highlighted
some of these connections between the CDU/CSU and Die Waage. Neumann re-
ported to Horten that Otto Lenz, Adenauer’s state secretary and the mastermind
behind the government’s propaganda efforts, had agreed to a meeting with D ie
Waage and was interested in “how they [Die Waage and the CDU/CSU] could
pursue coordinated advertisements. He [Lenz] had agr eed with the Chancellor
that close collaboration is something to aim for.”70 Here Die Waage’s public pro-
nouncements that it was not aligned with any particular party were brought into
serious question. Undoubtedly, Die Waage hoped for a victory by the “bourgeois”
parties when it solicited funds, but it appears that in more private moments, Die
Waage’s leadership sought to lend direct support to the CDU/CSU.71
With this cooperation, Die Waage’s advertisements harmonized well with the
CDU/CSU’s vision of the main themes of the campaign: security , stability, and
prosperity. In fact, several of the Die Waage advertisements appearing before the
election echoed the CDU/CSU’s slogans with “No experiments” and “We know
what we have.” As one pr oposal within the organization suggested, the main
theme of the ads for the election year was “freedom from fear.” The report saw West
Germans as being gripped b y fear: fear of the rise in prices, fear of unemplo y-
ment, and fear of an economic do wnturn. The emphasis, much like the CDU/
CSU’s, was upon demonstrating the tangible benefits of Erhard’s economic poli-
cies that all West Germans enjoyed and showing that the alternatives would jeop-
ardize the economic benefits they had secured. An important component of this
advertising campaign was to stress that reliance upon the state through a planned
economy would not alleviate the fears of rising prices. The only sure way to safe-
guard the economic achievements made since the currency reform was to stay the
course, an unsurprising position to take in support of a party in power. This mes-
sage of “freedom from fear” was to reach both the middle classes—whose bour-
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geois values had to be r econstructed after previous governments had wiped out
their savings—and the working class. The working class, the report warned, had
reached new income levels, but had not y et taken on middle-class practices and
attitudes, such as savings and home ownership, and was still potentially under the
influence of the “old slogans.”72
Throughout all of D ie Waage’s ad campaigns, ther e were concerns that D ie
Waage’s advertisements were not reaching their targeted working-class audience
because they were not being placed in the newspapers most read by workers.73 As
a result, in the 1957 election campaign, D ie Waage utilized some new methods
for spreading its message in order to reach not only Dr. Lieschen Müller, but also
Lieschen Müller, that is not only for Dr. John Doe, but also John Doe. Fritz and
Otto remained the main characters in the dialogue series. B ut this was supple-
mented by a monologue series that would represent “our economy to various types
of people.” Also, a car toon series would speak to a less-educated r eadership that
was harder to r each through purely textual adv ertisements.74 In addition, Die
Waage produced a car toon film entitled “B ehalte deinen klar en Blick” (Retain
your clear view) that recounted the achievements of the social mar ket economy
and reminded viewers of conditions only tw elve years before. Throughout the
film, when things were “seen through the wrong lens,” the screen turned red and
showed the plight of the gaunt-looking workers laboring under the planned econ-
omy with its shortages and poor conditions. In addition to the cartoon film, Die
Waage produced eighteen different ads appearing in ne wspapers and magazines
with a total circulation of 22 million copies in preparation for the election.75
The format of the Fritz and Otto series had evolved a bit from its earlier man-
ifestations. Instead of a dialogue in which Fritz finally reaches a “clearer” under-
standing of the economy after a bit of persuasion fr om Otto, in this series both
Fritz and Otto agreed right from the start. In addition, Fritz and Otto appeared
decidedly more middle-class as they were dressed in jackets and ties in all the il-
lustrations, giving the impression that somehow the two characters had risen out
of the working class. To a large extent, D ie Waage’s advertisements underscored
the idea that West Germany society had undergone a “deproletariatization.” The
message was that the social mar ket economy had not merely facilitated material
betterment of the rich, but had impr oved the conditions of all West Germans.
With this belief in the social mar ket economy, Die Waage hoped, the wor king
class would not only vote for the CDU/CSU, but also could be weaned from its
more radical demands for wage raises or codetermination. 
From this perspectiv e the message of the adv ertisement with the banner
“Everyone has a part of it!” was clear: the time had arriv ed when broad sections
of West German society had achieved true prosperity (Illustration 6.7). Standing
with his pal Otto before a prominently featured refrigerator, Fritz gushed that he
could afford a motor-scooter, that Brigitte, his wife, had a washing machine, and
that refrigerators had been twice the price only four years before. But he regarded
the new pension program as the most important result of Erhard’s economic poli-
cies because it spr ead the w ealth to ev eryone. Made possible b y the success of 
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Erhard’s economic principles, he explained, it was a tr ue example of the social
market economy, ignoring that Erhard, in fact, was opposed to the new pension
system. As Fritz put it, “From nothing comes nothing!” The advertisement con-
cluded, as did all of Die Waage’s appeals in the 1957 campaign, “We therefore are
sticking with Erhard’s social market economy in the future.” 
Clearly, the ad was making use of the symbolic capital that the refrigerator had
acquired in West Germany. Polling indicated by the second half of the 1950s that
the refrigerator had become the focus of West Germans’ consumerist aspirations.
Debates between left and right had raged upon the av ailability and meaning of
the refrigerator. In the summer of 1953 Erhard and trade unionists had exchanged
barbs in a series of articles appearing in Welt der Arbeit. One article attacked Er-
hard’s economic policy as benefiting only capital and demanded higher wages and
more equitable income distribution so that everyone could enjoy the products of
modern technology. In a 16 June 1953 ar ticle entitled “A Refrigerator in Every
Household,” Erhard responded that initially any luxury good, which a refrigera-
tor was in 1953, was consumed b y the rich. Holding the line on possible infla-
tion, Erhard argued that mer ely granting consumer cr edit would not sustain a
rising living standard. Rather, increased productivity was ultimately the only way
to increase real purchasing power. This was the way, Erhard noted, that the auto-
mobile had been transformed fr om a luxur y good to a common ar ticle in the
United States.76 Evoking such earlier discussions, D ie Waage made it clear that
this time of prosperity was now at hand. 
Not only the Otto and Fritz series, but all of Die Waage’s advertisements pro-
jected the same view: West Germany’s material conditions had markedly improved
since the 1948 curr ency reform, wealth was being equally distributed thr ough 
society, and all sections of society w ere enjoying a consumerist sense of comfor t
and security—echoing some of the organization’s 1956 ads that the “class war has
come to an end.” The comics series (I llustration 6.8) portrayed West Germans as
taking part in a new consumerism that many w ere already actually enjoying, or
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hoped to enjo y in the near futur e. The characters w ere depicted buying autos,
building their o wn homes, going to the mo vies, and talking about pur chasing
new suits and appliances. It was Erhard’s economic system that made “Life worth
living again,” as one strip commented. The monologue series str essed the same
ideas by depicting v arious people within West Germany—the elderly, women,
children, or apprentices. The social market economy took these different segments
of society and r econstructed a new West German community based upon con-
sumerism. One advertisement bearing the slogan “A new life obtained!” pictured
a refugee woman who, as the text explained, had fled to West Germany with her
children when her prisoner-of-war husband failed to return home (Illustration 6.9).
No mention appeared of the psychological hardships stemming from her life dur-
ing the Third Reich or experiences of flight, distancing her from any discomforting
connections to the old r egime. Instead, her stor y begins during the occupation
period in 1947. With her husband absent, she and her children were expelled from
Upper S ilesia and suddenly “left with nothing.” The advertisement explained
that the social market economy had made possible a new life, a solid income, and
a secure future for this woman “standing alone.” In this way the achievement of ma-
terial well-being was privileged over and insulated against any psychological or spir-
itual rehabilitation. In Die Waage’s view material security made any psychological
insecurity practically irrelevant, thereby creating a feeling of “freedom from fear.” 
Through these various advertisements, the CDU/CSU and Die Waage identi-
fied and adapted to an ev olving trend in West German consumerism and suc-
ceeded in attaching a political meaning to it. I ndeed, giv en their access to 
a wealth of public opinion data, they w ere exceptionally well informed of the
changes occurring in West German society. As Otto Lenz commented in a for-
ward to a 1956 Institut für Demoskopie study on the “Social Reality”: “We live
in an age of social upheaval. The fact that this change proceeds silently and its ef-
fect is bar ely perceived, does not change its r evolutionary character.” Increased
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free time and ne w consumer goods, par ticularly the r efrigerator had become
“symbols of the aspirations of civilization of the broadest social masses.” Market
research and public opinion polling clearly r evealed the rising expectations of
West German consumers in the midst of the economic miracle. I n a summer
1955 survey, 49 percent of respondents indicated their belief that an electric r e-
frigerator was an essential part of a proper living standard, although very few West
Germans stated that they actually owned such an appliance. Despite their grow-
ing aspirations, most West Germans viewed their financial circumstances as quite
favorable: 27 percent of respondents regarded their income as “good” and another
42 percent as “sufficient.”77
Michael Wildt has argued that there were two phases of consumption in West
Germany during the 1950s. I n the y ears immediately follo wing the 1948 cur-
rency reform, West Germans spent most of their incomes trying to replace basic
goods lost during the war, such as food, shelter, and clothing. This changed dra-
matically during the 1950s. I n 1950, 46.4 per cent of the income of an av erage
four-person working household w ent for food. B y 1960 this had decr eased to
36.2 percent. To be sure, most West Germans’ budgets continued to be tight, but
beginning around 1957 the demand for luxur y goods star ted to increase. More
money was spent at first on luxury goods such as coffee, tea, alcohol, and tobacco,
fashionable clothing, and mo vie tickets. I n fact, 1956 was a high point in the
number of movie-goers in the Federal Republic, tallied at 818 million in that year.
A few years later this rise in luxury consumption was followed by increased spend-
ing on vacations, travel, beauty products, and electrical appliances such as refrig-
erators, televisions, and electric o vens.78 Throughout their adv ertisements, Die
Waage por trayed these consumer goods that w ere still not affor dable for most
West Germans as the norm, ther eby strengthening the impression of West Ger-
many’s material progress. For example, Die Waage’s advertisement “Everyone has
a part of it!” prominently featured the refrigerator as a normal consumer good, al-
though official statistics showed that in 1955 only 11 per cent of West Germans
actually owned the product. By 1958 this figure had grown to 21 percent and to
almost 52 per cent by 1962. 79 The CDU/CSU and D ie Waage exploited this
growing realization of consumerism and ever increasing expectations and associ-
ated them with specific political conceptions. Consumerism was not merely con-
cerned with fulfilling needs or desir es, but was connected to ideas of West
German legitimacy as a whole, overall social harmony, and a sense of individual
security provided by the Adenauer-led government. There is no hint in the ad-
vertisements about the moral and social hazards of increased materialism—con-
cerns so often ar ticulated by the CDU/CSU immediately follo wing the war, in
the 1949 campaign, and by social conservatives throughout the 1950s.80
In fact, E rhard defended the implications of consumerism in a chapter of
Wohlstand für Alle entitled “Does Prosperity Lead to Materialism?” He explained
that despite objections that the social mar ket economy had led society to ward a
“corrupting materialism,” all economic activity and increased productivity in fact
had the goal of “opening up improved and freer ways of living for the whole peo-
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ple.” This economic progress would “liberate man from material want and stress”
and indeed, with increasing prosperity would decrease materialism since “an in-
crease in prosperity created the environment in which man is lifted from a purely
primitive materialistic way of thinking.” E rhard redefined consumerism, once a
force that shackled the G erman people to materialistic driv es that manifested
themselves in Nazism or communism, as one that liberated them to form a more
harmonious, just, and free society. Whether true social conservatives were buying
such a message is questionable at best, but in any case the party was clearly trying
to adapt its consumerist vision to the electorate.81
The advertisements of Die Waage and the CDU/CSU mirr ored sociological
developments taking place in West Germany as perceived by Helmut Schelsky, a
prominent 1950s sociologist who str ongly advocated a social policy that sup-
ported domestic roles for women. In his book, Wandlungen der deutschen Familie
in der Gegenwart (The Transformation of the German Family at the Present Time),
Schelsky argued that although the upheav al of war and the immediate postwar
years had been extr emely dangerous for the family , the 1950s w ere seeing the 
regeneration and strengthening of the family. Both men and women retreated to
the family as a source of stability and security after the upheaval of the 1930s and
1940s. Schelsky detected a growing trend of women wanting to take up roles within
the household and as mothers, while men w ere to provide financial support for
the family.82 Other studies suppor ted Schelsky’s vie w. One 1956 sociological
study conducted in West Berlin investigated the attitudes of wor king mothers.
The majority of interviewees living in “complete” families, which were defined as
a family with a husband, wife, and childr en, desired higher wages and job secu-
rity for men so that “mothers won’t be forced to take up employment.”83
Undoubtedly, the economic depression of the early 1930s, the war years of the
first half of the 1940s, and the so-called hunger years of second half of that decade
had a critical impact upon West Germans’ sear ch for familial security in the
1950s.84 Schelsky argued that hand in hand with the r econstruction of the fam-
ily within an ever expanding, open economy went the decline of the importance
of class stratification, identity, and tensions during the 1950s as a “leveled middle-
class society” (nivellierte Mittelstandsgesellschaft) was created. The destruction of
the Second World War and the ensuing flight of r efugees brought down the so-
cial levels of some, while new economic, professional, and living opportunities in
postwar West Germany permitted others to rise—resulting in an ever increasingly
middle-class and less ideological society. To Schelsky, the rise of consumerism was
an essential feature in this transformation of West German society. 85
Undoubtedly, as Robert Moeller has argued, Schelsky figur ed in the creation
of a conser vative social policy , spearheaded b y the CDU/CSU, that sought to
construct an idealiz ed “complete” family of wor king father and stay-at-home
mother that did not often correspond to reality as rates of women working out-
side the home rose during the 1950s. In the early 1960s, two thirds of working-
class families needed women to work in order to maintain their standard of living.
In addition, as E lizabeth Heineman has sho wn, marriage rates of women in-
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creased dramatically during the 1950s, r esulting in r elatively historic lev els of
marriage despite the continuing “surplus of women” of about 3 million. However,
single women after the war tended increasingly to be ones who were widowed or
divorced and suppor ting a household with dependents, as compar ed to single
women who had nev er married—as was the case for most single women befor e
the war. Others have argued that although income levels continually rose during
the 1950s, Schelsky’s view of a “leveled-out middle class society” did not reflect
West Germany’s social conditions as class differences continued and the concen-
tration of wealth remained relatively uneven.86
Although conservative visions of society did not corr espond to an empirical 
reality, they did hav e great political utility. With their access to public opinion
polling, Die Waage and the CDU/CSU w ere able to cr eate a coher ent and at-
tractive picture of a reconstructed West German political, social, and family life
that resonated with the West German public. It was a portrayal that echoed Schel-
sky’s vision of a passiv e, consumerist, middle-class, and non-ideological West
German society. The 1957 campaign successfully made use of the West Germans’
desire for stability—be it political, economic, social, or familial—while at the
same it exploited their fear that all gains might be lost. The different gendered im-
ages surrounding the national political figures of Adenauer and Erhard created a
sense of public stability within the family of the CDU/CSU and also of West
Germany that ran parallel to the scenes of private familial security in conservative
propaganda. While Adenauer looked after West Germany’s standing in the world,
Erhard concentrated on the domestic issues of economics and impr ovement of
West German living standards. From this perspective, the CDU/CSU and its par-
allel propaganda projected an image of itself imbued with the values that the so-
ciologist Schelsky described as vital to West Germans: wholeness, completeness,
stability, and security. The CDU/CSU promised these values, in large measur e,
through the passive consumerism of the economic miracle and b y avoiding any
risky “experiments.” 
Compared to earlier campaigns, the CDU/CSU did not often attack the SPD
directly—in part because it did not want to hand the party any free publicity. The
campaign followed the commer cial advertising motto that “P ersil [a West Ger-
man laundr y detergent] talks only of P ersil.”87 The par ty took this appr oach
knowing that it was unlikely to lur e voters from the SPD. This was a campaign
in which the CDU/CSU pr esented itself as bey ond mere party ideology and as
working in the interests of all parts of this mythical “leveled middle-class society.”
The messages of security and prosperity were ones that could appeal to support-
ers of the smaller parties within the bourgeois camp. If anything, the CDU/CSU’s
attacks on the SPD could be seen less as a way of wooing prospective voters from
the SPD than as a portrayal of the CDU/CSU as the only party strong and stable
enough to thwart the SPD threat. On the occasions when the CDU/CSU actu-
ally attacked the SPD directly, it was Adenauer who led the charge. Perhaps the
most famous of these attacks was a 7 J uly 1957 speech in N uremberg in which
Adenauer claimed that a SPD victor y would be “ the ruin [Untergang] of Ger-
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many”—especially in r egard to the SPD’ s position against A denauer’s policy of
Western alignment. Hans-Peter Schwarz has suggested that this was A denauer’s
calculated attempt to answer the SPD’s stirring up of fear within the electorate—
particularly in r egard to possible nuclear r earmament—by kindling an ev en
greater counter vailing fear. To be sur e, the go vernment-supported ADK spent
much of the summer of 1957 conv ening hundreds of rallies and meetings that
clearly delineated the threat of the Soviet Union to not only West Germany, but
to the West in general.88 In most cases, the CDU/CSU defined the SPD more in-
directly—especially by using the “N o experiments” slogan. I f the CDU/CSU’s
overriding metaphor was that Adenauer and his team were the protective, capa-
ble parents providing all forms of security for the West German people, the en-
tailment of “no experiments” was that the SPD represented something dangerous,
unproven, and alien to the West German family—a sentiment that despite the
postwar evolution of the SPD ran deep in the psyche of bourgeois Germany and
was particularly acute within the context of the Cold War. 
In contrast to the CDU/CSU campaign that r elied so heavily on polling and
advertising consultants, from a technical viewpoint the SPD approached the elec-
tion campaign in a much different manner. The party was in the process of mod-
ernizing its campaigning in hopes of r eaching out to ne w segments of West
German society, but there was clearly hesitation and division within the party re-
garding what these ne w campaigning techniques meant in terms of its policies
and its relationship to the working class, its political base. In preparation for the
campaign, the party’s executive committee commissioned various opinion surveys
to provide a basis for its campaign strategy , with an ey e particularly toward de-
veloping propaganda for gr oups of what it called “ soft voters” whom the com-
mittee felt might be swayed to the Social Democratic camp.89 Their surveys were
useful in painting broad trends in public opinion; however, the party did not care-
fully test the resonance of particular pieces of propaganda within the public. As a
result, the SPD’s propaganda appealed primarily to the party’s main working-class
constituents, despite the new use of polling and advertising techniques. 
For several years the SPD had been commissioning polls fr om EMNID to
track general public opinion trends. Leading up to the election, the SPD retained
DIVO to conduct various surveys that dealt specifically with election issues. Very
early on in the election preparations, the surveys indicated that the rise in prices
was a possible issue on which the SPD could go on the offensiv e. One goal was
to “make the CDU-Minister Erhard responsible for the price increases.” In terms
of economics, the surveys, like those commissioned b y the CDU/CSU, showed
that the rise in prices was the chief concern among the population. I n addition,
75 percent of respondents believed that the federal go vernment could do much
more to help control the rise in prices.90 Overall, the attack on prices increases was
part of the larger campaign theme that the SPD represented security for all West
Germans, a campaigning approach supported by Fritz Heine, the chairperson of
the Werbung und Propaganda Ausschuß (Advertising and Propaganda Commit-
tee) and the party’s campaign manager.91
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As the SPD realized, its financial limitations required that it concentrate efforts
upon a number of specific target gr oups in order to expand its share of the vote
in the upcoming Bundestag election. Coming out of the 1953 election, the SPD
had sought to profit from some “lessons learned.” One report analyzing political
attitudes through 1955 commented that the SPD tended to appeal to its tradi-
tional voters at the expense of trying to attract new ones. The report divided vot-
ers into categories of “soft” or “hard” party supporters. As it observed, “The ‘soft’
voter is above all pragmatic. . . . He feels no loyalty to a certain party and changes
to any party which he believ es will best consider his inter ests.” The “soft” voter
supported the CDU/CSU because he saw his own economic situation improving.
The report saw that the traditional German electoral milieu and subcultures were
loosening in the postwar society, in part because of the growth of an increasingly
middle-class society, and that the SPD must find ways to seize advantage of such
larger social changes. The report concluded that for the SPD to overcome the “30
percent hurdle,” it must do a better job of targeting the “ soft” voters. The party
should not change its fundamental policies, but the “soft” voters and “hard” vot-
ers who w ere the traditional SPD suppor ter had to be attracted to the par ty
through different appeals. The “soft” voter capable of being won over tended to
be better educated and younger, have a higher income, and inhabit larger popu-
lation centers.92 This conceptualization of “ soft” and “hard” supporters became
fundamental to formulating the SPD’ s strategy in the upcoming election and
highlighted a crucial challenge for the SPD leadership: H ow could the party at-
tract new supporters without alienating its base? 
As the 1957 election approached, the SPD’s public opinion surveys indicated
that there was a substantial group that could be won over to the SPD, and pros-
pects looked good for the SPD in late 1956. The popularity of the CDU/CSU
had fallen through the year, and in fact had dropped behind that of the SPD by
November 1956. In addition, there were about 4 million new voters as compared
to the 1953 election. In January 1957 Fritz Heine figured that there were still 10
million undecided v oters, of which about half w ere going to v ote. Ollenhauer,
however, commented at a meeting of the executive committee that “[w]e should
not overestimate the wor th of the polls, but nev ertheless we should pay serious 
attention to them, especially in r egard to the high percentage of undecided vot-
ers.”93 Polling reports from the autumn of 1956 repeated earlier results and indi-
cated the specific target groups, making up 37 percent of all eligible voters, that
the SPD felt it could potentially win over. These groups consisted of “soft” SPD
voters, “soft” CDU voters, “soft” voters of the smaller par ties, undecided voters
with SPD inclinations, and undecided v oters with CDU inclinations. The un-
decided voters and the “soft” voters of the CDU and smaller parties tended to be
from the middle class and have a professional background. The report recommended
that the SPD test the effectiveness of its appeals to the “soft” voters through pub-
lic opinion polling, in addition to continually tracking the fluctuations of these
groups between the two main par ties.94 Despite these recommendations, in the
end the SPD failed to utilize public opinion polling to track the effectiv eness of
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its propaganda, and the party’s central strategy of targeting the “soft” and unde-
cided voters ultimately fell flat.95
The SPD began formulating its technical appr oach for the campaign w ell 
in advance of the 1957 election. A t the 1956 Parteitag (party congress) Bruno
Gleitze, a polling expert within the party, spoke to the assembly about revamping
the SPD’s political advertising. He stressed that political propaganda must be sold
as if it were a “brand name product.” Although such a campaigning philosophy
was critical for success, Gleitze argued that the party’s propaganda should not be
too loud or contain exaggerated phrasing, thereby echoing common condemna-
tions of older advertising styles. His comments reflected some of the changing at-
titudes within the party toward a potential clash between substance and image in
party propaganda. He observed that “[t]he simple person does not make the ef-
fort to take apart sentences or sort through ideas. What is not immediately picked
up by him and does not elicit a positiv e reaction, has alr eady evaporated.”96 A
1956 article by Klaus Besser in Die Neue Gesellschaft, a Social Democratic maga-
zine founded by some of the party reformers, supported Gleitze’s position. The ar-
ticle explained that in or der for the SPD to r each out to ne w social groups, the
party must devise new ways to speak to these potential voters. The SPD’s election
campaigns, the article claimed, had been run too much by politicians rather than
advertising and publicity experts. The relation between the party and voter should
be similar to that of pr oducer and consumer. Echoing CDU/CSU strategies, an
election campaign should not be based upon factual arguments or a good pr o-
gram, the article explained, but rather upon personalities that embody the party.
These personalities of party must somehow respond to the “primitive demands”
that lay within the electorate.97 Besser’s position was quickly attacked by the po-
litical scientist Klaus Schültz, who argued that such an appr oach to politics was
bound to fail. He argued that many of the “soft” voters fell within the bourgeois
camp. The only way to br eak into this group of voters, bring them out of their
traditional decision-making mold, and attract them to the SPD was to center the
campaign upon concr ete, positiv e arguments and not upon personalities and
image. Despite his concerns, Schültz did agree that the party must do a better job
of directing its advertisements to the correct voting groups and not merely speak
to party leaders and members.98
This divided approach to the campaign was r eflected within the par ty’s lead-
ing circles. Overall, the Advertising and Propaganda Committee advocated a SPD
campaign that differed from the CDU/CSU’s. Well over a year before the elec-
tion, the committee began debating whether the SPD should r un a r elatively
more negativ e campaign, or concentrate on a factual, positiv e campaign. The
committee decided at the time that before a decision could be made the executive
committee should authorize some polling to provide some sense of the public sen-
timents.99 At a January 1957 meeting of the Advertising and Propaganda Com-
mittee, Fritz Heine identified thr ee options for the upcoming campaign: an
aggressive, negative campaign, one that was factual and positive, or one in which
the SPD would represent itself as the party of national unity that stood above the
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interparty conflicts. H e regarded the thir d option as intriguing, feeling that it
would constitute the best defense against the CDU/CSU attacks, yet overall un-
feasible because the SPD’ s position up to this point was that of an opposition
party. Against Heine, and in face of the realization in early 1957 that the CDU/
CSU was going to r un a campaign less with “ argumentation than with atmo-
sphere” and really “throw down the gauntlet” with an aggr essive campaign, the
Bezirkssekretär (regional party leaders) pushed for a mor e “factual” campaign.100
This tone for the election campaign, centered upon the slogan “Security for all”
was confirmed a few days later by Ollenhauer and the executive committee.101
Meanwhile, the ongoing r eform of the SPD economic pr ogram had been
growing since the early 1950s. It was becoming increasingly clear among many of
the party reformers that the SPD’s program must be adjusted to changing eco-
nomic and social conditions—especially the apparent success of the social market
economy. By 1957 the SPD was not calling for the socialization of the economy
on a broad scale. Instead, its official program had been transforming since Schu-
macher’s death in 1952. The Dortmund Action Program of September 1952 re-
vealed shifts in the par ty’s ideological positions to ward competition, mar ket
mechanisms, and consumer choice, while at the same time r etaining the party’s
social and humane concerns. The program called for improved living standards,
increased production, full emplo yment, and the just distribution of the social
product. Although the party still identified as one of its goals limited socialization
and planning of elements of the economy—such as the nationalization of the coal
and steel industries, some governmental direction of investments, and the intro-
duction of codetermination in industr y—there were now rumblings of “echter
Leistungswettbewerb” (true competition) where suitable. By no means did the pro-
gram accept Erhard’s social market economy, describing it as the “capitalist law of
the jungle,” but it did acknowledge the need for competition within a Social De-
mocratic economy.102 This evolving and more pragmatic position was exemplified
by the slogan of the leading SPD economist, Karl Schiller: “Competition as much
as possible, planning as much as necessar y.”103 Pointing out that as consumers,
workers had a substantial inter est in true competition among business firms r e-
sulting in lower prices, he became the strongest advocate for reforming the SPD’s
economic program toward a more market-oriented position. 
Reformers had been expanding their voice in the party since the SPD’s defeat
in the 1953 election, especially on local and regional levels. The reformers realized
that because anything smacking of state and bureaucratic controls had been dis-
credited by the experience of the postwar years and developments in the East, the
party should formulate ne w ideas about how to regulate the free market. There
were many disagreements, however, as to what type of market-oriented socialism
the party should advocate and how that might alienate some of their cor e sup-
porters who were attuned to more class-warfare rhetoric. Some reformers felt un-
easy about accepting elements of the fr ee market, fearing the par ty was losing
touch with its fundamental principles. They stressed that the social considerations
of the economy must r emain the focus and that the par ty had to r etain subtle
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means of steering the economy and redistributing wealth. In addition, the party
found itself facing the risk that any of its critiques of the fr ee market would be
painted by the CDU/CSU as the SPD’ s dredging up old concepts of the con-
trolled economy. In addition, some of the party’s older guard, such as Ernst Nölt-
ing and Victor Agartz, continued to push the SPD’ s 1953 campaign plans for
socialization of heavy industry.104
Despite intraparty discord, the elements of reform were incorporated into the
election campaign. The party’s platform for the 1957 election, put forth at the 16
June “election congress” held at Dortmund, recognized the existence of a “G er-
man economic miracle,” but stated that it had benefited only a small section of
society. The rise in prices had undermined the advances made by the bulk of so-
ciety. Nevertheless, the SPD attacked the idea of price ceilings as means of con-
trolling prices. I nstead, the impor tation of goods should be balanced with the
exports so that prices could stabiliz e. In addition, it renounced state controls of
the economy and supported a form of the free market by proclaiming: 
We Social Democrats demand free economic development, free competition, and priv ate
property conscious of its r esponsibilities to the common good. Car tels, monopolies, and
market dominating industrial groups are to be prevented from misusing their supremacy to
the disadvantage of weaker groups. . . . Our free society must be protected from controlled
economy measures.105
Yet, the SPD sometimes still gave the impression that it saw socialization as a
party objective—for instance in a pamphlet published b y Willi Eichler in April
1957 that stated that socialization remained a goal of the SPD. The confusion was
exacerbated by the fact that Eichler actually was one of the party’s leading reform-
ers and chair ed the committee that had pr oduced the 1952 D ortmund Action
Program.106 Overall, the SPD tried to do wnplay its M arxist roots in the cam-
paign. In his analysis of the 1957 campaign, the political scientist U. W. Kitzinger
has pointed out that the party wished to cleanse itself of any ideological taint and
portray itself as an unr evolutionary, trustworthy, and r espectable organization.
However, the perceived revolutionary legacy of the par ty’s past was not easy to
overcome. To most of the public, the party did not represent a political force that
had struggled for social justice or resisted the Nazis with much of the party lead-
ership having spent the y ears of the Third Reich in exile or languishing in con-
centration camps. Rather, to much of the electorate the party was seen as speaking
only for the working class, organized by functionaries and bureaucrats, and act-
ing as a dangerous and unreliable element in the midst of Cold War tensions. This
assessment was due in no small par t to the harsh inv ective directed against the
party since 1945 by the CDU/CSU.107
Because much of the electorate divided itself betw een the socialist and bour-
geois camps, the group that the SPD identified as a potential “swing” vote was rel-
atively small. S ince the SPD’s polling r esearch indicated that in this gr oup was
mainly members of the middle-class, most of the pr opaganda on economics at-
tempted to refer to more middle-class prerogatives. But this was a group that the
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party had no means of attracting because of the indeterminate and unsettled state
of the party’s ideology. From this perspective, the party program was still an im-
portant factor in the 1957 election campaign, if only because the SPD’s program
and propaganda seemed so disconnected, or at least cr eated a picture that was a
bit unclear. In contrast, the CDU/CSU’s image was unified, and perhaps mor e
importantly, coherent. It presented a worldview to the voter that seemed under-
standable and attractive to the segment of the population it wooed. 
Undoubtedly, the SPD updated much of its pr opaganda by using more visu-
ally appealing illustrated magazines developed by professional advertisers to sup-
plement traditional materials. F or example, the par ty distributed 9.2 million
copies of the magazine Illus.108 Each of the publication’s four editions displayed a
cover depicting happy children or attractive young women and incorporated ar-
ticles and pictures attacking the CDU/CSU for rearmament, the threat of atomic
war, and failure to achieve unification. All the magazines sought to constr uct a
more statesmanlike image around Ollenhauer by portraying him with Eisenhower,
to promote SPD proposals for constructing more social housing, and generally to
showcase the successes of SPD leadership in some of the individual states. As in
earlier campaigns, the SPD tried to hammer the CDU/CSU on the issue of in-
creasing prices. B ut in comparison to pr opaganda from earlier campaigns, the
people depicted were not so distinctly working-class. Instead the characters por-
trayed in the ads’ pictures were clearly middle-class, or the text spoke to the dan-
gers facing economic gains made in the recent years. Rather than merely harping
on the rising costs of basic goods, such as food, the SPD also no w accused the
CDU/CSU of maintaining the high prices of luxury goods such as refrigerators by
forbearing to break up monopolies that controlled their prices. (Illustration 6.10)
In a series of pamphlets meant to exploit West German fears of economic de-
velopments, the SPD again por trayed people who were clearly from the middle
class. The fold-out brochure proclaimed, “Sie stehen im Mittelpunkt” (You are the
focus), while explaining that the consumer was the center of the economy (Illus-
tration 6.11). According to the brochure, the CDU/CSU had allo wed prices to
rise and large industry to garner more and more power. Like in the magazine Illus,
this brochure attacked the CDU/CSU for increasing prices by taxing relative lux-
ury goods such as cigarettes, coffee, and liquor. By 1957 the SPD was so much on
the defensive that it had to admit that living standar ds had risen considerably
since the currency reform, but it attempted to attribute this economic success to
sources other than E rhard and the CDU/CSU. The brochure commented,
“Thanks to the willingness to work and the skill of our workers, white collar em-
ployees, technicians, and salesmen many people in the F ederal Republic have a
welcomed a high standard of living.” In the SPD’s view the CDU/CSU was not
helping the consumer with its seemingly weak actions against cartels.109 But this
was a difficult position to defend, especially considering the r esonance that Er-
hard possessed as the “minister of the consumer.” Given the increased prosperity
enjoyed by many West Germans, one has to wonder if the SPD’s message was re-
ally hitting the mark. 
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Overall, Kitzinger was corr ect in his analysis of the 1957 election campaign:
the political product the SPD had to sell put the party between a rock and a hard
place. It needed to please both its party membership and the electorate as a whole,
even as financial constraints and the par ty’s organizational structure limited the
SPD even further in the type of campaign it could run. The CDU/CSU was not
dependent upon its party membership for the vast majority of the contributions
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to fund the party. Therefore, the party leadership was free to devise its own cam-
paign strategy, attempting to corral the undecided voters instead of just speaking
to groups that made up the rock-solid CDU/CSU support. In contrast, the SPD
could not abandon its mostly wor king-class membership because much of its
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funding was drawn fr om party contributions by its members, people who w ere
close to the par ty’s Marxist roots.110 The tone of the campaign r esembled the
party itself: sterile, a bit confused, divided, and filled with half measur es—an
image of the party that the CDU/CSU itself was trying to create.
With these failings in campaigning the party opened itself to the onslaughts of
the CDU/CSU. Since the party was beholden to its wor king class members, its
propaganda did not effectively appeal to the crucial “swing vote” by coming out
clearly and str ongly in fav or of the fr ee market. Although the electorate might
have harbored a sense of insecurity about its economic futur e, the SPD was un-
able to project itself strongly enough to shift people from the bourgeois to the so-
cialist camp, especially when the par ty image seemed confused or incoher ent.
This comparative weakness of the SPD was further exploited by the CDU/CSU,
with its emphasis upon security and stability as personified by Adenauer and his
team. Overall, the SPD, unlike the CDU/CSU, failed to frame and define the is-
sues of the campaign to its o wn advantage, especially in r egard to security and
economics, and was constantly kept on the defensive by the CDU/CSU. The So-
cial Democrats had not yet come to grips with the reality that political campaigns
revolve around the image and mood surr ounding the campaign, as much as ra-
tionally based appeals to the electorate—an aspect of campaigning that the CDU/
CSU had mastered. 
Clearly, the matter of funding was also central to this issue of campaigning
styles. The CDU/CSU and its parallel campaigns had financial r esources far ex-
ceeding what the SPD could contribute to the campaign. While the SPD was
mostly supported by party membership, income from business enterprises, espe-
cially newspapers, and special election contributions from individuals and firms,
the CDU/CSU enjoyed a much larger income stream. The CDU/CSU’s money
was funneled in fr om primarily business sour ces through the system of Förder-
gesellschaften (promotional associations) dev eloped for the 1953 campaign and
through civic associations developed after the 1954 tax-law change that allo wed
firms to deduct party contributions from their taxable income. Unlike the earlier
Fördergesellschaften, the civic associations could devote all of their income to po-
litical par ties and w ere used par ticularly to suppor t bourgeois par ties’ federal
headquarters. Although firms did not gain any tax adv antage by using these or-
ganizations since businesses could now make direct, tax-deductible contributions
to parties, they decided to continue channeling funds thr ough the promotional
and civic associations in par t because they helped to shield their books fr om
probing eyes trying to detect any contributions going to particular parties.111
It is almost impossible to say exactly how much was spent in favor of the CDU/
CSU, especially in light of the v ast amount expended on parallel campaigns.
Nevertheless, a few comparisons can be made to convey an idea of the differences
in expenditures. For example, Kitzinger estimated that the central par ty head-
quarters of the CDU spent about DM 6.7 to 7 million specifically on propaganda
materials for the 1957 election. 112 This appears about right in light of ar chival
sources. In addition, the central party spent about another DM 7 to 9 million on
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related expenses and upkeep of the national-level party.113 In comparison, the SPD
executive committee expended a little over DM 4 million. But costs incurred by
the executive committee constituted only about half of the SPD’ s expenses.
Kitzinger estimated that about another DM 4 million was spent b y the SPD’s
local and regional organizations, raising the SPD’s total outlay to a grand total of
about DM 8 million. In comparison, the CDU/CSU’s national-level costs were
only the tip of the iceberg compared to its campaign’s total expenses. Kitzinger es-
timated that the CDU/CSU spent, in addition to the approximate DM 13 to 16
million at the national lev el, about DM 12 million at the r egional and district
party levels—which, as money generated by the state promotional and civic asso-
ciations, often r epresented dir ect contributions to individual candidates fr om
local businesses (estimates are that the CDU/CSU at its various levels received in
total DM 15 million fr om the civic and pr omotional associations). Altogether,
Kitzinger calculated, the CDU/CSU itself spent about DM 25–30 million on the
campaign, much of it in an intense rush of advertising in the final weeks before the
election. This figure exceeds by a factor of three or four what the SPD spent.114
Beyond the union parties, a vast web of propaganda campaigns worked on the
government’s behalf, including the actions of the Federal Press Agency, Adenauer’s
election train, and the Arbeitsgemeinschaft demokratischen Kreise. Kitzinger es-
timated the combined costs of the CDU/CSU and parallel campaigns, outside of
the government’s propaganda work for the first nine months of 1957 and its nor-
mal public relations activities, at about DM 30–35 million. 115 Overall, in areas
where we can check, Kitzinger’s numbers appear to be roughly correct. In terms
of Die Waage’s costs, Kitzinger estimated that they should have amounted to ap-
proximately DM 1.5 million, which was about Die Waage’s internal estimation of
its costs.116 It might not be cavalier to take Kitzinger’s overall estimates of the par-
allel campaigns as approximately correct. The exact figures might be disputable,
but the o verall picture is clear: the gap betw een CDU/CSU and SPD election
campaign spending was enormous. Also important is not only that the CDU/CSU
had far more money to spend on the campaign in comparison to the SPD, but
that it benefited from a web of organizations that could share information among
themselves. Public opinion survey results could be transferred among the CDU/
CSU, the Federal Press Agency, and the ADK, and moreover many of the surveys
were commissioned for by the Federal Press Agency in the first place. As a conse-
quence of the coordination of these organizations, their propaganda was mutually
supportive and generated a coherent picture of Adenauer and the CDU/CSU.
The SPD’s failure in the 1957 Bundestag election resulted in a reform of the
party’s propaganda efforts that paralleled the programmatic reform leading to the
historic Bad Godesberg Program.117 In the autumn of 1957, after the party’s crush-
ing electoral defeat, v oices at various levels within the SPD put for th proposals
calling for the impr ovement of the par ty’s propaganda efforts. One report dis-
cussing possible advertising strategies suggested a dramatic change in the tone and
style of the SPD’s campaign. As it noted: “The last election has clearly shown with
the reshuffling and changing of opinion before the election how little the politi-
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cal attitudes and decisions of the v oters are influenced by real political develop-
ments and common ideas on these dev elopments.118 Clearly the SPD’s attitude
toward the electorate was in the process of evolving, at least within certain circles.
The task of the par ty was elaborated, “ We should place an emphasis of our ad-
vertisement and propaganda for the broad groups of voters not upon political in-
formation and influence, but instead all energy in the next four y ears should be
employed for the creation of solid good will.”119 An important element in the cre-
ation of this “ good will” was the application of modern public r elations tech-
niques. The stereotype of the SPD as purely a worker party had to be changed if
the party was to achieve success. 
Part of this change in the SPD’s attitude toward the electorate was an effort to
popularize the par ty itself. One report admitted that the SPD faced tough ne w
challenges: “The party must find ne w ways and means to talk clearly about the
ideas of social democracy to groups alienated from the party.” An important ele-
ment in this popularization of the SPD, the r eport concluded, was the use of
“modern social science.” This included more intensive use of public opinion poll-
ing, particularly research on the “motives” of the voters.120 Other post-election re-
ports called for the modernization of the par ty’s advertising methods. The SPD
leadership went on to call for the mor e effective use of advertising professionals
along with the application of public opinion research.121 Some letters sent to the
campaign manager, Fritz Heine, even suggested that the SPD borrow advertising
techniques from Die Waage. In order to achieve “good will” with the electorate,
SPD party leaders were clamoring to revamp the technical aspects of the par ty’s
campaigning. 
Like the road to reforming the par ty’s platform, this transition was not easy .
The conflict between the par ty’s old and ne w elements clearly sur faced in a 31
January 1958 meeting of the Advertising and Propaganda Committee. Commit-
tee members complained that not enough had been done in the pr evious twelve
years to update the party’s campaigning techniques with an eye toward advertis-
ing, collecting polling data, and tracking the psychology of the voters. The intense
competition among the parties, argued one committee member, demanded that
the methods of commercial advertising be applied to political advertising. In fact,
he argued, the techniques of commercial advertising and political advertising were
not so different. He asked: “What do we want with our propaganda? We want to
sell ideas, a program, not to bring tangible things to people. We must familiarize
ourselves with it [commercial advertising]. We must build trust for our program,
for our ideas, and for our people.”122
In contrast, Fritz Heine, the old campaign leader from the Weimar Republic,
appeared resistant to such changes. He was fearful of the influence that the “econ-
omy” would have on the politics of the party. He commented, “The political lead-
ership of the party can never allow decisions to be taken out its hands, or wher e
the accent of the party would be placed.” He pointed out that much that was po-
litically necessary might not lend itself to good propaganda. Undeterred by the at-
tacks of the y oung reformers, he thought that the A dvertising and Propaganda
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Committee could exert a greater influence upon the party’s executive committee
in the future if it formulated a clear concept for the par ty’s propaganda for the
next election.123 This was one salvo between the party’s old and new guards in a
battle that continued to rage in the future. 
Over the next few years much of the SPD’s older leadership was jettisoned in
favor of more vibrant, energetic personalities. The 1957 election would be Heine’s
last national election as the party’s campaign manager. To many reformers within
the party, Heine as head of the A dvertising and Propaganda Committee r epre-
sented the inflexibility of the party’s encrusted leadership in Bonn that kept new
ideas from percolating through the organization and guaranteed defeat at the bal-
lot box. After the crushing 1957 defeat, local party organizations complained that
the election propaganda was inadequate and began calling for the removal of Heine
from his position.124 One resolution from the district of Weser Ems stated that
the SPD’s propaganda no longer spoke to the working population because it was
too academic, and that adv ertising professionals must r evamp the par ty’s ap-
peals.125 The SPD organization of B aden-Württemberg complained that the
party had to work harder to change voters’ perceptions of the party. It presented
a litany of complaints, including the campaign ’s focus on Ollenhauer at the ex-
pense of other party leaders, the party leaders’ scaring away of bourgeois voters by
using the term “ comrade” ( Genosse), and the par ty’s inability to defend itself
against charges that it favored socialization throughout the economy.126
At the next SPD party congress in 1958 in Stuttgart, Heine was not reelected
to the party’s executive committee.127 In May 1959, Waldemar von Knöringen, a
reformer who had acted as the Advertising and Propaganda Committee’s public-
opinion polling exper t, was named to head the committee. I n November 1959
the party put forth the Bad Godesberg Program, in which the SPD accepted the
free market, albeit with social underpinnings. For the next Bundestag election in
1961, the SPD picked up on campaign techniques used b y the CDU/CSU, es-
pecially the concentration on vibrant personalities to represent the party. In fact,
the emphasis upon party personalities began as early as the 1958 city elections in
West Berlin. In this campaign, Willy Brandt was placed in the “center of the en-
tire campaign” and depicted as independent of the SPD party machine. Because
Brandt sent his main campaign manager , Klaus Schültz, to the U nited States to
observe the Kennedy/Nixon campaign, Brandt’s autumn 1961 campaign for chan-
cellor almost exactly duplicated K ennedy’s presidential campaign.128 This rising
political star would become vice-chancellor in the grand coalition of the CDU/
CSU and SPD betw een 1966 and 1969 and finally would lead the SPD into
forming a government in 1969.
With 50.2 percent of the vote, the 1957 election the CDU/CSU reached the
apex of its power. For its broad success, the par ty relied upon appeals that dr ew
heavily upon the image of the economic miracle. West Germany’s maturing eco-
nomic reconstruction and expansion w ere integral aspects of the par ty’s image
which was center ed on security , stability, and capable leadership that pr ovided
West Germans with new levels of consumerism. At the same time the cultural and
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religious elements featur ed more prominently in earlier campaigns became in-
creasingly muted. Polls after the election bear out this vie w. A DIVO poll indi-
cated 23 percent of those who voted for the CDU/CSU viewed “satisfaction with
material prosperity and the economic upswing” as the most important reason to
vote for the party—up from 19 percent in 1953. Economic success was at the top
of the list, while 22 per cent of CDU/CSU voters were satisfied with the par ty’s
policies overall and 9 percent expressed trust in Adenauer. Meanwhile, the “Chris-
tian character” of the party as the most important reason voters chose the CDU/
CSU decreased from 21 percent in 1953 to 16 percent of respondents in 1957.129
The party successfully targeted women: 54 percent of women voted for the CDU/
CSU in 1957, up fr om 47.2 per cent in 1953. I n addition, this election ’s high
turnout of 87.8 percent of eligible voters compared to earlier Bundestag elections
and especially state elections benefited the CDU/CSU, particularly at the expense
of the smaller parties. 
As this chapter has shown, a well-oiled publicity machine employing modern
political advertising and polling techniques gave the CDU/CSU an enormous ad-
vantage over its rivals, motivating voters to get out and cast their ballots for the
CDU/CSU. With the apparent diplomatic and economic successes of Adenauer’s
government, the party successfully created and sold an image of itself focused on
the party’s leadership, especially Adenauer’s, and of West Germany prosperity. In
contrast, defeat in the 1957 campaign for ced the transformation of both the
SPD’s propaganda techniques and its platform, demonstrating that in its most
bitter defeat the seeds of the party’s later successes were planted. In addition, the
SPD’s reform pushed the West German party system along its inexorable path to-
ward the middle, wher e consensus no w emerged in r egard to the fundamental
form of the West German political economy.
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Their decisive victory in the 1957 Bundestag election catapulted Adenauer and
the CDU/CSU to the zenith of their power. Neither before nor since has a single
party in the F ederal Republic of Germany achieved a majority of the v ote. Yet, 
almost immediately after their gr eatest triumph, Adenauer and his par ty began
experiencing a slow decline. Adenauer’s failed bid for West Germany’s presidency
in late spring 1959, undermined in part by his reluctance to allow Erhard to suc-
ceed him in the chancellorship , underscored the gr owing divisions within the
CDU/CSU. The party had gr own overly dependent upon A denauer, who was
now weakening politically, as both a focal point in election campaigns and as
leader within the party. The autumn 1962 Der Spiegel affair, in which Adenauer
had the members of the magazine’s editorial staff arrested after they published an
article critical of the government’s defense policy, spelled the beginning of the end
for Adenauer. Ludwig Erhard, assuming Adenauer’s mantle in 1963, was charis-
matic and popular as the so-called father of the economic miracle, but he did not
possess Adenauer’s aura of authority and political ability to maintain discipline
within his party and the parliamentary system. His chancellorship lasted until only
1966—to be r eplaced by something unthinkable during the A denauer era, a
grand coalition between the CDU/CSU and SPD that lasted until 1969. Adding
to the par ty’s problems, the consolidation of the West German political system
during the 1960s did not exclusively favor the CDU/CSU. By 1961, the SPD had
altered its campaigning and platform strategies, succeeded in picking up v otes
from the smaller parties, and begun to gain on the CDU/CSU—resulting in Willy
Brandt’s ascendancy to the chancellorship in 1969.1
After its crushing 1957 electoral defeat, the SPD hastened the pace of its often
painful reform. Following the election, the par ty leadership came under sharp 
Notes for this section begin on page 261.
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attack from local party leaders. Within the next few years much of the older lead-
ership was voted down in favor of younger, charismatic, and more regionally based
politicians who were not beholden to the par ty apparatus and sought to r eform
the party—including Willy Brandt, Fritz Erler, Helmut Schmidt, and H erbert
Wehner. At the 1958 par ty congress in S tuttgart, several representatives of the
party’s old guard were not reelected to the executive board, signaling some of the
larger changes that were in the offing. 
On 13 November 1959 a special party congress was convened in the Bonn sub-
urb of Bad Godesberg to adopt the SPD’s new basic program. Perhaps most strik-
ing about the program statement was what it did not contain, most notably any
mention of M arx or a har d and fast ideological commitment. The section dis-
cussing economics made no mention of socialization, although it included some
reference to “public ownership” as “appropriate and necessary” when “sound eco-
nomic power relations cannot be guaranteed b y other means.” The Bad Godes-
berg Program accepted many basic elements of the fr ee market, including fr ee
competition, consumer choice, and fr ee initiative on the par t of entr epreneurs.
Overall, the document signified the SPD’s retreat from ideological battle with the
bourgeois parties; now it advocated a more just and equitable distribution of the
nation’s wealth instead of class conflict. M ost impor tantly perhaps, the B ad
Godesberg Program altered the public image of the SPD and helped transform
the party into a Volkspartei (catch-all party).2 Clearly, the program reacted to an
ongoing shift in public opinion toward the free market. One July 1960 survey in-
dicated that 61 percent of respondents favored the free market over some form of
socialization (7 per cent) or combination of the two systems (8 per cent).3 The
SPD’s niche “sub-culture” of primarily working-class constituents began dissolv-
ing, and in the 1960s the par ty succeeded in attracting suppor t from a broader
range of West German society, particularly from members of the middle class. 
The combined growth of the CDU/CSU and the SPD in the 1950s and 1960s
signaled the emergence of the party system that would dominate the Federal Re-
public until the growth of the Green Party in the late 1970s and early 1980s and
the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. In this system, the parties of the middle, con-
sisting of the CDU/CSU, SPD, and FDP, controlled the political landscape as the
extremist and splinter par ties disappeared.4 This volume has sho wn that the
CDU/CSU was successful in constructing and selling a political meaning of the
economic miracle and the social mar ket economy over the course of the 1950s.
Utilizing economics as a major issue, the par ty formed and pr ojected a par ty
image that effectively attracted votes from varied sociological groups within West
Germany. As a consequence, the CDU/CSU became the Federal Republic’s first
“catch-all” par ty, crossing cultural, r egional, and class lines. The cr eation of a
party that broke down Weimar voting patterns—an approach copied by the SPD
in the 1960s—was crucial to the development of West Germany’s political party
system. The construction of broader “catch-all” parties proved to be a crucial dif-
ference between Weimar’s unstable party system and the stable democracy of the
Federal Republic of Germany. 
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This more stable par ty system, anchor ed by broad-based par ties, was in no
small part the product of the adoption and implementation of American political
campaigning styles, advertising techniques, and public opinion polling. Through-
out the 1950s, the SPD consistently fared better in Land (state) elections than at
the national level. The SPD’s large membership played an important role in this
success, as the party could mobilize its faithful to go to the polls in Land elections,
where turnout tended to be lo wer than in federal elections. I n contrast, the
CDU/CSU achieved relatively more success on the national stage than in Land
elections. With its new propaganda techniques, the CDU/CSU was able to con-
struct and sell the image of its political products, namely Adenauer, Erhard, and
the economic miracle, to specific sociological gr oups within the Federal Repub-
lic and draw these groups to the polls, thereby maximizing the party’s success at
the ballot box. In conjunction with the utilization of these new techniques, there
emerged an orchestrated network of pro-Adenauer and pro-government propa-
ganda organizations that helped produce a coherent conservative message. While
adopting the most up-to-date adv ertising and polling techniques av ailable, the
CDU/CSU eschewed issuing mer ely dogmatic, ideological pr ogram statements
that appealed to the party’s most faithful members and a narrow segment of soci-
ety. Rather, the CDU/CSU car efully modified and dir ected its appeals to key
groups of swing voters—especially women and less religious voters. Without their
support, Adenauer’s goal of molding the CDU/CSU into a true Volkspartei would
not have been achieved. With their emphasis upon the creation and transmission
of an appealing party image, West German election campaigns revolved less and
less around ideological conflict. In many respects, this change constituted a “con-
sumerization” of West German politics during the 1950s as politics and par ties
were increasingly viewed as products to be sold to consumers whose tastes w ere
carefully researched. 
By minimizing cultural and r eligious issues in the 1950s campaign and es-
pousing a clear conception of a West German society incr easingly based upon 
rising consumerism and materialism, the CDU/CSU’s campaigning appeared, on
the surface, less ideological, par ticularly in comparison to the 1949 campaign.
During the 1950s campaigns, the party no longer pushed an ideological concep-
tion of a morally and physically r econstructed Christian community, as it had
done in 1949. Instead, the party offered a harmonious vision of West German so-
ciety that appeared to be above crass party politics and promised to supplant older
cultural, regional, and class conflicts that had traditionally beset German politics.
Consumerism was portrayed not only as satisfying individualistic desires but also
as representing the very legitimacy of this new state. However, the selling of the
economic miracle possessed an underlying ideological component that lent con-
siderable political power to conservative forces in West Germany. A mythological
narrative of a materially abundant West Germany allowed Adenauer, Erhard, and
the CDU/CSU to claim that they were creating something new without pushing
the electorate to confront Germany’s recent past. The beginning of their story was
not the Nazi era, but rather the aftermath of war, the destruction and despair of
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the immediate postwar years, and the miraculous rebirth engendered by the leg-
endary 1948 currency reform. The vision of a “phoenix rising out of the ashes ”
and the ensuing prosperity did not generate uncomfortable memories or doubts
regarding who the West Germans were or what their nation was built upon—sen-
timents election campaigners would in no way want to evoke. Instead, this posi-
tive vision encouraged West Germans to silence painful and discomfor ting
memories of the Third Reich and the immediate postwar years while also helping
them to create new memories of economic r econstruction for concrete political
purposes. In the process of glorifying the economic miracle, conservative propa-
ganda effor ts r efashioned the concept of consumerism fr om something pr evi-
ously seen as alien and un-G erman into a fundamental aspect of the West
German sense of nationhood.
Inherent in Adenauer’s and the CDU/CSU’s political messages were concep-
tions of how the West German democracy was to work and how its society should
be organized. “Adenauer and his team ” were to watch paternalistically o ver the
West German electorate, while, implicitly, the electorate should passiv ely enjoy
the physical and mental security of the chancellor ’s leadership and the material
comforts of consumerism. In many respects, Adenauer’s vision jibed well with the
views of the party’s main pollster, Elisabeth Noelle Neumann, regarding the ap-
propriate role that polling should play in a democracy . It constituted a tool to
help leaders monitor, control, and dampen the dangerous impulses of the masses.
The party’s propaganda reinforced this passive conception of politics and social
harmony. Despite the change in ideological underpinnings—from Christian anti-
materialism based upon the social mar ket economy to the embrace of individu-
alistic consumerism—the par ty’s conceptions of men and women assuming
prescribed roles as female consumers and male pr oducers within a well-ordered,
tranquil society remained constant throughout the 1950s. The same could be said
of Die Waage’s conception of a harmonious relationship between employees and
employers that created and distributed the fruits of the social market economy. 
During these years, Die Waage and the CDU/CSU successfully sold this vision
of economic and social reconstruction to an electorate exhausted and alienated by
the upheaval of a repressive regime, total war, and utter defeat. Economic propa-
ganda not only molded the West Germans’ conceptions of themselves and their
society, but also was crucial in the construction of a passive, if not stable, democ-
racy that was based in consensus where, apart from duly casting votes, economic
productivity and consumer choice wer e the paramount obligations of civic par-
ticipation. Many studies fr om the late 1950s and early 1960s demonstrated all
too well that West German citizens were more than willing to take on a passive role
in their new republic.5 Clearly it would take the social and cultural movements of
the 1960s and 1970s to generate a citiz enship that more actively engaged in the
political process and fully embraced individual civil liberties.6
In light of G ermany’s Nazi past, A denauer and the CDU/CSU’ s top-down,
somewhat authoritarian view of a controlled, submissive electorate is clearly trou-
bling, but in some important respects their vision did help establish the structures
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of the F ederal Republic’s democracy. Diethelm Prowe has argued that the r eal
“miracle” of the 1950s was not economic, but instead political—especially in
light of West Germany’s establishment of a democratic society within a generation
after the war. He identified the conser vative Adenauer-Erhard era as laying the
foundation of a democratic West Germany, despite the claims of the “New Left”
of the 1968 generation that West Germany did not experience a revolutionary pe-
riod immediately following the war that transformed its society and institutions.
Prowe suggested that the synthesis between the influence of Americanization and
the conservatives’ reintegration into West German society helped create a new sta-
ble environment that allo wed this democratic society to take r oot and gr ow.
American economic and diplomatic policies, such as militar y protection against
communism and Marshall Plan aid, fostered security, economic growth, and so-
cial stability, while simultaneously American demands for democratization cur-
tailed the resurgence of more strident and dangerous authoritarian traditions in
West Germany. This synthesis of Americanization and conser vative r eintegra-
tion, Prowe argued, allo wed West Germans “to distance themselv es from their
past without facing questions over the culpability of traditional G erman society
for the Nazi crimes. They could don the dress of Western democratic institutions
and American-style fr ee enterprise without disturbing familiar G erman social
structures. Germans could take ownership of democracy without the memory of
an antidemocratic past when G ermanness had been defined in opposition to
Western Enlightenment individualism.”7
As this work has shown, the Americanization of West Germany manifested it-
self not only in formal political and economic r elations and the impor tation of
American mass cultur e. In addition, its influence r evealed itself in v ery subtle
ways, many times beyond the conscious purview of the West German public. The
introduction of an American conception of electoral politics played a vital role in
the conservative creation of a democratic West Germany. Confronted with new
political conditions, conser vative for ces quickly adapted themselv es to a cam-
paigning style that was increasingly focused on the opinions and attitudes of the
electorate in order to construct a broad-based anti-Marxist party. The American
influence in politics did not necessarily completely clear away the debris of older,
German political attitudes and practices, although it undoubtedly helped trans-
form Weimar traditions into a mor e viable political system. I nstead, the impor-
tation of American campaigning techniques blended with older German practices
during the 1950s to produce a uniquely West German, democratic political cul-
ture that both looked to the past and searched overseas for its models.
In postwar democracies public opinion and modern political adv ertising
proved to be effectiv e means for sounding out the electorate and pr ojecting the
image of a political party that adopted these techniques. The CDU/CSU was the
party most successful in adopting polling and advertising efficiencies, allowing its
campaigns to target specific segments of the electorate. B ut fundamentally, the
party had to possess a product to sell. In West Germany, as in the United States,
the most successful campaign tactic was to sell a figure who personified a party’s
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image rather than a par ty platform or pr ogram. In the mar ketplace of political
personalities, the CDU/CSU possessed two powerful products in Adenauer and
Erhard, figures who by the second half of the 1950s had come to r epresent sta-
bility and economic pr osperity to the West German electorate. Until the 1961
campaign, the SPD possessed no such political assets. I t would take the SPD a
decade to realize its situation, abandon its commitment to a rigid party program,
and craft a product of such quality in the form ofWilly Brandt. Only then would
the real challenge to Bonn ’s political stability be posed and successfully met—
namely, the peaceful transfer of power. 
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